CJEU - C-78/18 - Commission v Hungary (Opinion of AG Campos): Difference between revisions

From GDPRhub
(Created page with "{{CJEUdecisionBOX <!--Information about the decision--> |Case_Number_Name=6 Ob91/19d |ECLI=ECLI:AT:OGH0002:2019:0060OB00091.19D.0523.000 |Opinion_Link= |Judgement_Link=http:...")
 
No edit summary
Line 2: Line 2:


<!--Information about the decision-->
<!--Information about the decision-->
|Case_Number_Name=6 Ob91/19d
|Case_Number_Name=C-78/18
|ECLI=ECLI:AT:OGH0002:2019:0060OB00091.19D.0523.000
|ECLI=ECLI:EU:C:2020:1


|Opinion_Link=
|Opinion_Link=
|Judgement_Link=http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=218462&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=875890/
|Judgement_Link=http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=218462&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=875890/


|Date_Decided=21. 5. 2018
|Date_Decided=14. 2. 2020
|Year=2018
|Year=2020


<!--Information about the applied law-->
<!--Information about the applied law-->
Line 54: Line 54:


|EU_Law_Name_1= Article 5(3) ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC
|EU_Law_Name_1= Article 5(3) ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC
|EU_Law_Link_1= https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32009L0136
|EU_Law_Link_1= http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=fr&td=ALL&num=C-78/18
|EU_Law_Name_2=
|EU_Law_Name_2=
|EU_Law_Link_2=
|EU_Law_Link_2=
Line 72: Line 72:
|EU_Law_Link_9=
|EU_Law_Link_9=
|EU_Law_Name_10=
|EU_Law_Name_10=
|EU_Law_Link_10=
|EU_Law_Link_10=http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=222223&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=6797446
|EU_Law_Name_11=
|EU_Law_Name_11=
|EU_Law_Link_11=
|EU_Law_Link_11=
Line 147: Line 147:


<!--Information about a possible appeal-->
<!--Information about a possible appeal-->
|Reference_Body=BGH (Germany)
|Reference_Body=
|Reference_Case_Number_Name=
|Reference_Case_Number_Name=
|
|
}}On 1 October 2019 the Court decided on the Planet49-case. The decision concerns the legal framework applicable to cookies and user consent.
}}The Advocate General Campos Sanchez-Bordona considered that the restriction imposed by Hungary on the financing of civil organisation from abroad are not compatible with the free movement of capitals provisions and the Charter. He proposed that the Court of Justice should declare that the legislation at issue unduly restricts the free movement of capital, in that it includes provisions which amount to unjustified interference with the fundamental rights of respect for private life, protection of personal data and freedom of association protected by the Charter.
==English Summary==
==English Summary==
===Facts===
===Facts - Curia's press release===
A German company called Planet49 organized an online lottery hosted on their webpage. In order to participate in the lottery the participant had to enter a name and an address. Underneath the input field there were two checkboxes. The first checkbox required the user to accept being contacted by firms for promotional offers. The second checkbox required the user to consent to cookies being installed on the participants computer. The first checkbox was not pre-ticked, while the second checkbox was. To participate in the lottery the user had to tick, at least, the first checkbox.
In 2017, Hungary adopted a lawin order to ensure transparency incivilorganisationsthat receivedonationsfrom  abroad. Under  that  law, suchorganisationsmustregister  withthe  Hungarian authorities as‘organisationsin receipt ofsupport from abroad’where the amount of the donations they  have  received  in  a  given  yearreaches  a  certain  threshold. When  registering, those organisations  also  have  to indicatethename  of donorswhose  supportreaches  or  exceeds 500000 Hungarian  forints  (HUF)(approximately€1500) and  the  exact  amount  of  thesupport. That informationis  later  published  on  a free, publicly  accessiblee-platform. In  addition, the  civil organisations concerned must indicate on their home pages and in their publications that they are an ‘organisationin receipt ofsupport from abroad’. The Commission brought an action for failure to fulfil obligations against Hungary before the Court of  Justice. It  claims  that  the  law  on the transparency of  civil organisations financed from  abroad infringes  both the principle  of  free movement  ofcapital and a  number  of rights  protected  by  the Charter of Fundamental Rights of  the EuropeanUnion  (‘the Charter’): the  right  to  respect  for private life, to protection of personal data, and to freedom of association.
===The opinion of the Advocate General ===
The Advocate General  Manuel  Campos Sánchez-Bordona takes  the  view  that  the transfer  of  a donationfrom  abroad  in favour of  a  Hungarian  civil organisationisa  movement  of capital. In  Hungary,  that movement  of  capitalis  subject  to  conditions such  as  the obligation imposed  on  certain  civil organisations to register  as ‘organisationsin  receipt  of support  from abroad’ and the publication of certain data.  


The Federation of German Consumer Organisations (the “Bundesverband”) initated court proceedings against Planet49, claiming that the declaration of consent did not meet the requirements for a freely given and informed consent.
However, those conditions apply solely in the case of donations coming from abroad, as a result of which they are much more likely to affect nationals of other Member Statesthan Hungarian nationals. In those circumstances, the Advocate General is of the opinion that those conditions amount to a restrictionof the principle of free movement of capital, both with regard to the organisations affected, which  may have  to cope  with  financing  difficultiesand  whose exercise  of  the  right  to freedom  ofassociation may be limited, and  their foreign donors, who may be  dissuaded  from making donationson account of the possible stigmatising effect of the publication of the details of those transactions, because they expressan ideological affinity that might be compromisingin the Hungarian national context. Concerning, in particular, theright to freedom of association, the financial effects of the legislation at  issue may  affect the viability and the survival of  the organisations concerned, undermining the attainment of their social objectives. Furthermore, by making thefinancial contribution of potential donors  more  difficult, that  legislation directly affects those persons’ exercise  of the  freedom  of association.


The case reached the Federal Court of Justice (“Bundesgerichtshof”), which referred questions regarding the scope of consent under provisions of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, the ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC, and the GDPR to the CJEU.
As  regards  the protection of private  life  and personaldata, the  Advocate General states that  the meredisclosure  of  the donor’s name  is sufficient by itself to  identify  that  donor and to  place that disclosure within the scope of the provisions of EU law on the treatment of personal data.1The fact that  the donor’s name is inextricably  linked to a donation for  the  benefit of a  civil organization constitutes a link that by itself reveals an affinity between the donor and that organisation, which may help  to  ideologically profile  the  donor. The Advocate General adds  that  the fact  that the data  published enable  such  profiling may deter donors or dissuade them  from helping to support civil organisations. In that context, the Advocate General considers that the publication in a publicly accessible  register of the  names of natural persons who make  donations from  abroad to  certain associations established in Hungary and  the  amounts of  such  donations is an  interference  in the private life of those persons as regards the processing of their personal data. Consequently, the  Advocate General takes  the  view that the publication of  those data is  an interference both with the rights relating to the protection of private life and personal data, and with the right to freedom of association, all safeguarded by the Charter. In  respect of whether there  is justification for  that interference, the  Advocate General  admits that some general  interest objectives relied  on  by Hungary—such  as  the protection of  public policy and  the  fight against  money  laundering and  terrorist  financing—may justify, in  principle, interference  with  the rights  concerned,  but finds  that, while the objective of the protection of public  policy could legitimise measures imposed  on civil organisations suspected of  breaching public policy, that obligation does not legitimize general legislation which imposes, ex ante, the obligations at  issue on  all  civil organisations. Moreover, the Advocate General considers that the EU legislative  provisions on  the fight  against  money  laundering and  against  terrorist financing2aresufficient for the purposes of guaranteeing adequate protection. Lastly, the  Advocate General finds that the  measures at  issue  are disproportionate because, first, the threshold of500000Hungarian forints(HUF)is excessively low given the gravity of the resulting interference; secondly, donations coming  from  other Member States  are  treated in  the same way as those coming from outside the EU and, thirdly, failure to comply with the obligation sat issue can lead to the winding-upof the infringing organisation. In those  circumstances, the  Advocate General  proposes that the  Court  of Justice  should declare that the Hungarian legislation at issue unduly restricts the free movement of capital, in that it includes provisions which amount to unjustified interference with the fundamental rights of respect for private life, protection of personal data and freedom of association protected by the Charter.


The case was referred to the Court of Justice on 5 October 2017 - before the GDPR became applicable on 25 May 2018. As the Bundesverband sought an injunction to prevent Planet49 from continuing its practices in the future, the Court’s decision takes into account the requirements for consent on the basis of both the Directive 95/46/EC and the GDPR.
===The decision of the Court===
===The decision of the Court===
The Court assessed the requirements for a valid consent under both Directive 95/46/EC and the GDPR and found that there were no substantial differences between them, noting however that the GDPR explicitly states requirements that need to be inferred under Directive 95/46/EC. As the Court notes, the notion of consent under the ePrivacy directive should have the same meaning as consent under Directive 95/46/EC and the GDPR.
To be completed..
===Consent===
A key question posed by the referring court in relation to the consent requirement was whether consent could be “passive” or if it had to be “active”. The Court concluded that a key component of a valid consent is that the consent is given by a clear affirmative act.  Requiring the user to untick a box to “opt-out” is not sufficient.  The Court emphasized that inaction is insufficient to establish whether the consent is a “freely given and informed decision”.  The Court concludes on this basis that Planet 49’s consent model was inadequate with regards to securing a compliant consent to place cookies on the user’s device. The Court’s conclusion follows from reading Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy directive in conjunction with Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC, and noting that active consent is now regulated under GDPR. For the consent to be valid, it must be “given”  on the basis of “clear and comprehensive information” communicated to the user.  The requirement for the information to be “clear and comprehensive” implies that in cases where the cookie aim to collect information for advertising purposes, there should be information about “the duration of the operation of cookies and whether or not third parties may have access to those cookies”.  Worth noting here is that the Court explicitly reference Article 13 of the GDPR and Article 10 of Directive 95/46/EC as the relevant framework for determining which information should be provided to the user.
===The ePrivacy directive and GDPR===
The German law transposing the ePrivacy directive establishes a difference between the collection of “personal data” and other data. The Court referenced the earlier opinion of the AG, noting that the AG correctly interpreted the provision to protect the user from any privacy interference, irrespective of whether that interference concerns personal data or other data.  The obligation to secure a valid consent for the placement of cookies is therefore applicable regardless of the legal status of that information. A consequence of this view is that the German incorporation of directive 2002/58 is not fully in line with the directive. It is worth highlighting that Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy directive carves out an exception for the consent requirement for cookies that are “strictly necessary” to provide the service as requested by the user. In broad strokes, this means that so-called “functional cookies” that are essential for browsing and using the website, typically for holding items in the cart while browsing a web shop, are exempt for the consent requirement (most often first-party session cookies).
==Comment==
==Comment==
The decision does not come as a big surprise. In its decision, the Court clarifies the notion of consent and connects consent under the e-Privacy directive, the DPD and the GDPR. While it’s hardly a surprising decision, a clear judgement on these issues might force some companies to change their policy regarding information gathering. Unfortunately, the Court concluded that it was not necessary to decide whether the requirement for a consent to be “freely given” was compatible with demanding that the user consented to having third-party tracking cookies placed on their device to participate in the lottery.
There is no judgement yet.

Revision as of 11:03, 20 February 2020

CJEU - C-78/18
Cjeulogo.png
Court: CJEU
Jurisdiction: European Union
Relevant Law: Article 4(11) GDPR
Article 6(1)(a) GDPR
Article 5(3) ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC
Decided: 14. 2. 2020
Parties: VZBV
Planet49 GmbH
Case Number/Name: C-78/18
European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EU:C:2020:1
Reference from:
Language: 24 EU Languages
Original Source: Judgement
Initial Contributor: n/a

The Advocate General Campos Sanchez-Bordona considered that the restriction imposed by Hungary on the financing of civil organisation from abroad are not compatible with the free movement of capitals provisions and the Charter. He proposed that the Court of Justice should declare that the legislation at issue unduly restricts the free movement of capital, in that it includes provisions which amount to unjustified interference with the fundamental rights of respect for private life, protection of personal data and freedom of association protected by the Charter.

English Summary

Facts - Curia's press release

In 2017, Hungary adopted a lawin order to ensure transparency incivilorganisationsthat receivedonationsfrom abroad. Under that law, suchorganisationsmustregister withthe Hungarian authorities as‘organisationsin receipt ofsupport from abroad’where the amount of the donations they have received in a given yearreaches a certain threshold. When registering, those organisations also have to indicatethename of donorswhose supportreaches or exceeds 500000 Hungarian forints (HUF)(approximately€1500) and the exact amount of thesupport. That informationis later published on a free, publicly accessiblee-platform. In addition, the civil organisations concerned must indicate on their home pages and in their publications that they are an ‘organisationin receipt ofsupport from abroad’. The Commission brought an action for failure to fulfil obligations against Hungary before the Court of Justice. It claims that the law on the transparency of civil organisations financed from abroad infringes both the principle of free movement ofcapital and a number of rights protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EuropeanUnion (‘the Charter’): the right to respect for private life, to protection of personal data, and to freedom of association.

The opinion of the Advocate General

The Advocate General Manuel Campos Sánchez-Bordona takes the view that the transfer of a donationfrom abroad in favour of a Hungarian civil organisationisa movement of capital. In Hungary, that movement of capitalis subject to conditions such as the obligation imposed on certain civil organisations to register as ‘organisationsin receipt of support from abroad’ and the publication of certain data.

However, those conditions apply solely in the case of donations coming from abroad, as a result of which they are much more likely to affect nationals of other Member Statesthan Hungarian nationals. In those circumstances, the Advocate General is of the opinion that those conditions amount to a restrictionof the principle of free movement of capital, both with regard to the organisations affected, which may have to cope with financing difficultiesand whose exercise of the right to freedom ofassociation may be limited, and their foreign donors, who may be dissuaded from making donationson account of the possible stigmatising effect of the publication of the details of those transactions, because they expressan ideological affinity that might be compromisingin the Hungarian national context. Concerning, in particular, theright to freedom of association, the financial effects of the legislation at issue may affect the viability and the survival of the organisations concerned, undermining the attainment of their social objectives. Furthermore, by making thefinancial contribution of potential donors more difficult, that legislation directly affects those persons’ exercise of the freedom of association.

As regards the protection of private life and personaldata, the Advocate General states that the meredisclosure of the donor’s name is sufficient by itself to identify that donor and to place that disclosure within the scope of the provisions of EU law on the treatment of personal data.1The fact that  the donor’s name is inextricably  linked to a donation for  the  benefit of a  civil organization constitutes a link that by itself reveals an affinity between the donor and that organisation, which may help  to  ideologically profile  the  donor. The Advocate General adds  that  the fact  that the data  published enable  such  profiling may deter donors or dissuade them  from helping to support civil organisations. In that context, the Advocate General considers that the publication in a publicly accessible  register of the  names of natural persons who make  donations from  abroad to  certain associations established in Hungary and  the  amounts of  such  donations is an  interference  in the private life of those persons as regards the processing of their personal data. Consequently, the  Advocate General takes  the  view that the publication of  those data is  an interference both with the rights relating to the protection of private life and personal data, and with the right to freedom of association, all safeguarded by the Charter. In  respect of whether there  is justification for  that interference, the  Advocate General  admits that some general  interest objectives relied  on  by Hungary—such  as  the protection of  public policy and  the  fight against  money  laundering and  terrorist  financing—may justify, in  principle, interference  with  the rights  concerned,  but finds  that, while the objective of the protection of public  policy could legitimise measures imposed  on civil organisations suspected of  breaching public policy, that obligation does not legitimize general legislation which imposes, ex ante, the obligations at  issue on  all  civil organisations. Moreover, the Advocate General considers that the EU legislative  provisions on  the fight  against  money  laundering and  against  terrorist financing2aresufficient for the purposes of guaranteeing adequate protection. Lastly, the  Advocate General finds that the  measures at  issue  are disproportionate because, first, the threshold of500000Hungarian forints(HUF)is excessively low given the gravity of the resulting interference; secondly, donations coming  from  other Member States  are  treated in  the same way as those coming from outside the EU and, thirdly, failure to comply with the obligation sat issue can lead to the winding-upof the infringing organisation. In those  circumstances, the  Advocate General  proposes that the  Court  of Justice  should declare that the Hungarian legislation at issue unduly restricts the free movement of capital, in that it includes provisions which amount to unjustified interference with the fundamental rights of respect for private life, protection of personal data and freedom of association protected by the Charter.

The decision of the Court

To be completed..

Comment

There is no judgement yet.