OVG Saarlouis - 2 A 124/22

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OVG Saarlouis - 2 A 124/22
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Court: OVG Saarlouis (Germany)
Jurisdiction: Germany
Relevant Law: Article 6(1)(c) GDPR
Article 6(1)(e) GDPR
Article 88 GDPR
SaarlDSG
Decided: 29.09.2022
Published:
Parties:
National Case Number/Name: 2 A 124/22
European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:DE:OVGSL:2022:0929.2A124.22.00
Appeal from: VG Saarlouis
5 K 1117/20
Appeal to:
Original Language(s): German
Original Source: Rewis (in German)
Initial Contributor: Sara Horvat

The Higher Administrative Court of Saarlouis upheld a decision of a court of first instance regarding the GDPR-conformity of judges sharing personal data on proceedings with a data subject's employer, because the data subject did not provided concrete grounds for legal admissibility as required for appeals by German procedural law.

English Summary[edit | edit source]

Facts[edit | edit source]

The data subject is a public employee of a state authority and involved in family law proceedings. In the course of the proceedings, she filed a lawsuit to seek a declaration that four judges, which were involved in the proceedings, violated her right to data protection by disclosing data from the family law dispute to her public employer without authorisation and requested that they cease and desist from violating her right to data protection in the future.

The defendants pointed out that during her family law proceedings, the data subject developed a history of filing numerous and extremely detailed regular disciplinary complaints against judges responsible for her law suits, succeeding more than 100 complaints a year. Furthermore, the data subject shared many of her correspondence with the court with her employer by placing their email address in the "cc" in an email and it was found that fax submissions by the plaintiff had shown the area code assigned to the data subject's state authority. Due to the excessive amounts of complaints, the judges have been given reasons to believe that she may not be able to properly represent herself in front of the court in her family law disputes or commit to her public employment. To ensure an exhaustive evaluation of the situation, some judges who were ruling in the family disputes got into contact with her employer and disclosed personal data concerning the family law proceedings.

The first instance court held that the data processing is legal pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) GDPR and Article 6(1)(e) GDPR. The GDPR does not provide any specific regulation regarding employment data protection law other than Article 88 GDPR, which allows employment data to be regulated by the member states. Due to her employment at a public office, the data processing was lawful upon § 22 Nr. 1 SaarlDSG, which regulates that data processing is allowed when the data processor is a public office and the processing is needed for the beginning or termination of employment. Additionally, in a balancing of interests, the interest of the employer to have trustworthy employees would overweight the right to protection of her personal data.

Holding[edit | edit source]

The court dismissed the appeal. It noted that requirement to present the case in the appeal admissions procedure pursuant to German procedural law requires that the respective applicant substantially examines the content of the challenged decision of the administrative court and its the supporting reasons. This substantiated discussion requires appropriate preparation by the applicant. On the other hand, it is not the task of the Higher Administrative Court to determine, from a mixture of statements in the form of a statement of grounds for appeal, which aspect of the argument could be assigned to which ground for admissibility.

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English Machine Translation of the Decision[edit | edit source]

The decision below is a machine translation of the German original. Please refer to the German original for more details.

OVG Saarlouis (2nd Senate), decision of September 29th, 2022 – 2 A 124/22
Title:

Disclosure of data to the employer (public service)
chains of standards:

BGB § BGB § 241 paragraph BGB § 241 paragraph 2

GDPR Art EWG_GDPR Article 6

GDPR Art EWG_DSGVO Article 88

GG Art GG Article 1

GG Art GG Article 2 Paragraph GG Article 2 Paragraph 1

GG Art GG Article 5 Paragraph GG Article 5 Paragraph 1

SaarlDSG § 22 paragraph 1 sentence 1

SaarlDSG § 4 paragraph 2

TV-L § TV_L § 3 paragraph TV_L § 3 paragraph 1 sentence 2
Official guidelines:

1. On the admissibility of the transmission of personal data of an employee in the public service by judicial bodies from family law disputes conducted by them to the employment office on the occasion of numerous supervisory complaints, in which, among other things, references to the state security of the former GDR or the time of the N. were made on on the basis of §§ 4 para. 2, 22 para. 1 sentence 1 SaarlDSG (individual case, affirmed here).

2. The obligation to explain in the appeal admission procedure according to § VWGO § 124a paragraph VWGO § 124A paragraph 4 sentence 4 VwGO requires that the respective applicant deals with the content of the decision of the administrative court he is challenging and also with the reasoning behind it. This requires a substantiated examination of the underlying justification of the challenged decision, based on the respective reason for admission, through which the matter in dispute is appropriately penetrated and processed.

3. On the other hand, it is not the task of the Higher Administrative Court to determine from a mixture of statements in the form of a statement of grounds of appeal which aspect of the statement could be assigned to which reason for admission.
Legal area:

Administrative procedure and process
tags:

Employers, employees, data protection, data processing, supervisory complaints, family law disputes, duty of loyalty, public service, disclosure
proceeding:

VG Saarlouis, judgment of May 11, 2021 - VGSAARLOUIS file number 5K111720 5 K 1117/20
ECLI:

ECLI:DE:OVGSL:2022:0929.2A124.22.00
Legal force:

unknown
Tenor:

The claimant's application for legal aid for the second-instance proceedings with the assignment of her legal representative is rejected.

The plaintiff's application for approval of the appeal against the judgment of the Saarland Administrative Court of May 11, 2022 - VGSAARLOUIS file number 6K111720 6 K 1117/20 - is rejected.

The plaintiff bears the costs of the admission procedure.

The amount in dispute for the admission procedure is set at €10,000.
Reasons:

I

1The plaintiff, who works in the defendant's S..., seeks with the lawsuit filed in October 2020, on the one hand, to find that four judges named by name who work for the defendant have violated their right to data protection by, in their opinion, using data without authorization from a family law disputes passed on to their employer and, secondly, the ordering of the defendant to refrain from violating their right to data protection in the future. In this respect, the subject of the dispute is, in particular, two letters to S... relating to the plaintiff's affairs:

2On June 5th, 2019, the then presidential judge at the regional court sent on behalf of the court president through official channels via the president of the Saarland higher regional court and the Ministry of Justice with the subject "supervision procedure" to the personnel department of the S... "upon request" and with reference to a previous one telephone call to the district court in L... for "family law proceedings" concerning the plaintiff.

3In their justification, reference was made to "the large number and type" of submissions made by the plaintiff in recent years, regular supervisory complaints against the judges responsible for their affairs, which, from the point of view of the signatory, are to be rated as "abnormal" in frequency. In the last three years alone, more than 100 submissions, some of which were very detailed, have been made. Their content gives the impression that the plaintiff is no longer able to take care of her family court affairs in a way that serves her well-being. This is underlined by the fact that, unperturbed by references to the limits of administrative supervision, she keeps making new submissions regarding all judges in all family proceedings that affect her and, in the sense of "pathological behavior", she leaves any "lack of insight into a judicial procedure and its result". The letter goes on to say that a selection of the submissions from recent years is attached.

4In a further letter dated June 19, 2019 to the S..., the then presidential judge (district court) submitted further submissions from the plaintiff, in which she suggested care for him and the president of the Saarbrücken district court and this "attempting a comparison with the n. unjust regime “have alleged behavior contrary to official law and “law-bending”. It also says there, among other things, that the director of the district court S... reported that after his last letter to the plaintiff, in which he informed her that he would only react to new factual presentations and otherwise in the "supervisory complaint matter regarding OGV P." no longer able to answer, she sent him another letter "possibly as an email" in which she announced that she would ensure from the S... that the Ministry of Justice was prompted to place a disciplinary note in the personnel file of "Mr. OGV P.", since he - the director - couldn't "manage" or "refuse" that. He has Dr. M. von der S... then described what he considered to be an unpleasant situation for the S... in the plaintiff's matter both by telephone and by e-mail and "notified the said letter from the plaintiff". An “official” contact by the Ministry of Justice was made by Dr. M. not considered necessary, rather promised to take care of the matter. But after that he heard nothing more. With regard to the proof that the plaintiff had occasionally carried out “her proceedings” from the S… fax machine, he had found faxes in a probate file that had come from an official fax with the identifier “…”. Apparently, however, the fax identifier cannot be assigned to the S.... However, such faxes existed in the most varied of court proceedings pursued by the plaintiff. It should be added that the plaintiff in a property law proceeding 42 F 498/11 GÜ at the district court S... on August 30th, 2013, on October 11th, 2013 and on June 30th, 2014 sent an e-mail with "cc" to the e- Mail address of the S… have sent. She showed a similar approach in maintenance proceedings 42 F 177/11 UEUK on September 2nd, 2013.

5At the beginning of October 2020, the plaintiff filed a "declaratory action and injunctive relief" with the administrative court against the President of the Saarbrücken Regional Court, the then Vice-President of the Saarbrücken Higher Regional Court, the then Presidential Judge of the Saarbrücken Regional Court and against the then Director of the District Court S.... As justification, she asserted that she had lodged various administrative complaints against the responsible judges and magistrates in her divorce proceedings before the President of the Saarbrücken Regional Court. With letters dated June 5th, 2019 and June 11th, 2019, the presidential judge at the regional court, acting on behalf of his president and referring to the director of the district court, informed her employer, S..., with content and extensive documents from her private family dispute proceedings, in an abusive manner. Both letters are stamped "Seen the President of the Saarland Higher Regional Court in deputy ... Vice President" and "Seen and forwarded to the Ministry of Justice on behalf". The judges had repeatedly "condescended" to "sniffing around" in the files of the family proceedings and "undermining data protection" to deliberately forward incorrect content from their purely private law proceedings to their employer. The letter from the Presidential Judge of June 19, 2019 provides clear evidence that the abuse of data protection and the information to her employer by the Director of the District Court had already taken place since 2016. In doing so, the judges referred to their private, non-public family proceedings and those of their relatives and made vague allegations without any evidence. The "arbitrarily untrue" information to her employer would only have concerned purely private family matters. The disclosure of personal data to their employer constitutes an encroachment on their fundamental right to informational self-determination. This should not only protect the individual from unjustified data collection, but also from data relating to him being used for another purpose. Irrespective of this, the mere transfer of data from one place to another is an encroachment on fundamental rights that requires justification, because it expands the circle of those who know the data and can make use of this knowledge. The two letters from June 2019 are suitable for deliberately disseminating false information from her family proceedings to her employer in order to cast doubt on her suitability for public service. The letters submitted through official channels were also signed by the Vice President of the Saarbrücken Higher Regional Court. In her divorce proceedings - 42 F 595/10 S/VA/UEUK - she decided on a complaint dated February 27th, 2020 and a hearing complaint dated June 9th, 2020 to her detriment, although she was obliged after her illegal co-signing of the letters mentioned self-report for bias. She - the plaintiff - was informed of this in a letter dated June 8, 2020. Since the judges were not legally authorized to pass on the data to their employer, they violated the fundamental right to informational self-determination through their illegal action. In 2015, the European Court of Justice severely restricted the exchange of data between authorities without the consent of those affected. Accordingly, data subjects must always be informed comprehensively in advance of any transmission and processing of personal data. With their actions, the judges involved therefore violated state, federal and European law. In the course of her divorce proceedings, she raised various legitimate administrative complaints with the President of the Regional Court, but by no means 100, as the defendant claims. The submissions all related to her family procedures and thus to her privacy. She sent her letters to the district court S... exclusively from her private e-mail address. The director of the district court S... did not provide evidence for his claim that she used the email address of S.... The director was also unable to prove his untenable accusation, she had explained to him that she could arrange a disciplinary notice against OGV P. in connection with her work at S.... This clearly proves that the letters from the judges mentioned were "unbelievable ..." in violation of the law and data protection in order to damage her professionally. The President of the Saarbrücken Regional Court wanted to silence her with his arbitrary suggestion of care. In the context of the administrative complaints she had raised, she had never pointed out that she was in the service of the S... and did not give the director of the S... District Court the impression that she would ensure that the S... came to the court intervene in order to achieve the desired action. The director of the district court determined the connection to her employer in "unimaginable S." from the court cost files of the family law disputes. She was also able to complain about these data protection violations by the "law-bending judges". The freedom of expression in Art. GG Article 5 Paragraph GG Article 5 Paragraph 1 Clause 1 GG also protects drastic and exaggerated assessments and enables a comparison of current social or political conditions and events with the N. and the H. as the most serious injustice according to general opinion history. Whether such a comparison appears appropriate or distasteful is irrelevant. Since she had conducted her family law disputes as a private person, the defendant could not "backwardly rely on the pretended care of the public-law employer".

6The defendant stated that the plaintiff had been involved in various court proceedings before the Saarland courts for many years and also acted as a representative for relatives. In the course of these proceedings, she filed numerous administrative complaints against judges, employees of the public prosecutor's office, judicial officers and bailiffs and filed criminal charges against various judicial employees. In the course of individual proceedings, she sometimes sent court submissions to S... at the same time by putting an e-mail address for S... in the "cc" in an e-mail to the court. In addition, the director of the district court concerned found that the plaintiff's fax entries had shown the area code 501 assigned to the state authorities. After the plaintiff had announced to the director of the local court S… in the course of a supervisory complaint against the higher court bailiff P. in connection with her work at S… that she could arrange for a disciplinary notice to be debited to the person concerned, the director of the local court decided that the S… to teach about this process. In a letter dated May 21, 2019, the President of the Saarbrücken Regional Court addressed a suggestion to the Director of the District Court L... to look after the plaintiff, limited to the area of "family court proceedings involving those affected". This was justified with a large number of supervisory complaints and with the intensity of the entries. There was the impression that the plaintiff did not perceive the proceedings in family matters in a way that served her well-being. The president of the district court informed the S... about this letter in a letter dated June 5, 2019. In a letter to the supervisory court at the Saarbrücken Higher Regional Court dated OLGSAARBRUECKEN on June 11, 2019, the plaintiff suggested that the presiding judge at the regional court, Dr. W. and the President of the Regional Court and stated that these were civil servants in need of care who had been well known for several years through their exclusively colleague-protective and reassuring feedback regarding the actions of their law-bending judges and magistrates. They would apparently fail to recognize that the population "cannot be silenced in the style of a dictatorship" and that "the days of N. are over". The district court L... decided on August 30, 2019 not to appoint a supervisor for the plaintiff. The present action is unfounded. The data transmission was not aimed at the subject matter of the family court proceedings, but solely at the supervisory complaints resulting from these proceedings and the actions of the plaintiff towards the members of the judiciary. This disclosure by the district court S... and the district court Saarbrücken to the S... was lawful, since it was necessary to fulfill the task lying in the responsibility of the transmitting body or the third party to which the data is transmitted. In the course of the court proceedings she was conducting, the plaintiff herself pointed out that she was in the service of S... and gave the director of the district court S... the impression that S... would have legal effect on the court in order to obtain the to achieve desired action. In addition, in the course of the numerous supervisory complaints, she has repeatedly and almost universally drawn the picture of a Saarland judiciary that bends the law, most recently supplemented by a comparison with the times of the N. It is therefore not objectionable that the then director of the district court S... as well as the President of the Regional Court had come to the conclusion that the plaintiff could cause damage to her reputation through the way she acted and in particular through the multiple references to her employer at his expense. In addition, the data transmission that takes place to carry out tasks can also be used to carry out social measures and, if necessary, to provide assistance. Against the background of the care suggestion, the President of the Regional Court was also allowed to transfer data with regard to the care of the public employer.

7In May 2022, the administrative court heard the complaint with the applications

1. determine that the judges employed by the defendant were not entitled to forward data from the private law family proceedings to the employer of the plaintiff - ... ... ... - due to a violation of their right to data protection and informational self-determination, and

2. to oblige the defendant to refrain from violating the plaintiff's data protection and informational self-determination by forwarding content from her private law family proceedings to her employer - ... ... ... -,

rejected. In the grounds of the judgment it is stated that the declaratory action, which is admissible according to § VWGO § 43 para. VWGO § 43 para. 1 VwGO with regard to the first application, is also otherwise admissible. The plaintiff has a legitimate interest in the desired determination. The principle of subsidiarity according to § VWGO § 43 Abs. VWGO § 43 Abs. 2 VwGO does not oppose the admissibility either. With regard to the second claim, the claim as a general claim for performance in the form of an action for an injunction is admissible, since the plaintiff is seeking an omission in this respect, which does not consist in the issuing of an administrative act. However, the lawsuit was unsuccessful in this matter. The judges employed by the defendant were entitled to forward personal data of the plaintiff to her employer, whereby the data transmission constitutes data processing within the meaning of Art. EWG_DSGVO Article 4 No. EWG_DSGVO Article 4 Number 2 GDPR. to footnote 1 Art. EWG_DSGVO Article 6 Abs. EWG_DSGVO Article 6 Paragraph 1 GDPR stipulates the conditions under which data processing is lawful. Both the need for processing to fulfill a legal obligation (Art. EWG_DSGVO Article 6 Para. EWG_DSGVO Article 6 Paragraph 1 lit. c GDPR) and the necessity of processing for the performance of a task that is in the public interest or in Exercise of official authority (Art. EWG_DSGVO Article 6 Abs. EWG_DSGVO Article 6 Paragraph 1 lit. e GDPR), into consideration. The GDPR does not contain any sector-specific provisions for employee data protection. Rather, this is based on the general regulations of the GDPR and with a view to the provisions of Art. EWG_DSGVO Article 88 para. EWG_DSGVO article 88 paragraph 1 GDPR contained opening clause at state level according to § 22 SaarlDSG. The legal basis for the defendant's data transmission is Section 22 (1) sentence 1 in conjunction with Section 4 (2) SaarlDSG. According to this, public bodies may only process personal data of applicants or employees to the extent that this is necessary to enter into, carry out, terminate or process the service or employment relationship or to carry out organizational, personnel and social measures, in particular for the purposes of personnel planning and personnel deployment or if a legal provision, a collective agreement or a service or company agreement provides for this (§ 22 Para. 1 Clause 1 SaarlDSG). According to Section 4 (2) SaarlDSG, the transmission of personal data to public bodies is permissible if it is necessary to fulfill the task for which the transmitting body or the third party to which the data is transmitted is responsible. §§ 22 para. 1 sentence 1, 4 para. 2 SaarlDSG would have entitled the judges employed by the defendant to forward the corresponding personal data of the plaintiff to her employer. According to §§ 4 para. 2, 2 para. 1 SaarlDSG, the permissible addressee of the data transmission authorization as well as the recipient of the transmitted data is any authority and public body in Saarland, of which in this case both the ... ... as the recipient of the data and the Ministry of the Justice included. The above conditions are met. The plaintiff is employed by S..., so that her personal data in connection with her service or employment falls within the scope of Section 22 (1) sentence 1 SaarlDSG. The processing of personal data by public bodies is permissible if it is necessary to fulfill the task for which the person responsible is responsible (§ 4 Para. 1 SaarlDSG). The data transmission carried out by the judges employed by the defendant in the form of passing on input from the plaintiff, in which she suggested, among other things, support for the judge at the W. district court and the president of the Saarbrücken district court and, in comparison with the n behavior as well as the suggestion that the plaintiff should be placed under supervision with regard to her matters in family court proceedings was necessary for the employer to exercise the rights and obligations arising from the underlying service or employment relationship. This presupposes that the data transfer is suitable for the respective legitimate purpose and that no less severe means are available with which the purpose can be achieved just as effectively. Suitability can already be assumed if the achievement of the relevant purpose is sensibly promoted. All measures through which the employer fulfills its obligations towards the employee or through which it exercises its rights towards the employee are to be subsumed under the term "implementation" of the service or employment relationship within the meaning of Section 22 (1) sentence 1 SaarlDSG. A transmission of the relevant correspondence relating to the plaintiff's submissions or administrative complaints fits in with this, as this puts the employer in a position to examine any legal steps, for example in the event of doubts about the plaintiff's suitability for public service. In particular, it should be borne in mind that the plaintiff was employed in the public service and was therefore subject to a special political duty of loyalty. According to § TV_L § 3 Abs. TV_L § 3 paragraph 1 sentence 2 TV-L, § TVOED_AT § 41 sentence 2 TVöD through their entire behavior to the free democratic basic order. From the plaintiff's correspondence with the Saarbrücken district court, it becomes clear that her attitude towards the entire Saarland judiciary is characterized by distrust, in that not only is there repeated talk of perverting the law, but in particular several comparisons are made at the time of N. The threatened loss of reputation of S... as the plaintiff's employer, as alleged by the defendant, seems quite obvious. It is important to take into account that the data transmission - which the plaintiff apparently assumes - was not based on information from the family court proceedings, but the purpose of the data processing was to pass on the supervisory complaints in order to show their intensity to the S.... This also applies to the extent that personal data from the fringe area of the family court proceedings may have been affected, which the plaintiff had neither substantiated nor made clear from the forwarded correspondence. The purpose of the data processing is not the transmission of personal data from the family court proceedings, but rather the perception of the employer's rights and obligations arising from the employment relationship. The intensity of the encroachment on fundamental rights resulting from the data transmission should not be disproportionate to the weight of the reasons justifying it. According to the justification for the comparable regulation in § BDSG § 26 BDSG applicable at the federal level, the conflicting fundamental rights positions have to be weighed up in the context of the necessity test in order to create practical concordance. The interests of the employer in the data processing and the personal rights of the employee must be brought to a gentle balance that takes both interests into account as far as possible. On the plaintiff’s side, these are Article 2 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, Article 2 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, Article 2 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law and the right to informational self-determination protected by European and Conventional Law under Article EMRK Article 8 paragraph EMRK Article 8 paragraph 1 EMRK, Art. 8 paragraph 1, paragraph 2 CrGH, Art. EWG_DSGVO Article 12 et seq the underlying employment relationship. In view of the comparisons made with the ... period, however, there were no indications that the plaintiff's interests worthy of protection outweighed the other. In this regard, she claims, above all, that the judges sent the data to her employer in order to harm her professionally. In doing so, she fails to recognize that her employer's interest in her duty of loyalty and in averting adverse external effects outweighs her interest in the protection of her personal data. The means and purpose of the data transmission are therefore overall in an appropriate relationship. Nothing else applies to the suggestion forwarded to the director of the district court L... to place the plaintiff under supervision with regard to her matters in family court proceedings. This data transmission to S... is also necessary for the employer to exercise the rights and obligations arising from the underlying employment relationship. On the one hand, this puts the employer in a position to assess the ability of his employees to work. On the other hand, this could also be useful for the plaintiff from a welfare point of view. Health data, which according to Art. EWG_DSGVO Article 9 Para. EWG_DSGVO Article 9 Paragraph 1 DSGVO, § 8 SaarlDSG are among the special types of personal data, are subject to special dangers for the rights and interests of the data subjects that are worthy of protection, which are threatened by discrimination and exposure, special processing barriers. However, the forwarded suggestion to appoint a supervisor for the plaintiff in family court proceedings does not contain any disclosure of health data, since no medical diagnoses or the like were communicated. Even in the event that the suggestion for care was already seen as a transmission of health data, this data processing would also have been lawful due to the exception regulated in § 8 Para. 1 No. 2 SaarlDSG. In this respect, the admissibility of the processing is also subject to the proviso of necessity and requires a proportionality test and the non-existence of overriding legitimate interests of the employees in an exclusion of the processing. The latter cannot be ascertained in the present case. In addition, the plaintiff has no right to omission of the forwarding of her personal data to her employer. The legal basis for the data transmission is - as explained - §§ 22 paragraph 1 sentence 1, 4 paragraph 2 SaarlDSG.

8The plaintiff applies for permission to appeal against this decision.

II.

9The plaintiff's application for approval of legal aid for the present appeal admission procedure could not be met.

10The legal remedy does not offer the necessary prospects of success (§§ VWGO § 166 VwGO, 114 para. 1 ZPO). In this regard, reference is made to the following statements on the matter.

III.

11 The plaintiff's application for approval of the appeal (§§ VWGO § 124a Abs. VWGO § 124A Paragraph 4, VWGO § 124A Paragraph 124 Abs. VWGO § 124A Paragraph 1 VwGO) against the judgment of the Administrative Court of May 11, 2022 - file number 6K111720 6 K 1117/20 - is permissible, but has no success in the matter. No reason for admission can be inferred from the catalog of § VWGO § 124 para. VWGO § 124 para. In particular, the plaintiff's submission does not justify the assumption of serious doubts about the correctness of the first instance decision, which can be assessed solely on the basis of the correctness of the results (Section VWGO Section 124 Paragraph VWGO Section 124 Paragraph 2 No. VWGO Section 124 Paragraph 2 Number 1 VwGO). to footnote 2

12 The plaintiff asserts - unsuccessfully - that the administrative court wrongly applied the principles applicable to civil servants in the contested decision and focused on the fact that, as employees in the public sector, they "have their off-duty work

- private - behavior had to be adapted to the interests of the public employer". At least that was no longer the case after a change in the relevant collective agreements as of October 1, 2005, according to which only the work owed under the employment contract was to be “conscientiously and properly carried out”. Since then, according to § 41 sentence 2 TVöD-BT-V, only employees entrusted with the performance of sovereign tasks have had to commit to the free democratic basic order within the meaning of the Basic Law through their entire behavior - including in their private lives.

13 In addition, the defendant correctly pointed out in the admission procedure that the applicable for state employees and due to the lack of relevance of the catalog of exceptions in § TV_L § 1 paragraph TV_L § 1 paragraph 2 TV-L in the case of the plaintiff relevant here § TV_L § 3 paragraph TV_L § 3 Paragraph 1 sentence 2 TV-L according to the earlier § BAT § 8 paragraph BAT § 8 paragraph 1 sentence 1 BAT (2005) still standardizes an obligation for employees, “through their entire behavior to the free democratic basic order within the meaning of the Basic Law <to> confess". According to this, the defendant's employees in the public service - like the civil servants - owe their employer loyalty, may not attack the state in whose service they work and its constitutional order and can be dismissed without notice in the event of gross violation of these official duties. Regarding footnote 3 It would also seem difficult to understand if such behavior on the part of the state could be tolerated without consequences, especially in the case of employees in the public sector, even if they are not civil servants. Even if the degree of loyalty to the constitution that is required of a public service employee is determined by the position and scope of duties assigned to the employee under the employment contract, footnote 4 must also be followed by employees who only have a “simple” political are subject to a duty of loyalty, at least demonstrate a minimum of loyalty to the constitution insofar as they are not allowed to disparage the state or its organs in their off-duty behavior. Regarding footnote 5, the plaintiff cannot therefore be upheld with her objection to the first instance decision that the duty of loyalty - including off-duty duties - only relates to employees in the public sector of the defendant who have the status of civil servants, since the parties to the collective agreement do not work for officials "Employees" in the public sector after the BAT "repeated" in 2005 "would no longer have wanted to establish any further obligations of conduct".

14Therefore, it is no longer necessary to go into whether the behavior of the plaintiff violated the general employment contract obligation to consider the interests of her public employer from § BGB § 241 paragraph BGB § 241 paragraph 2 BGB , which was answered in the negative, because a violation of this obligation through off-duty behavior would, in her opinion, have negative effects on the "operation" or a relation to the employment relationship that could not be determined and would not be assumed in her case.

The question of whether - for which there is no solid evidence - the numerous administrative complaints by the plaintiff, especially against the family judges dealing with her case, have a factual basis in individual cases or - in her words - could have been justified, may be left open here . In any case, it is not possible to make a definitive assessment here. That the approached heads of authorities, in particular the then director of the District Court S... and the President of the Regional Court Saarbrücken, on the occasion of such complaints by the plaintiff, are not only entitled to process this request, but are ultimately obliged within the framework of their official supervision, to the allegations by studying the relevant case files It goes without saying that it goes without saying what this - according to the plaintiff's allegation - has to do with "snooping around" or "impermissible verification" or even with "incomprehensible S." is not clear. The content of the letters of June 5, 2019 and June 19, 2019, which she quoted again, has been on record since the complaint was filed.

16 Whether the behavior of the plaintiff ultimately justifies termination of the employment relationship or not is also not a question to be decided here. The examples of "off-duty crimes" related to § BGB § 241 paragraph BGB § 241 paragraph 2 BGB described by the applicant in the context, without reference to the case, are therefore just as irrelevant as the question of how the personal statements of the Complainant are to be assessed in this regard, that is, whether - as she thinks - the comparisons with the N. and the actions of the state security authorities in the former German Democratic Republic from the point of view of a pointed expression of opinion or as a "quintessence" of one to a completely different one Facts of the decision of the Munich Higher Regional Court on footnote 6 with a view to Article 5 Paragraph GG Article 5 Paragraph 1 GG are still acceptable. The case decided there was about a refusal of a judge, which was justified from the point of view of the Higher Regional Court, due to insufficient granting of a legal hearing. It cannot be inferred from the published text that the plaintiff there, unlike the plaintiff, tried to justify his request for rejection with comparisons with "Methods of N."

17 In contrast, the plaintiff's statements regarding the appeal to freedom of expression (Art. GG Article 5 Paragraph GG Article 5 Paragraph 1 GG) are to be regarded in several cases as at least extremely borderline. For example, a message to the public prosecutor's office in Saarbrücken dated November 6th, 2017, titled as the supervisory authority against the public prosecutor S... - specifically highlighted in bold - states that behavior by a school authority that she felt to be "inhuman, disgusting and arbitrary" "in times of German N. ... was legitimate and the order of the day", which the "completely overwhelmed" prosecutor "should somehow have escaped".

18Since the plaintiff in the justification of her application for authorization with regard to the transmission of data to her place of employment, merely repeating her first-instance submissions in the form of an appeal justification for footnote 7, again violated her fundamental right to informational self-determination (Art. GG Article 1, GG Article 2 GG) made a complaint, but did not begin to deal with the detailed justification of the first-instance decision on the legal basis for the authorization to pass on data, it does not have to be discussed here. According to the presentation requirement standardized for the appeal admission procedure in § VWGO § 124a Abs. VWGO § 124A Paragraph 4 Sentence 4 VwGO, a substantiated, related to the respective admission reason related discussion with the supporting justification of the challenged decision is required, through which the disputed matter is penetrated and processed accordingly . Regarding footnote 8 Such is not to be inferred from the justification for the applicant's application for admission in relation to the standards of data protection law cited by the administrative court, which justify the transfer of data to the S... here. In addition, it should be noted that the administrative court's detailed dealing with the provisions of §§ 4 paragraph 2, 22 paragraph 1 sentence 1 SaarlDSG , which need not be repeated here, convincingly explains why data-based information from the plaintiff's employment office was not subject to any far-reaching legal objections.

19 Finally, it should be pointed out that the rejection of the care suggestion on which the present court dispute is based, and a copy of which was sent to the public prosecutor’s office on June 5, 2019, to the District Court L… of May 21, 2019 was not complied with in August 2019 because the “vehement rejection” cooperation with a caregiver or with the care authority by the plaintiff, despite appropriate efforts and offers of talks, a meaningful implementation of care "even if the medical requirements are met" was not judged to be possible. to footnote 9 In a "supervision suggestion" and administrative complaint by the plaintiff against the president and the then presidential judge at the regional court dated June 11, 2019, which is probably to be seen as a reaction, in connection with the handling of a "new administrative complaint" against a judge at the district court S..., the plaintiff among other things, stated that after the letter of May 21, 2019, which was to be classified as “exacerbated nonsense”, she “incomprehensibly asked herself” whether “these officials who were acting morbidly in the times of N. might have requested special treatment in the form of a gassing suggestion from the responsible N. instead of the suggestion for care would have". The two judges working at the regional court would have to have a great deal of respect for their “fearless submissions” in order to have to resort to “such perfidious and constitutional cheating methods”. The "abnormally acting officials" would completely misjudge the basic right to freedom of expression and, moreover, "that we are not in the T.", where the population could be "silenced in dictatorship style" and that the "times of N. be over". That actually speaks for itself. This does not need to be deepened further on the basis of the present decision. The same applies to the question of whether one can still speak of “family matters solely under private law” in this context.

20For the above reasons, the application for approval had to be unsuccessful.

IV

21The cost decision for the approval procedure is based on § VWGO § 154 paragraph VWGO § 154 paragraph 2 VwGO.

22The determination of the amount in dispute is based on Sections 63 (2), 52, 47 GKG.

23The resolution cannot be contested