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{{COURTdecisionBOX
! colspan="2" |Rb. Amsterdam - AWB 18/7146
|-
| colspan="2" style="padding: 20px; background-color:#ffffff;" |[[File:courtsNL.png|center|250px]]
|-
|Court:||[[:Category:Rb. Amsterdam (Netherlands)|Rb. Amsterdam (Netherlands)]]
|-
|Jurisdiction:||[[Data Protection in the Netherlands|Netherlands]]
|-
|Relevant Law:||Article 34 of the GDPR Dutch Implementing Act (Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens - Wbp)


[[Article 12 GDPR#3|Article 12(3) GDPR]]
|Jurisdiction=Netherlands
|Court-BG-Color=
|Courtlogo=Courts_logo1.png
|Court_Abbrevation=Rb. Gelderland
|Court_With_Country=Rb. Gelderland (Netherlands)


[[Article 17 GDPR|Article 17 GDPR]]
|Case_Number_Name=AWB 19/2901
|ECLI=ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2020:619


[[Article 18 GDPR|Article 18 GDPR]]
|Original_Source_Name_1=
|Original_Source_Link_1=https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2020:619&showbutton=true&keyword=AVG
|Original_Source_Language_1=Dutch
|Original_Source_Language__Code_1=NL
|Original_Source_Name_2=
|Original_Source_Link_2=
|Original_Source_Language_2=
|Original_Source_Language__Code_2=
 
|Date_Decided=04.02.2020
|Date_Published=05.02.2020
|Year=2020
 
|GDPR_Article_1=Article 5 GDPR
|GDPR_Article_Link_1=Article 5 GDPR
|GDPR_Article_2=Article 6(1)(b) GDPR
|GDPR_Article_Link_2=Article 6 GDPR#1b
|GDPR_Article_3=
|GDPR_Article_Link_3=
|GDPR_Article_4=
|GDPR_Article_Link_4=
 
|EU_Law_Name_1=
|EU_Law_Link_1=
|EU_Law_Name_2=
|EU_Law_Link_2=
 
|National_Law_Name_1=Recital 39 GDPR
|National_Law_Link_1=
|National_Law_Name_2=
|National_Law_Link_2=
 
|Party_Name_1=Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens (Dutch DPA)
|Party_Link_1=https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/en
|Party_Name_2=
|Party_Link_2=
|Party_Name_3=
|Party_Link_3=
 
|Appeal_From_Body=
|Appeal_From_Case_Number_Name=
|Appeal_From_Status=
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|Appeal_To_Status=
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|Initial_Contributor=
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The Gelderland Court of First Instance confirmed that the measure according to which passengers can purchase tickets on the buses only by means of credit/ debit cards is compatible with the principles of necessity and proportionality and that the subsequent processing of personal data is necessary for the performance of this purchase contract ([[Article 6 GDPR#1b|Article 6(1)(b) GDPR]]). Therefore, the processing is compatible with the GDPR.   


[[Article 21 GDPR|Article 21 GDPR]]
|-
|Decided:||25. 9. 2019
|-
|Published:||21. 11. 2019
|-
|Parties:||[https://www.advocatenorde.nl/algemene-raad Netherlands Bar Association]
|-
|National Case Number:||AWB 18/7146
|-
|European Case Law Identifier:||<small>ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2019:8329</small>
|-
|Appeal from:||n/a
|-
|Language:||Dutch
|-
|Original Source:||[https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2019:8329&showbutton=true&keyword=AVG de Rechtspraak (in NL)]
|}The Amsterdam Court of First Instance decided that the rejection of a suspended lawyer's request to the Dutch Bar Association to erase a list showing the claimant's suspension as a lawyer is not unlawful nor contrary to the GDPR.
==English Summary==
==English Summary==
===Facts===
===Facts===
The Dutch Bar Association published the plaintiff’s name on the online list of suspended and removed lawyers, after a disciplinary measure of unconditional suspension had been imposed on him. The plaintiff asked Google to remove the list from the search results relating to his name. Google refused and indicated the website operator as the competent entity for this removal. The Association, which was the website operator, rejected his request.
In the Netherlands, as of 1 July 2018 a passenger who wishes to purchase a ticket on the bus from the bus driver can only pay for this ticket with a debit or credit card and no longer with cash. The plaintiff requested the Dutch DPA to investigate the obligation to pay with a debit or credit card and the abolition of cash payments on the bus and to take an enforcement action against this measure under the GDPR. The DPA rejected the request and the plaintiff appealed its decision. He also asked the Court to suspend the present judgement until the CJEU issues a judgement on the preliminary questions which the Constitutional Court of Belgium referred with its judgement no. 135/2019 on the processing of passenger data. The DPA argued that the legal basis for the processing of PIN and credit card details when purchasing a ticket from a bus driver is [[Article 6 GDPR#1b|Article 6(1)(b) GDPR]].  
===Dispute===
The Court had to assess whether the Dutch DPA has been able to conclude that the third party did not violate the GDPR and subsequently whether it did not have to take an enforcement action indeed. To this end, the Court had to assess whether [[Article 6 GDPR|Article 6 GDPR]] provides a legal basis for processing credit cards details and whether the processing is compliant with [[Article 5 GDPR|Article 5 GDPR]]. It also had to examine whether the criteria of necessity and proportionality had been met in this case.  
 
===Holding===
===Holding===
The Court recalled Article 34 of the Durch Data Protection Act (''Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens - Wbp'') which foresees that a written decision on a request submitted under Articles 15 to 22 GDPR shall be regarded as falling within the time limits referred to in [[Article 12 GDPR#3|Article 12(3) GDPR]] and, in so far as it has been taken by an administrative body, such as the Bar Association, this decision shall be deemed as a decision within the meaning of the General Administrative Law Act. Therefore, the Association rightly refused to grant the request for erasure under [[Article 17 GDPR|Article 17 GDPR]].
The Court found that the legal basis of [[Article 6 GDPR#1b|Article 6(1)(b) GDPR]] is valid, hence there was no reason to further examine possible application of other legal grounds. Moreover, the Dutch DPA could reasonably consider the purpose of abolishing cash, since this measure was included in the action programme "Social Security in Public Transport" and aimed at the prevention of theft and robbery. For this purpose, the only plausible option for all third parties and bus routes could be only that one. The DPA could reasonably take the position that the processing of personal data in case of debit or credit card payments is limited to what is necessary for the purpose pursued and the principle of data minimisation is respected. The DPA could reasonably consider that there was no other, less drastic method to achieve the same objective.
 
The Court declared the appeal unfounded.    


Moreover, the Court found that the plaintiff did not justify his reliance on [[Article 18 GDPR|Article 18 GDPR]]. As for [[Article 21 GDPR|Article 21 GDPR]], the Court ruled that the public interest in the publication of the list outweighs the plausible interest of the plaintiff to apply for a job unencumbered. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal as unfounded.
==Comment==
==Comment==
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==English Machine Translation of the Decision==
==English Machine Translation of the Decision==
The decision below is a machine translation of the original. Please refer to the Dutch original for more details.<pre>DECISION
Court of Amsterdam


Facts and circumstances
The decision below is a machine translation of the original. Please refer to the Dutch original for more details.


1.1. From 2011 up to and including 15 June 2018, the plaintiff was registered as an attorney at law on the tableau of the Netherlands Bar Association (NOvA). He recently practised in [place name] . On 17 January 2017, following a complaints procedure, the Council of Discipline in Utrecht imposed on him the disciplinary measure of unconditional suspension of the practice for a period of four months. By decision of 9 July 2017, the Court of Discipline confirmed this decision.
<pre>DECISION


1.2. The plaintiff then suspended his practice for a period of four months with effect from 10 August 2017. In the meantime, he claims to have submitted the suspension for assessment to the European Court of Human Rights. On 1 June 2018 he was removed from the table at his own request.
Process sequence


1.3. The defendant made the plaintiff's suspension public on the so-called 'List of Suspended and Deleted Lawyers' (hereinafter: the list). The suspension of the plaintiff is listed as follows:
By decision of 10 January 2019, the defendant rejected a claimant's request to take enforcement action against [third party].


"[name] [plaintiff] (office: [name] ), office at [place name] , district [place name] , suspension in the practice for a period of four months with effect from 10 August 2017 (date of decision: 17 January 2017)'.
By decision of 14 May 2019 (the contested decision), the defendant dismissed plaintiff's objection as unfounded.


In the past, this list could be found as a pdf-file via the defendant's website. Nowadays the list can be found through search engines such as Google.
Plaintiff appealed against the contested decision.


1.4. On 4 March 2018 the plaintiff asked Google to remove the list from the search results concerning him or his law practice, or at least to remove the search results that refer the Internet user to this list as source page (hereinafter: the disconnection request). Google has responded - in brief - that the plaintiff must send his request for disconnection directly to the webmaster of the relevant website. The webmaster may remove the content in question from the Internet and prevent it from being displayed in search engines.
The defendant filed a statement of defence.


1.5. Subsequently, on 3 April 2018, the claimant sent an e-mail with a disconnection request to the [name] the [name] .
Third party submitted a written statement of defence.


Decision of the defendant
The investigation at the hearing took place on 16 December 2019. Plaintiff has appeared. The defendant is represented by its agents. Third Party is represented by its agents and M.J.M. Piels.
2.1. By the primary decision, the defendant rejected the claimant's request for disconnection.
Considerations


2.2. The claimant objected to this and applied for an interim injunction. By judgment of the Court in preliminary relief proceedings of 31 July 2018, the Court in preliminary relief proceedings rejected the application for an interim injunction.
Why doesn't the court grant the plaintiff's request for arrest?


2.3. Subsequently, by the contested decision the defendant declared the claimant's objection unfounded. On appeal, the plaintiff contested the defendant's position with reasons.
1. The plaintiff has requested that his case be stayed pending the answer to preliminary questions from the Constitutional Court of Belgium and pending the ruling on the appeal to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (the Division) in a similar case previously conducted by him.
1.1.


2.4. The positions of the parties will be discussed below, insofar as they are relevant to the court's assessment.
The court sees no reason to do so. In its ruling of 17 October 2019 (judgment no. 135/2019), the Constitutional Court of Belgium referred preliminary questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union. These questions relate to the national (Belgian) law of 25 December 2016 on the processing of passenger data. By this law, the (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016, 2004/82/EC of the Council of 29 April 2004 and 2010/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 October 2010 have been transposed into (national) law. Directive 2004/82/EC aims at improving border controls and combating illegal immigration and covers the professional transport of persons by air. Directive 2010/65 aims to simplify and harmonise the administrative procedures applicable to maritime transport. Directive 2016/681 lays down rules on the transfer by air carriers of Passenger Name Records (PNR) on flights for the purpose of the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime.


Legal framework
One of the questions of the Constitutional Court of Belgium concerns the applicability of Article 23 of the AVG to (this) national legislation. For the rest, the questions relate to Directive (EU) 2016/681.
3.1. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 8b of the Attorneys at Law Act, the secretary of the General Counsel shall make public in writing a list of information about lawyers in respect of whom a decision has been taken to unconditionally impose a measure as referred to in Section 48(2)(d) or (e) of that Act. This concerns, respectively, the measure to suspend the practice (for a period of four months in the case of plaintiff) and the measure to remove the tableau.


3.2. In its assessment, the court continues to base itself on the legal framework as set out in the annex attached to this judgment.
In the opinion of the Court, the answers given by the European Court to the questions asked do not affect the plaintiff's appeal in this case. The directives mentioned are not at issue and the AVG has been directly applied in this case and not through national legislation.


Is there an act of fact?
Nor is there any reason to await the decision of the Division on the appeal of the plaintiff against the decision of this court of 5 September 2019 in cases AWB 18/546 and 18/14871. The enforcement request at issue in this case relates to facts other than those referred to in the judgment of 5 September 2019.


4.1. The court understands, on the basis of the court documents and the proceedings at the hearing, that the plaintiff's request to the defendant is intended to prevent, when his personal details are entered in search engines on the Internet, such as Google, the aforementioned list with his name and information about his suspension from appearing as a hit, or the Internet user from being referred to this list as a source page.
What is this judgment about?


4.2. The Court considers that the request for disconnection constitutes a request for the performance of an act by the defendant and not a request for a decision. The claimant's request cannot therefore be regarded as an application within the meaning of Article 1:3, third paragraph, of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht, Awb). This means that the defendant's refusal to grant that request for disconnection cannot be regarded as a decision within the meaning of Section 1:3(1) of the Awb, as the defendant rightly argued in the defence.
2. In this judgment, the court assesses the defendant's refusal to take enforcement action against [third party] under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation; AVG). This concerns the measure that, as of 1 July 2018, a passenger who wishes to purchase a ticket on the bus from the bus driver can only pay for this ticket with a debit or credit card and no longer with cash. The plaintiff has requested the defendant to investigate the obligation to pay with a debit card or credit card and the abolition of cash payment on the bus and to take enforcement action against this.


Is there a decision on the basis of Regulation 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation, hereinafter: AVG)?
For the relevant laws and regulations, the court refers to the appendix. This appendix is part of the judgment.


5.1. The plaintiff argues that the refusal to grant his request for disconnection constitutes unlawful processing of personal data relating to him. The court understands that by doing so, the claimant is invoking article 17, first paragraph and under d of the AVG.
How does the court review the defendant's decision?


5.2. On 25 May 2018, the GTC entered into force. The defendant has also considered the request for disconnection in the light of that regulation.
3. In this case, the application of articles 5 and 6 of the AVG plays a role in the light of recital 39 in the preamble. The defendant has adopted a basis for processing PIN and credit card details when buying a ticket from a bus driver in Article 6(1)(b) of the AVG.
3.1.


Article 17(1) of the GCG provides that the data subject has the right to obtain from the data controller the erasure of personal data relating to him or her without unreasonable delay and that the data controller is obliged to erase personal data without unreasonable delay if one of the cases referred to in that paragraph applies.
The court will assess whether the defendant has been able to conclude that [third party] is not in breach of the AVG. If this is indeed not the case, the defendant is not entitled to take enforcement action.


Pursuant to Article 34 of the General Data Protection Implementation Act (Uitvoeringswet Algemene verordening gegevensbescherming, hereinafter: the Implementing Act), a written decision on a request as referred to in Articles 15 to 22 of the Regulation shall be taken within the time limits referred to in Article 12(3) of the Regulation and shall, insofar as it has been taken by an administrative body, such as the defendant, be deemed to be a decision within the meaning of the Awb.
To this end, the Court will assess whether article 6 of the AVG provides a basis for processing PIN and credit card details. It will also examine whether the defendant has been able to claim that the processing of these personal data meets the requirements of Article 5 of the AVG. Relevant in this respect is whether the reason why [third party] only allows debit and credit card payments in the coach is justified. Subsequently, the court assesses whether the requirements of necessity and proportionality have been met in the case of payment by debit and credit card and whether an alternative (subsidiarity) may exist (recital 39 of the AVG).


5.3. In view of the provisions of Article 34 of the Implementing Act, the defendant's refusal to apply Article 17(1) and (d) of the AVG constitutes a decision within the meaning of the Awb.
Is there a basis for data processing?


Can the claimant successfully invoke Article 17 of the AVG?
4. The plaintiff argues that he does not enter into an agreement with [third party] when using the bus, because he did not give permission for this. If it is assumed that he did give permission, he did not freely or unambiguously give this permission. The transport company has a monopoly position and the plaintiff is dependent on public transport.
4.1.


6.1. The plaintiff argues that he is no longer an attorney at law, so that (continuing) the linking of his name via search engines on the internet to the publication of the list on which his suspension was mentioned in the past no longer serves a reasonable purpose.
In the opinion of the court, the defendant was right to base the processing of the personal data of bus passengers on the transport contract. As the District Court also considered in its judgment of 5 September 2019, if a passenger uses public transport, he enters into a transport contract with a transport company. In this case, that is the plaintiff as a bus passenger and Breng/[third party] as a carrier. The processing of PIN and credit card details is therefore based on an agreement with [third party] as referred to in Section 6(1)(b) of the AVG.
4.2.


6.2. The defendant took the position that reliance on Article 17, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the AVG is of no avail to the plaintiff, since the ground for refusal in paragraph 3 and under b of that article applies. On the basis of that provision, paragraphs 1 and 2 do not apply to the extent that processing is necessary for compliance with a statutory processing obligation incumbent on the controller laid down in national law. That obligation for the defendant is laid down in Article 8b of the Advocatenwet (Lawyers' Act). The defendant referred in this respect to recital 65 of the preamble to the AVG. The Court found that it states, inter alia, that the retention of personal data for a longer period is lawful if it is necessary for the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and information, for the fulfilment of a statutory obligation, for the performance of a task in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller, for reasons of public interest in the field of public health, for archiving in the public interest, for scientific or historical research or statistical purposes or for the establishment, exercise or substantiation of a legal claim.
This ground for appeal does not succeed. The court will therefore not discuss the plaintiff's grounds relating to other provisions of Article 6 of the AVG concerning the lawfulness of the processing of personal data, such as consent of the data subject or a statutory obligation.


6.3. The District Court does not follow the plaintiff in its view that (continuing) the linking of his name via search engines on the Internet to the publication of the list on which his suspension was granted in the past no longer serves a reasonable purpose. The following is important in this respect. According to the memorandum of amendment to the Lawyers Act, the system, currently regulated in Section 8a of the Lawyers Act, is based on the situation that, for example, litigants request information about lawyers with whom they would like to collaborate, but this does not alter the fact that a more active form of publication (of the list, addition of court) is also desirable. A litigant who is already using the services of a lawyer cannot be expected to periodically request information to see whether measures have been imposed on the person concerned in the meantime and whether he is still authorised to act as a lawyer. For this reason, it is desirable that the NOvA actively publishes information about attorneys at law on whom a suspension has been irrevocably imposed or who have been removed from the tableau. In order to establish trust, the public must be able to see how the quality and integrity of the legal profession is safeguarded by means of public access to relevant information. Active disclosure sends a strong signal to society as a whole and to members of the legal profession in particular that compliance with (professional) standards is being actively enforced. It provides transparency in the operation of disciplinary law, which serves the public trust in the legal profession. Pursuant to Article 8b of the Lawyers Act, the publication of the list, to which no time limits are attached, constitutes a one-off act. In doing so, the legislator has made a general consideration between the objectives of the list and the potentially disproportionate consequences for (former) attorneys at law. The fact that the legislator has included former attorneys at law in its considerations is evident from, among other things, the explanatory memorandum (Parliamentary Papers II 2010/2011, 32382, no. 8, p. 10) where the following has been noted:
Does [third party] have a legitimate purpose to only allow debit or credit card payments on the bus?


"Imposed deletions remain transparent to everyone, even after 10 years. After all, it is conceivable that a lawyer who has once been removed will present himself as a former lawyer in order to gain the public's confidence in other cases, while concealing the reason for terminating the appeal. It cannot be ruled out in advance that a deleted attorney at law will use this to gain an influential position. As a result, trust in the legal profession may be seriously damaged. For this reason, it should be possible to check for a longer period of time whether the person concerned has been suspended from the table at any time".
5. The plaintiff argues that it is not necessary for security reasons to abolish cash payments on all bus routes. A sufficient level of security is only necessary on specific, high-risk bus routes. A general invasion of the privacy of all passengers on all bus routes is not necessary. Furthermore, security cannot be seen as a necessity for data processing, according to the plaintiff.
5.1.


6.4. The fact that the plaintiff no longer works as an attorney at law does not affect the aforementioned (general) objectives that the legislator intends to pursue with the publication of the list. It appears from the above that in addition to the protection of clients who already have an attorney at law, the preventive effect of active disclosure is important in the context of the proper administration of justice in general. Active disclosure sends a strong signal to society as a whole and to members of the profession in particular that compliance with (professional) standards is actively enforced. Together with the defendant, the court is of the opinion that if the plaintiff's request were to be granted, there would no longer be any disclosure of relevant data and that the public would then only be able to read the anonymous statements and consult the list on the defendant's source page via the website [name of website]. The Court follows defendant in the opinion that it is unlikely that the public would be able to consult the list on the defendant's source page, while the public would no longer be able to find plaintiff on the table by granting the disconnection request and that, since the list on the source page is only consulted to a very limited extent, the public would not be reached if the list could no longer be found via (search engines such as) Google.
The District Court is of the opinion that the defendant could reasonably consider the purpose for which [third party], as controller, abolished the cash payment on the bus and thereby processed personal data to be justified. [third party] has come to its decision as a result of the action programme "Social Security in Public Transport". This integrated action programme was drawn up in 2016 by parties from the public transport sector, carriers, trade unions, the police, local and regional authorities and central government. An integrated approach was chosen for the entire public transport sector to improve the safety of passengers and employees in public transport. One of the measures in this report is to no longer allow cash money in the bus to prevent theft and robbery.


6.5. Conclusion of the foregoing is that, also taking into account the limited period of time since the confirmation of its suspension of 9 July 2017 and the fact that the publication period pursuant to Section 8a(3) of the Lawyers Act has been shortened and ends on 11 July 2022, i.e. 5 years after the judgment has become irrevocable, the defendant has now refused to grant the claimant's request for disconnection pursuant to Section 17 of the AVG. The appeal on this ground is unsuccessful.
The following table is included in this action programme, where A incidents are understood to mean: assault, threat (with a weapon), theft, drug nuisance, vandalism, vandalism and offences such as pushing, pulling and spitting:


Can the claimant successfully invoke Article 18 of the AVG?
Table 1: registered A incidents regional transporters
[...]
As [third party] explained at the hearing, national efforts are being made to reduce the number of A incidents, including robberies. At [third party] robberies of bus drivers have taken place on their bus lines and this has had a huge impact on employees and passengers. By abolishing cash payments on buses, the number of robberies has dropped to almost zero nationwide.
In view of this report and the explanations provided by [third party], the defendant was able to consider the introduction of debit and credit card payments on the buses a justified objective. In this respect, the Court deems it plausible that the only option that can be chosen is to apply this national measure to all [third party] bus routes, because otherwise the robberies will be relocated. This ground for appeal is unsuccessful.


7. To the extent that the claimant invokes Article 18 of the AVG, the court considers that it has not substantiated in concrete terms why his request could be granted on one of the elements mentioned in that provision. For this reason already, the claimant cannot successfully invoke that article.
Is the processing of PIN and credit card details necessary and proportionate for the performance of the transport contract with [third party]?


Can plaintiff make a successful appeal to Article 21 of the AVG?
6. The plaintiff has argued that the burden of proof of necessity, proportionality and subsidiarity should not be placed on him but on Breng/[third party]. It concerns him not only his bank details but also his PIN code. There is a danger of hacking and profiling, according to the plaintiff.
6.1.


8. To the extent that the claimant invokes Article 21 of the AVG to object to the processing of his personal data for reasons related to his specific situation and is of the opinion that his personal interest outweighs the interest of the NOvA to maintain the list and the link, the court considers as follows. The plaintiff has not substantiated in any way with documentary evidence that the list and the enforcement of the link actually impede his ability to apply unencumbered. Therefore, the District Court agrees with the opinion of the NOvA that the social interest in publishing the list and the findability/linking of the list on Google outweighs the plaintiff's unsubstantiated interest in applying unencumbered. The appeal on this ground was unsuccessful.
In the District Court's opinion, the defendant could reasonably take the position that the processing of personal data in the case of a debit or credit card payment in the bus is limited to what is necessary for the purposes for which they are processed, and the requirement of minimum data processing has also been met. As [third party] explained at the hearing, payment by debit or credit card is made via a payment service provider (PSP). When buying a ticket in the coach, the details of the Passenger's debit card and credit card are pseudonymised and only the last four digits of the debit card and credit card are visible to the carrier. The PSP collects and processes these payments and periodically transfers the revenue to [third party]. [third party] will only periodically receive an overview of the total amount. Only the last four digits of the debit or credit card payments can be found on this overview in order to be able to retrieve them in case of any uncertainties about payments. No other information is received by [third party]. The PIN code also passes through the PSP and is not stored with [third party]. As a result, the invasion of the plaintiff's privacy by [third party] is limited to the minimum necessary to buy a ticket from the bus driver. This ground for appeal is unsuccessful.


Considerations in conclusion
Is there an alternative to [third party]?
9.1 The appeal is therefore unfounded.


9.2 The plaintiff has requested the court to order the defendant to pay compensation for damages suffered by him. It follows from Section 8:88(1)(a) of the General Administrative Law Act (Awb) that this must be an unlawful decision. From what has been ruled above, it follows that this is not the case. Now that there is also no question of one of the situations as referred to in Section 8:88(1)(b), (c) and (d) of the General Administrative Law Act that can lead to the award of compensation, the court will reject the claim for compensation.
7. The plaintiff is of the opinion that [third party] did not have to introduce the measure for all bus routes and should limit it to the high-risk bus routes. According to the plaintiff, [third party] can create a website on which employees and passengers can see on which routes cash can no longer be paid for at that time.
7.1.


9.3 There is no reason for an order to pay legal costs.
In the District Court's opinion, the defendant could reasonably take the position that [third party] cannot reasonably achieve the objective of increasing safety in the bus for employees and passengers by means of a less drastic working method. The position of [third party] that such a website will not be consulted by everyone and will lead to confusion and lack of clarity in communication among passengers and employees is plausible. third party] can also be followed that this proposal of plaintiff is not workable. It is also important that there is a national agreement. [third party] can be followed that it is not desirable to be the only one to deviate from it.
Decision
7.2.
The court:
 
- dismisses the appeal as unfounded;
The plaintiff may, incidentally, choose to buy bus tickets in advance. The plaintiff can also travel with a non-nominative public transport chip card which he can recharge at the ticket machine (anonymously). The defendant did not have to come to any other conclusion that the plaintiff was inconvenienced by this. Therefore, this ground of appeal is unsuccessful.
- rejects the claim for damages.


R.B. Kleiss, chairman, and O.P.G. Vos and L.Z. have issued this decision. Achouak el Idrissi, members, in the presence of E.M. de Buur, Registrar. The decision was publicly pronounced on 25 September 2019.
Other grounds of appeal. Conclusion


is prevented from signing the verdict
8. The plaintiff has put forward further grounds of appeal. The plaintiff's fear that there will increasingly be a society in which the privacy of the citizen will be put under pressure. However, these grounds do not directly relate to the contested decision and therefore cannot detract from its lawfulness. The other grounds for appeal do not detract from this either.


court clerk
9. Because the grounds of appeal are unsuccessful, the appeal is unfounded. There are no grounds for an order to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Decision


judge
The court declares the appeal unfounded.


Copy sent to parties on:
This ruling was made by J.H. van Breda, chairman, W.P.C.G. Derksen and W.P.C.G. Derksen.
Legal remedy


An appeal may be lodged with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State against this decision within six weeks of the date on which it was sent. If an appeal has been lodged, a request may be made to the Interim Injunction Judge of the Higher Appeal Court for a preliminary injunction or for the annulment or modification of a preliminary injunction made by this decision.
Mr S.E.M. Lichtenberg, Judges, in the presence of Mr M.G. Smeenk, Registrar.
</pre>
</pre>

Latest revision as of 16:18, 10 March 2022

Rb. Gelderland - AWB 19/2901
Courts logo1.png
Court: Rb. Gelderland (Netherlands)
Jurisdiction: Netherlands
Relevant Law: Article 5 GDPR
Article 6(1)(b) GDPR
Recital 39 GDPR
Decided: 04.02.2020
Published: 05.02.2020
Parties: Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens (Dutch DPA)
National Case Number/Name: AWB 19/2901
European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:NL:RBGEL:2020:619
Appeal from:
Appeal to:
Original Language(s): Dutch
Original Source: (in Dutch)
Initial Contributor: n/a

The Gelderland Court of First Instance confirmed that the measure according to which passengers can purchase tickets on the buses only by means of credit/ debit cards is compatible with the principles of necessity and proportionality and that the subsequent processing of personal data is necessary for the performance of this purchase contract (Article 6(1)(b) GDPR). Therefore, the processing is compatible with the GDPR.

English Summary

Facts

In the Netherlands, as of 1 July 2018 a passenger who wishes to purchase a ticket on the bus from the bus driver can only pay for this ticket with a debit or credit card and no longer with cash. The plaintiff requested the Dutch DPA to investigate the obligation to pay with a debit or credit card and the abolition of cash payments on the bus and to take an enforcement action against this measure under the GDPR. The DPA rejected the request and the plaintiff appealed its decision. He also asked the Court to suspend the present judgement until the CJEU issues a judgement on the preliminary questions which the Constitutional Court of Belgium referred with its judgement no. 135/2019 on the processing of passenger data. The DPA argued that the legal basis for the processing of PIN and credit card details when purchasing a ticket from a bus driver is Article 6(1)(b) GDPR.

Dispute

The Court had to assess whether the Dutch DPA has been able to conclude that the third party did not violate the GDPR and subsequently whether it did not have to take an enforcement action indeed. To this end, the Court had to assess whether Article 6 GDPR provides a legal basis for processing credit cards details and whether the processing is compliant with Article 5 GDPR. It also had to examine whether the criteria of necessity and proportionality had been met in this case.

Holding

The Court found that the legal basis of Article 6(1)(b) GDPR is valid, hence there was no reason to further examine possible application of other legal grounds. Moreover, the Dutch DPA could reasonably consider the purpose of abolishing cash, since this measure was included in the action programme "Social Security in Public Transport" and aimed at the prevention of theft and robbery. For this purpose, the only plausible option for all third parties and bus routes could be only that one. The DPA could reasonably take the position that the processing of personal data in case of debit or credit card payments is limited to what is necessary for the purpose pursued and the principle of data minimisation is respected. The DPA could reasonably consider that there was no other, less drastic method to achieve the same objective.

The Court declared the appeal unfounded.

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English Machine Translation of the Decision

The decision below is a machine translation of the original. Please refer to the Dutch original for more details.

DECISION

Process sequence

By decision of 10 January 2019, the defendant rejected a claimant's request to take enforcement action against [third party].

By decision of 14 May 2019 (the contested decision), the defendant dismissed plaintiff's objection as unfounded.

Plaintiff appealed against the contested decision.

The defendant filed a statement of defence.

Third party submitted a written statement of defence.

The investigation at the hearing took place on 16 December 2019. Plaintiff has appeared. The defendant is represented by its agents. Third Party is represented by its agents and M.J.M. Piels.
Considerations

Why doesn't the court grant the plaintiff's request for arrest?

1. The plaintiff has requested that his case be stayed pending the answer to preliminary questions from the Constitutional Court of Belgium and pending the ruling on the appeal to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (the Division) in a similar case previously conducted by him.
1.1.

The court sees no reason to do so. In its ruling of 17 October 2019 (judgment no. 135/2019), the Constitutional Court of Belgium referred preliminary questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union. These questions relate to the national (Belgian) law of 25 December 2016 on the processing of passenger data. By this law, the (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016, 2004/82/EC of the Council of 29 April 2004 and 2010/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 October 2010 have been transposed into (national) law. Directive 2004/82/EC aims at improving border controls and combating illegal immigration and covers the professional transport of persons by air. Directive 2010/65 aims to simplify and harmonise the administrative procedures applicable to maritime transport. Directive 2016/681 lays down rules on the transfer by air carriers of Passenger Name Records (PNR) on flights for the purpose of the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime.

One of the questions of the Constitutional Court of Belgium concerns the applicability of Article 23 of the AVG to (this) national legislation. For the rest, the questions relate to Directive (EU) 2016/681.

In the opinion of the Court, the answers given by the European Court to the questions asked do not affect the plaintiff's appeal in this case. The directives mentioned are not at issue and the AVG has been directly applied in this case and not through national legislation.

Nor is there any reason to await the decision of the Division on the appeal of the plaintiff against the decision of this court of 5 September 2019 in cases AWB 18/546 and 18/14871. The enforcement request at issue in this case relates to facts other than those referred to in the judgment of 5 September 2019.

What is this judgment about?

2. In this judgment, the court assesses the defendant's refusal to take enforcement action against [third party] under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation; AVG). This concerns the measure that, as of 1 July 2018, a passenger who wishes to purchase a ticket on the bus from the bus driver can only pay for this ticket with a debit or credit card and no longer with cash. The plaintiff has requested the defendant to investigate the obligation to pay with a debit card or credit card and the abolition of cash payment on the bus and to take enforcement action against this.

For the relevant laws and regulations, the court refers to the appendix. This appendix is part of the judgment.

How does the court review the defendant's decision?

3. In this case, the application of articles 5 and 6 of the AVG plays a role in the light of recital 39 in the preamble. The defendant has adopted a basis for processing PIN and credit card details when buying a ticket from a bus driver in Article 6(1)(b) of the AVG.
3.1.

The court will assess whether the defendant has been able to conclude that [third party] is not in breach of the AVG. If this is indeed not the case, the defendant is not entitled to take enforcement action.

To this end, the Court will assess whether article 6 of the AVG provides a basis for processing PIN and credit card details. It will also examine whether the defendant has been able to claim that the processing of these personal data meets the requirements of Article 5 of the AVG. Relevant in this respect is whether the reason why [third party] only allows debit and credit card payments in the coach is justified. Subsequently, the court assesses whether the requirements of necessity and proportionality have been met in the case of payment by debit and credit card and whether an alternative (subsidiarity) may exist (recital 39 of the AVG).

Is there a basis for data processing?

4. The plaintiff argues that he does not enter into an agreement with [third party] when using the bus, because he did not give permission for this. If it is assumed that he did give permission, he did not freely or unambiguously give this permission. The transport company has a monopoly position and the plaintiff is dependent on public transport.
4.1.

In the opinion of the court, the defendant was right to base the processing of the personal data of bus passengers on the transport contract. As the District Court also considered in its judgment of 5 September 2019, if a passenger uses public transport, he enters into a transport contract with a transport company. In this case, that is the plaintiff as a bus passenger and Breng/[third party] as a carrier. The processing of PIN and credit card details is therefore based on an agreement with [third party] as referred to in Section 6(1)(b) of the AVG.
4.2.

This ground for appeal does not succeed. The court will therefore not discuss the plaintiff's grounds relating to other provisions of Article 6 of the AVG concerning the lawfulness of the processing of personal data, such as consent of the data subject or a statutory obligation.

Does [third party] have a legitimate purpose to only allow debit or credit card payments on the bus?

5. The plaintiff argues that it is not necessary for security reasons to abolish cash payments on all bus routes. A sufficient level of security is only necessary on specific, high-risk bus routes. A general invasion of the privacy of all passengers on all bus routes is not necessary. Furthermore, security cannot be seen as a necessity for data processing, according to the plaintiff.
5.1.

The District Court is of the opinion that the defendant could reasonably consider the purpose for which [third party], as controller, abolished the cash payment on the bus and thereby processed personal data to be justified. [third party] has come to its decision as a result of the action programme "Social Security in Public Transport". This integrated action programme was drawn up in 2016 by parties from the public transport sector, carriers, trade unions, the police, local and regional authorities and central government. An integrated approach was chosen for the entire public transport sector to improve the safety of passengers and employees in public transport. One of the measures in this report is to no longer allow cash money in the bus to prevent theft and robbery.

The following table is included in this action programme, where A incidents are understood to mean: assault, threat (with a weapon), theft, drug nuisance, vandalism, vandalism and offences such as pushing, pulling and spitting:

Table 1: registered A incidents regional transporters
[...]
As [third party] explained at the hearing, national efforts are being made to reduce the number of A incidents, including robberies. At [third party] robberies of bus drivers have taken place on their bus lines and this has had a huge impact on employees and passengers. By abolishing cash payments on buses, the number of robberies has dropped to almost zero nationwide.
In view of this report and the explanations provided by [third party], the defendant was able to consider the introduction of debit and credit card payments on the buses a justified objective. In this respect, the Court deems it plausible that the only option that can be chosen is to apply this national measure to all [third party] bus routes, because otherwise the robberies will be relocated. This ground for appeal is unsuccessful.

Is the processing of PIN and credit card details necessary and proportionate for the performance of the transport contract with [third party]?

6. The plaintiff has argued that the burden of proof of necessity, proportionality and subsidiarity should not be placed on him but on Breng/[third party]. It concerns him not only his bank details but also his PIN code. There is a danger of hacking and profiling, according to the plaintiff.
6.1.

In the District Court's opinion, the defendant could reasonably take the position that the processing of personal data in the case of a debit or credit card payment in the bus is limited to what is necessary for the purposes for which they are processed, and the requirement of minimum data processing has also been met. As [third party] explained at the hearing, payment by debit or credit card is made via a payment service provider (PSP). When buying a ticket in the coach, the details of the Passenger's debit card and credit card are pseudonymised and only the last four digits of the debit card and credit card are visible to the carrier. The PSP collects and processes these payments and periodically transfers the revenue to [third party]. [third party] will only periodically receive an overview of the total amount. Only the last four digits of the debit or credit card payments can be found on this overview in order to be able to retrieve them in case of any uncertainties about payments. No other information is received by [third party]. The PIN code also passes through the PSP and is not stored with [third party]. As a result, the invasion of the plaintiff's privacy by [third party] is limited to the minimum necessary to buy a ticket from the bus driver. This ground for appeal is unsuccessful.

Is there an alternative to [third party]?

7. The plaintiff is of the opinion that [third party] did not have to introduce the measure for all bus routes and should limit it to the high-risk bus routes. According to the plaintiff, [third party] can create a website on which employees and passengers can see on which routes cash can no longer be paid for at that time.
7.1.

In the District Court's opinion, the defendant could reasonably take the position that [third party] cannot reasonably achieve the objective of increasing safety in the bus for employees and passengers by means of a less drastic working method. The position of [third party] that such a website will not be consulted by everyone and will lead to confusion and lack of clarity in communication among passengers and employees is plausible. third party] can also be followed that this proposal of plaintiff is not workable. It is also important that there is a national agreement. [third party] can be followed that it is not desirable to be the only one to deviate from it.
7.2.

The plaintiff may, incidentally, choose to buy bus tickets in advance. The plaintiff can also travel with a non-nominative public transport chip card which he can recharge at the ticket machine (anonymously). The defendant did not have to come to any other conclusion that the plaintiff was inconvenienced by this. Therefore, this ground of appeal is unsuccessful.

Other grounds of appeal. Conclusion

8. The plaintiff has put forward further grounds of appeal. The plaintiff's fear that there will increasingly be a society in which the privacy of the citizen will be put under pressure. However, these grounds do not directly relate to the contested decision and therefore cannot detract from its lawfulness. The other grounds for appeal do not detract from this either.

9. Because the grounds of appeal are unsuccessful, the appeal is unfounded. There are no grounds for an order to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Decision

The court declares the appeal unfounded.

This ruling was made by J.H. van Breda, chairman, W.P.C.G. Derksen and W.P.C.G. Derksen.

Mr S.E.M. Lichtenberg, Judges, in the presence of Mr M.G. Smeenk, Registrar.