Rb. Rotterdam - ROT 21/3636: Difference between revisions

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The Rotterdam District Court ordered the Rotterdam police to grant a data subject's right to rectification under [[Article 12 GDPR]], and to correct inaccurate data held in its records related to domestic abuse allegations by his ex-wife.
The Rotterdam District Court ordered the Rotterdam police to facilitate a data subject's rectification request under [[Article 12 GDPR]] and to correct inaccurate data held in its records related to domestic abuse allegations by his ex-wife.


== English Summary ==
== English Summary ==

Revision as of 11:24, 27 April 2022

Rb. Rotterdam - ROT 21/3636
Courts logo1.png
Court: Rb. Rotterdam (Netherlands)
Jurisdiction: Netherlands
Relevant Law: Article 12 GDPR
Article 16 GDPR
Decided: 29.03.2022
Published: 07.04.2022
Parties: Police Rotterdam
National Case Number/Name: ROT 21/3636
European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:NL:RBROT:2022:2574
Appeal from:
Appeal to: Unknown
Original Language(s): Dutch
Original Source: Rechtspraak.nl (in Dutch)
Initial Contributor: Giel Ritzen

The Rotterdam District Court ordered the Rotterdam police to facilitate a data subject's rectification request under Article 12 GDPR and to correct inaccurate data held in its records related to domestic abuse allegations by his ex-wife.

English Summary

Facts

This dispute was between a divorced father (the data subject) and the chief of police of Rotterdam (the controller). In 2020, the data subject found out that Veilig Thuis (an advice and reporting centre for domestic violence and child abuse) had registered two reports on him in their database. The first registration stated that he had committed domestic violence and that subsequently he was temporarily denied entrance to the home we previously shared with his ex-wife. According to the data subject, these allegations were unfounded. The second registration was also inaccurate, according to the data subject, since the report did not adequately state that his ex-wife had moved to a new place with their son, without informing him of the new location.

He requested to have the first report deleted, and the other rectified, but Veilig Thuis refused. The data subject then brought the issue before Court, which decided that Veilig Thuis did not have a substantial interest in retaining the personal data, and that it had to delete the first report and amend the other. Because Veilig Thuis had received the information from the Rotterdam police, the data subject subsequently requested the police to delete the inaccurate personal data and rectify the reports. The police, however, claimed that the information was accurate, and refused to rectify their files on the data subject.

The data subject then brought the issue before the District Court of First Instance of Rotterdam (hereinafter the Court), basing his claim on Article 12 GDPR on transparent information, communication and modalities for the exercise of the rights of the data subject, and his right to obtain from the controller the rectification of inaccurate personal data pursuant to Article 16 GDPR.

Holding

The Court upheld the claim. Regarding the first registration (on alleged domestic violence), the Court considered that, in 2019, the police had decided not to further investigate the allegations of domestic violence brought forward by the data subject's ex-wife. Hence, the Court stated that the report needed to be rectified in the sense that it must speak of "alleged" domestic violence. Moreover, the Court found that it must clearly follow from the report that the temporary ban to enter his previous home was instated by the judge in the divorce procedure and had nothing to do with the alleged domestic violence.

Regarding the second registration, the Court found that the report did not accurately display that the new address his ex-wife had moved into with their son, and that he was not provided this information.

The Court concluded that the personal data held by the Police was inaccurate, and ordered the police to grant the data subject's right to rectification and correct it.

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English Machine Translation of the Decision

The decision below is a machine translation of the Dutch original. Please refer to the Dutch original for more details.

COURT ROTTERDAM

Administrative law

case number: ROT 21/3636

judgment of the single chamber of 29 March 2022 in the case between

[name of claimant], from [place of claimant] , claimant

and

the chief of police, the chief of police of the Rotterdam regional unit, defendant

(authorized representative: mr. I.D. de Hoop).

Process sequence

With the decision of 18 May 2021 (the contested decision), the respondent partly rejected the claimant's request for destruction or rectification of police data on the basis of Article 28 of the Police Data Act (Wpg).

The applicant appealed against the contested decision.

Defendant has filed a statement of defence.

The court heard the appeal on February 3, 2022. Plaintiff appeared, accompanied by his partner [name]. Defendant was represented by his authorized representative.

Considerations

history

1.1.

As a result of a so-called VT report on February 12, 2020, Safe at Home has created file 84505. Plaintiff requested this file from Safe Home, which also made him aware at that time of the existence of file 63117, which Safe Home had created in response to an earlier VT report on 1 February 2019. Both VT reports come from the Rotterdam police unit.

1.2.

On March 23, 2020, the claimant requested Safe Home to destroy file 63117 and to adjust file 84505. Safe Home replied by letter dated April 16, 2020 that the requested changes to file 84505 will be implemented. Safe Home rejected the request for destruction of file 63117 by decision of 1 September 2020.

1.3.

Plaintiff subsequently requested the civil judge of the Rotterdam District Court on 16 October 2020 to order Safe Home, among other things, to destroy the file 63117 and adjust the file 84505, in the sense that from that file the data and information relating to the file 63117 will be deleted.

1.4.

In its decision of 1 March 2021, the civil court considered - in short - that it is not reasonably plausible that the retention of the personal data is of significant importance for someone other than the claimant and that this means that Veilig Thuis must delete the file 63117. File 84505 must be amended in such a way that the data and information related to file 63117 are removed from file 84505.

This procedure

1.5.

On March 8, 2021, the claimant submitted a request to the defendant to destroy or rectify the police data registered about him. Plaintiff based his request on Article 28 of the Wpg and Articles 12 and 16 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and based it on the following:

“(…) From the information that was read out during the 'telephone inspection' and from the data that Safe Home received from the police, it appears that a number of errors have crept into the file. This is because both the police and Safe Home incorrectly speak of domestic violence and a housing ban, which has an unjustly defamatory after-effect. Safe Home has now been obliged by the court to destroy a file and adjust a number of data. I would also like to request you to remove all incorrect data so that I can no longer be wrongly registered as a perpetrator of domestic violence, resulting in a housing ban. This has far-reaching consequences for me and my son. †

2. In the contested decision, the defendant - in summary - ruled as follows. The information relating to the claimant with registration number [official report number 1] has proven to be correct and complete. The defendant has therefore rejected the request for amendment to that extent and has not corrected the police data. This means that these police data remain unchanged. The defendant has further concluded that the information relating to the claimant must be supplemented with registration number [procedural report number 2], because these are factually incorrect because they are incomplete. Defendant granted the request for amendment to that extent. The reporting officer has since made an addition to what the reporting officer can remember regarding the report.

3. The applicable laws and regulations are included in the appendix, which is part of this ruling.

4. The claimant argues in the first place on appeal that he does not agree with the time limit within which the contested decision was taken. Defendant received his request on March 9, 2021. The applicant did not receive the contested decision until May 19, 2021, i.e. more than ten weeks after submitting his request, instead of within the statutory period of four weeks.

4.1.

In view of the text of Article 28, paragraph 3, of the Wpg, the defendant should have notified the claimant in writing within four weeks with regard to the follow-up of the claimant's request. It is not in dispute between the parties that the defendant did not take the contested decision within that period.

4.2.

In a letter dated May 18, 2021, the plaintiff gave the defendant notice of default and requested the defendant to provide a written answer about his request within two weeks. The defendant took the contested decision a day later, i.e. within the period of two weeks set by the plaintiff. In view of this and now that the claimant does not attach any consequences to his position that he does not agree with the term within which the decision was taken, what the claimant has argued cannot lead to annulment of the contested decision. The ground of appeal fails.

5. The central question in this case is whether the defendant has validly decided to adjust some of the police data relating to the claimant and to leave the rest of the police data unchanged. The court will assess this per notification below.

With regard to the first report (with registration number [official report number 1])

6. It appears from Exhibit 2 submitted by the claimant in his notice of appeal that on 1 February 2019 – insofar as relevant – the police made the following report to Safe at Home:

“(…) On Friday 01-02-2019, the mother (…) reported abuse and trespassing and trespassing/local trespassing committed by the father ([name of plaintiff]) at the Noord police station) [the court understands: [name of plaintiff] ]. Those involved are in a divorce, but this is not without problems. Father has a restraining order, partly because there was too much tension in the house, which caused his son (…) a disadvantage. This provisional provision of a housing ban has been imposed by the court in Rotterdam.

On 31-01-2019 there was an escalation between both parents after a valuation of the house. Dad took goods from the shed and put them in the trunk of the car and mom wanted to know what. Mother says father assaulted her, mother says father deliberately and forcefully slammed the tailgate shut and then the tailgate hit the back of the mother's head. Mother has a bruise on the back of her head and a headache. Mother says that father grabbed her with his right hand, by her left upper arm and pushed back. Mother was left with a bruised spot on her upper arm and pain in her back.

Specify the involvement of the minors:

Domestic violence has taken place in the family or domestic circle of this minor, whereby the minor was not present / was not a witness during the violence. †

The person concerned (…) reacted as follows: Afraid of the perpetrator (ex-husband) [name of claimant] [the court understands: [name of claimant]].

Relevant registrations

This concerns the first VT report for the family. No further relevant registrations on either person. †

6.1.

Plaintiff has – in summary – requested the court to have the term 'domestic violence' changed to 'not investigated report of domestic violence' and to have the terms 'residential prohibition' and 'temporary restraining order' removed, only to mention that the house had been destroyed during the divorce proceedings. was awarded to the ex-partner of the claimant by means of a provisional injunction and that this may not or cannot be interpreted or construed as a result of the reporting of domestic violence, in view of the unjustified continuing effect of this, according to the claimant.

6.2.

In the statement of defence, the defendant states that this report refers to the fact that the declarant reported that she had been mistreated and that this did not relate to the findings of the police. However, the bottom passage of the report, if read separately, leaves room for the assumption that the reporting police officer states that the domestic violence actually took place. The defendant will therefore, by means of an additional decision to be taken, adjust the bottom passage of this notification in: Specify the involvement of the minors: domestic violence has been reported from the family or domestic circle of this minor, whereby the minor was involved during the violence was not present/was not a witness.” Furthermore, the report in the police system has rightly been placed in the category of 'domestic violence', because the report actually relates to violence within the relational sphere. The fact that the report was not processed because it contained too few investigative indications to lead to possible prosecution does not affect the right of the plaintiff's ex-partner to file a report, according to the defendant.

6.2.1.

The court finds that the defendant has only partially met the objections of the plaintiff against this registration. Although the defendant rightly states that the plaintiff's ex-partner has the right to file a report against him, it has been established between the parties that the report was never examined and that it has therefore not been established that the plaintiff actually committed domestic violence. The defendant itself also states that the report was not processed because it contained too few investigative indications to be able to lead to possible prosecution.

6.2.2.

As the claimant rightly states, the terms “domestic violence” and “residential prohibition” are linked in the second notification. In addition, the claimant states that Safe Home has taken over and indicates that it cannot adjust that sentence, because this is what the police reported.

6.2.3.

In the opinion of the court, the claimant has thus shown that, as a result of the first report, he is wrongly registered as a perpetrator of domestic violence and that this haunts him, as it were. The fact that this is enormously burdensome for the claimant is apparent from the documents and has also proved more than sufficient during the court hearing. He therefore has a legitimate interest in the first VT report unequivocally showing the difference between statements by his ex-partner and objective observations by police officers, that it includes alleged domestic violence and that the report by the ex-partner partner has not been examined due to insufficient detection indications. The defendant's attorney stated at the hearing that she has no objection to this.

6.3.

In the statement of defence, the defendant further states that, although the registration refers to a "provisional provision for a restraining order", such registrations are intended for internal use and can therefore only be consulted by police officers, so that it is sufficiently clear that the The term “residential ban” does not concern a measure imposed by the mayor, but the outcome of a provisional injunction. In order to satisfy the claimant, the following text will nevertheless be added to the registration: “the text of the prohibition on housing is colloquial language and should be replaced by the text “the provisional injunction that Mr [name of claimant] [understands the court: [name of claimant] ]] should not be in the home,” said the defendant.

6.3.1.

It appears from the divorce decision (Exhibit 4 to the notice of appeal) that the family judge examined whether the plaintiff could stay in the matrimonial home with his ex-partner, but that this encountered objections from the ex-partner. The family judge has therefore, in the interest of the son, assigned the house to the ex-partner. Furthermore, the claimant has stated without being contradicted that he subsequently bought out his ex-partner and that he is now staying in the house again.

6.3.2.

This means that the court has established that the (temporary) assignment of the marital home to the ex-partner had nothing to do with domestic violence, but was only a provisional measure in the context of the divorce proceedings. With regard to this point, the court is therefore of the opinion that the claimant is right to argue that the "residential prohibition"/"temporary restraining order" used by the defendant, which are imposed as a result of domestic violence, has a completely different meaning and gives a different suggestion than should be. in the nature of the provisional provision made above.

6.3.3.

The fact that the claimant was temporarily not staying in the house as a result of the provisional injunction does not mean that there was a housing ban. In the opinion of the court, the defendant cannot suffice for that reason alone with the mere addition that this concerns colloquial language. The documents show, as the plaintiff rightly states, that the use of this 'colloquial language' in official documents has already had far-reaching consequences, including the effect in the second notification. In his response to the statement of defence, the claimant stated that the social worker of [institution] [municipality] engaged by Veilig Thuis saw the claimant in advance as an aggressor because it would appear from information provided to him that the claimant would have used violence, resulting in a restraining order. The court understands that this effect must also be extremely onerous for the plaintiff. The Plaintiff therefore has a legitimate interest in having the notification amended on this point as well, in order to prevent such an effect in the future and, where possible, to have that effect undone.

6.3.4.

Moreover, the adjustment made by the defendant - the phrase "not allowed to be in the house" - is not that much different and within the total context of the VT report, as it currently reads, in fact no less defamatory than "a restraining order has". Moreover, the court cannot accept the defendant's assertion that the registrations are intended for internal use and can only be consulted by police officers. In any case, the first report was passed on to Safe Home in these terms and this body is not part of the police organisation. In this connection it is also important that Safe Home has informed the claimant that it cannot adjust her file any further than she has already done, because this is what she received from the police. To that extent, too, the plaintiff therefore has a legitimate interest in a more far-reaching adjustment than the defendant has proposed.

6.3.5.

The defendant's representative stated at the hearing that she has no objection to the registration on these points being adjusted in line with what the family judge has ruled.

6.4.

The conclusion is that the grounds of appeal with regard to the first notification succeed. The court will declare the appeal well-founded to that extent and annul the contested decision to that extent. It will furthermore determine, pursuant to Article 8:72, paragraph 3, under b, of the General Administrative Law Act (Awb) that this decision will replace the annulled decision to that extent. This means that the notification on the aforementioned points must be adjusted in the defendant's system as follows:

“(…) On Friday 01-02-2019, the mother (…) reported abuse and domestic trespassing/local trespassing committed by the father ([name of claimant]) at the Noord police station. Those involved are in a divorce, but this is not without problems. Father has a restraining order, partly because there was too much tension in the house, which caused his son (…) a disadvantage. This provisional provision of a housing ban has been imposed by the court in Rotterdam. In the context of the divorce proceedings, the family judge temporarily assigned the matrimonial home to the mother as a provisional measure. This has nothing to do with domestic violence.

On 31-01-2019 there was an escalation between both parents after a valuation of the house. Dad took goods from the shed and put them in the trunk of the car and mom wanted to know what. Mother says father assaulted her, mother says father deliberately and forcefully slammed the tailgate shut and then the tailgate hit the back of the mother's head. Mother says she has a bruise on the back of her head and a headache. Mother says that father grabbed her with his right hand, by her left upper arm and pushed back. According to her mother, this left a bruised spot on her upper arm and pain in her back.

Specify the involvement of the minors:

Domestic violence has taken place in the family or domestic circle of this minor. where the minor was not present during the violence/this escalation/was not a witness. †

The person concerned (…) reacted as follows: Afraid of the perpetrator (ex husband [name of plaintiff]).

Relevant registrations

This concerns the first VT report for the family. No further relevant registrations on either person. † The report of domestic violence by the mother has not been further investigated because of the lack of sufficient investigative indications.”

With regard to the second report (with registration number [official report number 2] )

7. It appears from the Exhibit 9 submitted by the claimant in his notice of appeal that the police made the following report to Safe at Home on 12 February 2020 – insofar as relevant:

“(…) Meldster did not get an 8-year-old son with her. The reason is that the father (…) is seriously concerned about the child because, according to him, he was now moving to [place] and in his view that was contrary to the legal regulation. (…) Now he wanted answers to questions before handing over the child. It was not entirely clear to us from the documents that both parties could show and we did not want to drag the child. After much back and forth, the new partners of both parties also did their best to convince us, we sought advice from the OVDP.

He referred to the CIT and they had the documents read out and concluded that the child really had to go with the mother. This happened but was nevertheless an unpleasant situation for all parties.

Specify the involvement of the minors:

Other concerns. Child notices that the subject is a conflict between the parents. †

Relevant registrations

This concerns the 2nd Safe Home report for the family. Furthermore, no relevant registrations on all persons. 1st VT report on February 1, 2019 in connection with HG. At the time, a restraining order against [name of plaintiff]. †

7.1.

The claimant has - in summary - requested the court to have the defendant adjust the file, so that it is clear that his ex-partner had moved with his son to an address unknown to him without his permission. Furthermore, the claimant requests that references to the legal basis for the relocation, the contact with Youth Care and a document that would have been signed by the claimant be removed, as this is not correct. Finally, the claimant requests that the registration with regard to the collision be adjusted. If the police misjudged the situation because information from the first report was mistakenly mistaken for truth, the claimant would like to see this added to the file. It should be clear what the facts are and what the personal interpretations or assumptions are of the agents. A report has also been made to Safe Home about this registration, whereby the first report is repeated incorrectly, since Veilig Thuis was informed that this concerns a second report, according to the claimant.

7.1.1.

Respondent has explained in the statement of defense that this registration contains a mutation in which the findings of the relevant police officers are recorded, as well as a notification to Safe at Home. The mutation contains the following text:

Reporter did not get an 8-year-old son with her. Father who lives [lacquered] was seriously concerned about the child because, according to him, he was now moving to [place] and in his view that was contrary to the law. He was also very concerned about his child's performance at school having deteriorated and he would have liked to arrange support at school, but his ex did not agree. The documents that both parties could show did not show this 1 2 3 but we did not want to drag the child. After much back and forth, during which the new partners of both parties also did their best to convince us, we sought advice from the OVDP [lacquered] They referred to the CIT and they had the documents read out and concluded that the child was really involved had to go with mother. This happened but it was an unpleasant situation for all parties

†

rap. [lacquered]

LTHG consultation 23/04 this case discussed social work deployed, both parents spoken. Both parents have new partners. However, the child in question is still at school in [place]. Safe at home is aware of this problem. Continue to monitor this and parents have a contact person at social work.

†

Rapp [lacquered]

Supplement in response to writing by colleague [lacquered]

During the handling of the incident, I had telephone contact with a youth care employee. However, due to the long term, I don't remember her name and phone number. She indicated that there was a legal basis that the mother of the child could decide for herself where the child would live. This was also in writing that both parents would have signed for. The father also knew where the child would stay in [place]. In addition, the grandfather would have been hit. Conflicting statements showed that the father had jumped in front of the car. There was no intentional collision and we mainly focused on mediation."

7.1.2.

The defendant argues in the statement of defense that the text of this amendment sufficiently demonstrates that the police officer concerned has recorded his findings, namely that the Youth Care employee communicated this information to him. The fact that the claimant does not agree with the content of this information does not make the findings of the relevant police officer incorrect or incomplete. With regard to the complainant's comments about the handling of the incident by the local police officers and to what extent the previous registration may have influenced their perception, the respondent argues that this falls outside the scope of these proceedings, as the Wpg relates to data captured by the police systems and not on the thoughts or motives of police officers. The registration, as supplemented, is not incorrect or incomplete and it appears that contradictory statements have been made about the situation in which the claimant's father was allegedly hit by a car. Although it is conceivable that after the conversation with the police officers on site, the Claimant had different expectations with regard to the handling of the (attempted) collision, while the efforts of the police officials were mainly aimed at mediating in a conceivable manner harmful to the Claimant's son. conflict, the defendant is of the opinion that this also falls outside the scope of the present proceedings.

7.1.3.

The court states first and foremost that, contrary to what the claimant argues, the direct cause has been correctly included in this notification. After all, the complainant (the claimant's ex-partner) did not receive their son from the claimant – which the claimant has also acknowledged – and that was the direct reason for the involvement of the police and subsequently the second VT report. The reasons that the claimant had for not wanting to give his son along cannot alter that single fact in itself.

7.1.4.

Although the defendant rightly argues that the mutation with regard to the contact between the police officer and a youth care employee is a factual representation of the findings of that police officer, this mutation does raise the necessary questions. In the first place, Plaintiff has stated without being contradicted that the family has never had anything to do with Youth Care. This raises the question of what exactly the Youth Care employee based on when providing the information to the police officer. It also appears from the judgment in summary proceedings of 15 May 2020 submitted by the claimant as Exhibit 8 with his notice of appeal that the information provided is demonstrably incorrect. The joint custody of the claimant and his ex-partner had already been established earlier, the ex-partner did not have the claimant's permission to move to [place] with their son (and did not ask the judge for alternative permission) and it was thus not free her to move to [place] with the son. In the judgment in summary proceedings, no further mention is made of a written agreement to that effect to which the claimant would have signed, so that serious doubts can also be raised about the correctness of the statement "This was also in writing for which both parents would have signed .” Finally, in these proceedings, the claimant has made it plausible by means of a logbook dated February 3, 2020 from his son's school that he did not know, at least not from the outset, where his son was staying, so that the comment "The father where the child would reside in [place].” appears to be incorrect.

The court has established that the change does not provide any clarity on this point with regard to the answer to the question on what knowledge or information this youth care employee relied on in her contact with the police. It would have been up to the police officer to provide that clarity. Since this has not happened and now that at least part of the information is demonstrably incorrect, the claimant has a legitimate interest in having the registration adjusted on this point. This also applies to the suggestion that the plaintiff, without reason, did not cooperate in the implementation of the visitation arrangement. In the opinion of the court, it is logical to formulate the registration on this point in terms that are as neutral as possible, while avoiding confusion about this in the future.

7.1.5.

At the hearing, the mutation with regard to the intentional or unintentional (attempted) collision of the plaintiff's father by his ex-partner's new partner was also discussed. Plaintiff explained that he was angry about this incident and that he therefore wanted to see the incident included in the report. Plaintiff also stated that he told police officers at that time that he wanted to file a report. The defendant's attorney explained at the hearing that the collision had not been dealt with. According to her, what the police officer wanted to say in the VT report is that it has not been investigated whether there has been a (attempted) collision, because they focused on mediation with regard to the child.

7.1.6.

The court finds that the mutation does not excel in clarity on this point. This is because it states that “it appeared from contradictory statements (…) that the father had jumped in front of the car”, while logically it cannot be established that something has emerged if contradictory statements have been made about it. It is true that the claimant has stated that after this incident he stated that he wished to file a report, but at the hearing the respondent's representative stated with reasons that at that time in any case no official report had been filed, because the reporting officers focused on mediation. Although the court understands that feelings were very high that day, it considers it appropriate under these circumstances to change the report regarding the (attempted) collision in terms that are as neutral as possible, while avoiding confusion about this.

7.1.7.

Finally, the defendant correctly states in the defense that the Wpg relates to data recorded in the police systems and not to the thoughts or motives of police officers. The court therefore sees no reason to adjust the report with comments about whether or not the situation was misjudged because information from the first report was mistakenly mistaken for truth by the reporting officers, as requested by the plaintiff.

7.2.

The conclusion is that the grounds for appeal with regard to the second notification also largely succeed. The court will declare the appeal well-founded to that extent and annul the contested decision to that extent. Furthermore, in application of Article 8:72(3)(b) of the General Administrative Law Act, it will determine that this decision will replace the annulled decision to that extent. This means that the notification and the changes made to it on the aforementioned points must be adjusted in the defendant's system as follows:

The notification

“(…) Meldster stated that she could not get her 8-year-old son with her. The reason is that the father who lives [lacquered] stated that he is seriously concerned about his son because, according to him, he was now moving to [place] and in his view that was contrary to the legal regulation. Furthermore, he was very concerned about his child's performance in school

deteriorated and he would have liked to arrange support at school, but his ex did not agree. Now he wanted to get answers to questions before handing over the child. From the documents that both parties were able to show, it was not entirely clear to us who was right and we did not want to drag the child. After much back and forth, the new partners of both parties also did their best to convince us, we sought advice from the OVDP. He referred to the CIT and they had the documents read out and came to the conclusion that the child really had to go with the mother, we consulted with various authorities. This consultation led to the son going with mother. This happened but was nevertheless an unpleasant situation for all parties.

Specify the involvement of the minors:

Other concerns. Child notices that the subject is a conflict between the parents. †

Relevant registrations

This concerns the 2nd Safe Home report for the family. Furthermore, no relevant registrations on all persons. 1st VT report on February 1, 2019 in connection with HG. At the time, a restraining order against [name of plaintiff].”

The mutations

†

rap. [lacquered]

LTHG consultation 23/04 this case discussed social work deployed, both parents spoken. Both parents have new partners. However, the child in question is still at school in [place]. Safe at home is aware of this problem. Continue to monitor this and parents have a contact person at social work.

†

Rapp [lacquered]

Supplement in response to writing by colleague [lacquered]

During the handling of the incident, I had telephone contact with a youth care employee. However, due to the long term, I don't remember her name and phone number. She indicated that there was a legal basis that the mother of the child could decide for herself where the child would live. This was also in writing that both parents would have signed for. The father also knew where the child would stay in [place]. In addition, the grandfather would have been hit. There was also a conflict about a collision with the child's paternal grandfather. According to father, there was a deliberate collision, according to mother, he would have jumped in front of the car. Because there were conflicting statements, it turned out that the father had jumped in front of the car. It was not possible to determine whether there was a deliberate collision, and we mainly dealt with the mediation."

A new mutation will also have to be made, which contains the following:

“Afterwards it turned out that mother had moved with the child without permission and that father had heard of this through the school. It has also become apparent that it is not the case that the father did not cooperate in the implementation of the visitation arrangement, but that he first wanted to know where his son would be staying from now on.”

8. Because the court declares the appeal well-founded, the defendant must reimburse the court fee to the claimant.

9. There are no reimbursable legal costs.

10. Plaintiff has requested the court to declare this judgment provisionally enforceable. However, since the Awb does not provide for a provisionally enforceable declaration (not even by declaring Article 233 of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable by analogy) and there is no basis for this in case law, the court rejects this request.

11. The claimant has requested the court to impose a penalty of €250 per day that the respondent does not comply with this ruling. As a rule, there is only reason to impose a penalty payment at a later stage, i.e. if the administrative authority initially fails to comply with the decision (on time) or in an incorrect manner. An appeal against this decision, which may be lodged by the defendant, does not have suspensive effect on the basis of Articles 6:16, 6:24 and 8:106 of the Awb, which means that this decision will not lose its effect if a higher appeal is lodged. profession. This means that the defendant will have to comply with the ruling, even if it appeals against it. The court has no reason to assume that the defendant will not comply with this ruling, in particular in view of the willingness shown by the defendant to (further) adjust the registrations in the system. Therefore, the court sees no reason to impose a penalty.

12. Finally, the plaintiff's partner stated at the hearing that she and the plaintiff do not have the financial means to pay a lawyer and that this procedure has cost so much energy that compensation would be appropriate. Plaintiff has further added that he had to conduct nine lawsuits.

12.1.

The court regards the request as a request for compensation within the meaning of Article 8:88 of the Awb. In order to order the defendant to pay compensation for damage that the plaintiff suffers or will suffer, there must first be an unlawful government decision. The illegality of the contested decision is established because the court will declare the appeal against the contested decision well-founded, annul this decision and substitute this judgment for the annulled decision. This requirement has therefore been met.

12.2.

Compensation for damage requires a causal link between the unlawful decision and the alleged damage. Subsequently, only those loss items are eligible for compensation that are related to that decision in such a way that they can be attributed to the administrative authority as a result of that decision. The burden of proof with regard to the alleged damage and its scope and of the causal link between this damage and the unlawful decision lies in principle with the claimant and it is therefore up to the claimant to substantiate the alleged damage in an objective and verifiable manner.

12.3.

The court states first and foremost that it understands that all lawsuits that the claimant has had to conduct, including the cases against his ex-partner in the context of the divorce, custody and access, have demanded a lot from the claimant and still do. From a legal point of view, however, these cases are separate from these proceedings, even though the claimant may experience it very differently. The alleged damage suffered by the claimant as a result of (having to conduct) those proceedings cannot therefore, in the opinion of the court, be attributed to the defendant. In that respect, there is therefore no reason to award compensation for this. This also applies to a somewhat lesser extent to the civil case that the claimant conducted against Safe Home, although that case is of course related to these proceedings.

12.4.

It is also important that the claimant has not substantiated his alleged (tangible or immaterial) damage in an objective and verifiable manner, for example by submitting (medical) documents showing the damage. The court therefore has no tools to conclude that the claimant has suffered (material or immaterial) damage as a result of an unlawful decision by the defendant. The possible (material or immaterial) damage can therefore not be determined at this time. For that reason, the court will reject the claim for compensation.

Decision

The court:

- declares the appeal well-founded;

- annul the contested decision;

- determines that this judgment replaces the annulled decision, which in this case means that the defendant will adjust both VT notifications and the changes made in its systems in the manner determined by the court above;

- orders the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff for the court fee paid of € 181;

- rejected the claim for compensation.

This decision was made by mr. T. Boesman, judge, in the presence of mr. S.M.J. Boss, clerk. The verdict was pronounced in public on March 29, 2022.

clerk

The judge is prevented from signing this ruling

judge

A copy of this ruling has been sent to the parties at:

Do you disagree with this statement?

If you do not agree with this ruling, you can send a letter to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State explaining why you do not agree with it. This is called an appeal. You must submit this notice of appeal within six weeks of the day on which this decision was sent. You can see this date above.

Appendix

Police Data Act

Article 1

In this Act and the provisions based on it, the following definitions apply:

a. police data: any personal data that is processed in the context of the execution of the police task, as referred to in Articles 3 and 4 of the Police Act 2012, with the exception of:

†

†

b. personal data: all information about an identified or identifiable natural person;

c. processing of police data: any operation or set of operations relating to police data or set of police data, whether or not performed by automated means, such as collecting, recording, organizing, structuring, storing, updating or changing, retrieving, consulting, using , provide by means of forwarding, dissemination or otherwise making available, associating, associating, blocking or destroying police data;

d. provision of police data: publishing or making available police data;

e. †

f. controller: this is at:

1°. the police: the chief of police, referred to in Article 27 of the Police Act 2012;

2°. up to and including 4°. †

g. person involved: the person to whom a police data relates;

h. up to and including y. †

Article 28
1. The data subject has the right, at the written request of the controller, to obtain rectification of inaccurate police data concerning him/her and, taking into account the purpose of the processing, the right to have incomplete police data completed, including by means of an additional declaration. The request contains the changes to be made.

2. The data subject has the right, at the written request of the controller, to have the police data concerning him or her destroyed without undue delay if the data is processed in violation of a legal requirement or in order to comply with a legal obligation. Instead of destruction, the controller ensures protection if:

the accuracy of the data is contested by the data subject and the accuracy or inaccuracy cannot be verified, in which case the controller shall inform the data subject before the blocking is lifted, or

b. the data must be kept as evidence.

3. The controller shall inform the data subject in writing within four weeks regarding the follow-up of his request.

4. The controller shall forward the correction of the incorrect police data to the competent authority from which the data originated.

5. If the controller has rectified, destroyed or blocked police data, it shall inform the recipients thereof.

General Administrative Law Act

Article 8:88, first paragraph, preamble and under a

At the request of an interested party, the administrative court is authorized to order an administrative body to pay compensation for damage that the interested party suffers or will suffer as a result of an unlawful decision.

Article 8:90

1. The request shall be submitted in writing to the administrative court competent to hear the appeal against the decision.

2. At least eight weeks before submitting the petition referred to in the first paragraph, the interested party shall request the relevant administrative authority in writing for compensation for the damage, unless this cannot reasonably be expected of him.

Article 8:91, first and second paragraph

1. If the request is made during the appeal against or the appeal regarding the decision causing the damage, it shall be submitted to the administrative court before which the appeal or appeal is pending.

2. In that case, Article 8:90, second paragraph, does not apply.