TA - 413/2025
From GDPRhub
| TA - 413/2025 | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Court: | TA (Romania) |
| Jurisdiction: | Romania |
| Relevant Law: | Article 14(2)(g) GDPR Article 17 GDPR Article 18 GDPR Article 21 GDPR Article 22 GDPR Article 22(1) GDPR Article 30 GDPR Article 35 GDPR Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights |
| Decided: | 30.12.2025 |
| Published: | |
| Parties: | Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited Microsoft Romania SRL |
| National Case Number/Name: | 413/2025 |
| European Case Law Identifier: | |
| Appeal from: | |
| Appeal to: | Unknown |
| Original Language(s): | Romanian |
| Original Source: | Rejust (in Romanian) |
| Initial Contributor: | dt |
A court awarded RON 500,000 (approximately €98,000) in immaterial damages to a judge and ordered Microsoft to remove and block content relating to him on the search engine Bing, as well as to communicate the logic involved in the search engine algorithm.
English Summary
Facts
An individual working as a judge (the data subject) sued Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited and its Romanian establishments (the controllers) and requested in court the removal or blocking from the search engine Bing (the search engine) of all links and URL addresses containing content relating to him from the web page www.luju.ro in accordance with Article 17 GDPR, Article 18 GDPR, Article 21 GDPR and Article 22 GDPR. The data subject alleged that the content was defamatory.
Furthermore, the data subject requested an interdiction for the search engine to publish or transmit any content from the above-mentioned web page relating to the data subject and the awarding of RON 199,000 (approximately €39,000) in immaterial damages.
In addition, the data subject asked for the logic behind the search engine algorithm to be communicated to him, specifically related to the content from the website luju.ro involving the data subject and how it is prioritised in the search results.
Moreover, the data subject requested the communication of the records of processing activities in relation to him carried out by the controllers under Article 30 GDPR, along with the evaluation of the impact on his rights in accordance with Article 35 GDPR.
Previously, the data subject obtained in court an order for the elimination and blocking from the search engine Google of all links leading to published articles on him on the website luju.ro.
Holding
The removal of links from the search engine
The court referred to a previous judgement which held that several articles published on the website luju.ro about the data subject have an impact on his honour and dignity. Subsequently, the court declared that the articles identified by the data subject in the present lawsuit have a defamatory character, affecting in particular his professional reputation as a judge. However, the court held that the reference to the data subject’s profession does not exclude a violation of his private life protected under Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights, since it impacts his reputation and the trust of the public in his judgements.
Furthermore, the court noted that the data subject previously submitted several requests to the controllers for the removal of certain links to articles from their search engine. However, the controllers refused the data subject’s requests.
In relation to these refusals, the court held that the controllers wrongly concluded that judges are a part of the categories of public figures which justify the refusal of removing the contested articles. While the court accepts that the data subject is a public figure, it found that the false and defamatory character of the information in the articles meant that the right to private life and the right to data protection took priority against the right to be informed.
Therefore, the court held that the controllers breached the rights conferred by the GDPR and caused the data subject harm by affecting his dignity and reputation through the propagating of defamatory content and the refusal to remove the contested links. The court also held that the controllers breached the GDPR by processing personal data after the data subject’s request for removal and blocking of the search results.
Thus, the court ordered the removal or blocking of all links and URL addresses with content on the data subject from the website luju.ro, with the interdiction for the future to publish or transmit any of the content as well.
Immaterial damages
In deciding on awarding immaterial damages to the data subject and their amount, the court held that the controllers enabled the defamation of the data subject due to their algorithm prioritising the contested articles in the search results. The court took into consideration the data subject’s work as a judge for one of the most important Romanian judicial courts and the propagation of the online defamatory content, among other aspects.
Thus, the court awarded the data subject RON 500,000 (approximately €98,000) in immaterial damages.
The algorithm
Furthermore, the court decided in accordance with Article 22(1) GDPR and Article 14(2)(g) GDPR that the controllers are obligated to provide the data subject with the information regarding the logic behind the automated decision-making process used in his case, specifically the logic behind the algorithm through which the search results are prioritised involving content from luju.ro on the data subject.
Other claims
The court rejected the data subject’s requests regarding their records of processing activities in relation to him and the website content on him under Article 30 GDPR, along with the evaluation of the impact on his rights in accordance with Article 35 GDPR.
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English Machine Translation of the Decision
The decision below is a machine translation of the Romanian original. Please refer to the Romanian original for more details.
ECLI Code ECLI:RO:TBARG:2025:007.###### Case No. #####/280/2024 R O M Â N I A COURT #####* CIVIL SECTION CIVIL JUDGMENT No. ###/2025 Public hearing of December 30, 2025 The court is composed of: PRESIDENT #####-###### ####### Clerk ###### ####### ### The civil case is pending regarding the plaintiff ##### ####### ####### and the defendants ####### ######### ####### ####### SRL, ######### ####### SRL and MICROSOFT ####### OPERATIONS LIMITED, having as its object the obligation to remove or ##### ## when searching through the #### engine, remove links or URL addresses; moral damages of 199,000 lei. The debates in question took place in the public hearing of 02.12.2025, being recorded in the decision to postpone the ruling from that date, which forms part of this judgment, on which date the court, needing time to deliberate, pursuant to art. 396 paragraph 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, postponed the ruling initially to 17.12.2024 and subsequently to 30.12.2025, when: COURT: Deliberating on the summons, finds the following: By the summons registered on the docket of the Piteşti Court on 27.06.2024, under no. #####/280/2024, the plaintiff ##### ####### ####### requested, in contradiction with the defendants Microsoft Corporation through ######### ####### SRL and ######### ####### SRL: - obliging the defendants to cease the infringement of the plaintiff's non-patrimonial rights, by removing or blocking from the search engine ####, by using the keywords ##### ####### #######, ##### #######, judge ##### ####### #######, judge ##### ####### #######, judge ##### #######, judge ##### #######, judge ##### #######, judge ##### #######, judge ##### #######, judge ##### #######, judge ##### #######, judge ##### #######, judge ##### #######), under penalty of paying damages fines of 5000 lei/day, calculated until the date of effective fulfillment of the obligation; - prohibiting the defendants in the future from publishing or transmitting, directly or indirectly, in any form, by any means, any references and any materials published about ##### ####### ####### on the website www.luju.ro or on other pages that copy / take over from the website www.luju.ro (such as, but not limited to, the dissemination and publication of news, debates, surveys, written or audiovisual reports, etc.); - ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the sum of 199,000 lei representing compensation for moral damages caused to his honor, dignity and reputation by not eliminating and not blocking from the search engine ####, by using the keywords ##### ####### #######, ##### #######, judge ##### ####### #######, judge ##### #######, judge ##### #######, of all links or URL addresses from web pages containing any materials published about him and posted on the website www.luju.ro or on other pages that copy/take from the website www.luju.ro (materials that appear in the list of results displayed when searching on the internet with the bing search engine, on the portal on the website www.luju.ro or on other pages, by copying/taking from the page judge ##### ####### #########, judge ##### #######); - obliging the defendants to communicate the algorithm according to which they prioritize the search results, through the #### engine, by using the keywords ##### ####### #######, ##### #######, judge ##### ####### #######, judge ##### ####### #########, judge ##### #########, judge ##### #######, of the articles, materials and information on the website www.luju.ro; - obliging the defendants to communicate the materialization of the mapping of personal data processing (art. 30 of the Regulation) regarding his person and the articles, materials and information on the website www.luju.ro; - obliging the defendants to communicate the assessment they made on the impact on data protection and respect for his rights (art. 35 of the Regulation); - obliging the defendants to pay the court costs. In the motivation, the plaintiff invoked – in essence – that the conditions for tortious civil liability provided for in art. 1349 Civil Code, since the defendants refused to fulfill the obligation to block the links that led to the articles published by www.luju.ro about his professional activity, although the final court decisions pronounced by the Piteşti Court and the ##### Tribunal imposed this measure. He found that the unlawful act consists in the defendants' refusal to cease the infringement of his non-patrimonial rights, by removing the links or URL addresses from the web pages containing materials published about him and posted on www.luju.ro or on other pages that copy or take over the information from this page. The defendants' refusal violates the res judicata and the enforceability of the Civil Judgment no. ###/2023 of 27.01.2023 pronounced by the Piteşti Court in file no. #####/280/2022, final by Civil Decision no. ### of 09.03.2023 of the Tribunal #####. He indicated that, by this decision, the immediate blocking of all links leading to articles published about him by www.luju.ro from Google search was ordered. He specified that, recently, by Decision no. 209 pronounced on June 3, 2024, in file no. #####/280/2022, the Tribunal ##### admitted his action and ordered the blocking of links containing the keywords “###### ####### #######”, “###### #######”, “judge ##### ####### #######” and “judge ##### #######”. The plaintiff stated that the defendants’ refusal is all the more serious since, according to address no. ###/P/2022 of December 16, 2022 issued by the National Anticorruption Directorate, criminal prosecution was initiated regarding the publication and promotion by ###### ###### from www.luju.ro and ######## ##### SRL of the articles whose blocking is the subject of its requests to Microsoft. It mentioned that D.N.A. discovered that the company ######## ##### SRL, which administers www.luju.ro, collected the amount of 391,325 lei from the P.S.D. led by ##### #######, and during the #Resist protests, www.luju.ro was paid 58,000 euros by ###### #######, indicted for organized criminal group, money coming from systematically defrauded public sources. The plaintiff reported that www.luju.ro publishes articles presenting him as a “resister” or “close” to the D.N.A., while denigrating him and presenting him as an “enemy” of justice. As a judge of the Bucharest Court of Appeal, he resolved complex cases such as the reopening of the August 10 case, regarding the brutal repression of demonstrators in Piața #########, as well as major corruption cases, ordering severe punishments and obliging the defendants to pay tens of millions of euros to #######. He also claimed that the articles published by www.luju.ro are written in bad faith, presenting his professional activity in a truncated and false manner. #### final court decisions ordered the blocking of links, the defendants Microsoft refused to comply with these decisions, which violates the provisions of art. 17, 18, 21 and 22 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the right to erasure, restriction of processing, opposition and the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing. The plaintiff considered that the defendants cannot invoke the processing for journalistic purposes, since they are not authorized press publications and do not have the capacity of representatives of internet users. Their economic interest prevails over his rights, and the de-listing of links does not affect the data on third-party websites. Also, the guilt required by law for retaining tortious civil liability in the case of the defendants, who own the search engine ####, arises from the way in which they treated the numerous requests that the plaintiff addressed to them, as well as from the way in which they refused to comply with the operative part and the considerations of the enforceable and final court decisions to which he referred in the previous paragraph. The extension of defamatory content constitutes a more serious unlawful act than the creation of this type of content, it being evident that the plaintiff's dignity is harmed especially by the large number of people who access the defamatory content through the Bing engine managed by Microsoft. The plaintiff also claimed that in this case the damage and the causal link are presumed, since the provisions of art. 8 #### are applicable, as well as the case law developed on its basis by the ECHR, which have, according to art. 11 and 20 of the Romanian Constitution, supra-legislative force. The damage caused is of a moral nature, consisting of the harm to his honor and dignity, and the causal link is presumed. According to art. 8 of the ECHR Convention, every person has the right to respect for his dignity and reputation, and the case law of the ECHR has ruled that reputation is part of the right to private life. At the same time, it considered that the action should be allowed because the defendants did not communicate to it the algorithm used to prioritize search results, and the de-listing of links was not carried out, although it does not affect data on third-party sites. The plaintiff referred to the provisions of art. 22 of Chapter III of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, showing that he has the right not to be subject to a decision based exclusively on automated processing. Also, according to the Digital Services Act, tech companies are obliged to explain to users how their algorithms work. At the same time, he considered that the action should be admitted because the defendants did not communicate to him the concretization of the mapping of personal data processing and the assessment of the impact on the protection of his data, as required by art. 30 and art. 35 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. When establishing the tortious civil liability of the defendants Microsoft, which own the search engine ####, the plaintiff requested that the multiple decisions by which the courts of various countries sanctioned the aforementioned entities be taken into account. In law, the following provisions were invoked: art. 21 of ##### fundamental rights of the European Union (2010/C 83/02), art. 20 and art. 30 of the Romanian Constitution, Chapter III of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 8 of the E.E.D.O. as well as the jurisprudence developed on its basis by the E.D.O. Court, art. 30, art. 58, art. 72-75, art. 252 and 253, art. 1349 and art. 1357 Civil Code. In proof, he requested the approval of documentary evidence. The request was stamped with the amount of 200 lei (f. 125 vol. I court file). By the request dated 08.07.2024, the plaintiff ##### ####### ####### requested the correction of the obvious omission in the summons, in the sense that he omitted to mention among the defendants Microsoft ####### Operations Limited through the subsidiary / branch of #######, ######### ####### SRL. On 08.10.2024, the plaintiff filed a specific request in which he indicated that he requested the removal from the search engine #### of all links or URLs from web pages containing any materials published about him and posted on the website luju.ro, indicating several links and URLs as examples. By the response dated 09.12.2024, the defendant ######### ####### SRL invoked the exception of the lack of passive procedural capacity and the exception of the prematurity of the application, and on the merits requested the partial rejection of the first petition as devoid of purpose, given the lack of relevant links on the search engine page #### at present, the rejection of the third petition as devoid of purpose, given the communication dated 9 July 2024 by which the request formulated by the plaintiff was already responded to, as well as the rejection as unfounded of the application for summons, with the obligation of the plaintiff to pay the legal costs. In its reasoning, the defendant stated – in essence – that the plaintiff submitted on 15 June 2024 the first request for delisting of links containing articles about him, addressed to the e-mail address intended for public relations, requesting the blocking from search by the #### engine of all links or URLs containing any materials published about the plaintiff on www.luju.ro. The defendant responded to the initial request on 19 June 2024, indicating that it had no authority regarding the request and redirecting the plaintiff to the correct entity, Microsoft ####### Operations Limited (MIOL). It mentioned that, on 26 June 2024, the plaintiff submitted a new request requesting the communication of the algorithm for prioritizing results, the mapping of personal data processing and the assessment of the impact on data protection, and on 1 July 2024 it redirected the plaintiff again to MIOL. The defendant stated that, on June 27, 2024, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit, although the legal deadlines had not been met, and requested the issuance of a presidential ordinance, the definitive blocking of the links and the repair of an alleged damage. The plaintiff sent to the email address intended for public relations from an advertising perspective (PR) an email with the subject “urgent and final summons / urgent legal request” by which he requested the blocking from the search engine #### of all links or URLs from web pages containing any articles, information or materials published about the plaintiff by the website www.luju.ro. He claimed that, despite the detailed instructions provided, the plaintiff did not address the correct entity, namely Microsoft ####### Operations Limited (MIOL), but continued to send requests to Microsoft #######, without respecting the established communication channels. In the absence of a request to MIOL, the one-month deadline provided for in Article 12 paragraphs (3) and (4) of the GDPR Regulation for resolving the delisting request could not be met. The defendant stated that most of the links had already been delisted from the search engine ####, and for the others it had not received any delisting request, so the lawsuit is devoid of purpose. It also reported that, on August 13, 2024, the Piteşti Court admitted the request for a presidential ordinance, and on October 4, 2024 the ##### Court dismissed the appeal as unfounded. The plaintiff invoked the res judicata of previous cases in which it was tried with entities from the Google group, but indicated that no final decision had been rendered on the disputed issues. The defendant argued that MIOL does not have passive procedural capacity, since the plaintiff did not prove the link between the defendant and the subject of the disputed legal relationship, and the claim was filed against an entity that does not process the plaintiff's data. It also showed that the claims made by the plaintiff have no legal basis, since the right to erasure is not absolute, and the test of balance between the rights of the data subject and the public interest must be carried out by the relevant platform, and not by the court. It argued that there is no legal obligation for MIOL to delete links that do not yet exist on the internet or to block search results for the future, and the requirement to remove results for certain keywords is unjustified. The defendant also argued that it has no legal obligation to block future links, but only to analyze requests to delist existing links, and the test of balance between the rights of the data subject and the public interest cannot be carried out in the absence of a concrete request. Moreover, the plaintiff did not specify the legal basis of the action for moral damages, and the requests regarding the mapping of personal data processing and the assessment of the impact on data protection have no legal basis. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff requested the communication of the algorithm and the mapping of data processing, but these are not provided for by the GDPR Regulation, so the requests are unfounded. In law, he invoked art. 205 of the Civil Procedure Code and the GDPR Regulation. In proof, he requested the approval of the documentary evidence. #### legally cited with appropriate mention, the other defendants did not file a response. On 25.02.2025, the plaintiff filed an amending request, by which he indicated that he was increasing the amount of moral damages requested from the amount of 199,000 lei to the amount of 4,000,000 lei. By Civil Judgment no. ######### of 26.02.2025, the Piteşti Court admitted the exception of material lack of jurisdiction invoked ex officio and declined the jurisdiction to resolve the case in favor of the ##### Court – Civil Section, the file being registered on the docket of the latter court on 18.03.2025, under the same number. On 15.04.2025, the defendant ######### ####### SRL filed notes of the hearing, in which it invoked the exception of the first claim being devoid of purpose. By Civil Judgment no. ###/2025 of 15.04.2025, the ##### Court admitted the exception of material lack of jurisdiction and declined the jurisdiction to resolve the case in favor of the Piteşti Court, found that the negative conflict of jurisdiction had arisen and notified the Piteşti Court of Appeal in order to resolve it. By Civil Judgment no. #/2025 of 04.06.2025, pronounced by the Piteşti Court of Appeal in file no. ###/46/2025, the jurisdiction to resolve the case was established in favor of the Tribunal #####. At the hearing of 02.12.2025, the tribunal joined the exception of the lack of passive procedural capacity of ######### ####### SRL to the merits of the case, rejected as unfounded the exception of the prematurity of the request for summons and joined the exception of the lack of object of the first head of claim to the merits of the case. In the case, documentary evidence was administered. Analyzing with priority, according to art. 248 of the Civil Procedure Code, the exceptions joined to the merits of the case, the tribunal notes the following: 1) The exception of the lack of passive procedural capacity of ######### ####### SRL, invoked by the response According to art. 36 of the Civil Procedure Code, the procedural capacity results from the identity between the parties and the subjects of the litigious legal relationship, as it is inferred to the court, and the existence or non-existence of the rights and obligations asserted constitutes a matter of substance. The plaintiff is the one who has the obligation to justify both the active procedural capacity, namely that there is an identity between his person and the right holder in the legal relationship inferred to the court, as well as the passive procedural capacity of the defendant, namely that he is the one who is the passive subject in this legal relationship. The plaintiff expressly invoked the violation of the rights conferred by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the Parliament ######## and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. Thus, in relation to the subject of the claims inferred to the court, the arguments and conclusions of the Judgment delivered in Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia ######## de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and ##### Costeja ########, which ruled as follows: ‘1) Article 2(b) and (d) of Directive 95/46/EC of the ######## Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that, first, the activity of a search engine consisting in finding information published or entered on the internet by third parties, indexing it automatically and temporarily storing it and, finally, making it available to internet users in a given order of preference must be classified as ‘processing of personal data’, within the meaning of Article 2(b), where that information contains personal data and, second, the operator of that search engine must be regarded as a ‘controller’ within the meaning of Article 2(d).2. Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that processing of personal data is carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller in the territory of a Member State, within the meaning of that provision, where the operator of a search engine sets up in a Member State a branch or subsidiary intended for the promotion and sale of advertising space on the page of that engine, the activity of which is directed at the residents of that Member State. 3. Article 12(b) and Article 14(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to comply with the rights provided for in those provisions and in so far as the conditions laid down therein are actually met, the operator of a search engine is required to remove from the list of results displayed following a search carried out on the basis of a person’s name, links to web pages published by third parties and containing information relating to that person, and in the event that that name or that information is not deleted beforehand or simultaneously from the web pages concerned, and that, where appropriate, even if their publication on those pages is itself lawful. 4. Article 12(b) and Article 14(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that, in assessing the conditions for the application of those provisions, it must be examined in particular whether the data subject has the right to have the information relating to him or her no longer associated with his or her name in a list of results displayed following a search carried out on the basis of his or her name, without, however, the finding of such a right presupposing that the inclusion of that information in that list causes that person any harm. Since the data subject may, in the light of his or her fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, request that the information in question no longer be made available to the general public by means of its inclusion in such a list of results, those rights prevail in principle not only over the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also over the interest of that public in having access to that information when a search is carried out on the basis of that person’s name. This would not be the case, however, if it were to emerge that, for special reasons, such as the role played by the person concerned in public life, the interference with his fundamental rights is justified by the overriding interest of the said public in having access, by means of that inclusion, to the information in question”. This CJEU judgment concerned the interpretation of Directive 95/46/EC, repealed by Article 94 of the General Data Protection Regulation, but the concepts of “controller” and “establishment” remain relevant, having been taken over by the Regulation. The considerations of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which state that ‘establishment in the territory of a Member State presupposes the effective and genuine pursuit of an activity in the form of a stable establishment’, that ‘the legal form of the establishment, whether it is a mere branch or a subsidiary with legal personality, is not the determining factor’, that ‘being endowed with its own legal personality, it therefore constitutes a subsidiary of Google Inc. … and, therefore, an ‘establishment’ within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 95/46’, that it is not required that the processing of personal data in question be carried out ‘by’ the establishment in question itself, but only that it be carried out ‘in the context of its activities’, that ‘the Union legislature sought to ensure that individuals are not deprived of the protection to which they are entitled under it and to prevent that protection from being circumvented by providing for a particularly wide territorial scope’, are relevant in the present case. In particular, the following considerations are noted: ‘55. In the light of that objective of Directive 95/46 and the wording of Article 4(1)(a) thereof, it must be held that the processing of personal data carried out for the purposes of the operation of a search engine such as Google Search, which is operated by an undertaking established in a third country but which has an establishment in a Member State, is carried out ‘in the context of the activities’ of that establishment where it is intended to ensure, in that Member State, the promotion and sale of the advertising space offered by the search engine, which serve to make the service offered by that engine profitable. 56. Thus, in such circumstances, the activities of the operator of the search engine and those of its establishment situated in the Member State concerned are inextricably linked, since the activities relating to the advertising space constitute the means of making the search engine in question economically profitable and that engine is at the same time the means of enabling those activities to be carried out. (...) 80. In that regard, it must be noted at the outset that, as has been found in paragraphs 36 to 38 of this judgment, processing of personal data such as that at issue in the main proceedings, carried out by the operator of a search engine, is capable of significantly affecting the fundamental rights to respect for private life and the protection of personal data where the search using that engine is carried out on the basis of the name of a natural person, since that processing enables any internet user to form, by means of the list of results, a structured overall idea of the information relating to that person which can be found on the internet, which potentially touches on a multitude of aspects of his private life and which, without that search engine, could not have been combined or could only have been combined with great difficulty, and thus to establish a more or less detailed profile of that person. Furthermore, the effect of the interference with the data subject’s rights is aggravated by the important role played in modern society by the internet and search engines, which give the information contained in such a list of results a ubiquitous character (see, to that effect, judgment in eDate Advertising and Others, C-509/09 and C-161/10, EU:C:2011:685, paragraph 45). (...) 84. In that regard, it must be pointed out that, having regard to the ease with which information published on a website can be reproduced on other websites and to the fact that the operators who publish it are not always subject to EU law, effective and complete protection of the data subjects could not be achieved if they had to first or in parallel obtain the deletion of information concerning them from the publishers of websites. (...) 87. Thus, since the inclusion in the list of results displayed following a search carried out on the basis of a person’s name of a web page and the information it contains relating to that person significantly facilitates the accessibility of that information for all internet users who carry out a search on the data subject and may play a decisive role in the dissemination of that information, it may constitute a more significant interference with the fundamental right to respect for the data subject’s private life than the publication by the publisher of that web page. (...) 96. ##### In the light of the foregoing, in the context of the assessment of such claims brought against processing such as that at issue in the main proceedings, it must be examined in particular whether the data subject has the right to have information relating to him or her no longer associated with his or her name in a list of results displayed following a search carried out on the basis of his or her name. In that regard, it must be emphasised that the finding of such a right does not require that the inclusion of the information in question in the list of results causes harm to the data subject. 97. Since the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights laid down in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, request that the information in question no longer be made available to the general public by his inclusion in such a list of results, it must be held that those rights, as is apparent in particular from paragraph 81 of the present judgment, prevail in principle not only over the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also over the interest of that public in finding the information in question when searching for that person’s name. That would not be the case, however, if it were to appear that, for special reasons, such as the role played by that person in public life, the interference with his fundamental rights is justified by the overriding interest of that public in having access, by means of that inclusion, to the information in question. In essence, regarding the passive procedural capacity of a company established on the territory of a Member State, the European court ruled that the economic link between it and the parent company, namely Microsoft Corporation, is sufficient to consider that it also processes personal data collected by the company based in the USA. The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which represents complementary legislation, justifies in the present case the retention of the passive procedural capacity of the defendant ######### ####### SRL, in compliance with the provisions of art. 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court thus establishes that for the company established in #######, respectively the defendant ######### ####### SRL, even if it is not a subsidiary, branch, work point or legal representative in #######, according to the special legislation – Law no. 31/1990, of the company in the USA or of the company in #######, both defendants in question, the retention of the passive procedural capacity is justified, in relation to the subject of the claims brought to the judgment of face. According to the rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union, however, it is not necessary to choose a representative, but, within the meaning of European Union law, the defendant represents an “establishment” as a result of the activities carried out by it. According to the provisions of Art. 5 of the Civil Code, in matters regulated by this code, such as those at issue in the present case, the rules of European Union law shall apply as a priority, regardless of the capacity or status of the parties. The application of European Union law means the implementation of EU legislation in the Member States, ensuring a uniform and efficient application of European rules, assuming both respect for fundamental rights and respect for the rule of law, which is a fundamental principle of EU European Union law. Consequently, the court will reject as unfounded the exception of the lack of passive procedural capacity of ######### ####### SRL, invoked in the response. 2) The exception of the first claim being devoid of purpose, invoked by the defendant ######### ####### SRL through the hearing notes of 15.04.2025 The defendant motivated this exception by the fact that, as can be seen from the screenshots attached to the hearing notes of 15.04.2025 (p. 74-95 last volume), with reference to the search engine ####, there would no longer be any link or URL address containing materials published about the plaintiff and posted on the website www.luju.ro. Therefore, using the search words "###### #######", "###### ######### #########", "judge ##### ####### #########" or "judge ##### #######", the search engine #### does not display any results from the links indicated by the plaintiff. At the same time, in support of this exception, the defendant invoked that the search results no longer contain references to the links indicated by the plaintiff through the address formulated on 07.10.2024 and posted on the website www.luju.ro. #### of the arguments presented by the defendant in support of this exception, the court notes that the object of the first claim is related to the removal from the search engine #### of all links or URL addresses from web pages containing any materials published about the plaintiff and posted on the website luju.ro, through the specific request of 08.10.2024, several links and URL addresses being indicated only by way of example. From this perspective, the exact indication of links or URLs by the plaintiff was irrelevant, since he specified the relevant person, subject and site from the moment the action was filed, the results he had in mind resulting from entering this data into the search engine ####. Therefore, contrary to the defendant's claims, this claim would be rendered moot only if, during the course of the present litigation, the defendants proceeded to remove all links or URLs, and not just those that were the subject of the specification of 08.10.2024. Contrary to the defendant's opinion, the invocation of the considerations in Case 131/12 of the C.J.U.E. does not confirm its claims, on the contrary, the Guidelines provide that data subjects should provide sufficient information on the reasons for requesting the removal of URLs, identify the specific URLs (links) and indicate whether they have a role in public life, aspects that were respected by the claimant. Consequently, the court will reject as unfounded the exception of the first head of claim being devoid of purpose, invoked by the defendant ######### ####### SRL through the meeting notes of 15.04.2025. On the merits, analyzing all the evidentiary material administered in the case, the court holds the following: The plaintiff invoked the existence of defamatory articles on the website www.luju.ro in relation to him and his activity as a judge, obtaining through the courts the blocking from the Google search of all links leading to articles published about him on the respective website, as is evident from the court decisions pronounced in file no. #####/280/2022. At the same time, by Civil Sentence no. ###/2024 of 03.06.2024, pronounced by the Court of ##### in file no. #####/280/2022, it was ordered – among other things – to block from searching through the google engine (including google.com; google.ro; google.at), by using the keywords “###### ####### #######”, “###### #######”, “judge ##### ####### #########”, “judge ##### #######”, of the links or URLs from the web pages containing any materials published about the plaintiff by www.luju.ro. By Civil Decision no. ######### of 30.04.2025, pronounced by the Piteşti Court of Appeal in file no. #####/280/2022, the appeals filed by the defendant Google entities were rejected and the appeal of the plaintiff ##### ####### ####### was admitted, but with regard to some petitions without relevance to the factual situation in this file. The courts that resolved the files no. #####/280/2022 and #####/280/2022 established that several articles are published on the website www.luju.ro that are likely to affect the honor and dignity of the plaintiff. Based on these findings of the courts in the cases referring to the Google search engine, the plaintiff brought the present action by which he requested – in essence – the same things in relation to the search engine ####, in particular the blocking from searches using the keywords “###### ####### #########”, “###### #######”, “judge ##### ####### #########”, “judge ##### #######”, of all links or URLs from web pages containing any materials published about him and posted on the website www.luju.ro. By verifying the links indicated by way of example by the plaintiff in the specific request of 08.10.2024, as well as the website www.luju.ro, itself, by searching for the plaintiff, the court finds, as also held by the Civil Judgment no. ###/2024 of 03.06.2024, pronounced by the Court of Appeal ##### in file no. #####/280/2022, that there is defamatory content against the plaintiff, in particular by affecting his professional reputation, a reputation essential for the activity of a judge. In the case of Niemetz v. Germany, the European Court of Human Rights considered that there is no reason in principle to exclude professional or commercial activities from the scope of the notion of private life, given that at work most people make and maintain contact with the outside world. It is often difficult to draw a line between a person’s professional and personal life or to distinguish between a professional act and a private one. The Court therefore considered that Article 8 affords protection to a person not only in his intimate circle but also during and in the course of his professional activity. Thus, the fact that the articles referred to relate to the applicant’s professional activity does not mean that they are not liable to affect his right to private life; on the contrary, as has been shown, their content is harmful to the applicant, affecting his prestige and affecting the confidence of citizens in the fairness of his decisions and in the administration of justice. Through numerous decisions, the Court of Justice of the European Union has recognized and given full effectiveness to the right to erasure and opposition, in the prefiguration of the right to be forgotten in the online environment, holding that any data subject has the right to obtain from the controller, as the case may be, the rectification, erasure or blocking of data whose processing does not comply with the provisions of Directive 95/46, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data. In case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia ######## de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and ##### Costeja ########, the Court held: "(...) 66. As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, as is apparent from Article 1 and recital 10 thereof, Directive 95/46 seeks to guarantee a high level of protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, in particular the right to privacy, with regard to the processing of personal data (see, to that effect, IPI, EU:C:2013:715, paragraph 28). 68. The Court has already held that the provisions of Directive 95/46, in so far as they govern the processing of personal data which may adversely affect fundamental freedoms and in particular the right to privacy, must necessarily be interpreted in the light of the fundamental rights which, according to settled case-law, form an integral part of the general principles of law the observance of which the Court ensures and which are now enshrined in the Charter (see, inter alia, others Connolly v Commission, C 274/99 P, EU:C:2001:127, paragraph 37, and Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, EU:C:2003:294, paragraph 68). 73. As regards the legitimacy, under Article 7 of Directive 95/46, of processing such as that at issue in the main proceedings carried out by the operator of a search engine, that may be limited to the ground set out in Article 7(f). 74. That provision permits the processing of personal data where it is necessary for the purposes of a legitimate interest pursued by the controller or by one or more third parties, provided that such interest does not overrule the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject, in particular the right to respect for his or her private life with regard to the processing of personal data, which requires protection under Article 1(1) of that directive. Application of Article 7(1) (f) thus requires a balancing of the opposing rights and interests at stake, in which account must be taken of the importance of the data subject’s rights arising from Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter (see judgment in ASNEF and FECEMD, EU:C:2011:777, paragraphs 38 and 40). 80. In that regard, it must be noted at the outset that, as has been found in paragraphs 36 to 38 of this judgment, processing of personal data such as that at issue in the main proceedings, carried out by the operator of a search engine, is capable of significantly affecting the fundamental rights to respect for private life and the protection of personal data where the search using that engine is carried out on the basis of the name of a natural person, since that processing enables any internet user to form, by means of the list of results, a structured overview of the information relating to that person which can be found on the internet, which potentially touches on a multitude of aspects of his private life and which, without that search engine, could not have been combined or could only have been combined with great difficulty, and thus to establish a more or less detailed profile of that person. Furthermore, the effect of the interference with the data subject’s rights is aggravated by the important role played in modern society by the internet and search engines, which give the information contained in such a list of results a ubiquitous character (see, to that effect, judgment in eDate Advertising and Others, C 509/09 and C 161/10, EU:C:2011:685, paragraph 45).” In case C-460/20, the Court held the following by its Judgment (##### Chamber) of 08.12.2022: "(...) 44. In this regard, it should be recalled that the processing of personal data carried out in the context of the activity of a search engine is different from and additional to that carried out by website publishers, which consists in uploading that data to a website (Judgment of 13 May 2014, Google Spain and Google, C 131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 35). When the data subject brings an action against the operator of the search engine, the rights, interests and restrictions present in the case are therefore not necessarily the same as in an action brought against a content provider, so that a specific comparative assessment is necessary for the purpose of examining a request for de-indexation under Article 17 of the GDPR. 50. Thus, as As recalled in paragraph 44 of this judgment, the processing of personal data carried out in the context of the activity of a search engine is distinct from and additional to that carried out by website publishers, which consists in uploading those data onto a web page. That activity also plays a decisive role in the global dissemination of those data by making them accessible to any internet user who carries out a search on the name of the data subject, including internet users who would not otherwise have found the web page on which those data are published. Furthermore, the organisation and aggregation of information published on the internet carried out by search engines in order to facilitate their users’ access to that information may lead, where the search for that information is carried out on the name of a natural person, to the fact that, by means of the list of results, they obtain a structured overview of the information relating to that person which can be found on the internet, which enables them to establish a more or less detailed profile of the data subject (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 May 2014, Google Spain and Google, C 131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraphs 36 and 37, and judgment of 24 September 2019, GC and Others (De-indexation of sensitive data), C 136/17, EU:C:2019:773, paragraph 36]. 51. Consequently, in so far as the activity of a search engine is likely to significantly and additionally affect the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data in relation to that of website publishers, the operator of that engine, as the person who determines the aims and means of that activity, must ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities, powers and possibilities, that that activity meets the requirements of Directive 95/46 and the GDPR in order for the guarantees provided for in that directive and in that regulation to be fully effective and for effective and complete protection of the persons concerned, in particular of the their right to respect for private life, can be effectively achieved (see in this regard Judgment of 13 May 2014, Google Spain and Google, C 131/12, EU:C:2014:317, paragraph 38, and Judgment of 24 September 2019, GC and Others (De-indexation of sensitive data), C 136/17, EU:C:2019:773, paragraph 37).” The above clearly leads to the conclusion that where the applicant for de-indexation proves the false or inaccurate nature of the information contained in the indexed content, the operator of the search engine is obliged to grant the de-indexation request. In the case, as shown, the published articles suggest to the public that the activity of the plaintiff judge considers aspects outside the legal framework that he should respect, ## ###### ######### ## #### ####### ######## ######## #######, but only speculative. The plaintiff made several requests, through the mechanisms established for this purpose, by which he requested, with arguments, the deletion / removal from the search engine ####, by using the keywords "###### #########", "###### #######", "judge ##### ####### #########", "judge ##### #########", "judge ##### #######", of the links or URL addresses from the web pages containing any materials published about him by www.luju.ro, the response received being negative, as is evident from the documents in the file. The Tribunal notes that the position of judge does not fall within the categories mentioned in Microsoft's responses, to motivate the refusal to comply with the plaintiff's requests. The judge has a status regulated by specific legislation and is not elected, does not run for public office, does not participate in government and there are no potential voters who can justify an interest in information directly relevant to the political, economic and cultural position of the candidate. Article 8 of Regulation (EU) ######### of the Parliament ######## and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Regulation - DSA), which is applicable to very large online search engines (including ####) of 25 August 2023, regarding the absence of a general obligation to monitor or actively investigate the facts, provides that intermediary service providers are not subject to a general obligation to monitor the information that intermediary service providers transmit or store, nor to an obligation to actively search for facts or circumstances indicating illegal activities. ####, what is at issue is not a general obligation of monitoring or a general obligation of active investigation of the facts or a general obligation of providers to take proactive measures regarding illegal content, but the concrete situation that was notified by the complainant, thus becoming incidental to the provisions of art. 16 of the Regulation governing notification and action mechanisms [“Hosting service providers shall establish mechanisms that allow any natural person or entity to notify those providers of the presence within the service they provide of certain information that that person or entity considers to constitute illegal content. Those mechanisms must be easy to access and use and allow for the transmission of notifications exclusively by electronic means – paragraph 1; The mechanisms referred to in paragraph (1) shall be such as to facilitate the transmission of sufficiently precise and duly substantiated notifications. To that end, hosting service providers shall take the necessary measures to allow and facilitate the transmission of notifications containing all of the following elements: (a) a sufficiently substantiated explanation of the reasons why the natural person or entity claims that the information in question constitutes illegal content; (b) a clear indication of the exact electronic location of that information, for example the exact URL or URLs or, if necessary, additional information allowing for the identification of the illegal content, adapted to the type of content and the specific type of hosting service; (c) the name and email address of the natural person or entity submitting the notification, unless the information is considered to involve one of the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 7 of Directive ######## EU; (d) a statement confirming that the natural person or entity submitting the notification has a good faith belief that the information and allegations contained in the notification are accurate and complete – paragraph 2); Notifications referred to in this Article shall be deemed to lead to actual knowledge or awareness, within the meaning of Article 6, of the specific information concerned, where they enable a diligent hosting service provider to identify the illegal nature of the relevant activity or information without detailed legal examination – paragraph 3; Hosting service providers shall process all notifications they receive under the mechanisms referred to in paragraph 1 and take decisions on the information to which they relate notifications, in a timely, diligent, non-arbitrary and objective manner – paragraph 6]. Paragraph 3 of the Preamble to this Regulation states that “Responsible and diligent conduct by intermediary service providers is essential for a safe, predictable and trustworthy online environment and to enable citizens of the Union and others to exercise their fundamental rights guaranteed by the ##### of fundamental rights of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as “######”), in particular the freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business, the right to non-discrimination and the achievement of a high level of consumer protection”, and paragraph 9 states that “This Regulation fully harmonises the rules applicable to intermediary services in the internal market, with the objective of ensuring a safe, predictable and trustworthy online environment, preventing the dissemination of illegal content online and the societal risks that the dissemination of disinformation or other content can generate, and in which the fundamental rights enshrined in ##### are effectively protected and is innovation facilitated". The Court notes the inaccurate nature of the information provided about the plaintiff in the aforementioned articles, a circumstance in which accessing the internet pages through the search engine #### starting from his name is likely to continuously affect his image. #### It is true that the plaintiff is a public figure, however, given the false, defamatory nature of the information presented, the preferable nature of the right to inform and to be informed can no longer be retained, taking priority over the plaintiff's right to respect for private life and the protection of personal data. Therefore, the unlawful act consists in the violation of the rights conferred by EU Regulation 2016/679, and the violation of non-pecuniary rights causes the plaintiff moral damage, by damaging his honor, dignity and reputation. As the CJEU has held in its case-law, processing of personal data such as that at issue, carried out by the operator of a search engine, may significantly affect the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data where the search with that engine is carried out on the basis of the name of a natural person. Furthermore, the effect of the interference with the aforementioned rights of the data subject is aggravated by the important role played in modern society by the internet and search engines, which give the information contained in such a list of results a ubiquitous character. It has also been held that effective and complete protection of the persons concerned could not be achieved if they had to obtain, first or in parallel, the deletion of information concerning them from the publishers of websites. It was also considered that, since the inclusion in the list of results, displayed following a search carried out on the basis of a person’s name, of a web page and the information it contains concerning that person significantly facilitates the accessibility of that information for all internet users who carry out a search concerning the person concerned and may play a decisive role in the dissemination of that information, it may constitute a more significant interference with the fundamental right to respect for the private life of the person concerned than the publication by the publisher of that web page. It is therefore not necessary, first or in parallel, to obtain the deletion of the information concerning the applicant from the author or publisher of the content (information) placed on the website. The fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data enjoy, under national and European law, effective and complete protection, and the inclusion and maintenance in the list of results by the operator of a search engine constitutes a more significant interference with the fundamental right to respect for private life of the data subject than the publication by the publisher of this web page. The unlawful act alleged in the case is neither the creation nor the posting of the articles, but the propagation of defamatory content and the refusal to remove the content of the URLs, as well as the processing of personal data by the operator of a search engine, although it was duly notified, with solid and pertinent arguments, of their inappropriate, irrelevant and excessive content, requesting the appropriate measures to be taken to remove and block from search by the engine ####, by using the keywords representing the complainant's first and last name, the links or URLs from the web pages containing any materials published about him by www.luju.ro. The reasoning for the refusal to resolve the complainant's notifications in a positive manner results in a superficial analysis unrelated to the factual circumstances, an argumentation unrelated to the complainant's specific situation and status, devoid of content and efficiency, which amounts to a failure to carry out the necessary test. The formal invocation of the procedure that should have been followed to ensure the protection of the complainant's rights, conferred by EU Regulation 2016/679, does not prove the non-existence of the alleged unlawful act. Also, the issue of freedom of journalistic expression, namely its prevalence over the right to private life, does not arise in the case, given the subject matter of the action and the status of the defendants. Consequently, in order to eliminate the infringement of the plaintiff's non-patrimonial rights, arising from the inaccurate content of the articles published by www.luju.ro, the court will oblige the defendants to cease the infringement of the plaintiff's non-patrimonial rights, by removing or blocking from the search engine ####, by using the keywords "###### ####### #########", "###### #######", "judge ##### ####### #########", "judge ##### #######", of all links or URL addresses from web pages containing any materials published about him and posted on the website www.luju.ro. Furthermore, in accordance with the provisions of art. 253 para. 1 letter b) Civil Code, the court will admit petition no. 2 and will prohibit the defendants in the future from publishing or transmitting, directly or indirectly, in any form, by any means, any references and any materials published about the plaintiff ##### ####### ####### on the website www.luju.ro or on other pages that copy / take over from the website www.luju.ro (such as, but not limited to, the dissemination and publication of news, debates, investigations, written or audiovisual reports, etc.). In this regard, it is noted that the violation of the plaintiff's non-patrimonial rights is still ongoing, given that at the time of the judgment, the search engine #### still identified several results related to the keywords indicated by the plaintiff and the website www.luju.ro. As for petition no. 3, having as its object moral damages, the court is to admit it in part. According to art. 1.381 para. 1 and art. 1.385 para. 1 Civil Code, any damage gives the right to reparation, and the damage is fully repaired, unless otherwise provided by law. According to the jurisprudence of the High ##### of Cassation and Justice, when establishing the existence of moral damage, the nature and importance of the non-pecuniary values damaged, the personal situation of the victim will be taken into account, taking into account the social environment of which the victim is a part, the education, culture, standard of morality, the personality and psychology of the victim, the circumstances of the commission of the act, social status, etc. Since it is a question of damaging values without economic content and of protecting rights that fall within the sphere of private life, the existence of damage is circumscribed to the condition of reasonable assessment, on a fair basis corresponding to the real and effective damage caused to the victim. Regarding the proof of moral damage, the Î.C.C.J. established that proof of the unlawful act is sufficient, with the prejudice and causality being presumed, the courts deducing the occurrence of moral damage from the mere existence of the unlawful act likely to cause such damage and the circumstances in which it was committed, the solution being determined by the subjective, internal nature of the moral damage, its direct proof being practically impossible. The plaintiff invoked the damage to his honor, dignity and reputation, asserting that his moral and professional probity had been attacked, given that he had an exceptional professional career, exercising a profession that involves education, culture and high standards of morality, the effects of the unlawful act being perceived as extremely serious. In relation to the general assessment of his character, conduct and merits, based on the experience and perception of others, namely moral integrity, probity, fairness, it is obvious, without the need for additional evidence, that questioning these qualities and the insinuation that he does not represent the plaintiff, as results from the articles in dispute, have created significant moral prejudice to him. Therefore, it is not required that the plaintiff prove the external, physically manifested effects of the moral prejudice suffered, being in question emotional/affective suffering, proven by any means of evidence, including simple presumptions, and the legal provisions in the matter of tortious civil liability do not provide for the need for the moral prejudice suffered to be confirmed by physical manifestations that can be proven, the values damaged being dignity, honesty, reputation, prestige, moral integrity, probity, fairness. The defendants favored the process of denigrating the plaintiff, by the fact that the algorithm chosen by them prioritizes the search results, with the articles analyzed in the decision, relating to the plaintiff's activity as a judge, being published with priority. The defendants' refusal denotes that the unlawful act was committed with the form of guilt of intent. The biased, false information, as shown above, affected the plaintiff's honor and reputation, rights protected by the provisions of art. 72 of the Civil Code, creating a false representation of his person and causing an alteration of his identity. As for the amount of compensation for moral damages, these are difficult to establish, in the absence of material evidence the judge being the only one who, in relation to the consequences suffered by the injured person, must assess a certain global amount. As for the extent of the damage, it is obvious that it cannot be quantified according to mathematical or economic criteria, so that, depending on the specific circumstances of the case, ruling in equity, the court will award compensation capable of constituting fair satisfaction. The plaintiff is a judge at the Bucharest Court of Appeal, one of the largest and most complex courts in #######, being entrusted with resolving complex cases with high stakes and major public impact, so that his reputation is an essential element for carrying out his activity in good conditions. The moral damage suffered by the plaintiff is significant, considering his profession, the speed of spread of the defamatory content in question, the impact and notorious interest shown by internet users for such articles, regarding comments on files and the solutions pronounced, the damage to the non-patrimonial values invoked being serious and continuous. Consequently, in order to compensate for the damage suffered by the plaintiff through the violation of his personal non-patrimonial rights, the court will oblige the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the amount of 500,000 lei representing moral damages. Regarding petition no. 4 of the action, regarding the communication of the algorithm according to which it prioritizes search results, the court considers that it is well-founded. According to art. 22 para. 1 chapter III Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the Parliament ######## and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, which regulates "Automated individual decision-making, including profiling", the data subject has the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning the data subject or similarly significantly affects him or her. According to art. 14 para. 2 let. g) of the Regulation, which regulates "Information to be provided where personal data have not been obtained from the data subject", the controller shall provide the data subject with the following information necessary to ensure fair and transparent processing in respect of the data subject: the existence of automated decision-making including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4), as well as, at least in those cases, relevant information on the logic involved and on the significance and envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject. In the case, the personal data were not obtained by the defendants from the plaintiff, an undisputed aspect, so the aforementioned provisions become incidental, according to which the defendants are obliged to communicate to the plaintiff the algorithm according to which they prioritize the search results through the #### engine, by using the keywords "###### ####### #########", "###### #######", "judge ##### ####### #########", "judge ##### #######", of the articles, materials and information published about the plaintiff on the website www.luju.ro. Since it is an automated decision-making process including the creation of profiles, the defendants are obliged to provide the plaintiff with pertinent information regarding the logic used and regarding the importance and expected consequences of such processing for the data subject. Consequently, the court will oblige the defendants to communicate to the plaintiff the algorithm according to which they prioritize the search results through the #### engine, by using the keywords "###### ####### #######", "###### #######", "judge ##### ####### #########", "judge ##### #######", of the articles, materials and information published about the plaintiff on the website www.luju.ro. As for petition no. 5, regarding the communication of the mapping of the processing of personal data concerning his person and the mentioned articles, and petition no. 6, regarding the communication of the assessment that the defendants made on the impact on data protection and respect for his rights to prioritize the search for the respective articles, materials and information on the website www.luju.ro, the court establishes that both are unfounded. According to art. 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, each operator is obliged to keep records of processing activities, but paragraph 4 of this article provides that “the operator or the processor, as well as, where applicable, the representative of the operator or the processor, shall make the records available to the supervisory authority, upon request.” Therefore, the invoked Regulation does not provide for any obligation on the operator to communicate to the data subject, respectively the complainant, the records of processing activities, but only provides that the operator makes the records available to the supervisory authority, upon request. The supervisory authority is not a party to the case, and the complainant’s request is not justified, as no such obligation is provided for the defendants. According to art. 35 para. 1 of the Regulation, which regulates the “Data Protection Impact Assessment”, taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing, where a type of processing, in particular that based on the use of new technologies, is likely to generate a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall carry out, prior to processing, an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data. However, there is no provision regarding the obligation of the controller to communicate the assessment to the data subject. It follows from the provisions of art. 36 of the Regulation that the supervisory authority is the one that has the powers and provides consultation to the controller, thus receiving the data protection impact assessment. Thus, the invoked Regulation does not provide for any obligation of the controller to communicate the data protection impact assessment to the data subject, respectively the complainant, but rather provides that the controller provides this assessment to the supervisory authority, in the procedure provided for consultation. The supervisory authority is not a party to the case, and the plaintiff's request is not justified, since no such obligation is imposed on the defendants. Consequently, the court will dismiss as unfounded petitions no. 5 and 6 of the action. Considering all the factual and legal arguments in the precedent, the court will reject as unfounded the exception of the lack of passive procedural capacity of ######### ####### SRL invoked by the response and the exception of the lack of object of the first claim invoked by the defendant ######### ####### SRL through the notes of the meeting of 15.04.2025, will partially admit the amended request for summons and: - will oblige the defendants to cease the violation of the plaintiff's non-patrimonial rights, by removing or blocking from the search engine ####, by using the keywords "###### ####### #######", "###### #######", "judge ##### ####### #######", "judge ##### #######", "judge ##### #######", of all links or URL addresses from web pages containing any materials published about it and posted on the website www.luju.ro; - will prohibit the defendants in the future from publishing or transmitting, directly or indirectly, in any form, by any means, any references and any materials published about the plaintiff ##### ####### ####### on the website www.luju.ro or on other pages that copy / take over from the website www.luju.ro (such as, but not limited to, the dissemination and publication of news, debates, investigations, written or audiovisual reports, etc.); - will oblige the defendants to communicate to the plaintiff the algorithm according to which it prioritizes the search results through the #### engine, by using the keywords "###### ######### #######", "###### #######", "judge ##### ####### #########", "judge ##### #######", of the articles, materials and information published about the plaintiff on the website www.luju.ro; - will oblige the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of 500,000 lei representing moral damages. It will also reject the rest of the amended summons, as unfounded. #### by the solution pronounced and the provisions of art. 453 paragraph 1 Code of Civil Procedure, the court will oblige the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of 160 lei as legal expenses, representing the judicial stamp duty related to the admitted petitions. FOR THESE REASONS, IN THE NAME OF THE LAW, RULES: Rejects the exception of the lack of passive procedural capacity of ######### ####### SRL, invoked by the response, as unfounded. Rejects the exception of the first head of claim being devoid of purpose, invoked by the defendant ######### ####### SRL through the notes of the meeting of 15.04.2025, as unfounded. Admits in part the amended summons filed by the plaintiff ##### ####### #########, domiciled in Bucharest, #### ###### ########### ### ##, ### ##, ### #, ### ##, Sector 5, in contradiction with the defendants MICROSOFT CORPORATION, headquartered in the USA, #### ######### ####### SRL, headquartered in Bucharest, Sector 6, b-dul ##### #####, Campus Building 6.2, no. 6P, ######### ####### SRL, headquartered in Bucharest, Sector 6, b-dul ##### #####, no. 6P, Campus Building, with the legal seat chosen at ########, ####### & Associates in Bucharest, Sector 1, #### ############# ### ##-15, S-#### Business Center, Gate B, 2nd floor, and MICROSOFT ####### OPERATIONS LIMITED, with its registered office in #######, #### ######### ####### SRL, with its registered office in Bucharest, Sector 6, b-dul ##### #####, Campus Building 6.2, no. 6P. Obliges the defendants to cease the infringement of the plaintiff's non-patrimonial rights, by removing or blocking from the search engine ####, by using the keywords "###### #########", "###### #######", "judge ##### ####### #########", "judge ##### #########", "judge ##### #######", of all links or URL addresses from web pages containing any materials published about it and posted on the website www.luju.ro. Prohibits the defendants from publishing or transmitting, directly or indirectly, in any form, by any means, any references and any materials published about the plaintiff ##### ####### ####### on the website www.luju.ro or on other pages that copy / take over from the website www.luju.ro (such as, but not limited to, the dissemination and publication of news, debates, investigations, written or audiovisual reports, etc.). Obliges the defendants to communicate to the plaintiff the algorithm according to which it prioritizes the search results through the #### engine, by using the keywords "###### ######### #######", "###### #######", "judge ##### ####### #########", "judge ##### #######", of the articles, materials and information published about the plaintiff on the website www.luju.ro. Obliges the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of 500,000 lei representing moral damages. Rejects the amended summons as unfounded. Orders the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the amount of 160 lei as legal costs, representing the judicial stamp duty related to the admitted petitions. With the right of appeal within 30 days of notification, which will be filed with the ##### Court. Delivered today, 30.12.2025, by making the solution available to the parties through the court registry. President, ######-###### ####### Clerk, ###### ####### ##### Editor ###### Technological editor. #### 27.01.2026 / 6 copies
