VG Potsdam - 11 K 4526/16

VG Potsdam - 11 K 4526/16
Court:	VG Potsdam (Germany)
Jurisdiction:	Germany
Relevant Law:	Article 2(1) GDPR Article 4(1) GDPR Article 15(1) GDPR
Decided:	19.11.2019
Published:
Parties:	anonymous
National Case Number/Name:	11 K 4526/16
European Case Law Identifier:	ECLI:DE:VGPOTSD:2019:1119.11K4526.16.00
Appeal from:
Appeal to:
Original Language(s):	German
Original Source:	Berlin-Brandenburg Court Decisions (in German)
Initial Contributor:	n/a

The Administrative Court of Potsdam ruled that the GDPR does not apply to personal data contained in files kept by the Court which is not collected or processed using data processing equipment.

English Summary

Facts

The plaintiff had applied for a position at the Administrative Court. His application was rejected based on an assessment which included notes of the President of the Court. The plaintiff requested access to his personal file including that assessment, as provided for in Article 15(1) GDPR, which was kept by the Higher Administrative Court. The Court denied the request.

Dispute

Does Article 15 GDPR apply to hand written paper notes?

Holding

In the judgement, as for the part that is relevant here, the Berlin-Brandenburg Administrative Court ruled that the GDPR does not apply to the notes of the President of the Administrative Court. According to Article 2(1) GDPR, it applies to data processing which is carried out wholly or partly by automated means. This term is not defined under Article 4 GDPR. According to Article 3(2) of the German Federal Data Protection Act (BSDG), the term automated data collection means the collection, processing or use of personal data using data processing equipment. In this case the President’s notes contain personal data of the plaintiff but they are handwritten and not collected or processed using data processing equipment.

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English Machine Translation of the Decision

The decision below is a machine translation of the original. Please refer to the German original for more details.

DECISION
Facts

1. 
The applicant essentially challenges the staff reports drawn up in respect of him, requests reassessments and, in addition, requests the publication of the assessor's notes.

2.
On the occasion of an application for a position as Presiding Judge at the Administrative Court, the plaintiff was first evaluated in the course of his work by the President of the Administrative Court on April 11, 2016 for the period from July 1, 2010 to March 18, 2016. In order to prepare the assessment, the President of the Administrative Court held interviews with the presiding judges whose chambers the plaintiff had belonged to during the assessment period, and made notes of these interviews, which he used as a reminder and did not include in the files. The assessment was notified to the plaintiff in the form of an over-evaluation by the President of the Higher Administrative Court on 7 June 2016. By letter dated 9 June 2016, the plaintiff lodged an objection to this assessment and requested access to all documents on which the assessment procedure was based. Among other things, the assessment was based on an inadmissible source of knowledge, since assessment discussions, in this case with the (former) chairmen of the plaintiff's chambers, were not planned.

3.
In a letter dated 14 June 2019, the plaintiff filed a separate objection to the fact that the President of the Administrative Court did not, as requested by the plaintiff in advance, obtain the personal file from the Higher Administrative Court and did not grant him access to his personal records. The refusal of the President of the Administrative Court to comply with his request in this regard expressed a "negative basic attitude", "which, moreover, was based on arguments that were obviously beside the point or not justified at all". According to the "General Order of the Minister of Justice of 20 June 2008 (2051-I.4)", the personal files were kept by the presidents of the administrative courts and the certificate book was part of the personal file. Moreover, Article 11.1 sentence 1 of the Brandenburg Land Constitution (Landesverfassung Brandenburg - LVerf) gave rise to a comprehensive right of inspection of files. As a precautionary measure, the plaintiff requested that the letters described by the president of the administrative court as "reminders" be added to his personal file. Furthermore, the plaintiff pointed out that the chairmen of the chambers questioned by the president of the Administrative Court had also produced documents which in any case had to be consulted.

4.
The applicant's opposition of 14 June 2016 has been overcome in so far as his personal file has been made available to him for inspection at the Administrative Court. The appeal of 17 June 2016 was dismissed by notice of opposition dated 17 June 2016 to the extent that the plaintiff requested access to the written notes of the President of the Administrative Court on his discussions with the chairmen of the plaintiff's chambers. The plaintiff did not return the acknowledgement of receipt of this objection.

5.
On 6 July 2016, the applicant provided a provisional statement of grounds for his appeal against his staff report of 11 April 2016 in the form of the overstatement of 31 May 2016.

6.
In an appeal notice dated October 20, 2016, the President of the Higher Administrative Court rejected the plaintiff's objection to his assessment. In it, he pointed out, among other things, that since 2010, it has been a consistent practice of the presidents of the administrative courts not to obtain written assessment contributions but to conduct assessment interviews. The President of the Administrative Court did not have an obligation to consult the documents prepared by the chairmen of the plaintiff's chambers. The President of the Administrative Court did not ask the chamber chairmen of the plaintiff for written assessment contributions, but decided at his own discretion to hold discussions with them, which was not objectionable.

7.
On November 28, 2016, the plaintiff brought an action. In this action, the plaintiff alleges what he considers to be gross errors of assessment.

8.
After the applicant, following a new application for a position as Presiding Judge of the Administrative Court, had received a further occasional assessment of 28 December 2017, in the form of the over-evaluation of 16 January 2018, he also appealed against this and requested access to the recordings of the interview between the President of the Administrative Court and the Chairman of the Chamber to which the applicant belonged during the assessment period, as well as the consultation of his recordings, which the President of the Administrative Court rejected under 26 February 2018, to which the applicant appealed.

9.
The abovementioned oppositions were rejected by notice of opposition of 5 June 2018. The arguments exchanged during the administrative procedure were essentially the same as those relating to the previous assessment procedure. The plaintiff merely pointed out in addition that the right to receive the minutes follows from Art. 15 para. 1 DSGVO. On 13 July 2018, the plaintiff extended his complaint to include these matters in dispute.

10.
By letter of 12 November 2019, the defendant stated that it had annulled the contested staff reports on the ground that there had been no occasion for the reports to be carried out, since they had not been tested. At the hearing, the applicant contested the notification of the decision to set aside his staff reports. The defendant subsequently reiterated the annulment at the oral hearing, to which the applicant declared an objection at the oral hearing.

11.
Finally, the applicant made a verbatim application,

12.
order the defendant, by annulling the decisions of 20 October 2016 and 5 June 2018, to annul the staff reports of 11 April 2016 and 28 December 2017 in the form of the overvaluations of 31 May 2016 and 16 June 2018 Annul the Staff Reports of 11 April 2016 and 28 December 2017, the over-reviews of 31 May 2016 and 16 January 2018 and the decisions of 20 October 2016 and 5 June 2018 on objections, or, in the alternative, declare that the Staff Reports of 11 April 2016 and 28 December 2017, the over-reviews of 31 May 2016 and 16 January 2018 and the decisions of 20 October 2016 and 5 June 2018 were unlawful.

13.
Annul the decisions of the President of the Higher Administrative Court of 20 October 2016 and 5 June 2018

14.
order the defendant to grant the applicant access to the following three documents, annulling the rejection decisions of the President of the Administrative Court of 14 June 2016 and 28 February 2018 and the objection decisions of the President of the Higher Administrative Court of 17 June 2016 and 5 June 2018: Minutes of the President of the Administrative Court on the two personal appraisal interviews conducted in 2016 with the Presiding Judge of the Administrative Court and with the Presiding Judge of the Administrative Court, as well as minutes of the President of the Administrative Court on the personal appraisal interview conducted in 2017 with the Presiding Judge of the Administrative Court

15.
The defendant claims that the Court should

16.
dismiss the action.

17.
On 26 July 2018, the defendant stated that the action was unfounded and referred to the decisions of appeal issued in respect of the respective appeals against the assessments. With regard to the asserted right of access to the file, the defendant also referred to the statements in its opposition notices.

18.
At the hearing, the court handed over to the plaintiff the decisions on previously filed motions of bias against two members of the chamber. At the hearing, the plaintiff submitted a further application for a declaration of bias against the chairman of the Board, which the Board rejected as inadmissible. For further details of the facts of the case and the dispute, reference is made to the content of the court file, the administrative proceedings and the hearing of 19 November 2019.

Reasons for the decision

19.
The plaintiff's further application for rejection, which he submitted at the beginning of the oral proceedings, was to be rejected without obtaining a further official statement by the rejected judge and with his cooperation because of the lack of a legal interest in legal protection (see Federal Court of Finance, decision of 2 December 2008 - VII B 122/08 -, juris para. 4). This application for rejection was abusive of the law. A judge's refusal is abusive if the proceedings are to be delayed or if the refusal is to be used as a tactical means to achieve objectives not related to the proceedings (see BVerfG, Order of 27 November 2006 - 1 BvR 2719/06 -, jurisprudence marginal no. 3; Higher Regional Court Zweibrücken, Order of 17 March 2014 - 3 W 15/14 -, jurisprudence marginal no. 7 with further details). N.). This can be inferred not only from the content of the application for rejection itself, but also indirectly from the other procedural conduct of the party rejecting it. The plaintiff justified his third motion of rejection in essence by the fact that he had neither received the official statement on his first motion of rejection against the chairman nor a decision on the motion of rejection. Since no decision had been made on the request for a bias, the chairman had not been allowed to call the oral hearing. The official opinion on the applicant's request for a bias against the chairman, which had been lodged in person at the post office at 3 p.m. on 12 November 2019, was sent by the same mail as the official opinion of another judge, who had also been rejected, on 13 November 2019. In accordance with the legal concept of § 41, Subsection 2, Sentence 1, VwVfG, it can therefore be assumed that the plaintiff received it on Monday, 18 November 2019. Even if this were not the case, it is clear from the conduct of the plaintiff that the aim of his third application for a review of the application for a bias within one week in these proceedings is obviously to delay the proceedings. The previous bias applications already point to such a goal. The plaintiff substantiated the first bias petition against the chairman by stating that it had become known to him on November 11, 2019, that the chairman was participating in the "Justice Management Program" in the course of further training, without of course stating where he had obtained this information. Furthermore, the bias of the chairman had to be concerned by the fact that the chairman had been seconded to various administrative departments of the Ministry of Justice. In any event, the latter point had been known to the plaintiff for months and he had also submitted a request for a bias in comparable cases in other proceedings immediately after the secondment had ended. Why he now waited until 3:00 p.m. on November 12, 2019, the end of the court's opening hours, can only be explained with the aim of substantiating the subsequent request for bias in the way that had happened. This goal is also indicated by the bias petition against another member of the Chamber, which was justified by the fact that in another proceeding he had knowingly sent documents incorrectly as "confidential personnel matter" and had thus shown an excessive turning towards the defendant. In any case, the plaintiff would have been able to inquire by telephone or by calling the chamber's office about the Chairman's official statement (and, if necessary, also that of the other rejected judge), which had been available there since 13 November 2019. Particularly since the plaintiff was in any case present on 19 November 2019 in the morning anyway in the court library, which is only three doors away from the office of the 11th Chamber, and it should be clear to him that official statements are usually made immediately if they are prompted. Whether the plaintiff's intention to protract the proceedings is also shown by his refusal to take the decisions on his bias petitions on 19 November 2019 at 10:20 a.m. in or in front of the court library, or whether this was merely due to the acute need to go to the toilet, which the plaintiff referred to when trying to hand over the decisions, was no longer relevant. Because in the total view it becomes also so obviously apparent that the plaintiff was not interested in the publication of official explanations or resolutions to its refusal request, but in obstructing the process.

20.
The proceedings were not to be suspended pursuant to § 94 VwGO. According to this provision, if the decision of the court in a dispute depends in whole or in part on the existence or non-existence of a legal relationship which is the subject of another pending dispute or is to be determined by an administrative authority, the court may order that the proceedings be suspended until the other dispute has been resolved or until the administrative authority has reached a decision. The factual preconditions for this are already not met. At the time of the application for suspension, a decision had already been made on the constitutional complaint named by the plaintiff, which was filed under the file number 2 BvR 1867/19. In the proceedings before the Higher Administrative Court under file no. 4 B 2/19, cited by the plaintiff, the subject of the proceedings is whether an official who has already been promoted can still receive an assessment according to a different assessment provision from the one on which this application is based even after promotion has taken place, i.e. whether an assessment other than the one on which this application is based can still be made.

21.
The President of the Higher Administrative Court is the correct representative of the defendant. Pursuant to § 5 of the Regulation on Jurisdiction of Judges and Civil Servants in the Ordinary Courts, Administrative Courts, Financial Courts and Public Prosecutor's Offices in the State of Brandenburg of 11 August 2006, as amended on 11 August 2006, the President of the Higher Administrative Court is the proper representative of the defendant. December 2006, the power of the supreme administrative authority to decide on an appeal by a judge against a measure of administrative supervision (§ 26 of the German Judges' Act) or against the rejection of a claim to a benefit is conferred on the President of the Higher Administrative Court, insofar as he himself or authorities subordinate to him have issued the decision contested by the appeal. Admittedly, the plaintiff objects to the applicability of this provision, arguing that the official assessment is not a measure of administrative supervision. In doing so, however, the plaintiff fails to recognise that a disciplinary measure is to be understood as any measure emanating from the supervisory authority, regardless of whether it is used to carry out supervisory activities in terms of their nature and content (Federal Court of Justice, judgments of 26 January 2006, p. 1). July 2017 - RiZ (R) 3/16 -, juris marginal no. 15 and of 16 March 2005 - RiZ (R) 2/04 -, juris marginal no. 20; VG Potsdam, judgment of 22 November 2012 - 10 K 272/07 -; Schmidt-Räntsch, 6th ed. 2009, DRiG, § 26, marginal no. 42; in the same vein, also BVerwG, judgment of 17 April 1986 - 2 C 28/83 -, jurisprudence, marginal 11: The task of determining the employer who is to carry out the task of official assessment is connected with the assessment of the exercise of official and specialist supervision; in addition, the fact that this is sometimes viewed differently for standard assessments Schnellenbach/Bodanowitz, Dienstliche Beurteilung, 53rd update, April 2016, C I, marginal 494 et seq. N.). Consequently, the President of the Higher Administrative Court is the competent representative of the defendant. This is not changed in the present proceedings by the extension of the plaintiff's action of 13 July 2018, although at that time the Regulation on Jurisdiction of Judges and Civil Servants in the Ordinary Courts, Administrative Jurisdiction, Finance Courts and Public Prosecutor's Offices in the Land of Brandenburg of 9 May 2018 (RuBZV 2018) was already in force, according to which jurisdiction for the cases described above for judges of administrative jurisdiction was transferred to the President of the Higher Regional Court. Pursuant to § 6 of this Regulation, with regard to the competence for representation in proceedings already pending at that time, the competence existing at the time of the entry into force of this Regulation shall remain in force. Whether an extension of a claim pursuant to § 91 VwGO is to be assessed as a new claim within the meaning of the RuBZV 2018 or as an extension of the previous one, serves to simplify the procedure in accordance with the obvious sense and purpose of § 6 RuBZV 2018. In any case, if, in the case of an extension of the action, the amended action is suitable to serve the final elimination of the matter in dispute between the parties in the current proceedings and the matter in dispute is essentially the same in the sense of a complex of differences of opinion in fact and law which impairs the party relations (cf. on § 91 VwGO Schoch/Schneider/Bier-Ortloff/Riese, VwGO Kommentar, 36 EL 2019, § 91 marginal no. 61), it corresponds to this purpose that the representative of the parties remains the same. In the present case, the factual and legal issues to be resolved between the parties are largely identical. In both cases, a decision must be made on the modalities of the assessment of the plaintiff and his further claims asserted in connection therewith (see below). In this capacity, the President of the Higher Administrative Court could also dispose of the subject matter of the dispute on behalf of the defendant and annul the assessments of the plaintiff.

22.
In so far as the applicant seeks the annulment of the staff reports, the action is admissible as an action for performance (see BVerwG, judgment of 17 September 2015 - 2 C 13/14 -, juris, paragraph 12), but inadmissible. Even if the plaintiff did not receive not only the official statements of the judges who had been dismissed, but also the decision to set aside the judgment of the defendant, he was in any event informed of the decision to set aside at the hearing. His objection at the oral hearing could not lead to the suspensive effect of the decision to set aside simply because it was not declared in accordance with the rules of form. Pursuant to § 70 VwGO, the objection must be lodged in writing, in electronic form or for recording with the authority which issued the administrative act. This has not been done by the declaration to the court. Irrespective of this, it is probably abusive of the law to request the annulment of an assessment and at the same time to object to the requested annulment decision.

23.
Following the annulment of the staff reports, the action for a declaration of invalidity is therefore admissible as a form of action for the applicant's request for a declaration in the alternative. If the measure is taken, its admissibility presupposes a risk of recurrence, the pertinence of the measure to the preparation of an official liability trial or a need for rehabilitation after discrimination has occurred (Schoch/Schneider/Bier-Pietzcker, VwGO Kommentar, 36 EL February 2019, § 43 marginal no. 35 and § 113 marginal no. 102). However, none of this is present. Insofar as the plaintiff asserts a risk of repetition, this does not exist for the simple reason that an assessment of the reason for the intended office is not required due to the lack of fulfilment of the constitutive requirement profile (see below). For this reason, fertilization for the preparation of a claim for official liability, which would obviously be unsuccessful, is also ruled out. An interest in rehabilitation is ruled out due to a lack of discriminatory effect. A justified idealistic interest in rehabilitation exists only if the attacked measure results in a stigmatisation of the affected person which is suitable to lower his reputation in the public or in the social environment. This stigmatisation must have acquired an external effect and still persist in the present (see BVerwG, judgment of 16 May 2013 - 8 C 14/12 -, juris marginal no. 25; NdsOVG, judgment of 7 February 2001 - 2 L 1373/97 -, juris marginal no. 36). Such stigmatisation is neither asserted by the plaintiff nor is it otherwise apparent.

24.
In so far as the plaintiff objects to the failure to issue the handwritten notes of the President of the Administrative Court regarding the occasional assessment of 11 April 2016 in the form of the over-evaluation of 31 May 2016, the action is admissible as a result, and in particular not time-barred. It is true that the plaintiff did not file an action until more than one month after the issuance of the notice of objection of 17 June 2016. However, the date of service of the notice of opposition cannot be determined after the plaintiff has not returned the acknowledgement of receipt. Nor can it be assumed that the plaintiff received the notice of opposition on 25 August 2016 in any event. It is true that on this date he declared to an employee of the Higher Administrative Court, as evidenced by a memorandum in connection with the present proceedings, that he would not return "the acknowledgements of receipt" because they were not the "correct" ones. However, it cannot be established whether the acknowledgement of receipt for the receipt of the notice of opposition of 17 June 2016 is also covered by this declaration. Although the above-mentioned note on the interview contains the file number of the defendant, it does not include the file number under which the opposition proceedings are conducted to refuse to hand over the handwritten notes.

25.
However, in so far as the action is admissible (including the remainder), it is not well founded. The plaintiff is not entitled to the preparation of a reasoned assessment for the application for a position as presiding judge at the Administrative Court. There is no legal basis for re-evaluating the plaintiff after the completion of the appointment procedures. The defendant is neither entitled to prepare such an assessment after the sole reason for the assessment has ceased to exist, nor is the plaintiff entitled to such an assessment. The reasons for the assessment ceased to exist when the posts were filled (see also VG Potsdam, judgments of 3 December 2018 - 2 K 810/18 -, juris nos. 13 et seq. N. and of 10 October 2018 - VG 2 K 834/16 -, marginal nos. 24 et seq.; Schnellenbach/Bodanowitz, Die Dienstentliche Beurteilung der Beamten und der Richter, as of July 2019, marginal nos. 462 and 447, marginal no. 65; different for the case that an assessment should originally have been made OVG Berlin-Brandenburg, decision of 22 November 2018 - OVG 4 N 54.16 -, e.A. page 3 et seq.) In addition, there was and is no reason for an assessment with regard to a promotion office, as can be seen from the lack of the necessary requirements for promotion offices in accordance with No. III of the Ordinance on Requirements in conjunction with No. 1 of the Test Ordinance (cf. on the decisiveness of the requirement profiles set out in administrative regulations BVerfG, resolution of 12 November 2019 - 2 BvR 1867/19 -; OVG Berlin-Brandenburg, resolution of 30 September 2019 - OVG 4 p 53.19 -; VG Potsdam, resolution of 30 July 2019 - 11 L 504/19 -). It would be pure formality and would involve unnecessary effort if an applicant could insist on an assessment for a purpose that cannot be achieved. It is true that the BeurtAV provides in § 2 para. 4 a) that judges are to be assessed when applying for another office. Understandably, however, this obligation to assess can only exist if the conditions for the reason for assessment are not obviously not met. The plaintiff is neither tried and tested, nor has any activity that could be recognised as a substitute test subsequently.

26.
The plaintiff is also not entitled to the publication of the notes of the President of the Administrative Court . The right constituted there to decide on the disclosure and use of his personal data himself, to information about the storage of his personal data and to inspection of files and other official documents, insofar as they concern him and do not conflict with the rights of third parties, is intended to enable the individual to preserve his privacy and to prevent him from becoming increasingly dependent on public and non-public bodies, because they know more and more about him through the collection of his data (cf. Constitutional Court of the Land Brandenburg, judgment of 20 June 1996 - 3/96 -, juris para. 30; Lieber/Iwers/Ernst, Commentary on the Constitution of the Land Brandenburg, 2012, Article 11 para. 2). In the present case, however, the storage of data is not provided for. In particular, records of the present type are not part of the personnel files (see Führung der Personalakte, Brandenburgisches Justizministerialblatt of 20 June 2008, no. 7, p. 75). There is neither an obligation nor a claim to include personal notes in the personnel file (see VG Berlin, decision of 31 March 2017 - 26 L 339/16 -, juris nr. 35; Schnellenbach/Bodanowitz, Die Dienststundenbewertung der Beamten und Richter, nr. 338, 301 et seq.) Rather, the records of the President of the Administrative Court, if they still exist at all, are mnemonic aids that may under certain circumstances indirectly find their way into administrative proceedings, but may also be discarded. If every somehow spontaneously manifested train of thought of a public official during his or her period of service were to be fixed and taken into an administrative process, this would amount to a curtailment of the possibility that these too might well be allowed to think thoughts that are to be immediately discarded. However, this would be detrimental to a well thought-out and ultimately also lawful administrative action, as is a requirement of the rule of law principle from Article 20.3 of the Basic Law, Article 2.1 of the Basic Law.

27.
Nor is there any corresponding claim for restitution under simple legal provisions. As far as one can think of a claim under Section 1 of the German Act on Inspection of Files and Information (AIG), according to which everyone has the right to inspect files in accordance with this Act, unless overriding public or private interests under Sections 4 and 5 of the AIG conflict with this or other legal provisions contain sector-specific regulations for an unlimited group of persons, there is already a lack of files. According to § 3 AIG, files are all documents recorded in writing, electronically, optically, acoustically or in any other way, as long as they serve exclusively official or service purposes. This does not include preliminary drafts and notes which are not part of the process and which are destroyed at the latest when the process is completed (cf. also § 2 Federal Freedom of Information Act). Consequently, the notes made here are not files within the meaning of the AIG, as they are merely notes which serve to structure thought.

28.
There is also no claim for restitution under Article 15 (1) of the Basic Regulation on Data Protection (DSGVO), which the plaintiff is famous for. According to this provision, the data subject may request confirmation from the data controller as to whether personal data relating to him or her is being processed; if this is the case, he or she has the right to be informed of this personal data and to receive the following information. Irrespective of whether this provision gives rise to a right to information, the DSGVO does not apply to the notes of the President of the Administrative Court. According to Art. 2 para. 1, the DSGVO applies only to fully or partially automated data. This term is not defined in Art. 4 DSGVO. In accordance with Art. 3 para. 2 sentence 1 of the Federal Data Protection Act, automated data collection is understood to mean the collection, processing or use of personal data using data processing equipment. In the present case, the notes do contain personal data of the plaintiff. However, they are of a handwritten nature and are not collected, processed or used by means of data processing systems. It is therefore also irrelevant whether the notes are available as a reminder and are personal data within the meaning of Art. 4 No. DSGVO, which presupposes that the data relate to an identified or identifiable person and are not merely anonymous documents kept separately from reference files.

29.
Ultimately, the plaintiff's claim for restitution also does not follow from the point of view of welfare, because it would require the publication of the notes of the President of the Administrative Court on the exercise of rights. It is true that written assessment contributions must be published in the event of an objection to the assessment, since knowledge of them is indispensable for effective prosecution (BVerwG, judgment of 1 March 2018 - 2 A 10/17 -, juris, marginal no. 33). This purpose can no longer be fulfilled here, since the assessments have been revoked. Moreover, the notes of the President of the Administrative Court are not a written assessment contribution, but merely recordings of conversations for memory purposes. Only if the assessor were to refer to certain statements made by third parties would these possibly be the subject of the assessment and their content would have to be determined by way of free evidence, if necessary.

30.
The decision on costs is based on Section 154(1) of the VwGO.

31.
The decision on provisional enforceability is based on § 167 VwGO in conjunction with §§ 708 no. 11, 711 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

32.
DECISION

33.
Pursuant to § 52, Subsection 2, GKG, in conjunction with No. 10.5 of the Catalogue of Amounts in Litigation for Administrative Jurisdiction 2013, the amount in dispute is set at EUR 10,000.