VG Ansbach - AN 14 K 22.00468

VG Ansbach - AN 14 K 22.00468
Court:	VG Ansbach (Germany)
Jurisdiction:	Germany
Relevant Law:	Article 2(2) GDPR Article 6(1)(f) GDPR Article 58 GDPR
Decided:	02.11.2022
Published:
Parties:
National Case Number/Name:	AN 14 K 22.00468
European Case Law Identifier:
Appeal from:
Appeal to:	Unknown
Original Language(s):	German
Original Source:	openJur (in German)
Initial Contributor:	Julia

The Administrative Court of Ansbach held that reporting parking offences with pictures taken by phone to the police is lawful pursuant to Article 6(1)(f) GDPR and does not constitute a household activity.

English Summary

Facts

The controller is a cyclist who took pictures of parking offences and, together with a short description, sent it to the police authority in charge to report the offence. The case at hand concerned photographs taken in June 2020 of various vehicles that showed the parking situation and the vehicles' license plates.

In June 2021, the competent DPA issued a reprimand against the controller in accordance with Article 58(2)(b) GDPR. The DPA argued that taking and redirecting pictures of the parking offences constitutes processing of personal data and that the controller did not fulfil their informational duties pursuant to Articles 13(1)(d) and 14(2)(b) GDPR. The authority claimed that there was no legitimate legal basis under Article 6(1) GDPR for the processing, as the controller neither obtained a consent of the vehicle owners nor had a legitimate interest that would justify the processing. The controller was requested to pay an administrative fee of 100 euros.

The controller filed a complaint against the DPA's decision in a written statement at the Administrative Court of Ansbach.

Holding

The Administrative Court Ansbach overturned the DPA's decision. It held that the reprimand issued by the DPA is unlawful because the claimant did not violate any provisions of the GDPR, which is a condition for a reprimand pursuant to Article 58(2)(b) GDPR.

Material scope of the GDPR

According to the court, the GDPR applies in the case at hand since taking pictures of vehicles and forward them to the police constitutes the processing of personal data in accordance with Article 2(1) GDPR and Article 4(1) GDPR. A license plate is information that allows the identification of a natural person, despite the fact that the provision of additional information from authorities is necessary to identify the data subject. Furthermore, the household exemption laid down in Article 2(2) GDPR is not applicable since the processing of personal data is leaving the private sphere. The pictures taken were intended to be forwarded to the police which is not a purely personal activity.

Legal basis of processing

The court states that the controller could rely on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR to process the personal data at stake as the controller had a legitimate interest in being able to report an offence, which includes the submission of photographs to the police. Reference point for this claim is Recital 50, which states that "Indicating possible criminal acts or threats to public security by the controller and transmitting the relevant personal data in individual cases or in several cases relating to the same criminal act or threats to public security to a competent authority should be regarded as being in the legitimate interest pursued by the controller." Although the first part of Recital 50 is referring to a change of purpose in the processing activity, the court held that the reporting of criminal offences generally constituted a legitimate interest on which controllers may rely.

The court further noted that within the scope of the GDPR (consequently, also within the scope of Article 6(1)(f) GDPR and Recital 50 GDPR), the notion of "criminal offences" has to be interpreted autonomously under EU law. In accordance with the common legal tradition of the Member States, the notion "criminal offence" is not defined quantitatively (in terms of the severity of the sanction imposed), but qualitatively (in terms of the form of the imposed legal consequences). Since the commission of an administrative offence is punishable by a fine and the prosecution of an administrative offence has a "repressive character" under German law, the court held that a German administrative offence has to be regarded as a criminal act within the GDPR. For the processing to be in accordance with Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, the controller does not have to be personally affected. Furthermore, a claim to anonymity within road traffic does not exist under German law, rather the license plate has to be visible at all times (see § 23 StVO).

The court stated that the controller's information requirements under the GDPR and other rights of the data subjects were not relevant in this case since the reprimand of the DPA only addressed allegedly illegal processing of the personal data by the transmission of the photographs. No other data protection obligations, rights or violations of the GDPR were touched upon.

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English Machine Translation of the Decision

The decision below is a machine translation of the German original. Please refer to the German original for more details.

Rubrum

Bavarian Administrative Court AnsbachIn the name of the peopleIn the administrative matter...- Plaintiff -authorized: Lawyers...against Bavarian State Office for Data Protection SupervisionPromenade 18, 91522 Ansbach- Defendant-due to data protection law, law of the census, the Bavarian Administrative Court Ansbach, 14th chamber, by the presiding judge at the administrative court dr S...the judge at the administrative court P...the judge R...and by honorary judge...honorary judge...on the basis of the hearing on November 2, 2022on November 2, 2022the following judgment:

tenor
1. The defendant's decision of January 28, 2022 is rescinded.2. The defendant bears the costs of the procedure.3. The judgment is provisionally enforceable with regard to the costs. The defendant can avert enforcement by providing security or a deposit in the amount of the fixed costs if the plaintiff does not provide security in the same amount before enforcement.
facts
The plaintiff objects to a warning under data protection law. The plaintiff lives in Munich and regularly rides a bicycle. He photographed several vehicles that he drove past and that were illegally parked. He then forwarded the photographs together with reports of administrative offenses by email to the responsible police station, sometimes using a website that provides forms for this and sends them to the responsible authorities after they have been filled out (cf. https://www.w.. ./). At issue are six e-mails with a total of twelve photographs of six illegal parkers, which the plaintiff sent to the responsible Munich 15 police station on September 17 and 20, 2021. Vehicles that are parked in the absolute no-stopping zone can be seen in the photographs with their license plates; other personal data, such as people or license plates of other vehicles, cannot be seen. Some of the vehicles are parked on the street, some on a sidewalk in such a way that it would no longer be possible to pass on the sidewalk at this point. The texts The e-mails also contain the license plate number in question, as well as the place and time the photo was taken, and the make and model of the vehicle. Two of the ads refer to the same vehicle on different occasions. In none of the e-mails did the plaintiff explain that he was affected as a road user due to the parking violations. With an event report dated September 20, 2021, police inspection 15 (Munich - Sendling) informed the criminal department 11 Munich with the request to examine a violation of the DS- GVO that the plaintiff is acting as a reimburser of mass reports in the area of traffic offenses. With a letter dated September 23, 2021 and six corresponding e-mails from the plaintiff, including photographs, the case was then forwarded to the defendant by Criminal Division 11 Munich for examination In a decision dated January 28, 2022, the plaintiff was warned after a prior hearing because of the data protection violation found. The reason given was, among other things, that photographing and forwarding the license plate number constitutes data processing within the meaning of the GDPR, but for which there is no legal basis under Article 6 (1) GDPR, and in particular there is no sufficiently legitimate interest within the meaning of Article 6 Para. 1 lit. f GDPR. Because the power for anyone to file a complaint, which follows from § 158 StPO, only includes the transmission of data that would be needed to initiate investigations, i.e. the crime scene, the license plate number of the vehicle and the identity of witnesses in the case of parking violations. On the other hand, a further power to collect evidence such as the transmission of crime photos is not part of the right to report. Since the plaintiff has neither presented a specific risk of his own nor has a general right to undisturbed use of the traffic area, there is also no legitimate interest in this respect. In addition, there is also a lack of the demanded in Art Necessity of the data ver
reasons
The lawsuit, for which the Bavarian administrative court in Ansbach is responsible (see 1.), is admissible (see 2.) and justified (see 3.). a legal person and a supervisory authority of the federal government or a state over rights according to Article 78 paragraph 1 and 2 of the regulation (EU) 2016/679 (DS-GVO) given the administrative legal process. The competence of the Administrative Court of Ansbach results objectively from § 45 VwGO and locally from § 20 Para. 3 BDSG as a special provision to § 52 VwGO. According to Section 20 (3) BDSG (cf. also Art. 78 (3) GDPR), the administrative court in whose district the supervisory authority is based is responsible for proceedings under Section 20 (1) sentence 1 BDSG - as here . The Ansbach Administrative Court is therefore the factually and locally competent court, since the defendant, as the supervisory authority pursuant to Art. 51 DS-GVO, Section 40 BDSG and Art. 18 Para. 1 Sentence 1, Para. 2 BayDSG, is based in Ansbach and thus in the administrative district Middle Franconia (cf. Art. 1 Para. 2 No. 4 AGVwGO). The warning from the notification of January 28, 2022 is a declaratory administrative act, since, according to its number I, the defendant has determined a more detailed data protection violation by the plaintiff (cf. also VG Hannover, U.v. 27.11.2019 - 10 A 820/19 - juris marginal note 19; VG Mainz, U.v. 17.12.2020 - 1 K 778/19.MZ - juris marginal note 22; Selmayr in Ehmann/Selmayr, DS-GVO, 2nd edition 2018, Article 58 20; Polenz in Simitis/Hornung/Spiecker by Döhmann, DatenschutzR, 1st edition 2019, paragraph 29, 7 on Article 58 GDPR ). The plaintiff's right to sue results from Art. 78 Para. 1 DS-GVO, according to which every natural person has the right to an effective judicial remedy against a legally binding decision of a supervisory authority concerning them. The plaintiff is therefore authorized to bring an action against the warning given to the defendant in accordance with Art. 58 DS-GVO of the violation has an incriminating effect on the plaintiff as the addressee of the warning (Körffer in Paal/Pauly, DS-GVO/BDSG, 3rd edition 2021, Art. 58 para. 18). timely, been raised. 3. The lawsuit is justified, because the warning of January 28, 2022 is illegal and violates the plaintiff's rights, so that both the warning from paragraph I and its subsequent decisions from paragraphs II to IV of the disputed decision are to be repealed (§ 113 Para. 1 Sentence 1 VwGO).a. The defendant Bavarian State Office for Data Protection Supervision is itself passively legitimate. According to § 20 Para. 5 Sentence 1 No. 2 BDSG, the supervisory authority is directly involved as a defendant lit. There is therefore a special federal regulation vis-à-vis § 78 VwGO due to the independence of the supervisory authority under Union law. b. The warning at issue of January 28, 2022 is illegal GDPR. Accordingly, the supervisory authority responsible under Art. 51 DS-GVO has the power to warn a person responsible if he has violated the DS-GVO with processing operations. Procedural errors in relation to the issuing of the warning are not apparent, in particular the 58(2)(b) GDPR responsible for issuing a warning pursuant to Article 51(1) GDPR and Section 40 BDSG in conjunction with Article 18(1) sentence 1 BayDSG. However, the warning is materially unlawful because the plaintiff has not violated data protection regulations within the meaning of Art. 58 Para. 2 Letter b DS-GVO. 2 letter b DS-GVO, is described in more detail in the justification for the warning in accordance with Section I of the notification of January 28, 2022. The justification for the warning must therefore be used to determine which of the data protection violations is the basis for the warning and which has been identified with it. Accordingly, the plaintiff's data protection violation is said to have consisted in the fact that he processed the personal data of the owners of illegally parked vehicles in an inadmissible manner and thus violated Art. 5 Para. 1 Letter a, Art. 6 Para. 1 DS-GVO by taking pictures of illegally parked vehicles and sending them to the responsible police station. The official files consulted by the defendant show six such transmissions of recordings. Consequently, these six cases of the processing of the personal data of the holders and a violation of the data protection regulations of Art. 5 Para. 1 Letter a, Art. 6 Para January 28, 2022 and thus also the present action for rescission. The warning at issue does not indicate that the processing of other personal data than that of the owner of the illegally parked vehicles or other obligations under the GDPR is found to be a data protection violation parked vehicles to the police inspection does not violate data protection law.aa.The scope of the GDPR is open, because the recordings of photographs of illegally parked vehicles taken by the plaintiff and their forwarding to the police inspection represent a processing of personal data of the vehicle owners as data subjects in the sense by Art. 2 Para. 1, Art. 4 No. 1 and No. 2 DS-GVO. License plates are information relating to an identifiable natural person and are therefore personal data within the meaning of Art. 4 No. 1 GDPR. Because it is possible to determine and identify a person, the owner, based on the license plate number, albeit with the help of official information (cf. Gola in Heckmann/Gola, DS-GVO/BDSG, 3rd edition 2022, para 9 to Article 4 paragraph GDPR; Klar/Kuhling in Kühling/Buchner, DS-GVO/BDSG, 3rd edition 2020, paragraph 30 to Article 4 No. 1 GDPR; sign in BeckOK data protection regulation Wolff/Brink, 41st edition, as of August 1, 2022, paragraph 21 on Article 4 GDPR; see also BGH, U.v. 15.5.2018 - VI ZR 233/17 - juris paragraph 21). By transmitting the recordings of the illegally parked vehicles to the police, the plaintiff processed this personal data of others within the meaning of Art. 2 Para. 1, Art. 4 No. 2 DS-GVO by recording the personal data and transmitting them to the police inspection .This transmission of license plates to the police is not subject to the so-called "household exception" of Art. 2 Para. 2 Letter c GDPR. According to this, the material scope of the GDPR does not apply if personal data is processed by natural persons exclusively for the purpose of carrying out personal or family activities. However, the data processing leaves the purely private sphere to which the "household exception" refers, even if it only partially extends to the public space, and especially if the purpose of taking the photographs is to pass them on (cf. ECJ , U.v. 11.12.2014 - C-212/13 - juris para. 35). As can be seen from the photographs, the plaintiff only took pictures in the public traffic area in order to forward them to the police inspection for the prosecution of the offenses depicted on them. As a result, the recordings have not been processed exclusively as part of the plaintiff's personal or family activities. According to Article 5 (1) (a) GDPR, the plaintiff's processing of personal data must be lawful, with the processing only then is lawful if at least one of the conditions of Art. 6 Para. 1 DS-GVO is fulfilled. (1) The disputed data processing by the plaintiff was lawful according to Art. 6 Para. 1 Sentence 1 Letter f DS-GVO. Processing is lawful in accordance with Art. 6 Para. 1 Sentence 1 Letter f DS-GVO if it is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the person responsible or a third party, provided that the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject do not affect the protection of personal data require, outweigh. In the present case, there is such a legitimate interest of the plaintiff as the person responsible (see (a)), the data processing was to protect this interest also required (see (b)) and no overriding interests of the persons concerned have become apparent (see (c)).(a) The plaintiff has a legitimate interest in being able to report an administrative offense to the police by submitting a photograph .The concept of the legitimate interest of the person responsible within the meaning of Art. 6 Para. 1 Sentence 1 Letter f DS-GVO is to be understood broadly (cf. Frenzel in Paal/Pauly, DS-GVO/BDSG, 3rd edition 2021, para. 28 to Art. 6 DS-GVO, with reference to recital 47 p. 2, 6, 7 DS-GVO). Therefore, legal, factual, economic or non-material interests can be included in the concept of legitimate interest (cf. Buchner/Petri in Kühling/Buchner, DS-GVO/BDSG, 3rd edition 2020, para. 146a to Art. 6 DS-GVO ). The recitals to the DS-GVO provide clues for understanding the concept of legitimate interest within the meaning of Art. 6 Para. 1 Sentence 1 Letter f DS-GVO. The recitals of the DS-GVO are not independent legal norms with a regulatory character, but describe the objective pursued by the legislator with the adoption of the DS-GVO. Therefore, the recitals of the DS-GVO are decisive for the interpretation of the provisions of Union law, because the general legal ideas underlying the DS-GVO can be found in the recitals. In the present case, recitals 47 et seq. provide indications with regard to when the legality of processing personal data can be assumed due to a legitimate interest of the person responsible. According to recital 50 sentence 9 of the DS-GVO, there is a legitimate interest in data processing if the information from the person responsible about possible criminal offenses or threats to public security and the transmission of the relevant personal data in individual cases or in several cases in connection with the same criminal offense or the same threat to public security, is transmitted to a competent authority. In contrast to recital 50 sentence 1 or sentence 8, recital 50 sentence 9, in terms of its content, does not solely refer to previously granted consent to the Data processing and a change in the purpose of this processing that has now taken place. Because then the prerequisite for a legitimate interest in data processing for criminal prosecution would be that the data must always have been previously collected for a different purpose. Processing the collected data for direct reporting would always not be justified. Such a limitation of the admissibility of data processing to provide information in the field of criminal prosecution does not correspond to the broad concept of legitimate interest and would also be absurd. Even if the defendant's view were to assume that sentence 9 of recital 50 of the DS- GMO would only relate directly to change of purpose constellations, the general legal idea could at least be derived from it that data processing that is necessary to give competent authorities information about criminal offenses that have been committed should be considered a legitimate interest of the person responsible. From sentence 9 of the recital 50 of the DS-GVO follows that it can be understood as a legitimate interest of the person responsible in data processing within the scope of the DS-GVO if the data processing serves to inform the competent authorities of a possible criminal offense. The concept of criminal offenses 1 sentence 1 letter f DS-GVO and recital 50 sentence 9 of the DS-GVO, is to be interpreted autonomously according to Union law (cf. Bäcker in BeckOK data protection law, Wolff/Brink, 41st ed., as of November 1st, 2021, para. 25 f. to Art. 2 DS-GVO). There is no reference to the terms "offences" used in the GDPR to those under national legal systems (cf. ECJ, U.v. 22.6.2021 - C-439/19 - juris para. 82). Unlike the understanding in German Legally, the concept of criminal offenses under Union law also includes such facts which would result in an administrative offense within the meaning of German law. According to the case law of the European Court of Justice, the following criteria are decisive for the assessment of the criminal character of infringements: the legal classification of the infringement in domestic law, the type of infringement and the severity of the sanction threatened by the person concerned (cf. ECJ, U.v. 22.6.2021 - C-439/19 - juris para. 87 to Art. 10 GDPR). Violations that are not designated as "criminal" in domestic law can also have such a character from the nature of the violation and the severity of the sanctions threatened by the person concerned (cf. ECJ, loc.cit., para. 88). With regard to the nature of the infringement, what is decisive is whether the sanction in question resulting from the infringement has, inter alia, a repressive aim. A measure that is only intended to compensate for the damage caused by the infringement, on the other hand, is not of a criminal nature (cf. ECJ, U.v. 22.6.2021 - C-439/19 - juris para. 89). Accordingly, the administrative offenses of German law as Criminal offenses in the context of Union law of the DS-GVO, since the commission of an administrative offense is punishable by a fine (cf. § 1 para. 1 OWiG) and the prosecution of an administrative offense has a repressive character (§ 17 OWiG and § 46 para. 1 OWiG; Mitsch in Karlsruhe commentary on the OWiG, 5th edition 2018, § 17 marginal number 8; cf. also BVerfG, Bv Administrative offenses by the police). If the transmission of personal data to a police inspection as the competent authority within the meaning of recital 50 of the GDPR serves to indicate an administrative offense committed, there is consequently a legitimate interest in de r Data processing, which in principle can justify the processing of personal data within the meaning of Art. 6 Para. 1 Sentence 1 Letter f DS-GVO. A personal concern of the complainant is not required for the existence of a legitimate interest. The question of whether an unlimited transmission of data to the police inspection departments is possible on the basis of this understanding is not relevant in the present case. The defendant accuses the plaintiff of having sent recordings to the police inspection in six cases. It has not become apparent that the plaintiff processed personal data in an abusive manner. Even the small number of reprimanded transmissions does not suggest data processing on an unlimited scale. It was therefore not possible to decide here whether the fundamentally existing legitimate interest in cases in which masses of personal data are transmitted to report administrative offenses could be omitted due to abuse of rights Whether the violations of regulatory provisions reported by the plaintiff with the transmission of the personal data are actually prosecuted is ultimately decided by the police as the prosecuting authority in accordance with the principle of opportunity applicable in the law on administrative offenses, exercising their due discretion (§ 47 para. 1 sentence 1 OWiG). Even if other data protection violations than the processing of personal data of the owners of illegally parked vehicles have not become part of the warning at issue here, it is conceivable that when such photographs are taken, data protection violations, for example by photographing other people or license plates of uninvolved vehicles, since there should be no legitimate interest in the processing within the meaning of Art. 6 Para. 1 Sentence 1 Letter f DS-GVO. In this respect, the principle of data minimization (Art. 5 Para. 1 Sentence 1 Letter c DS-GVO) is also required when transmitting recordings of vehicles parked in violation of the prohibition the roadway is partially blocked and thus narrowed, at least the abstract risk of an accident for other road users such as the plaintiff is increased. Therefore, due to the broad understanding of the concept of legitimate interest, such an interest also arises here from the plaintiff's fundamental rights to physical integrity and security from Art. 3 Para. 1, Art. 6 Var. 2 GRCh. (b) Furthermore, the legality of data processing within the meaning of Art. 6 Para. 1 Sentence 1 Letter f DS-GVO requires that this is also necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the plaintiff as the person responsible. Data processing must be for the specific processing purpose may be necessary in such a way that the legitimate interests of the person responsible cannot be realized to the same extent in a reasonable manner by other means (cf. recital 39 p. 9 DS-GVO, Lehr/Becker, ZD 2022, 370 m.w.N.). Reports of illegally parked vehicles at a police station cannot be carried out to the same extent by an oral or written description of the circumstances - for example by naming the license plate number of the vehicle, the location and possible witnesses cited by the defendant. A description of the circumstances is not suitable to the same extent as a picture to bring about a punishment of the offense: Because a Lichtb ild usually objectively reflects the actual circumstances of the violation, namely the illegally parked vehicle including license plate and the situation from which the person responsible for reporting the offense concludes that an administrative offense has been committed. This makes it easier for the police inspectorates to exercise their discretion regarding the prosecution of administrative offenses compared to a description of an administrative offense that has usually been subjective could not be revealed to the court, at least insofar as the same personal data (license plate number and location data of the vehicles concerned) are to be transmitted. Insofar as, in the defendant's opinion, "more" accompanying information regarding the vehicle (e.g. the general condition of the vehicle) would be transmitted by a photograph, it is questionable to what extent this can be personal data (and only this is relevant in the context of the determination of the necessity according to Art. 6 Para. 1 Sentence 1 Letter f DS-GVO), and on the other hand, a lot of accompanying information can also be contained in a written report. Also the argument that a photograph represents "more" because Evidence would (only) be collected as a result, which is the task of the prosecution authorities, is not convincing, since an object of inspection and a witness are also generated as evidence by sending an e-mail without a photo and by naming the complainant himself. Therefore, when administrative offenses are reported, even without a photo, evidence is likely to arise that could be used in the subsequent proceedings. (c) Finally, there are no interests of the data subjects that conflict with data processing within the meaning of Art. 6 Para. 1 Sentence 1 Letter f GDPR (see (aa)), which could outweigh the plaintiff’s interest in processing the data (see (bb)). The controversial question of the burden of proof and burden of proof for the preponderance of conflicting interests (cf. Lehr/Becker, ZD 2022, 370 (375), with further citations) can remain open, since both parties have submitted extensive statements on this and no questions that would have to be decided according to the principles of the burden of proof , have remained open. (aa) The person concerned within the meaning of Article 6 Paragraph 1 Clause 1 Letter f DS-GVO in conjunction with Article 4 No. 1 DS-GVO is the respective owner of the photographed vehicle. The vehicle owner does not necessarily have to be identical to the driver, because only the owner can ultimately be identified. As a conflicting interest of the vehicle owner, the right to protection of the personal data concerning them according to Art. 8 Para. 1 GRCh or Art. 16 Para 1 TFEU under consideration. The vehicle owners concerned may also have an interest in remaining anonymous on the road. Finally, the vehicle owner also has an interest in not being prosecuted for committing an administrative offense due to the violation documented by the person responsible. In this respect, it is not a matter of data subjects within the meaning of Article 6 Paragraph 1 Clause 1 Letter f GDPR in conjunction with Article 4 No. 1 GDPR. The inclusion of conflicting interests other than those of the persons concerned does not result from the provision of Art. 6 Para. 1 Sentence 1 Letter f DS-GVO. In addition, it should be pointed out again that it is ultimately up to the prosecuting authorities to decide which of the administrative offenses reported under the processing of personal data are to be prosecuted (§ 47 Para. 1 Sentence 1 OWiG). (bb) The weighing of the legitimate interests of the plaintiff and the opposing Interests of the vehicle owners as data subjects do not lead to the interests of the vehicle owners overriding. Rather, the interests of the plaintiff weigh more heavily, whereas the interests of the data subjects are of comparatively little weight. With regard to the right of the data subjects to protection of their personal data according to Art. 8 para. 1 GRCh or Art. 16 para. 1 TFEU, the legislator has standardized the lawfulness of the processing of personal data as a restriction of this right by creating the various legal bases of Art. 6 Para. 1 Sentence 1 Letter b to f DS-GVO. Therefore, an encroachment on this right is justified if one of the conditions of Art. 6 Para. 1 DS-GVO is met. Within the meaning of recital 47 sentence 4 of the DS-GVO, the interests and fundamental rights of the data subject can outweigh the interests of the person responsible , when personal data is processed in situations where an individual should not reasonably expect further processing. This is not the case here, since the persons concerned must and can expect that their data will be processed for the purpose of prosecuting an administrative offense. There is no right to anonymity in road traffic, rather the license plate number of a vehicle must always be legible ( cf. § 23 para. 1 sentence 3 StVO) and therefore publicly accessible (cf. BVerwG, U.v. 22.10.2014 - 6 C 7/13 - juris para. 24). A vehicle owner must expect that a parking violation committed with his vehicle will be documented and reported. The fact that such a report can be made not only by the prosecuting authorities but also by private individuals results from Section 46 OWiG in conjunction with Section 158 (1) StPO. If the documentation of the illegally parked vehicle does not lead to the processing of additional personal data from bystanders, a difference between a written notification and the transmission of the vehicle owner's personal data by sending a photograph is not recognizable Protection of personal data through the transmission of photographs showing the vehicle registration number and the situation of the parking violation can be considered as minimal as possible. License plates have only little information content, precisely because a data-processing private individual, such as the plaintiff, would only be able to determine the identity of the vehicle owner after querying the vehicle register (cf. BVerwG, U.v. 22.10.2014 - 6 C 7/13 - juris paras. 23, 25). Finally, the interest of the persons concerned in not being prosecuted for committing an administrative offense must also take a back seat, since this is based on illegal behavior and is therefore not an interest worthy of protection. Overall the interests of the vehicle owners that conflict with the data processing are therefore to be classified as of minor importance. In contrast, the plaintiff's legitimate interests in the processing of the personal data are to be given greater weight. The plaintiff's interest in reporting an administrative offense on the basis of the processing of personal data is to be given some weight because this legitimate interest is explicitly stated in a recital of the GDPR (recital 50 sentence 9 of the GDPR). In addition, the plaintiff's interest in physical integrity and safety, as described above, also has some weight, since on the one hand these are high-ranking legal interests, but on the other hand there was no specific danger to the plaintiff in the parking violations reported here. The weighing of the mutual interests therefore shows that that the interests of the plaintiff as the person responsible for the data processing in the case at issue here outweigh those of the data subjects, so that the requirements of Art. 6 Para. 1 Sentence 1 Letter f DS-GVO were given. Accordingly, the processing of the personal data by the plaintiff was lawful within the meaning of Art. 5 Para. 1 Sentence 1 Letter a, Art. 6 Para. 1 Sentence 1 Letter f DS-GVO. Whether in the present case it corresponded to a dutiful exercise of discretion, the plaintiff because of a single-digit number of advertisements - in which he also carefully made sure not to process any data of uninvolved third parties, among other things by blacking out - not in the Informally pointing out the alleged illegality of the data processing in the sense of a "conclusion without action", but taking a remedial measure according to Art. 58 Para remain. (2) Whether there are information obligations (Art. 13, Art. 14 DS-GVO) or a right of withdrawal (Art. 21 DS-GVO) due to the data processing, it does not apply in this case. In the warning at issue, the defendant only complained about the processing of personal data through the transmission of photographs of the wrongly parked vehicles; other data protection obligations or violations of the DS-GVO were not determined in the warning. The warning issued by the defendant due to a violation of Art January 28, 2022 is therefore illegal.d. The plaintiff's rights have been violated as a result (§ 113 Para. 1 Sentence 1 VwGO). Because at least the plaintiff is warned by the official complaint of a violation of data protection law against continuing to use personal data in the future to process the transmission of photographs. The fact that the plaintiff's behavior constitutes a violation is expressly stated in the warning at issue. This finding is intended to indirectly prevent the plaintiff from making further recordings of illegally parked vehicles and submitting them to police inspections Outflow of the general right of personality from Article 2 Paragraph 1 in conjunction with Article 1 Paragraph 1 GG (cf. Goers in BeckOK StPO with RiStBV and MiStra, 45th ed. Status: October 1st, 2022, Article 158 marginal number 8). If the plaintiff is warned by the defendant state office if he makes use of the opportunity granted to report an administrative offense, this accordingly represents an inadmissible restriction of the plaintiff's rights and thus a violation of the law within the meaning of Section 113 (1) sentence 1 VwGO .In addition, the plaintiff is restricted by the statement underlying the warning and incriminating him at least in his general freedom of action resulting from Art. 2 Para. 1 GG. e. Due to the illegality of the warning as a basic order within the meaning of Art. 16 Para the follow-up decisions from numbers 2 to 4 of the disputed decision of the defendant of January 28, 2022, i.e. the cost decision in number 2 based on Article 19 (6) sentence 1 BayDSG in conjunction with Article 1 and Article 2 BayKG, were also the determination the fee i.H.v. EUR 100.00 according to Art. 6 Para. 1 Sentence 2 and 3, Para. 2 KG in Section 3 and the statement on the expenses in Section 4, illegal .The alternative request for evidence made by the plaintiff's representative in the oral hearing on November 2, 2022 is a conditional request for evidence, which could no longer be decided due to the plaintiff's victory . The statement on the provisional enforceability is based on § 167 paragraph 2, paragraph 1 sentence 1 VwGO in conjunction with § 708 No. 11, § 711 ZPO. Resolution: The amount in dispute is set at EUR 5,000.00. Reasons: According to § 52 paragraph 1 GKG, the value in dispute is to be determined at our discretion according to the importance of the matter for him resulting from the plaintiff's application. In the absence of further indications, the value in dispute was to be set at EUR 5,000.00 in accordance with Section 52 (2) GKG; In particular, the plaintiff's representative also stated in a letter dated February 28, 2022 that there were no concerns in this regard.