ICO (UK) - Crown Prosecution Service

ICO - Crown Prosecution Service
Authority:	ICO (UK)
Jurisdiction:	United Kingdom
Relevant Law:	S.40 Data Protection Act 2018
Type:	Investigation
Outcome:	Violation Found
Started:
Decided:
Published:	18.01.2024
Fine:	n/a
Parties:	Crown Prosecution Service
National Case Number/Name:	Crown Prosecution Service
European Case Law Identifier:	n/a
Appeal:	Unknown
Original Language(s):	English
Original Source:	ICO (in EN)
Initial Contributor:	n/a

An Enforcement Notice has been issued to the Crown Prosecution Service in relation to a contravention of the sixth data protection principle in section 40 DPA 2018 (Law Enforcement Directive). The CPS had insufficient technical and organsational measures to ensure the security of personal data stored on personal USB devices.

English Summary

Facts

The contravention was identified following an investigation into the disclosure of an unencrypted USB device, containing personal data, to an unauthorised third party.

Holding

A contravention of the sixth data protection principle in section 40 DPA 2018 (security of processing) (Law Enforcement Directive). An Enforcement Notice has been issued to the Crown Prosecution Service in relation to a contravention of the sixth data protection principle in section 40 DPA 2018.

Comment

Share your comments here!

Further Resources

Share blogs or news articles here!

English Machine Translation of the Decision

The decision below is a machine translation of the English original. Please refer to the English original for more details.

DATA PROTECTION ACT 2018

                          (PART 6, SECTION 149)

   ENFORCEMENT POWERS OF THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER


                          ENFORCEMENT NOTICE




To:   The Crown Prosecution Service



Of:   102 Petty France, London, SW1H 9EA



1.    The Crown Prosecution Service ("CPS") is a “controller” as
      variously defined in sections 3(6) and 32 of the Data Protection Act

      2018 (“DPA 2018”). The CPS prosecutes criminal cases that have

      been   investigated  by   the   police  and   other  investigative

      organisations in England and Wales.



2.    The Information Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) hereby

      issues CPS with an Enforcement Notice under section 149 DPA
      2018. The Notice is in relation to a contravention of the sixth data

      protection principle set out in section 40 DPA 2018. This Notice

      would accordingly be issued under section 149(2)(a) DPA 2018.



3.    This  Notice  explains  the   Commissioner’s   decision   to  take

      enforcement action. The specific steps that CPS is required to take
      are set out in Annex 1.



4.    The Commissioner has previously served CPS with a Preliminary
      Enforcement Notice ("the PEN") dated 4 July 2023. CPS provided

      its written representations ("the Representations") in response to

      the PEN on 26  th July 2023.   The Commissioner has taken into

      account the entirety of the Representations when deciding to issue


                                   1      this Notice and refers to the Representations below when

      appropriate.


      Legal framework for this Notice



5.    DPA 2018 contains various enforcement powers in Part 6, which

      are exercisable by the Commissioner.



6.    Section 149 DPA 2018 materially provides:


      “(1) Where the Commissioner is satisfied that a person has failed,

      or is failing, as described in subsection (2), (3), (4) or (5), the

      Commissioner    may   give  the   person  a   written  notice  (an

      “enforcement notice”) which requires the person—


            (a) to take steps specified in the notice, or

            (b) to refrain from taking steps specified in the notice,



      or both (and see also sections 150 and 151).


      (2) The first type of failure is where a controller or processor has

      failed, or is failing, to comply with any of the following—



            (a) a provision of … Chapter 2 of Part 3 … of this Act

            (principles of processing);
      …

      (6) An enforcement notice given in reliance on subsection (2), (3)

      or (5) may only impose requirements which the Commissioner

      considers appropriate for the purpose of remedying the failure.”



7.    Section 150 DPA 2018 materially provides:


                                   2      “(1) An enforcement notice must—

            (a) state what the person has failed or is failing to do, and

            (b) give the Commissioner’s reasons for reaching that
            opinion.



      (2) In deciding whether to give an enforcement notice in reliance

      on section 149(2), the Commissioner must consider whether the

      failure has caused or is likely to cause any person damage or

      distress.


      …



      (4) An enforcement notice may specify the time or times at which,

      or period or periods within which, a requirement imposed by the
      notice must be complied with (but see the restrictions in

      subsections (6) to (8)).”



8.    By reason of section 34(3) DPA 2018, the controller shall be

      responsible for, and to be able to demonstrate compliance with the

      sixth data protection principle in section 40 DPA 2018.


      Background


            th
9.    On 18   March 2018 a CPS                           ("    ") copied

      a CPS case file case concerning historic child abuse from a CPS
      computer system onto an unencrypted personal USB device. The

           di this with the intention of passing the device to a colleague

      who would be dealing with the case. Therefore, the       used the

      USB device for CPS business and for the discharge of his

      employment duties. As such, at all material times the         w as
      acting on behalf of CPS.



                                   310.   The Representations challenged the Commissioner's finding that

      the       used the USB device for CPS business and for the

      discharge of his employment duties, due to the       purportedly
      contravening the CPS Electronic Media Policy that was in force at

      the relevant time and because the       purportedly acted on his

      own volition and not in discharge of his employment duties,

      because there was no requirement for him to provide the case file

      to his colleague who had similar access rights to the CPS computer

      system and who would therefore have been able to access it via
      their own account/device.


11.   There  is  nothing   in the   Representations   that  cause  the

      Commissioner to alter his findings in paragraph 9 and not to

      proceed with this Notice. When initially downloading the material

      to the portable media device in performing his actions, the

      accessed the information as part of his role and his actions were
      not of a nature that break the usual responsibility that a controller

      has for its employees – the individual was initially seeking to

      provide information to a colleague for a legitimate business

      purpose. The Commissioner has considered the CPS Investigation

      Report  written  by                        which   supports  the

      Commissioner's   findings  in this  regard.  For  example,   The
      Investigation Report expressed the finding at paragraph 5.2 that "I

      do not believe that [the    's] intentions went beyond a desire to

      share material with another           i a manner convenient to

      himself to help in the presentation and preparation of the

      case." Furthermore, there is no evidence that the     was aware

      of the CPS’ Electronic Media Policy or trained on it.


12.   The Commissioner is not satisfied that there were appropriate

      technical or organisational measures in place to prevent the

      from downloading sensitive data to a portable media device, or that

                                   4      there was sufficient awareness of controller’s expectations of the

           in this regard. As the     had been erroneously included in

      an Active Directory Group, encryption software had not been
      downloaded to the individual’s device, meaning that data was able

      to be downloaded to a self-procured USB without protections such

      as a means of preventing the USB’s ability to access / download

      material, or by the presence of encryption software.



13.   For the avoidance of doubt, the USB device that the         copied
      the case file to was not provided for their use by CPS. Instead, the

      USB device was provisioned by the       themself and belonged to

      them. For the purpose of this Enforcement Notice, the provisioning

      of the USB device by the      is referred to as "self-procurement".


14.   For the further avoidance of doubt, despite having a policy in place,

      it was clear in response to the Commissioner’s enquires that the

      self-procurement of USB devices by CPS staff for use on CPS

      business was a practice that CPS was aware of but was not

      rigorously controlled through appropriate technical measures which

      would have reduced the prospect of a breach of this nature.


15.   The Representations challenged the finding referring to the
      Electronic  Media   Policy, but   there  is  nothing   within  the

      Representations that cause the Commissioner to alter his findings

      and to proceed with this Notice. The Commissioner refers to the

      audit that is identified at paragraph 34(IV) below and the

      information provided by the CPS in response to the Commissioner's

      investigation.


16.   The documents that were copied to the USB device included

      medical and social care records of the complainant in the case;

      police records including the incident log and investigation reports;

                                   5      the record of interview of the defendant; witness names and

      addresses; instructions to the                       and related

      case  information;   and   other  sensitive  documents.    These
      documents contained personal data, including personal data of the

      highest sensitivity, the processing of which is regulated by Part 3

      DPA 2018. The personal data related to approximately ten persons.



17.   None of the documents containing the personal data were

      encrypted when stored on the USB device.


18.   The documents were held by CPS for the purposes of the

      prosecution of a criminal offence or offences, the trial of which took

      place after the coming into force of DPA 2018 on 25 May 2018 ("the

      commencement date" for the Act). The processing of at least some
      of these documents constituted "sensitive processing" within the

      meaning of section 35 DPA 2018.



19.   For the purposes of Part 3 DPA 2018, CPS is a "competent

      authority" within the meaning of section 30. Part 3 applied to the

      processing of the personal data within the documents from the
      commencement date.      Prior to the commencement date, the

      processing was regulated by the Data Protection Act 1998 ("DPA

      1998").



20.   The      did not hand-over possession of the USB device to their
      colleague, but instead retained possession of it with the CPS

      documents stored thereon, until a precise date that is unknown to

      the Commissioner, but is believed on the balance of probabilities

      to have been in August 2018, when th   e      gave possession of

      the USB device to their              , o that the          could

      load onto it a        video.


                                   621.   The trial of the case to which the documents and personal data

      related commenced on                     and concluded later that

      month with the conviction of the defendant.


22.   On 27 November 2018 the       s                made contact with

      the       about the USB device, having viewed some of the

      documents.



23.   The                 returned the USB device to the         on 28
      November 2018. The         informed their manager at CPS of the

      incident on 29 November 2018 and handed-in the USB device.

      Thereafter, CPS commenced an investigation and reported the

      incident as a personal data breach to the Commissioner on 4

      December 2018. CPS also communicated the fact of the breach to
      the impacted persons.



24.   Following  the  reporting  of  the  breach,   the  Commissioner

      commenced an investigation. The investigation found that:



      I.  The      was wrongly included in an Active Directory group of
          approximately 1,500 persons, which gave him the ability to

          download a large volume of sensitive personal data to his

          personal, unencrypted USB device, without appropriate

          controls being in place.

      II. Some members of the Active Directory group were able to use
          USB devices without the forced installation and use of CPS

          encryption software.

     III. The CPS did not provide USB devices for its staff to use, but

          instead allowed a system of self-procurement of these devices

          by staff.

     IV.  The use of self-procured USB devices was not subject to
          supervision by CPS or asset management.

                                   7      V.  CPS considered that it would be a "considerable exercise" to

          ascertain how many members of the Active Directory group

          were   included  in  error,  so  it could  not   provide  the
          Commissioner with this information, nor could it confirm how

          long people had been members of the group for.

     VI.  CPS considered that the management of portable media was

          "complex", which resulted in a far greater disparity than CPS

          would have expected between the number of users that had

          write access to data and the numbers that had licences to use
          encryption software. Of the approximately 1,500 members of

          the Active Directory group, only 800 had access to CPS

          encryption software. Therefore, it seems likely that not every

          member of the Active Directory group who had the capability

          to copy or download data to USB drives were able to encrypt
          such data.



25.   The Representations challenged the accuracy of the information

   now contained in 24.I. above. The Commissioner accepts that due to

   the approach adopted for the use of gender pronouns in the PEN, there

   was a potential for it to convey a different meaning to the one
   intended and the Commissioner's understanding of the evidence.

   Paragraph 24.I conveys the Commissioner's understanding and there

   is nothing in the Representations that causes him to alter his findings

   and not proceed with this Notice.


26.   The Representations also challenged the Commissioner's findings

   now contained in paragraph 24.III, adopting the challenge made to

   paragraph 14. As such, there is nothing in the Representations to

   cause the Commissioner to alter his findings and not proceed with this

   Notice.




                                   827.   The Representations also challenged the Commissioner's findings

   in paragraph 24.IV, adopting the challenge made to paragraph 14.

   The Representations also claimed that the CPS understood the
   importance of maintaining a comprehensive records of all approved

   use of USBs. However, during the course of the investigation, the

   CPS was asked about whether it maintained an asset register for USB

   devices. In response, the CPS stated that "USBs are not held on the

   register" and that "Asset Registers do not include USB devices". The

   CPS also stated, in response to a question about self-procured USBs,
   that "due to this limited usage and only being available should other

   methods not be suitable, it is not appropriate per se to include them

   on an asset register, as they are immediately, after use, sent outside

   the organisation". As such, there is nothing in the Representations to

   cause the Commissioner to alter his findings and not to proceed with
   this.



      The contravention



28.   The Commissioner has concluded that the retention of the
      documents on the USB device by the          between 25 May 2018

      and August 2018, followed by the passing of possession of the USB

      device with the documents stored thereon to the            's

                 followed by the viewing of some of the contents on the

      device by the            constituted a personal data breach within

      the meaning of section 33 DPA 2018.


29.   Furthermore, the Commissioner is of the view that the sixth data

      protection principle in section 40 DPA 2018 was contravened, due

      to a failure of CPS to implement appropriate technical and

      organisational measures for the security of personal data.


30.   Section 40 materially provides:

                                    9      "The sixth data protection principle is that personal data

      processed for any of the law enforcement purposes must be so
      processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the

      personal data, using appropriate technical or organisational

      measures (and, in this principle, “appropriate security” includes

      protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and

      against accidental loss, destruction or damage)."


31.   Moreover, the Commissioner notes the requirements of section

      66(1) DPA 2018, which materially provides:



      "(1)  Each   controller and   each   processor  must   implement

      appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a
      level of security appropriate to the risks arising from the processing

      of personal data."



32.   The Commissioner is of the view that section 40 was contravened,

      for the following reasons:


       I.  CPS   did   not   implement    appropriate    technical  and

           organisational measures for the management of the Active

           Directory group, in that the      was included in the Active

           Directory group in error, with the result that they had

           permission to access and write personal data that they were
           not entitled to. Furthermore, CPS was unable to provide an

           account of the extent of this problem, with the result that the

           Commissioner considers it likely that other persons were

           wrongly given access and write permissions to which they

           were not entitled, or did not need.

      II.  CPS   did   not   implement    appropriate    technical  and
           organisational measures for the provisioning and use of

                                   10           portable media storage devices, in that due to it being aware

           of the use of self-procured USBs and due to its failure to

           implement appropriate countermeasures to manage the risks
           involved in their use it allowed the   to self-procure and use

           USB devices for the storage and transportation of highly

           sensitive personal data in a manner that was free of any form

           of formal asset control by CPS, including registration of assets

           and recording of their use. To all intents and purposes, the

           processing of the data on the       's USB device was wholly
           ungoverned and free of supervision by CPS and had it not been

           for the responsible conduct of the                  CPS would

           have remained unaware of the fact that a personal data breach

           had occurred. In light of the foregoing, CPS did not implement

           appropriate technical and organisational measures to prevent,
           detect or respond to a personal data breach.

     III.  CPS    did  not    implement    appropriate    technical   and

           organisational measures for the encryption of highly sensitive

           personal data that were stored on the USB device.



33.   The Commissioner is also of the view that CPS' position that it
      would be a "considerable exercise" to ascertain how many

      members of the Active Directory group were included in error and

      its position that the management of portable media was "complex",

      which resulted in a far greater disparity between the number of

      users that had write access to data and the numbers that had
      licences to use encryption software than CPS would have expected,

      is further evidence of a failure to implement appropriate technical

      and organisational measures for the security of personal data.



      Issue of the Notice




                                   1134.   The Commissioner considers that the contravention of DPA 2018 is

      a significant one that warrants enforcement action. His reasons for

      this conclusion include the following.


       I.  The personal data that were put at risk were of the highest

           sensitivity.

      II.  Due to the absence of appropriate technical and organisational

           measures, the personal data breach would have gone

           undetected but for the actions of a member of the public.
     III.  The measures that should have been adopted for asset control

           and encryption are basic controls for the use of portable

           storage media.

     IV.   CPS has rejected both the Commissioner's 2019 Audit

           recommendation that it should procure portable media such
           as USB drives for use by its staff, instead of allowing self-

           procurement by staff, and the recommendation that records

           should be kept of their distribution, ownership and use.

      V.   Without enforcement action, the risks to personal data arising

           from the self-procurement of USB devices by CPS personnel,

           which are illuminated by the personal data breach, will be
           unremedied.

     VI.   The contravention was longstanding and pre-dated the

           commencement date of DPA 2018.

    VII.   Since this incident, the CPS has reported further incidents to

           the ICO involving the loss of portable storage devices. The ICO
           therefore consider there to be an on-going issue with the use

           of such devices which needs to be addressed.



35.   The Representations challenged the information that is now

      contained in paragraph 34.III, by repeating the Representations

      made in challenge to paragraph 24.IV. As such, they do not cause


                                   12      the Commissioner to alter his findings and not proceed with this

      Notice.


36.   The Representations challenged the information that is now

      contained in paragraph 34.IV, by stating the rationale for the

      rejection of the Audit recommendations. The Commissioner relies

      on  that  rationale  in  support  of  his  findings  and  so   the

      Representations do not cause him to alter them and not proceed

      with this Notice.


37.   The Representations challenged the information in the PEN that is
      contained in paragraph 34.V, by repeating the Representations

      made in challenge to paragraph 14. As such, they do not cause

      the Commissioner to alter his findings and not proceed with this

      Notice.


38.   The Commissioner therefore requires CPS to take the steps set out

      in Annex 1.



39.   The Commissioner considered, as he is required to do under section

      150(2) DPA 2018 when deciding whether to serve an Enforcement

      Notice, whether any contravention has caused or is likely to cause
      any person damage or distress. The Commissioner considers that

      there was clear potential for distress to have been suffered by the

      impacted data subjects, due to the overall context of the case and

      the nature of the data involved.



40.   Moreover, CPS has also recognised that the personal data breach
      may have caused significant emotional distress to those data

      subjects.





                                   1341.   However, the Commissioner considers that compliance with the

      provisions of DPA 2018 referred to above to be a matter of central

      importance to data protection law. Even if a failure to comply has
      not, or is not likely, to cause any person damage or distress, the

      issue of this Enforcement Notice to compel compliance would

      nonetheless be an appropriate exercise of the Commissioner’s

      enforcement powers.



42.   The Commissioner has considered whether it is practicable for CPS
      to comply with the requirements of Annex 1. In this regard the

      Commissioner notes that the requirements are basic ones for the

      procurement, use and tracking of portable data storage media and

      they are proportionate to the facts in issue in this case.


43.   Having regard to the significant nature of the contravention, the

      scale of the personal data being processed and the context in which

      it is processed, the Commissioner considers that this Enforcement

      Notice is a proportionate regulatory step to bring CPS into

      compliance.


44.   The Commissioner has also had regard to the desirability of

      promoting economic growth, and the potential impact his Notice

      might   have.   The   Commissioner    considers  the   proposed

      enforcement action is unlikely to have an impact on any measure

      of economic activity or growth in the UK.


      Terms of the Notice



45.   The Commissioner therefore exercises his powers under section

      149 DPA 2018 to serve an Enforcement Notice requiring CPS to

      take specified steps to comply with the DPA 2018. The terms of the
      proposed Notice are set out in Annex 1 of this Notice.

                                  14      Consequences of failing to comply with an Enforcement

      Notice.


46.   If a person fails to comply with an Enforcement Notice the

   Commissioner may serve a penalty notice on that person under

   section 155(1)(b) DPA requiring payment of an amount up to
   £17,500,000 or 4% of an undertaking’s total annual worldwide

   turnover whichever is the higher.



      Right of appeal


47.   By virtue of section 162(l)(c) DPA there is a right of appeal against

   this Notice to the First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights). If an appeal

   is brought against this Notice, it need not be complied with pending

   determination or withdrawal of that appeal. Information about the

   appeals process may be obtained from:


      General Regulatory Chamber

      HM Courts & Tribunals Service

      PO Box 9300

      Leicester

      LE1 8DJ
      Telephone: 0203 936 8963

      Email: grc@justice.gov.uk



48.   Any Notice of Appeal should be served on the Tribunal within 28

   calendar days of the date on which this Notice is sent.







                                  15Dated the 20th day of December 2023



Signed:










Anthony Luhman

Director PACE Projects and Temporary Director of Investigations

Information Commissioner’s Office

Wycliffe House
Water Lane

Wilmslow

Cheshire

SK9 5AF





























                                 16ANNEX 1



TERMS OF THE ENFORCEMENT NOTICE


By no later than 3 months of issue of the notice CPS shall take the

following steps:



   1. Implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to

      prohibit and prevent the use by CPS personnel of self-procured USB
      portable storage devices for the storage, transportation and related

      processing of personal data of which CPS is the controller.

   2. Implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to

      provision the use of CPS-procured USB portable storage devices

      by CPS personnel for the storage, transportation and related
      processing of personal data of which CPS is the controller.

   3. Implement appropriate technical and organisational measures for

      the purposes of asset management of CPS-procured USB portable

      storage devices, including the registration of the procurement of

      these assets, requests for use of these assets, distribution of these

      assets, sharing of these assets with third parties, such as law
      enforcement agencies and the courts, and the timely return of

      these assets.

   4. Implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to

      ensure that the use of CPS-procured USB portable storage devices

      complies with CPS policies and procedures for data protection,
      including security principles and the implementation of measures

      such as device or file encryption.

   5. Implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to

      limit the use of CPS-procured USB portable storage devices, taking

      account of the overall risks of their use, the context of processing

      and the presence of available alternatives to their use such as


                                   17secure file transfer using the Egress solution or related solutions

approved by the National Cyber Security Centre.























































                             18