Tallinna Ringkonnakohus - 2-22-11979: Difference between revisions
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A | A court ruled that the creditor’s interest in publishing online personal information on a small debt is overridden by the data subject’s right to deletion when the controller no longer has the right to obtain the payment. | ||
== English Summary == | == English Summary == | ||
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On 25 March 2022, AS Ühisteenused and Julianus Inkasso OÜentered, a debt collection company (‘controller 2’) entered into an agency agreement on the basis of which and Julianus Inkasso OÜ was authorized to represent AS Ühisteenused in the recovery of the debt owed by the data subject. As two controllers jointly determined the purposes and means of processing, they became joint controllers under [[Article 26 GDPR|Article 26 GDPR]]. | On 25 March 2022, AS Ühisteenused and Julianus Inkasso OÜentered, a debt collection company (‘controller 2’) entered into an agency agreement on the basis of which and Julianus Inkasso OÜ was authorized to represent AS Ühisteenused in the recovery of the debt owed by the data subject. As two controllers jointly determined the purposes and means of processing, they became joint controllers under [[Article 26 GDPR|Article 26 GDPR]]. | ||
As a result, the data subject’s debt was published on the website ''taust.ee'' (eng translation: ''background.ee''). On 29 May 2022, the data subject requested both controllers to stop processing their personal data and delete them from the website. According to [https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/106072023098 §146 of the Estonian Civil Code], the expiry date for the request arising from a violation of the law is three years. Since the penalty was to be paid by 2 May 2019, the three-year deadline expired on 3 May 2022 and the claim was therefore time-barred. | As a result, the data subject’s debt was published on the website ''taust.ee'' (eng translation: ''background.ee'') by Julianus Inkasso OÜ. On 29 May 2022, the data subject requested both controllers to stop processing their personal data and delete them from the website. According to [https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/106072023098 §146 of the Estonian Civil Code], the expiry date for the request arising from a violation of the law is three years. Since the penalty was to be paid by 2 May 2019, the three-year deadline expired on 3 May 2022 and the claim was therefore time-barred. | ||
Therefore, the data subject asked a court to order the controller to delete the debt information linked to them and to pay €270 by way of damages for per-litigation legal costs. | Therefore, the data subject asked a court to order the controller 2 to delete the debt information linked to them and to pay €270 by way of damages for per-litigation legal costs. | ||
In its reply, controller 1 stated that they have a right to disclose this type of data. In particular, under [https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/104012019011 § 10(2)(5) of the Estonian Data Protection Act], the transfer of personal data to a third party in connection with debt-relationship is permitted for a period of 5 years after the breach of an obligation. Additionally, according to [https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/122032024007 § 146(4) Estonian Civil Procedure Code], the expiry date for the claims is 10 years if the person responsible violates his or her duties intentionally. | In its reply, controller 1 stated that they have a right to disclose this type of data. In particular, under [https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/104012019011 § 10(2)(5) of the Estonian Data Protection Act], the transfer of personal data to a third party in connection with debt-relationship is permitted for a period of 5 years after the breach of an obligation. Additionally, according to [https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/122032024007 § 146(4) Estonian Civil Procedure Code], the expiry date for the claims is 10 years if the person responsible violates his or her duties intentionally. | ||
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The decision adopted by the first instance court was in part confirmed by the appeal court as follows: | The decision adopted by the first instance court was in part confirmed by the appeal court as follows: | ||
The court found that the controller's claim concerning the | The court found that the controller's claim concerning the debt was time-barred and ordered controller 1 to pay related costs of the proceedings. On the other hand, and as far as the GDPR is concerned, the court ordered controller 2 to delete the data subject’s data from its website. | ||
Regarding the publication of the data subject’s debt on the website taust.ee, the court found that Article 10(1) of the Estonian Data Protection Act, such processing is permitted for the purpose of assessing the creditworthiness of the data subject or for any similar purpose. However, the controller must verify the accuracy of the transferred data and the legal basis for such transfer. In addition, the Estonian law provides that transfer of this data to a third party cannot be permitted if such transfer would cause excessive damage to the rights or freedoms of the data subject, nor if more than five years have elapsed since the breach of the obligation. This constitutes a legitimate interest under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. | Regarding the publication of the data subject’s debt on the website taust.ee, the court found that under Article 10(1) of the Estonian Data Protection Act, such processing is permitted for the purpose of assessing the creditworthiness of the data subject or for any similar purpose. However, the controller must verify the accuracy of the transferred data and the legal basis for such transfer. In addition, the Estonian law provides that transfer of this data to a third party cannot be permitted if such transfer would cause excessive damage to the rights or freedoms of the data subject, nor if more than five years have elapsed since the breach of the obligation. This constitutes a legitimate interest under [[Article 6 GDPR#1f|Article 6(1)(f) GDPR]]. | ||
Although the 5-years period had not elapsed, yet, the court performed a balance between the interest of the controllers and the fundamental rights of the data subject. The court took the view that the controller 1 did not take active steps to obtain the debt within the limitation period in a sufficiently justified and timely manner to allow the disclosure of the data subject's debt after three years. The court stated that for a small debt of €79.57, if the creditor finds legal action too costly or complex, or fails to act within the limitation period, the creditor's interests in processing the data under [[Article 6 GDPR#1f|Article 6(1)(f) GDPR]] do not outweigh the data subject’s interest in having the data deleted. The controllers should have complied with the data subject’s request to delete their personal data. | Although the 5-years period had not elapsed, yet, the court performed a balance between the interest of the controllers and the fundamental rights of the data subject. The court took the view that the controller 1 did not take active steps to obtain the debt within the limitation period in a sufficiently justified and timely manner to allow the disclosure of the data subject's debt after three years. The court stated that for a small debt of €79.57, if the creditor finds legal action too costly or complex, or fails to act within the limitation period, the creditor's interests in processing the data under [[Article 6 GDPR#1f|Article 6(1)(f) GDPR]] do not outweigh the data subject’s interest in having the data deleted. The controllers should have complied with the data subject’s request to delete their personal data. | ||
All in all, the court found a breach of [[Article 6 GDPR#1f|Article 6(1)(f) GDPR]] as the data subject personal data related to its time-barred debt were unlawfully disclosed. The controller 1 is ordered to pay related costs of the processing. The court also ordered the controller 2 to delete the data concerning the data subject’s debt from its website and pay the data subject €200 for damages incurred from per-litigation costs. | All in all, the court found a breach of [[Article 6 GDPR#1f|Article 6(1)(f) GDPR]] as the data subject personal data related to its time-barred debt were unlawfully disclosed. The controller 1 is ordered to pay related costs of the processing. The court also ordered the controller 2 to delete the data concerning the data subject’s debt from its website and pay the data subject €200 for damages incurred from per-litigation costs. |
Latest revision as of 12:04, 11 July 2024
Tallinna Ringkonnakohus - 2-22-11979 | |
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Court: | Tallinna Ringkonnakohus (Estonia) |
Jurisdiction: | Estonia |
Relevant Law: | Article 6(1)(f) GDPR |
Decided: | 18.04.2024 |
Published: | |
Parties: | AS Ühisteenused Julianus Inkasso OÜentered |
National Case Number/Name: | 2-22-11979 |
European Case Law Identifier: | |
Appeal from: | Harju Maakohtu (Estonia) Harju Maakohtu 28.11.2023 otsus |
Appeal to: | Unknown |
Original Language(s): | Estonian |
Original Source: | Tallinn Circuit Court (in Estonian) |
Initial Contributor: | im |
A court ruled that the creditor’s interest in publishing online personal information on a small debt is overridden by the data subject’s right to deletion when the controller no longer has the right to obtain the payment.
English Summary
Facts
The data subject brought an action against AS Ühisteenused, a company providing parking services ('controller 1'). The company that made a claim against the data subject arising from a contractual penalty in the amount of €79,57 for a car parking violation. According to a debt notice of 29 April 2022 sent to the data subject, the violation occurred on the 17 April 2019 and the penalty was to be paid by 2 May 2019. The data subject sold the car on 27 August 2019, and was not aware of AS Ühisteenused's parking regulations or the alleged violation on 17 April 2019, as they did not personally use the car.
On 25 March 2022, AS Ühisteenused and Julianus Inkasso OÜentered, a debt collection company (‘controller 2’) entered into an agency agreement on the basis of which and Julianus Inkasso OÜ was authorized to represent AS Ühisteenused in the recovery of the debt owed by the data subject. As two controllers jointly determined the purposes and means of processing, they became joint controllers under Article 26 GDPR.
As a result, the data subject’s debt was published on the website taust.ee (eng translation: background.ee) by Julianus Inkasso OÜ. On 29 May 2022, the data subject requested both controllers to stop processing their personal data and delete them from the website. According to §146 of the Estonian Civil Code, the expiry date for the request arising from a violation of the law is three years. Since the penalty was to be paid by 2 May 2019, the three-year deadline expired on 3 May 2022 and the claim was therefore time-barred.
Therefore, the data subject asked a court to order the controller 2 to delete the debt information linked to them and to pay €270 by way of damages for per-litigation legal costs.
In its reply, controller 1 stated that they have a right to disclose this type of data. In particular, under § 10(2)(5) of the Estonian Data Protection Act, the transfer of personal data to a third party in connection with debt-relationship is permitted for a period of 5 years after the breach of an obligation. Additionally, according to § 146(4) Estonian Civil Procedure Code, the expiry date for the claims is 10 years if the person responsible violates his or her duties intentionally.
In this case, the debt notice was published 3 years after the breach occurred. The data subject argued that the controller 1 had no legal basis to process data subject’s personal data because the limitation period had expired. Therefore, it is neither lawful nor fair to disclose the claimant's personal data after the claim itself was time-barred.
The first instance court gave its decision, which was appealed.
Holding
The decision adopted by the first instance court was in part confirmed by the appeal court as follows:
The court found that the controller's claim concerning the debt was time-barred and ordered controller 1 to pay related costs of the proceedings. On the other hand, and as far as the GDPR is concerned, the court ordered controller 2 to delete the data subject’s data from its website.
Regarding the publication of the data subject’s debt on the website taust.ee, the court found that under Article 10(1) of the Estonian Data Protection Act, such processing is permitted for the purpose of assessing the creditworthiness of the data subject or for any similar purpose. However, the controller must verify the accuracy of the transferred data and the legal basis for such transfer. In addition, the Estonian law provides that transfer of this data to a third party cannot be permitted if such transfer would cause excessive damage to the rights or freedoms of the data subject, nor if more than five years have elapsed since the breach of the obligation. This constitutes a legitimate interest under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR.
Although the 5-years period had not elapsed, yet, the court performed a balance between the interest of the controllers and the fundamental rights of the data subject. The court took the view that the controller 1 did not take active steps to obtain the debt within the limitation period in a sufficiently justified and timely manner to allow the disclosure of the data subject's debt after three years. The court stated that for a small debt of €79.57, if the creditor finds legal action too costly or complex, or fails to act within the limitation period, the creditor's interests in processing the data under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR do not outweigh the data subject’s interest in having the data deleted. The controllers should have complied with the data subject’s request to delete their personal data.
All in all, the court found a breach of Article 6(1)(f) GDPR as the data subject personal data related to its time-barred debt were unlawfully disclosed. The controller 1 is ordered to pay related costs of the processing. The court also ordered the controller 2 to delete the data concerning the data subject’s debt from its website and pay the data subject €200 for damages incurred from per-litigation costs.
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English Machine Translation of the Decision
The decision below is a machine translation of the Estonian original. Please refer to the Estonian original for more details.
COURT DECISION ON BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA Court Tallinn District Court Court composition Chairman Maris Kuurberg, members Indrek Soots and Neve Again Time and place of decision making 18.04.2024, Tallinn Case number 2-22-11979 Case X lawsuit against AS Ühisteenused and Julianus Inkasso OÜ for claim expiration detection, data deletion for obligation and compensation Disputed court decision Harju County Court decision of 28.11.2023 Appellant and Class X Appeal The cost of the complaint is 270 euros The parties to the proceedings and their Plaintiff: X (identity code XXXXXXXXX) representatives in the district court Defendant: Julianus Inkasso OÜ (registration code 10686553), contractual representative SR Type of procedure Written procedure RESOLUTION 1. Accept the evidence submitted with X's appeal (two payment orders). 2. Satisfy the appeal in part. 3. Annul the decision of the Harju County Court of 28.11.2023 in the part in which the county court completely unsatisfied X action against Julianus Inkasso OÜ for awarding damages (p. 2.3 of the resolution of the county court's decision) and shared those related to this claim procedural costs (section 2.4 of the resolution of the county court's decision). Make a new one in the canceled part the decision to partially satisfy X's claim, i.e. in the amount of 200 euros, and change distribution of procedural costs according to the overall resolution. In the rest of the disputed part the decision of the county court remains unchanged. 4. The decision of the Harju County Court of 28.11.2023 regarding AS Ühisteenused has entered into force (the county court paragraphs 1, 1.1, 1.2 of the resolution of the decision; paragraphs 5.1, 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 of the full resolution). Also the decision of the Harju County Court of 28.11.2023 entered into force in relation to Julianus Inkasso OÜ points 2.1 and 2.2 of the resolution (points 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 of the full resolution). 5. To word the full resolution of the judgment as follows: 2-22-11979 5.1. To settle X's claim against AS Ühisteenused. 5.1.1. To identify that AS Ühisteenused liquidated damages claim no. 0232009724 has expired. 5.1.2. Dismiss the procedural costs of AS Ühisteenused against AS Ühisteenused in X's action wear. 5.2. Partially settle X's claim against Julianus Inkasso OÜ. 5.2.1. Obliging Julianus Inkasso OÜ to delete AS Ühisteenused from the fine No. 0232009724, claims against X arise from the website taust.ee. 5.2.2. The decision is subject to immediate execution in terms of point 2.1 of the resolution. 5.2.3. SatisfyXhagiJulianusInkassoOResponsibility for awarding damages in the amount of 200 euros. In the part that exceeds this amount, the claim remains unsatisfied. 5.2.4. Jätta X filed a lawsuit against Julianus Inkasso OÜ in the county and district court 90% of the procedural costs will be borne by Julianus Inkasso OÜ and 10% by X wear. Appeal procedure and court explanations A cassation appeal may be submitted to the Supreme Court against the decision within 30 days from the decision from the delivery of the cassator's letter, but not after the decision to pass has been made public of doing. In the action proceedings, the party to the proceedings may perform procedural actions in the Supreme Court and make statements and submit applications only through a sworn attorney. The party to the proceedings can present himself To submit a request for procedural assistance to the Supreme Court, as well as to submit a complaint of another party to the proceedings or other views and objections on the application. If a party to the proceedings requests a cassation appeal to submit procedural aid, in addition to the application for procedural aid, must be submitted during the appeal period cassation appeal. The financial amount of the procedural costs is determined by the county court that decided the case within a reasonable time after the entry into force of the judgment or the order terminating the proceedings. CIRCUMSTANCES AND PROCEDURE The plaintiff's claim and the circumstances underlying it 1. X (plaintiff) submitted a statement of claim to the Harju County Court on 16.08.2022 AS Ühisteenused ja Julianus Against Inkasso OÜ (defendant). The plaintiff requested: − identify the expiration of AS Ühisteendues liquidated damages claim no. 0232009724, − oblige Julianus Inkasso OÜ to delete AS Ühisteenused from the fine No. 0232009724, the claims against the plaintiff stem from the website taust.ee and - order Julianus Inkasso OÜ to pay pre-trial legal fees in favor of the plaintiff damage compensation 270 euros. 2. According to the claim, the plaintiff received a debt notice with reference number 715526028 from the defendant on 29.04.2022, which was based on AS Ühisteenused liquidated damages claim No. 0232009724. According to the debt notice, AS- il Uhisteendues claimed 79.57 euros against the plaintiff, which was based on a violation of the parking requirement resulting liquidated damages. The plaintiff claimed that he first learned about the claim from the defendant on 29.04.2022 from the debt notice. The plaintiff does not dispute that the car with the registration plate OPEL ZAFIRA XXXXXX belonged to him. The plaintiff sold the car on 27.08.2019 and does not know anything about AS Ühisteenused of the requirements of the parking regulations and the violation that allegedly occurred on 17.04.2019, because he is not 2 2-22-11979 used the car himself. The plaintiff's car was used by his family members and acquaintances. AS The common services claim became collectable on 02.05.2019 and expired on 03.05.2022. 3. On 24.05.2022, the plaintiff sent an e-mail to the defendant with an objection stating that the claim was rejected of payment, referring to § 142 subsection 1 of the General Part of the Civil Code Act (TsÜS) and the Law of Obligations Act (VÕS) § 4 to subsection 1. Later, the plaintiff found out that the defendant disclosed the plaintiff's data on the website taust.ee after the expiry of AS Ühisteenused's claim. 4. On 29.05.2022, the plaintiff sent AS Ühisteenused, Julianus Inkasso OÜ and Krediidiregister A letter to OÜ with a request to stop processing his personal data and to delete his personal data internetilehsylttaus.ee.AS ÜhisteenusedjaKrediidiregister OÜnot registered. Defendant in the answers that he has the right to publish this data and referred to the Personal Data Protection Act (IKS) § 10 subsection 2 to p 5. 5. The plaintiff claimed that AS Ühisteenused lost the right to claim due to the expiration of the limitation period. If AS Ühisteenused's claim right has expired, the defendant has no legal basis as a plaintiff to process personal data and the disclosure of the plaintiff's personal data after the expiration of the claim is not lawful or fair. The defendant is aware that the plaintiff has disputed the claim and the plaintiff disclosure of personal data after the expiration of the claim is illegal because it violates the plaintiff's right good name, is in conflict with the principle of good faith and personal data processing. Proprietary rights for protection, the plaintiff has consulted a lawyer. The plaintiff therefore incurred legal costs, which were the necessary 29.05.2022 demand letter and 20.06.2022 intervention request to the Data Protection Inspectorate (AKI) for preparation. The plaintiff would not have incurred costs if the defendant had acted in good faith and followed the principles of personal data processing. Defendants' objections 6. The defendants requested that the lawsuit be dismissed and that the plaintiff bear the costs of the proceedings. 7. AS Ühisteenused claimed that the vehicle with registration number XXXXXX was issued on 17.04.2019 at 09.24 an agreed fine for disregarding the requirements of the parking regulations (the vehicle did not have a proper parking permit). The liquidated damages have not been disputed by the unpaid ones. There was an agreement between the parties contract which the plaintiff breached. There has been continued collection of liquidated damages claim No. 0232009724 justified. The indebtedness does not end with expiration. It is a contractual obligation that the plaintiff has not fulfilled. The plaintiff's out-of-court procedural costs are neither necessary nor justified. It's a case is not a legally complex dispute and the plaintiff could have approached the defendants and AKI himself. 8. The defendant (Julianus Inkasso OÜ) submitted the same objections as AS Ühisteenused. Defendant explained that on 25.03.2022 AS Ühisteenused and the defendant entered into an agency agreement, on the basis of which the defendant was authorized as the assignee of the debt claim, i.e. parking fine no. 0232009724 from the plaintiff to represent in collection. 9. The defendant objected to the statute of limitations, finding that the statute of limitations had been interrupted. In case the court should find that the limitation period of the claim has not been interrupted and that the claim is also not subject to TsÜS § 146 par- the 10-year limitation period provided for in s 4, then the claim would have expired on 02.05.2022 (liquidated penalty No. 0232009724 was made on 17.04.2019 and became enforceable on 02.05.2019). The defendant found that disclosure of non-payment is justified even in the case of an expired parking fine (ICS § 10 (1) and (2) p. 5). 10. The defendant also objected to the costs of the plaintiff's pre-trial legal assistance. The defendant stated that the plaintiff is personally signed the demand letter submitted to the defendant and the intervention request sent to AKI. Also AKI 3 2-22-11979 the answer is addressed only to the plaintiff, without reference to the representative. According to the defendant, it is unproven that someone represented the plaintiff in the pre-trial proceedings. Submission of invoices does not prove service provision. In theory, the costs related to the performance of an administrative procedure are also not to be sentenced in civil proceedings. If the court still finds that the plaintiff's loss the claim for compensation is either or partially justified, then the defendant requested a reduction of the compensation On the basis of Section 139(1) of the Income Tax Act and Section 140(1) of the Income Tax Act up to EUR 0. The decision and reasons of the county court 11. By the decision of Harju County Court of 28.11.2023, the lawsuit against AS Ühisteenused was satisfied. County Court determined that AS Ühisteenused liquidated damages claim no. 0232009724 has expired and left the related the costs of proceedings shall be borne by AS Ühisteenused. The lawsuit filed against the defendant was partially satisfied by the county court. The county court ordered the defendant to delete from the taust.ee website the information reflecting the plaintiff's indebtedness data, but rejected the plaintiff's claim of 270 euros for pre-trial legal fees for compensation. The county court left the plaintiff and the defendant to bear the procedural costs themselves. 12. The county court established that there is no dispute between the parties that the car OPEL ZAFIRA with registration number XXXXXX belonged to the plaintiff on 17.04.2019 and that on that day AS Public services made fine for parking with this vehicle at 09.24 a.m. No. 0232009724 for the reason that there was no payment for parking. AS Ühisteenused fine no. 0232009724 had to be paid and became collectable on 02.05.2019. Thus, TsÜS § 147 subsections 1 and 2, § 135 subsections 1 and 2 and on the basis of § 146 (1) the 3-year expiration of the claim will run on 03.05.2019 and end on 02.05.2022 at midnight (TsÜS § 136, subsection 2, § 137, subsection 1). The county court found that the statute of limitations has not been interrupted, as well the 10-year requirement according to § 146 subsection 4 of the Civil Code does not apply in the disputed legal relationship expiration date. Therefore, the claim of AS Ühisteenused has expired. 13. IKS § 10 (1) provides that the transfer of personal data related to the breach of a debt relationship to a third party and the processing of transmitted data by a third party is permitted for the purpose of assessing the creditworthiness of the data subject or for other similar purposes and only if the responsible or authorized processor has checked the correctness of the transmitted data and legal basis for the transfer of personal data and has registered the data transfer. The same paragraph 1 of the section states that for the purpose specified in paragraph 1, data will be collected and given to a third party it is not allowed to transfer if it would excessively harm the rights or freedoms of the data subject (paragraph 3), as well as if more than five years have passed since the end of the breach of duty (p. 5). 14. The county obligor recognizes that the defendant discloses the plaintiff's location data in the non-payment register according to the demand expiration. The county court took the view that in this case there is not enough against the plaintiff reasonable and timely active steps to obtain the debt within the limitation period, which would allow disclosure of data on his debt after the claim has expired. The court noted that in the case of a one-time small debt (79.57 euros) in a situation where the creditor himself considers that the lawsuit Filing may be procedurally costly and evidentially complex, or may be delayed for some reason not submitting a claim within the limitation period, does not outweigh the interests of the creditor or third parties receive this data of the General Regulation on the Protection of Personal Data (GPR) Art. 6 (1) p f and IKS § 10 (1) purpose, compared to the data subject's (plaintiff's) interest in demanding the deletion of this data. 15. The county court took the position that in this case there is no time-barred claim against the plaintiff the publication of the data is justified and not allowed, because it is not in accordance with IKYM art. 6 paragraph 1 p f and IKS with the purpose of § 10 subsection 1. Therefore, publishing the data excessively violates the plaintiff's interests § 10 of the IKS according to paragraph 2 p. 3, therefore the publication is not justified according to IKS § 10 paragraph 2 p. 5. So is the plaintiff the right to claim from the defendant as the responsible processor on the basis of § 101 subsection 1 p. 1 of the Tax Code and § 25 subsection 3 subsection 2 of the IKS fulfillment of the obligation and deletion of personal data. The county court satisfied the claim of the plaintiff 4 2-22-11979 against the defendant to delete data from taust.ee. The county court reversed the decision in this regard immediately executed. 16. Lastly, the county court dealt with the plaintiff's pre-trial legal expenses claim. The county court referred VÚS § 1043, § 1045 subsection 1 p. 4, IKÜ art. 82 p. 1 and 2, as well as VÚS § 101 subsection 1 p. 3, § 115 subsection 1, § 127 subsections 1 and 3 and § 128 subsections 2 and 3. 17. The county court found that the plaintiff's personal rights had been violated and took the view that in such in this case, it can be assessed whether the plaintiff has been harmed by the publication of the data in accordance with § 128 subsection according to te 2 and 3. According to the circumstances of the action, it is a matter of costs as a loss that the plaintiff has allegedly carried because he consulted a lawyer before filing a lawsuit for legal advice and filing a claim against Julianus Inkasso OÜ (29.05.2022 claim letter), as well as to submit an intervention request to AKI. The county court essentially considered these costs VÚS According to subsections 2 and 3 of § 128, for property damage that the creditor can claim if the debtor is breached the obligation. 18. However, the county court did not consider it proven that the plaintiff had incurred the alleged expense and damage. On 29.05.2022, the plaintiff submitted a demand letter to the defendant, in which he asked to terminate by 31.05.2022 at the latest processing of his personal data and deleting his data from the website taust.ee. In addition warned the plaintiff that in case of non-fulfillment of the claim, he intends to contact AKI and/or to court, including a claim for damages. The plaintiff has personally signed this letter and nowhere does it appear that he has used a legal aid service to draft the letter or that he has corresponding costs already incurred. The previous and also the e-mail correspondence between the plaintiff and the defendant on the subject of the debt claim no refer to the possible representative of the plaintiff and the use of the legal aid service. Also submitted to AKI the request for intervention has been signed by the plaintiff himself. Thus, the defendant could not assume that the plaintiff uses legal aid to exercise rights, which entails costs and possible damage. Court stated that it must be clear to the person who caused the damage that the victim will suffer or have suffered damage and in what way it consists. 19. The county court also found that the plaintiff's statement that it appears from the invoices that he has incurred obligation to pay for legal aid and this is sufficient to prove damage. The mere fact that Fida Grupp UÜ submitted invoices to the plaintiff for the payment of 270 euros, does not mean that there was such an expense and loss actually incurred by the plaintiff. The county court found that it has not been proven that the plaintiff had developed a VL In the sense of § 128 subsections 2 and 3, damages in the form of pre-trial legal aid costs are 270 euros. The county court left plaintiff's claim for damages VÚS § 101 subsection 1 point 3, § 127 subsection 1, § 128 subsections 2, 3, § 1043, 1045 subsection 1 p 4 and IKYM art 82 p 1 and 2 not satisfied. 20. In the county court annex, if the preliminary claim is not satisfied, the meaning of this is, the defendant in his opinion, with a complex dispute, for which the plaintiff did not need the help of a lawyer. The court did not appreciate either causal relationship (VÕS§127lg4) disclosure of data by the defendant and the occurrence of the alleged damage sometimes, because the occurrence of damage was unproven. Appeal 21. The plaintiff filed an appeal against the defendant, in which he asks to cancel the decision of the county court in the part in which his claim for pre-trial legal fees was not satisfied, and make a new one in this part a decision to satisfy the claim and leave the costs of the proceedings to be borne by the defendant. The defendant submitted two new certificates (payment orders) with the appeal. 22. The plaintiff considers that the county court has violated the obligation to explain when it did not explain to the plaintiff that it is not enough for the claimant to submit invoices for legal expenses to prove his claim. The plaintiff found 5 2-22-11979 that in this respect the decision of the county court is surprising. The plaintiff maintained that the claim for legal fees has been proven by the invoices presented to him, but he also submitted related payment orders. 23. Secondly, the plaintiff found that the county court had apparently wrongly relied on Section 127(3) of the Tax Code, which stipulates that the contracting party who has breached the contractual obligation must compensate only for the damage that he saw the possible consequences of the violation at the time of signing the contract, unless the battery damage was caused intentionally or due to gross negligence. Since there is no contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, it is not provision applicable. 24. In the plaintiff's opinion, the fact who signed the statement of claim and AKI's request for intervention is not important wrote. The plaintiff has signed the documents prepared by the lawyer. 25. The plaintiff stuck to the position that if the defendant had not published the data, he would not have legal expenses incurred. Thus, there is a causal connection between the defendant's actions and the harm caused to the plaintiff connection. Defendant's position 26. The defendant objects to the appeal, requests that it be dismissed and costs the proceedings borne by the plaintiff. The defendant requests that the plaintiff's request for admission of new evidence be dismissed. 27. The defendant considers that the prerequisites for the claim for damages have not been met (VÕS § 143, § 1045 subsection 1 p-d 4 and 8, VÚS § 128 subsection 3). The defendant considers that it was not a complex dispute, therefore no had to use the plaintiff's legal aid. The defendant considers it important that the plaintiff has a letter of demand and AKI signed the appeal himself, which is why it has not been proven that they were drawn up by a person with legal knowledge. The defendant does not consider the request submitted to AKI to be relevant because it is not included in the proceedings, nor is the cost related to the administrative procedure sentencing in civil court proceedings is justified. The defendant considers that there is no causal connection debt between recovery and plaintiff's legal fees. 28. The defendant relies on § 139 subsection 1 and § 140 subsection 1 of the Civil Code and asks to reduce the compensation to 0. 29. The defendant separately objects to the justification, necessity and amount of legal aid costs. The defendant points out that the invoices submitted by the plaintiff do not include the representative's hourly price, so they cannot to assess the reasonableness of the hourly fee. In any case, it was not bulky or complicated. The defendant finds that It takes about 40-45 minutes to prepare a 1-page substantive procedural document. The defendant alleges that the plaintiff has not mentioned the time spent to prepare the demand letter and AKI's complaint. DISTRICT COURT'S POSITION 30. The district court finds that the decision of the county court is subject to the Code of Civil Procedure (TsMS) be partially canceled on the basis of § 657 subsection 1 p. 2. The district court reverses the decision of the county court in respect of which the county court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for damages against the defendant as a whole and divided procedural costs related to this claim. The district court makes a new decision on the annulled part, with which orders 200 euros from the defendant in favor of the plaintiff. The disputed part exceeding this amount remains the county court decision is unchanged. The appeal is partly satisfied. The district court determines also determine the distribution of procedural costs. Guided by § 654 subsection 2² of the TsMS, the district court submits the complete wording of the valid resolution of the judgment at the resolution of the decision. 31. The district court checks the legality and justification of the decision of the county court only in respect of, in which the decision of the county court has been challenged (TsMS § 651 subsection 1). In the present case, the plaintiff objected 6 2-22-11979 regarding the decision of the county court, in which his claim for damages against the defendant was not satisfied and was divided procedural costs related to it (points 2.3 and 2.4 of the resolution of the county court's decision). Defendants did not challenge the decision of the county court, so it has entered into force in the part in which the county court satisfied the plaintiff action against AS Ühisteenused (point 1 of the resolution of the district court decision with the alaps), and in terms of, in which the county court satisfied the claim of the plaintiff against the defendant from data taust.ee without delay for deletion (points 2.1 and 2.2 of the resolution of the county court's decision). The district court controls the legality and justification of the decision of the county court in the part contested by the plaintiff, i.e. whether the plaintiff the claim against the defendant for pre-trial legal fees is justified. 32. First, the court resolves the plaintiff's request for evidence. The district court finds that the plaintiff the evidence presented must be accepted. 32.1. Together with the appeal, the plaintiff submitted a payment order to Fida Grupp UÜ on 26.05.2022 to pay an invoice of 150 euros and 11.06.2022 payment order to Fida Grupp UÜ 120 euros to pay the bill of size. The plaintiff justified the need to submit new evidence by saying that because the county court violated the obligation to explain, then it did not know that the legal aid bill had not been sufficiently incurred to prove the cost. The plaintiff relied on the practice of the Supreme Court, according to which legal aid is sufficient to prove the obligation to pay expenses from the invoice submitted for the provision (RKTKm 01.12.2015, 3-2-1-154-15, paragraph 11). The defendant asks that the new evidence not be admitted because the plaintiff is not justified why he failed to present these evidences in the county court. 32.2. The district court notes, first of all, that it does not agree with the plaintiff that in this case there would be the relevant view of the Supreme Court that as a contractual representative of a party to the proceedings is a sworn advocate according to TsMS § 218 (1) p. 1, then it can be assumed that the party to the proceedings has obligation to pay for legal services, and in this case the court will receive compensation for legal aid costs decide without applying the first sentence of § 176 subsection 6 of the TsMS (RKTKm 01.12.2015, 3-2-1-154- 15, p. 11). The plaintiff has not had a sworn attorney representative, and the relevant presumption does not apply either in case of proof of expenses in dispute in this case. Pre-trial legal costs the claim for compensation is not based on the same basis as the claim for compensation for procedural costs in court proceedings. The Supreme Court has clarified that pre-trial legal aid costs must be awarded evidence confirming expenses to the court (e.g. RKTKo 21.04.2021, 2-14-6942 p. 14). 32.3. At the same time, the district court agrees with the plaintiff that the county court should have ruled against the plaintiff to explain the burden of proof. Although the court cannot tell the parties during the proceedings whether the evidence is sufficient to satisfy or reject the claim, then in this case it is the county court later rejected the claimant's claim for pre-trial legal aid costs in part also this for the reason that the plaintiff did present the invoices of Fida Grupp UÜ, but no proof of payment for them documents. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the obligation of TsMS to discuss the matter exhaustively § 392 (1) (4) means, among other things, the court's obligation to explain to the parties what needs to be proven in the case circumstances and the burden of proving the circumstances (e.g. RKTKo 17.12.2008, 3-2-1-114-08, p. 14). In the present case, it can be seen from the evidence attached to the appeal that the plaintiff had at his disposal the payment orders prove payment for the invoices presented, and even though the plaintiff would have received them to be presented in the county court, they were not presented due to the failure of the county court to fulfill its obligation to explain because of. The district court also takes into account the fact that the plaintiff did not have a sworn lawyer in the county court representative, and in this case the court's burden of explanation is greater. The district court takes accepted the submitted payment orders, as they are relevant and necessary for the correctness of the matter for resolution (TsMS § 652 paragraph 3 paragraph 2, paragraph 4). 33. Next, the district court resolves the plaintiff's appeal. The district court finds that the county court has wrongly applied the substantive law and wrongly assessed the evidence, leaving the plaintiff 7 2-22-11979 the claim for pre-trial legal fees was not satisfied in its entirety. The relevant claim must be satisfied partially. 34. According to the well-established practice of the Supreme Court, legal aid costs before court proceedings are awarded compensation can come into question as a claim for normal civil damage compensation § 115 subsection 1 or on the basis of § 1043 and § 128 subsection 3 (RKTKo 14.10.2014, 3-2-1-84-14, p. 24; RKTKo 30.04.2013, 3-2- 1-5-13, p50). is compensable as damage according to Section 127(2) of VÚS, if the prevention of such damage is covered VÍS § 1045 (1) with the specific purpose of protection. Specifying the extent of compensable damage According to § 128 subsections 1 and 3, the direct property damage subject to compensation includes reasonable costs incurred due to the occurrence, including reasonable costs to prevent damage or to reduce and obtain compensation, including determining damages and damages for submitting claims related to compensation (RKTKo 29.11.2017, 2-14-56641/69, p. 22, see also RKTKo 03.04.2013, 3-2-1-19-13, p 11). Out-of-court legal aid costs are reimbursable provided that, that the general prerequisites for a claim for damages are met, i.e. the existence of damages and a causal connection between violation and damage (RKTKo 05.11.2008, 3-2-1-79-08, p. 18). 35. In this case, the decision of Harju County Court of 28.11.2023 entered into force in this case, in which it was established that AS Ühisteenused liquidated damages claim no. 0232009724 has expired, and in part, in which Julianus Inkasso OÜ, i.e. the defendant, was obliged to delete AS Ühisteenused from the fine No. 0232009724, the claims against the plaintiff stem from the website taust.ee. The county court found that the defendant had published information about the plaintiff in the default register after the claim was already filed expired. The county court took the position that since the plaintiff had a one-time small debt, it was not publication of data justified according to IKS § 10 (2) p. 3 and p. 5 (publication of data was an offense interests of the plaintiff excessively) and the plaintiff had the right to demand deletion of the data. So it is it was established by the court decision that entered into force that the defendant violated the rights of the plaintiff by publishing the expired debt (IKYM art. 6 paragraph 1 point f, IKS § 10 paragraph 2 point 3 and point 5). 36. Because the county court is the plaintiff in the present case when resolving the claim for pre-trial legal aid costs referred to both contractual (including VÚS § 101, § 115, § 127 (3)) and non-contractual relations to the regulatory provisions, the district court notes first that since in this case it is with delictual damage, then VÚS § 1043 and § 1045 subsection 1 point 4 (personal law violation), as well as IKÜM art 82 p-d 1 and 2, together with § 127 subsections 1, 2 and 4 and § 128 subsections 2 and 3. The purpose of § 1045 subsection 1 point 4 of the Tax Code is to protect a person from, among other things, damage caused by his enforcement of rights, including out of court, which is why pre-trial legal aid costs can be considered would be covered by the protective purpose of this norm in the sense of § 127 subsection 2 of the VÚS (cf. RKTKo 29.11.2017, 2-14-56641/69, p 22; TlnRnKo 22.12.2023, 2-21-9794, p 17.1). 37. Since the defendant's violation has been proven, it is necessary to further establish whether and what damage the plaintiff suffered therefore carried and whether there is a causal link between the breach and the damage. 38. Since the county court does not have circumstances related to the plaintiff's pre-trial legal expenses has sufficiently dealt with, then the district court first identifies the following that are important in the case circumstances: 1) On 29.04.2022, Julianus Inkasso OÜ submitted a debt claim to the claimant AS Ühisteenused for payment. The debt claim was related to liquidated damages no. 0232009724. 2) From the e-correspondence between the plaintiff and defendant on 24.05.2022-26.05.2022, it appears that on 24.05.2022 the plaintiff replied, for not admitting liability for wrongful parking and refusing to pay based on statute of limitations. 8 2-22-11979 On 25.05.2022, the plaintiff informed the defendant that it is not clear where taust.ee comes from the debt disclosed on the website is 79.79 euros (dtl 14–19). 3) On 29.05.2022, the plaintiff submitted to AS Ühisteenused, Julianus Inkasso OÜ and Krediidiregister letter of demand to OÜ (dtl 22–23). The plaintiff stated that he received it on 29.04.2022 from Julianus Inkasso OÜ in the demand for the payment of the fine no. 0232009724 of the debt notification Ühisteenused AS. The plaintiff explained, that the fine has expired and that he demands the deletion of the debt notice from the taust.ee website. Plaintiff warned that if his demand is not fulfilled, he plans to appeal to AKI and/or to the court, incl with a claim for damages. The demand letter was signed by the plaintiff himself. 4) On 31.05.2022, the defendant replied that he has the right to publish the data and that the statute of limitations does not prevent debt claim from the creditor (Article 24). 5) On 26.05.2022, Fida Grupp UÜ submitted invoice no. 20220526 for payment of 150 euros to the plaintiff (dtl 31). The invoice shows that 100 euros was due for legal advice from 03.05.2022 to 26.05.2022 for which the content was AS Ühisteenused's claim against X. 50 euros was due on the basis of the same invoice payable from legal aid, which was 29.05.2022 when the statement of claim was drawn up. The plaintiff paid the invoice on 26.05.2022 with the explanation "Legal consultations" (dtl 476). 6) On 01.06.2022, Fida Grupp UÜ submitted invoice no. 20220601 for payment of 120 euros to the plaintiff (dtl 32). The invoice shows that 120 euros was payable for legal assistance, which was the preparation of a complaint To AKI in connection with AS Ühisteenused's claim against X. The plaintiff has paid this invoice on 11.06.2022 with the explanation "Legal aid. Drawing up a complaint to the Data Protection Inspectorate" (dtl 474). 7) On 20.06.2022, the plaintiff submitted a request for intervention to AKI, in which he asked AKI to obligate Julianus Inkasso OÜ and AS Ühisteenused to delete his personal data from the website background.ee. The plaintiff signed the application himself (dtl 25–28). 8) On 12.07.2022, AKI informed the plaintiff that it would not start the procedure requested by the plaintiff (dtl 29–30). AKI explained to the plaintiff, among other things, that if the plaintiff finds that the disclosure of debt data does not comply with IKS The requirements of § 10, including the fact that the disclosure of the data excessively harms him, must come first apply to the non-payment register and explain and justify your specific life situation, i.e. submit an objection to the data processor in accordance with art. 21 paragraph 1 of IKÜM to stop processing. AKI noted that the plaintiff has turned to the data processor, but since AKI has received in connection with default registers (including OÜ Krediidiregister, www.taust.ee) with the disclosed debt data, many complaints, then they have decided not to resolve complaints related to debt data one by one, but to register them in the non-payment register a uniform procedure for the holders. AKI explained that the plaintiff can claim damages go to court. 39. The district court, unlike the county court, finds that it has been proven previously with what was stated in paragraph 38, that the plaintiff paid a total of 270 euros for the legal assistance that Fida Grupp UÜ provided to him in connection with AS Joint services with a claim against him and the defendant's disclosure of this claim on taust.ee, incl for preparing a specific 29.02.2022 demand letter and AKI request. 39.1. As stated above, the plaintiff paid a total of 150 euros based on the invoice of 26.05.2022. From this 100 euros 03.05.2022–26.05.2022 for legal advice in connection with the claim of AS Ühisteenused against and 50 euros for preparing the statement of claim on 29.05.2022. According to the district court, it is this cost is clearly related to AS Ühisteendues liquidated damages claim against the plaintiff, to which the plaintiff objected, and in connection with which the plaintiff demanded the defendant to delete his data from taust.ee. 9 2-22-11979 This is confirmed by the time of legal aid provision. AS Ühisteenudega defendant has claimed in the proceedings, that at the end of May 2022, they had another pending dispute with the plaintiff, neither does the defendant stated that the plaintiff would have submitted another letter of demand to him on 29.05.2022. 39.2. It is clearly visible from the request for intervention submitted to AKI on 20.06.2022 that the complaint is related the same with the publication of the liquidated damages claim on taust.ee, i.e. with the defendant's actions. from 01.06.2022 and from the plaintiff's payment order for the payment of this invoice, there is a clearly visible connection to the complaint to AKI with compilation. 40. Therefore, the district court finds that the plaintiff has proven such pre-trial legal expenses charges related to the defendant's violation of his personal rights, i.e. overdue debt in taust.ee by publishing data about In addition to the violation, it is therefore proven that the expenses incurred and the causal connection of the expenditure with the defendant's breach. 41. The District Court does not consider the fact that the plaintiff signed the demand letter and AKI's application to be important himself. The plaintiff has submitted a claim based on a delict, which is why § 127(3) of the Civil Code does not apply application. However, even if VÚS § 127(3) would be relevant, pre-trial legal aid costs wearing in a situation where the person claims his personal rights are violated, the violator must - especially if it is a professional debt collector - be reasonably foreseeable (cf. RKTKo 29.11.2017, 2-14-56641/69, p 22, where the Supreme Court held that pre-trial legal aid costs as a consequence of copyright infringement reasonably foreseeable to the infringer). Although the contents of the letter of demand part is only one page, it contains references to legislation and the opinion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and is prepared in the so-called legal language. According to the District Court, the demand letter of 29.05.2022 is different clearly from the e-mails sent by the plaintiff earlier, i.e. 24.05–25.05.2022, therefore it must have been clear to the defendant that the plaintiff has probably used legal aid. As for the intervention request sent to AKI, since it was not directed at the defendant, no the defendant learned about it separately. However, the court considers it important that the demand letter of 29.05.2022 contains a warning that if the deletion request is not met, the plaintiff intends to turn to AKI and/or to court, including a claim for damages. The District Court finds that from the demand letter of 29.05.2022 it had to be reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that the plaintiff could also use the AKI to apply legal aid. The district court finds that in any case it must have been sufficiently clear to the defendant that the plaintiff could be has used or is using legal aid, which is the plaintiff's expense and may later in the event of a violation being detected turn out to be damages awarded against the defendant. 42. The district court does not agree with the defendant's statement that the plaintiff did not need to use legal aid because it was a simple dispute. A dispute that concerns both parking-related fines (VÚS), data protection (IKÜM, IKS) as well as claim expiration (TsÜS), is not a dispute that a person without legal knowledge should be able to solve it himself. Everyone has the right to use their own professional legal assistance to protect rights. The district court must also in this case the use of legal aid as justified and necessary. As mentioned above, the Supreme Court has held pre-trial legal aid costs as reasonable if they are aimed at preventing damage or to reduce (RKTKo 29.11.2017, 2-14-56641/69, p. 2). In the present case, the plaintiff used legal aid in order to end the violation against him out of court, i.e. faster and for the purpose of preventing higher expenses and damage. 43. Next, the district court assesses the justified amount of specific costs (RKTKo 03.04.2013, 3-2-1-19-13, p 11). 10 2-22-11979 43.1. The District Court finds that legal advice and drafting a letter of demand for 150 euros is not not an excessive cost. The fact that the service on the invoice is distinguished for legal advice for the period 03.05.- for 26.05.2022 and 29.05.2022 for drawing up a letter of demand without specifying the service hourly rate, doesn't matter. The court can also assess the reasonableness and necessity of legal aid costs according to the total price of a specific service. The court finds that legal advice for 100 euros and drawing up a letter of demand for 50 euros is not excessive in any case. Legal advice presupposes a matter perusal of the materials, legal analysis, and in this case additionally prepared letter of demand. If considered for the service (ie qualification) of a lawyer who is not a member of the Bar Association in a case of medium complexity, a reasonable hourly price is 100 euros (cf. e.g. RKTKm 14.04.2021, 2-19-10324, TlnRnKm 11.06.2021, 2-19-10324, p 20; in this case, legal fees are not included VAT), then the service has been provided for 1.5 hours (for 100+50 euros). Legal aid in this scope is not can be considered unreasonable. Thus, the district court considers it justified to judge the plaintiff from the defendant 150 euros in connection with invoice no. 20220526 of 26.05.2022. 43.2. As for the legal aid cost of 120 euros for preparing a complaint to AKI, then the district court has already established the bearing of this cost and the connection of the cost with the defendant's violation. The district court also notes that the claim of the relevant cost is not in civil proceedings excluded by itself. First, the plaintiff has addressed the defendant with a letter of demand, which could be understood to receive that it was drawn up by a lawyer, and warned that he would turn to either AKI or the court if his request to delete data from taust.ee is not satisfied. Defendant to plaintiff's letter of demand did not respond positively, i.e. did not delete the data. According to IKYM art 77, everyone has the data subject has the right to submit a complaint to the supervisory authority if the data subject is of the opinion that the processing of personal data concerning him is transferred to IKÜM.EestisonAKI for the institution whose one of the tasks is to resolve the complaints of data subjects (ICS § 28, § 56 pt. 3 p. 8, § 61 paragraph 1). If AKI had satisfied the plaintiff's appeal, it could have obliged the defendant to stop the violation. Therefore, the plaintiff's complaint to AKI was not unfounded and if AKI had obliged the defendant to stop the violation, i.e. to delete the data, it would not have happened the plaintiff had to go to court. Although AKI failed to start the procedure, it was not because that the plaintiff would have filed an unjustified complaint, only on the grounds that AKI was analogous overloaded with complaints and was currently carrying out a single one against the keepers of default registers procedure. AKI also admitted in its answer that the plaintiff had behaved correctly and applied first to the defendant itself. Therefore, the legal aid costs incurred by the AKI party did not receive the plaintiff's appeal considered inappropriate. 43.3. However, the District Court finds that in a situation where the request for intervention submitted to AKI contains essentially the same information as the demand letter submitted to the defendant on 29.05.2022 - referred to in the demand letter the legal norms are only described in more detail, and the position of the Chancellor of Justice is longer quoted, the 120 euro legal aid expense is not justified. Because the legal aid provider was aware of the circumstances no later than 29.05.2022, by the time the letter of demand is drawn up, and has been added later but knowing that the defendant answered the letter of demand in the negative, then a request for intervention to AKI can be read 30 minutes for the reasonable legal aid cost of preparation. Because there is no hourly price on this bill either given, the district court once again takes as a basis the average hourly price of a lawyer of 100 euros (see above p. 43.1). In this case, the fee for 30 minutes would be 50 euros (100/2). Thus, the district court must to judge justified from the defendant in favor of the plaintiff in connection with the 01.06.2022 invoice no. 20220601 50 euros. 44. Although the defendant has applied for a reduction of the compensation for damage on the basis of Section 139(1) and Section 140(1) of the Civil Code to zero, the court does not consider it justified. The defendant explains his claim based on Section 139(1) of the Civil Code with the fact that the plaintiff himself made the decision to use pre-trial legal aid, so he is responsible for it himself 11 2-22-11979 to pay. The district court has already explained that the plaintiff had the right to use the help of a lawyer and because it was partly justified, then it belongs to the judgment of the defendant in the justified part. Defendant also relies on Section 140(1) of the Civil Code, according to which the court may reduce the compensation if the damage full compensation would be extremely unfair to the obligee, but it is not justified why, in this case, pre-trial legal aid costs should be awarded to him unfair or otherwise reasonably unacceptable. Therefore, the district court did not reduce compensation on the basis of § 139 subsection 1 or § 140 subsection 1 of the Civil Code additionally. 45. As a result of the above, the district court annuls the decision of the county court, in which the plaintiff the claim for pre-trial legal aid costs in the amount of 200 euros was not satisfied and he makes a new one in this regard a decision ordering 200 euros (150+50) from the defendant in favor of the plaintiff. As for the rest (70 euros), the plaintiff's claim for pre-trial legal aid costs remains unsatisfied in the district court as well. 46. Since the district court partially annuls the contested part of the decision of the county court, it will be repeated also share the procedural costs related to the claim for pre-trial legal aid costs. 47. The county court divided the procedural costs of the plaintiff and the defendant in such a way that it left them to the defendant in the share affected by the action, either of them shall be carried forward the lawsuit against the defendant in part, i.e. satisfied the demand for data deletion, but left the pre-trial ones claim for procedural costs not satisfied (TsMS § 163 (2)). According to the decision of the District Court, the plaintiff's claim against the defendant was upheld almost in its entirety - in addition to the defendant being bound to delete the data, the claim for pre-trial legal aid costs has been satisfied to the extent of 74% (required Of the 270 euros, the claim was satisfied in the amount of 200 euros). Therefore, according to the district court, it is not fair leave the plaintiff's procedural costs to be borne by the plaintiff. The district court finds that in such a situation the costs of the procedure must be divided in proportion to the extent of the satisfaction of the claim. As the plaintiff so submitted obligation claim as well as a financial claim, it is not possible to determine the exact percentage of claim satisfaction to calculate, but in the opinion of the district court it is fair to divide the procedural costs in such a way that the plaintiff 90% of the procedural costs incurred by the parties both in the county and district courts in the lawsuit against the defendant to the extent to be borne by the defendant and to the extent of 10% to be borne by the plaintiff (TsMS § 163 subsection 1). 48. The financial amount of procedural costs is determined by the county court after the judgment enters into force (TsMS § 174 paragraph 4). (digitally signed) (digitally signed) (digitally signed) Maris Kuurberg Indrek Soots Neve from Uud 12