VG Osnabrück - 1 B 72/21

VG Osnabrück - Beschluss vom 17.12.2021 - 1 B 72/21
Court:	VG Osnabrück (Germany)
Jurisdiction:	Germany
Relevant Law:	Article 6 GDPR Article 85 GDPR § 4 NPresseG
Decided:	17.12.2021
Published:
Parties:
National Case Number/Name:	Beschluss vom 17.12.2021 - 1 B 72/21
European Case Law Identifier:
Appeal from:
Appeal to:	Unknown
Original Language(s):	German
Original Source:	OpenJur (in German)
Initial Contributor:	n/a

The Administrative Court of Osnabrück held that an authority has to issue names and residence of assembly indicators to press representatives according to § 4 NPresseG but against this it does not have to issue the concrete addresses.

English Summary

Facts

A press representative filed an emergency motion in court to get to know names and addresses of the data subjects. These are persons who had indicated assemblies on 4, 11 and 18 December 2021 which took or should take place as protest against COVID-19. The emergency motion was directed to the authority where the assemblies were displayed.

On 14 Decembre 2021 the press representative sent an electronic mail to the authority to find out the names of the data subjects, but the authority did not state them for data protection reasons by own account.

On the same day the press representative filed the emergency motion in court.

Holding

The court makes a difference between giving the names and the addresses or residences to the press representatives.

The court sees a claim basis for getting the names of the assembly indicators to press representatives in § 4 NPresseG. It keeps the possibility of other bases for claims open. The court does neither doubt on the constitutionality of the § 4 (1) NPresseG nor on the compatibility with European Law. According the court the request of the press representative is captured by the freedom of press according to Art. 5 (1) GG. The information of the names would help the press to fulfill its public function. On the other side there is the right to informational self-determination of the data subjects. That means that each person can decide and dispose about its data itself. According to the court the social sphere is concerned here which has the effect that in principle true assertions concerning a fact with reference to the social sphere are allowed except the possible expectable personality damage prevails the interest about the truth. The court is of the opinion that also the responsibility of the data subjects, that the interest has been formed, would be relevant which is the case here. Regularly the public has according to the court an interest on the assembly indicators when the assemblies take place in public space. The court considers the present assemblies as public. In the present case the interest of the publicity prevails over the interest of the data subjects so the press representative has a right to get to know the names of the assembly indicators according to the court.

Against this the court does not see an interest of the public with regard to the addresses of the assembly indicators. Insofar the interest of the data subjects prevails over the interest of the press representative. The court though held that the authority has to give the residence of the assembly indicators to the press representative. Typically the name and residence of a person are published in the context of a reporting. In that way the public could assign according to the court wether the assembly is indicated by a person from the place or not.

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English Machine Translation of the Decision

The decision below is a machine translation of the German original. Please refer to the German original for more details.

VG Osnabrück, decision of December 17th, 2021 - 1 B 72/21
reference
openJur 2021, 46621

tenor

The Respondent is obliged by way of an interim order to inform the Applicant of the names of the people who reported the Corona protest meetings to the Respondent on December 4th, 11th and 18th, 2021, as well as their place of residence.

Otherwise the application will be rejected.

The applicant bears 1/4 of the costs of the procedure and the respondent 3/4.

The amount in dispute is set at €5,000.
reasons

I

The Applicant is requesting that the Respondent provide the names and addresses of the people who reported the Corona protest demonstrations in the Respondent’s urban area on December 4th, 11th and 18th, 2021.

The applicant is relocating the A. Corona protest demonstrations were reported to the respondent for the above dates. In an email dated December 14, 2021, the editor-in-chief of E., G. asked the respondent for the names of the people who had registered the three events mentioned. The respondent replied by email on the same day that the names could not be named for data protection reasons.

The applicant then submitted an urgent application on December 14, 2021. With this, the respondent is to be literally obliged to answer in writing the questions as to who has registered the meetings for the three dates mentioned, whereby the name and address are to be given.

For clarification, the applicant also states: The data of the "registering party" are of interest and not those of any person who is different from the person chairing the meeting. She explains the following as justification: The reason for the order arises from the upcoming meeting on December 18, 2021. There is also a right to an order. There is no private interest worthy of protection in the secrecy of the name or address of the person who registered the meeting, since he made himself known to the approval authority and subsequently had to publicly answer for the course of the meeting. The unsubstantiated reference to the General Data Protection Regulation does not replace a legitimate interest. On the other hand, the population has an overwhelming interest in information. There is no need for evidence that no topic is currently affecting the public more than the corona pandemic. This also applies in particular to the activities of the "corona opponents" and to the public protests you organize. The respondent, who is obliged to provide information, is not entitled to speculate as to whether the names and addresses of the "registrants" of the meeting should be found in the reporting, because the right to information already relates to the research preceding the reporting. In this respect, reference is made to a judgment sent by the Administrative Court of Ansbach on June 2nd, 2020 (- AN 14 E 20.00436). The fact that so-called corona opponents are sometimes exposed to hostilities is irrelevant, since vaccination advocates also have to endure hostilities.

Accordingly, the applicant requests

to oblige the respondent by means of an interim order to provide information about who reported the "corona protest demonstrations" on December 4th, 11th and 18th, 2021 and what his or her address(es) is or ring.

The Respondent requests

to reject the application.

In their view, the application should be rejected for several reasons:

On the one hand, it is not clear who the applicant means by the "registering person". Lower Saxony's assembly law distinguishes between the person of the notifier of a meeting and that of the person chairing the meeting, who could be the same person, but under no circumstances have to be. In addition, it is questionable whether the applicant would not have received or could not have received sufficient information at the demonstrations on December 4th and 11th, 2021.

On the other hand, there is no reason for the order. The applicant was neither prevented from reporting on the corona demonstrations that had already taken place on December 4th and 11th, 2021, nor were there any obstacles to a report on the demonstration on December 18th, 2021. In particular, it is not clear why the imminent reporting would have to include the names and addresses of the persons reporting the meeting.

Finally, however, the applicant has no right to an order:

This could derive the requested information neither from the press law nor from other regulations. In principle, the General Data Protection Regulation prohibits the disclosure of personal data. An exception from Art. 6 Para. 1 GDPR does not apply as a result. In particular, the requirements of the legal basis of Section 4 of the NPresseG in the Member States are not met. Rather, the private interests of the persons who reported the meetings, which are worthy of protection, prevail. She had contacted the notices of the meetings and informed them of the applicant's attempts to contact them and passed on her telephone number. Since no one reported this, it can be assumed that the persons concerned did not want contact with the applicant.

It is also questionable whether the name and address of the notice of the meeting are of particular public interest. At the very least, however, private interests worthy of protection on the part of the meeting notice would prevent the data from being passed on. This is to be determined by comprehensively weighing up the public's interest in information and conflicting private interests. Both would have to be brought into an appropriate balance by means of practical concordance. The decisive factor here is how high the public interest in the requested information is to be assessed and how strongly the infringement of private rights by disclosing the requested information is to be weighted. It had not been adequately demonstrated what the public's legitimate interest in the disclosure of the names and addresses of meeting notices was. In addition, so-called corona opponents are exposed to hostilities. Against this background, the disclosure of the relevant data is to be seen as an intensive encroachment on general personal rights.

For further details of the facts and the statements of the parties involved, reference is made to court files and administrative procedures.

II.

The coveted interim order aims, of course, at notifying the names and addresses of those who reported the Corona protest demonstrations on December 4th, 11th and 18th, 2021. This is made sufficiently clear from the application, which only uses the word "registered" instead of the word "notified", see Section 5 (1) sentence 1 NVersG, and was also clarified again in a brief dated December 16, 2021. On the other hand, the request does not (in the meantime explicitly) refer to the notification of the names and addresses of any persons who are different from the person making the notification. An application is admissible in accordance with Section 123 (1) VwGO, because in the main a performance action is permissible, Section 123 (5) VwGO, so that Sections 80 (5), 80a (3) VwGO do not apply.

I

The request is allowed.

The applicant is authorized to apply as a representative of the press within the meaning of § 4 Para. 1 NPresseG, § 42 Para. 2 VwGO analogously.

There is also a need for legal protection for the urgent application if information about addresses is requested. In her e-mail of December 14, 2021 to the respondent, the applicant only asked for the name of the notice of the meeting and not for his address. However, after it became clear that not even the name would be disclosed, disclosure of the address could definitely be ruled out. It was therefore not necessary to express a corresponding request to the authority before the urgent court proceedings were initiated or before the urgent decision was made.

The need for legal protection (for the urgent application as a whole) is also not lacking because the applicant already has the requested data or could have had it with sufficient research and questioning of participants in the events held so far, as the respondent suggests. Nothing is evident for the former. The latter does not preclude the assertion of a right to information under press law anyway.

II.

The request is partly justified.

1.

The requirements of § 123 para. 1 sentence 2 VwGO exist with regard to the request to communicate the name of the meeting notifier (cf. on the assumed obligation of a municipality to communicate the name of a leader of a Pegida demonstration to a press representative: VG Würzburg, decision of February 13, 2015 – W 7 E 15.81, juris).

According to Section 123 (1) VwGO, the court can issue an interim order in relation to the subject matter of the dispute, even before an action is filed, if there is a risk that a change in the existing situation will thwart or significantly impede the realization of a right of the applicant could become. Temporary orders are also permissible to regulate a provisional situation in relation to a disputed legal relationship if this regulation, especially in the case of permanent legal relationships, is necessary to avert significant disadvantages or to prevent impending violence or for other reasons. In doing so, the applicant must assert a threat to his own individual interest (reason for order) and the existence of a right or legally protected interest (claim for order) and substantiate the facts required for justification, Section 123 (3) VwGO in conjunction with Section 920 (2) ZPO. The legal and factual circumstances at the time of the court's decision are decisive for this.

If the main issue is finally anticipated with the requested temporary injunction in the sense that the decision and its consequences can no longer be reversed for legal or factual reasons even after the main issue decision (for the definition and against the inclusion of the so-called "provisional" anticipation the main thing: Kopp/Schenke, VwGO, 23rd edition 2017, § 123 para. 14), increased requirements apply because this is fundamentally contrary to the nature of the temporary legal protection. An anticipation of the main matter is permissible in exceptional cases if the substantive legal claim exists with a high degree of probability and the applicant faces irreversible and unreasonable disadvantages in the event of non-granting (Kopp/Schenke, loc.cit., § 123 marginal number 14). These requirements can be assigned directly to the reason for the order (unreasonable and irreversible disadvantages instead of mere urgency) and claim (high probability of the existing substantive legal claim instead of sufficient ones) (cf. OVG Lüneburg, decision of October 7th, 2016 - 10 ME 56/16, para 17, juris: "reason for the order that exceptionally justifies anticipation of the main matter").

In press law, on the one hand, the requirements for the reason for the order are specified (stronger relevance to the present and increased public interest, more on that immediately). Whether the usual requirements (unacceptable and irreversible disadvantages) no longer have to be checked - which is obvious - can remain open because these requirements ultimately exist, taking into account the special features of press freedom from Article 5(1) sentence 2 GG, because if the information is not provided up-to-date reporting with the required information becomes impossible (on the reason for the order in detail below).

Whether, on the other hand, lower requirements than usual apply in press law when anticipating the main issue with regard to the claim for an order (cf. OVG Lüneburg, decision of 12.2.2014 - 10 ME 102/13, para. 9, juris: credibility with sufficient probability when anticipating the main issue probably sufficient in press law; no separate examination of the admissibility of anticipating the main issue) can be left undecided because the increased requirements are also met in any case, taking into account the importance of freedom of the press. The substantive legal right to information from § 4 para. 1 NPresseG exists not only with sufficient but also with high probability for the following reasons.

The applicant has substantiated both a reason for the order (a.) justifying the anticipation of the main issue and a claim for an order (b.) justifying this.

In detail:

a.

The reason for the order justifying the anticipation of the main issue has been made sufficiently credible.

The issuance of an interim order to enforce a right to information under press law requires both a matter of increased public interest and a strong contemporary relevance of the reporting (OVG Lüneburg, decision of October 7th, 2016 - 10 ME 56/16, 1st principle, para 18, juris; on the admissibility of this requirement: BVerfG, decision of 09/08/2014 - 1 BvR 23/14, principle 2b, para. 30, juris). Both conditions are present.

ah.

There is a matter of heightened public interest. The press can decide for itself according to journalistic criteria what it considers to be of public interest and what not (BVerwG, judgment of 16.3.2016 - 6 C 65.14, para. 18f., juris; OVG Lüneburg, decision of 12.2.2014 - 10 ME 10/13, para. 9, juris; Bay. VGH, decision of November 8th, 2021 - 7 CE 21.1531, para. 15, juris). According to the applicant's underlying assessment (which is also obviously not incorrect), the public is interested in finding out who denies the necessity of the current restrictions in private and public life and who opposes an overwhelming proportion of scientists who suggested these or similar restrictions. In view of the dominance of the topic in the media, it can also be assumed that there will be increased public interest.

bb

There is a strong reference to the present. It already results from the current demonstration activities of the "Corona opponents" in A-town. The fact that reporting cannot be postponed is harmless. The strong reference to the present cannot be denied with the reference to the later possible and meaningful reporting. The press can only carry out its control and mediation function if no excessive demands are made on the urgent legal protection information procedure, also with regard to the topicality of a reporting (BVerfG, decision of 8.9.2014 - 1 BvR 23/14, para. 30, juris; OVG Lüneburg, Decision of October 7th, 2016, loc.cit., para. 19, juris). Their right to self-determination also includes the question of whether reporting should be prompt (BVerfG, decision of September 8, 2014, loc. cit., para. 29, juris).

b.

A claim for an order justifying the anticipation of the main issue has also been made credible.

The claim for an order is the claim asserted in the main proceedings. The right to be informed of the names of the people who reported the Corona protest demonstrations results from § 4 para. 1 NPresseG. Whether a corresponding claim also arises from other bases for a claim can remain open (Art. 6 Para. 1 Subparagraph 1 lit. f) Var. 2 GDPR is ruled out due to Art. 6 Para. 1 Subparagraph 2 GDPR, because answering press inquiries is also part of sovereign activity, BVerwG, judgment of September 27th, 2018 - 7 C 5/17, para. 26, juris).

The constitutionality of Section 4 (1) NPresseG cannot be called into question (cf. BVerfG, decision of 27 July 2015 1 BvR 1452/13, para. 12, juris). Conformity with European law is also not in doubt. This applies regardless of whether the provision is regarded as the legal basis within the meaning of Article 6 Paragraph 3 in conjunction with Paragraph 1 Letter c) or Letter e) GDPR, whereby according to Article 85 Paragraph 1, 2 GDPR the protection of personal data and freedom of information, namely the processing of data for journalistic purposes, must be balanced and deviations from Chapter II GDPR with its Art. 6 can also be made.

§ 4 NPresseG is applicable and the requirements of the right to information under press law are met.

ah.

The requirements of Section 4 (1) NPresseG are met.

The applicant is a representative of the press (see above). The respondent is an authority within the meaning of the provision. According to what was said above about the reason for the order, the naming of the people who reported the Corona protest demonstrations is information that serves to fulfill the public task of the press.

bb

The provision of information is not subject to the provision of § 4 Para. 2 No. 3 Var. 2 NPresseG.

According to this provision, information can be refused if it would violate private interests that are worthy of protection. In this respect, on the one hand, the fundamental right of the person concerned to informational self-determination and, on the other hand, the fundamental right to physical integrity come into consideration - provided there is a (concrete) risk of attacks on the person concerned if their names become known.

Conflicting fundamental rights positions are to be brought into a gentle balance by way of practical concordance. If - despite all attempts at reconciliation - as is usually the case, the opposing fundamental rights positions cannot be fully realized in each case, it must ultimately be decided whether the interest in information guaranteed under constitutional law on the basis of freedom of the press (Article 5 (1) sentence 2 GG) or the above-mentioned interests of those affected is to be given preference. (Federal Administrative Court, judgment of October 1, 2014 - 6 C 35/13, para. 20 ff., juris; Bay. VGH, decision of November 8, 2021, loc. cit., paras. 11-13, juris; VGH BW, judgment of September 11. 2013 - 1 S 509/13, para. 26, juris; Bay. VGH, decision of 14.5.2012 - 7 CE 12.370, para. 13, juris; VG Augsburg, decision of 29.01.2014 - Au 7 E 13.2018, para. 83, legal;). This comprehensive consideration is fully verifiable by a court (VGH BW, judgment of September 11, 2013, loc. cit., para. 26, juris with further references).

(1)

The right to informational self-determination of the persons who reported the demonstrations does not prevent the applicant from being given information because their interest in information outweighs the interest in secrecy of the former.

(a)

The following can be said about the conflicting fundamental rights positions:

(aa)

The information interest of press representatives is very important. The request for information falls under the scope of freedom of the press in accordance with Article 5(1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law. The protection of press freedom ranges from gathering information to spreading news and opinion. The journalistic preparatory work is to be given special weight. Only if access to information is unimpeded in principle, the press is able to effectively perform its function in a free democracy (BVerwG, judgment of October 1, 2014 – 6 C 35/13, para. 22 et seq., juris). The freedom of the press is particularly protected under fundamental rights with regard to the fact that a free press that is not controlled by public authority is an essential element of a free state and is indispensable for a democracy (st. Rspr.; cf. BVerfG, judgment of August 5th, 1966 - 1 BvR 586/62 and others - BVerfGE 20, 162, 174; decision of November 6, 1979 - 1 BvR 81/76 - BVerfGE 52, 283, 296; most recently BVerwG, judgment of October 1, 2014, loc.cit., para. 26, juris; VGH BW , Judgment of September 11, 2013, loc. cit., para. 28 et seq., juris). In addition to an information function, the press also has a control function (see BVerfG, decision of 25.6.2009 - 1 BvR 134/03 - DVBl 2009, 1166 para. 62; BVerwG, judgment of 20.2.2013 - 6 A 2.12 - BVerwGE 146 , 56 para. 27; judgment of 1.10.2014 - 6 C 35/13; para. 26, juris).

(bb)

On the other hand, there is the right to free development of personality according to Art. 2 Para. 1 GG and human dignity according to Art. 1 Para. 1 GG of the indicators of assemblies, which guarantee each individual an autonomous area of private life. The general right of personality has a particularly high priority, especially its core of human dignity.

(aaa)

The recognized content includes the right to dispose of one's own person, social recognition and personal honor. An essential guarantee is the protection against statements that are likely to have a detrimental effect on the reputation of the person, in particular their image in public. The general right of personality protects the person in particular from falsifying

or distorting representations that are of not insignificant importance for the development of personality (st. case law, cf. BVerfG, decision of 13.6.2007 - 1 BvR 1783/05 - BVerfGE 119, 1, 24 with further references). The general right of personality also guarantees the right to remain in chosen anonymity and not to see one's own person represented in public (see BVerfG, judgment of June 5, 1973 - 1 BvR 536/72 - BVerfGE 35, 202, 220). As a special form, the right to informational self-determination includes the authority of each individual to determine the disclosure and use of their personal data themselves (cf. only BVerfG, judgment of December 15, 1983 - 1 BvR 209/83 et al. - BVerfGE 65, 1, 41 et seq.; decision of March 9, 1988 - 1 BvL 49/86 - BVerfGE 78, 77, 84).

(bbb)

However, not the entire area of private life is under the absolute protection of the fundamental right mentioned. If the individual as a citizen living in the community enters into communication with others, influences others through his being or behavior and thereby affects the personal sphere of fellow human beings or matters of community life, his exclusive right to determine his private sphere may be restricted, insofar as this does not belong to the inviolable innermost area of life. The privacy and social sphere is subordinate in terms of protection intensity to the core area of private life, the intimate and secret sphere, which is protected as absolutely untouchable. The private sphere must be delimited both thematically and spatially (Bay. VGH, decision of November 8th, 2021, loc.cit., para. 14, juris). Here there is often only an interest of the public in entertainment, which is regularly not worthy of protection (Bay. VGH, decision of November 8th, 2021, loc.cit., para. 15, juris). In the social sphere, on the other hand, the individual has to accept the restrictions that are made in the overriding general interest or with regard to the interests of third parties protected by fundamental rights while strictly maintaining proportionality (BVerwG, judgment of October 13, 2020 - 2 C 41/18, para. 14 f. , juris; VGH BW, judgment of September 11, 2013, op. This applies in particular to data relating to the individual that relates to his or her social behavior and to this extent is withdrawn from his or her exclusive power of disposal (BVerwG, judgment of October 13, 2020, loc. cit., para. 15, juris). True statements of fact that name events from the social sphere must be accepted as a matter of principle. In these cases, a personal injury can only occur if the provision of information raises the fear of personal damage that would be disproportionate to the interest in the dissemination of the truth (OVG Lüneburg, decision of February 12, 2014 - 10 ME 102/13, para. 14, juris). It is also important to consider whether the person concerned is (at least jointly) responsible for the emergence of the public interest in information (OVG Lüneburg, decision of February 12, 2014, loc.cit., para. 15, juris).

(b)

In the specific case, the overall assessment leads to the public’s interest in information or the applicant’s right to information being outweighed by the rights of the people who reported the Corona protest demonstrations.

(aa)

First of all, it must be borne in mind that meetings in public spaces are designed for publicity from the outset and the public usually has a legitimate interest in finding out who is behind a reported meeting. The notices of the meetings are responsible for the media attention.

In addition, not only the meeting in public space takes place here - without this consideration being absolutely necessary in order to justify the right to information. Rather, the assembly itself seems to be a public one. In contrast to the Federal Assembly Act, the Lower Saxony Assembly Act does not recognize the concept of a public assembly. It only differentiates between meetings in closed rooms and in the open air. But a gathering is ultimately public if an unlimited flow to it is possible. This is likely to be the case here in view of the registered number of 2000 people with a meeting point in the castle garden (email of December 14, 2021 to the applicant).

For the restriction of the fundamental right to informational self-determination in public, see also: BVerwG, judgment of October 1, 2014 - 6 C 35/13, guiding principle, paragraphs 21, 30, juris: right to press information regarding the names of defense counsel and public prosecutor in public hearings .

(bb)

According to what has been said above, the notices of the meetings are only affected by the provision of information in the social sphere of the fundamental right to informational self-determination. Accordingly, the assertion of true facts - here the notification of a meeting for corona protests - is to be accepted in principle. The prerequisites for accepting an exceptional case are not met. There is no threat of stigmatization through the dissemination of true facts. In particular, according to local assessments, there is no reason to fear lasting damage to reputation in the professional or private sphere. In this respect, it must also be taken into account that, given the activities carried out by those affected, which can hardly remain hidden, those around them are generally informed to the public. Incidentally, the mere lack of understanding for corona deniers and opponents of vaccination, which is widespread, is not sufficient for stigmatization, because this is usually not associated with any consequences in the actions of those who feel this way.

(cc)

In contrast, there is currently an overwhelming public interest in reporting on the Corona protest demonstrations. This phenomenon is related to the pandemic events overshadowing all other events. It has dominated national and regional reporting in all media and public discussion for months. Providing information on the names of those who reported the demonstration allows for proper reporting on an objective basis and understanding of the background to this behavior when further investigations are undertaken on that basis.

(2)

The basic right to physical integrity - if it can be considered separately from the impairment of the basic right to informational self-determination - is not endangered. In the present case, there is no evidence that the persons concerned are endangered (Article 2(2) sentence 1 of the Basic Law) through the disclosure of their identity. There are no concrete indications of intentional attacks on the organizers of the demonstrations. A merely abstract danger is not suitable for restricting the applicant's interest in information (cf. Administrative Court of Würzburg, decision of February 13, 2015 - W 7 E 15.81 -, para. 20, juris). In addition, at least the responsible persons who appear at the event are already in the public eye, so that the disclosure of their names does not lead to a disproportionate impairment of their right to informational self-determination.

(3)

The – required – cumulative consideration of the basic rights to informational self-determination and physical integrity as well as their weighing up against the basic right of freedom of the press do not lead to a different result.

2.

With regard to the notification of the full addresses of the meeting notices, the requirements of Section 123 (1) VwGO are not met, but they are with regard to the notification of their places of residence. In this respect, the urgent application is only partially successful.

a.

For the notification of the full addresses, there is a lack of sufficient evidence of circumstances that justify a claim for an order. Here the conflicting fundamental rights positions are balanced in favor of the people who reported the Corona protest events.

ah.

There is no apparent public interest (worthy of protection) in the disclosure of the specific addresses of those affected.

bb

According to local assessments, the press representatives themselves may not be interested in disclosing the address, at least if the applicant has offered to contact the press representatives – as is the case here – and they have not responded. Ultimately, however, this does not require a decision. In any case, following the corresponding notification by the defendant, the applicant did not adequately explain in its response to the application why it needed the addresses, e.g. for research in the (residential) environment of the notice of the meeting.

b.

However, the Chamber regards the request to communicate the place of residence of the notifiers to the meeting as a minus to the request for communication of the full address. In this respect, the urgent application is successful.

ah.

The order justifying the anticipation of the main issue is present.

In the Chamber's opinion, the public's interest in information very likely outweighs the interest of those affected, which is worth protecting. It is already common in journalistic reporting that people are given their names and place of residence. This serves in particular the information interests of the residents of the meeting place, because this is the only way to tell whether "foreigners" are reporting the relevant meeting or whether the person reporting is a local. The fact that localization is only potentially disadvantageous for those affected in the sense of a basis for determining their addresses is to be given less weight than the public's interest in information.

Since the naming of name and place of residence is common in reporting, there is no need for a substantiated explanation of what the place of residence is used for. Of course, this would not have been detrimental, especially since the notification of the place of residence does not seem to be mandatory (see Würzburg Administrative Court, decision of February 13, 2015, loc. cit., operative part and para. 2, juris: only information about names requested).

bb

With regard to the reason for the order justifying the anticipation of the main matter, reference is made to the statements on the names of the informants.

III.

The decision on costs is based on Section 155 (1) sentence 1 VwGO. Since the request for notification of the address resulted in a partial loss due to all the information going beyond the place of residence, the Chamber assumes a cost ratio of ¾ to ¼.

The amount in dispute is determined in accordance with §§ 53 Para. 2, 52 Para. 1 GKG. Due to the anticipation of the main issue, a reduction in the value of the dispute is not indicated in summary proceedings.
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