AEPD (Spain) - EXP202105669
From GDPRhub
| AEPD - PS-00128-2022 | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Authority: | AEPD (Spain) |
| Jurisdiction: | Spain |
| Relevant Law: | Article 5(1)(f) GDPR Article 32 GDPR Article 58(2)(d) GDPR |
| Type: | Complaint |
| Outcome: | Upheld |
| Started: | 08.11.2021 |
| Decided: | |
| Published: | 30.12.2022 |
| Fine: | n/a |
| Parties: | n/a |
| National Case Number/Name: | PS-00128-2022 |
| European Case Law Identifier: | n/a |
| Appeal: | n/a |
| Original Language(s): | Spanish |
| Original Source: | AEPD (in ES) |
| Initial Contributor: | Paola León |
The Spanish DPA issued a corrective measure to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, for violating Article 5(1)(f) and 32 GDPR by sharing the personal data of more than 200 public employees with third parties without their consent.
English Summary
Facts
A data subject filed a complain with the AEPD indicating that their employer, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, specifically the General Directorate of Personnel Management (data controller), shared with third parties, on September 28, 2021, an Excel sheet containing the name, surname, ID, job position of more than 200 public employees and an additional cell to indicate if they wanted to carry out the medical examination without the consent of the data subjects.
The data controller argued that the email was sent to the corporate email accounts of each organisation, which were attended by the secretaries of the senior positions of each of them who solely had access to it, and that it is unknown if the table was forwarded to the rest of the workers of each organisation or if, as seems more appropriate, it was the receivers of the email who consulted personally to each partner about their preferences for the medical examination.
In its defense, the data controller clarified that the complainant data subject did not receive the email to his personal work email address but had access to it through the corporate account of the General Directorate to which he was subscribed which means that the General Directorate of Personnel did not massively disseminate the data of the department's employees, but instead asked the people who occupy the secretaries of the department's senior positions (the General Directorates) to obtain consent for the medical examination, assuming that only people who have access to those table would have access to that table .
Finally, it adds that the General Directorate of Personnel will be required to review and bring this process into compliance (that is, obtaining the consent of public employees to carry out the medical examination), which it will be sent to the Data Protection Delegate of this department, so that they can oversee and advise on this review to ensure the appropriate measures are adopted in addition to those already in place.
Holding
The AEPD confirmed that in the present case, there has been a personal data breach categorised as confidentiality breach since the data controller disclosed personal data to third parties, without the express consent of the owners of said data, by disseminating an Excel sheet in an email containing the name, surname, ID, job position of more than 200 public employees and an additional cell to indicate if they wanted to carry out the medical examination. Therefore, it is considered an infringement of Article 5(1)(f) GDPR
Furthermore, the DPA stated that the controller also infringed Article 32 GDPR due to the lack of technical and organisational measures that enabled the disclosure of personal data and lack of diligence by the data controller, allowing unauthorised access by third parties.
Therefore, the AEPD imposed the corrective measure described in article 58(2)(d) of the GDPR and ordered the data controller to adopt appropriate security measures within a month to ensure that the processing meets the requirements set forth in the articles 5.1 f) and 32 of the GDPR, preventing similar situations from occurring in the future.
Comment
In its decision, the AEPD made it clear that controller must have been aware of the risk to which the corporate email was exposed, since privileged access to the mailbox is usually restricted to several people from a determined area, so the actions of said accesses must be conveniently traced to detect any unusual situation, especially those that may lead to loss of confidentiality.
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English Machine Translation of the Decision
The decision below is a machine translation of the Spanish original. Please refer to the Spanish original for more details.
1/14
File No.: EXP202105669
RESOLUTION OF SANCTIONING PROCEDURE
Of the procedure instructed by the Spanish Agency for Data Protection and based on
to the following
BACKGROUND
FIRST: D.A.A.A. (hereinafter, the claiming party), on November 8,
2021, filed a claim with the Spanish Agency for Data Protection. The
The claim is directed against the DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
DEPORTE, with NIF S5011001D, (hereinafter, the claimed party). The reasons in
on which the claim is based are as follows:
The claimant states that the General Directorate of Personnel Management of the
department in which it provides services (Education, Culture and Sport) sent, in
dated September 28, 2021, an email attaching a
Excel sheet with the data of more than 200 employees disclosing to third parties their
names and surnames, ID, job position and an additional cell to indicate if
wished to carry out a medical examination, without the express consent of the
owners of said data.
On September 30, 2021, the claimant sent an email to the
Data Protection Unit of the Government of Aragon reporting the incident.
On October 19, 2021, said Data Protection Unit put into
knowledge of the claimant that said department had been informed of the
need to carry out technical and organizational measures that prevent the access of
third parties to personal data, both identifying and special category.
Along with the claim, it provides an email sent on September 28,
2021, the Excel sheet in which you can view personal data from more than 200
employees (including those of the claimant himself) and the email communicating
incident and response.
SECOND: In accordance with article 65.4 of Organic Law 3/2018, of 5
December, Protection of Personal Data and Guarantee of Digital Rights
(hereinafter LOPDGDD), said claim was transferred to the claimed party,
to proceed with its analysis and inform this Agency within a month,
of the actions carried out to adapt to the requirements established in the
data protection regulations.
The transfer, which was carried out in accordance with the regulations established in Law 39/2015, of
October 1, of the Common Administrative Procedure of the Administrations
Public (hereinafter, LPACAP) by electronic notification, was not collected by
the person in charge, within the period of availability, understood as rejected
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in accordance with the provisions of art. 43.2 of the LPACAP, dated January 3, 2022,
as stated in the certificate that is in the file.
Although the notification was validly made by electronic means, assuming that
carried out the procedure in accordance with the provisions of article 41.5 of the LPACAP, under
information, a copy was sent by postal mail, which was duly notified in
dated January 20, 2022. In said notification, he was reminded of his obligation to
interact electronically with the Administration, and were informed of the media
of access to said notifications, reiterating that, in the future, you will be notified
exclusively by electronic means.
No response has been received to this letter of transfer.
THIRD: On February 8, 2022, in accordance with article 65 of the
LOPDGDD, the admission for processing of the claim presented by the
complaining party.
FOURTH: On July 7, 2022, the Director of the Spanish Agency for
Data Protection agreed to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the claimed party,
in accordance with the provisions of articles 63 and 64 of Law 39/2015, of October 1,
of the Common Administrative Procedure of Public Administrations (in
hereafter, LPACAP), for the alleged infringement of articles 5.1.f) and 32 of the GDPR,
typified in articles 83.5 and 83.4 of the GDPR, respectively.
The initiation agreement was notified, in accordance with the regulations established in the Law
39/2015, of October 1, of the Common Administrative Procedure of the
Public Administrations (hereinafter, LPACAP), on July 26, 2022, as
It is stated in the certificate that is in the file.
FIFTH: Notified of the aforementioned start-up agreement in accordance with the rules established in
Law 39/2015, of October 1, on the Common Administrative Procedure of
Public Administrations (hereinafter, LPACAP), the claimed party submitted a written
of allegations in which, in summary, he stated that he requested a report from the
General Directorate of Personnel, this indicates that the referral was made to the accounts of
corporate mail of each organization, which are attended only by the
high-ranking secretaries in each of them, it is unknown if, for
For their part, the table was forwarded to the rest of the workers of each organization or if, as
seems more appropriate, it was the heads of each secretariat who consulted
personally to each partner about their preferences for carrying out the
medical examination.
Likewise, it states that the complainant did not receive in his email account
corporate staff of public employee the list, but had access to it through
of the corporate account of the General Management to which it is attached. This is the
General Directorate of Personnel did not disclose the data of the employees of the
department in mass mail addressed to all of them, but instead asked the people
held by the secretaries of the department's senior positions (the Directorates
General) that obtain the consent to the medical examination, assuming
fact that only people who have access to those tables would have access to that table.
corporate accounts and have it in the exercise of the functions that are theirs.
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Finally, it adds that the General Directorate of Personnel will be required to promote
the review of the adequacy of the procedure that brings cause of the complaint to the
regulations in force on the matter (obtain the consent of public employees
to carry out the medical examination to which they are entitled), for which
will be sent to the Data Protection Delegate of this department, so that they
advise on this review and that the necessary measures be adopted, where appropriate,
in addition to those that are already implemented in this Administration.
SIXTH: On August 19, 2022, a resolution proposal was formulated,
proposing:
<< That by the Director of the Spanish Agency for Data Protection be imposed on the
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, with NIF S5011001D,
for a violation of article 5.1.f) of the GDPR, typified in article 83.5 of the GDPR,
a warning sanction and for a violation of article 32 of the GDPR, typified
in article 83.4 of the GDPR, a warning sanction.>>
The aforementioned resolution proposal was sent, in accordance with the rules established in
Law 39/2015, of October 1, on the Common Administrative Procedure of
Public Administrations (hereinafter, LPACAP), by means of electronic notification,
being received on August 22, 2022, as stated in the certificate that works
on the record.
SEVENTH: The claimed party has not submitted allegations to the Proposal for
Resolution.
In view of all the proceedings, by the Spanish Agency for Data Protection
In this proceeding, the following are considered proven facts:
PROVEN FACTS
FIRST: It is on record that on November 8, 2021, the claimant
filed a claim with the Spanish Agency for Data Protection, since
the respondent party has disclosed personal information and data to third parties,
without the express consent of the owners of said data.
SECOND: It is verified that it is an email in which a
Excel sheet in which the data of more than 200 employees can be viewed by giving
know third parties, their names and surnames, ID, job position and a cell
additional information to indicate if they wished to undergo a medical examination.
THIRD: The claimed party states that it will proceed to review the adequacy
of the procedure to the regulations in force on the matter.
FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW
Yo
In accordance with the powers that article 58.2 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679
(General Data Protection Regulation, hereinafter GDPR), grants each
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control authority and as established in articles 47, 48.1, 64.2 and 68.1 of the
Organic Law 3/2018, of December 5, Protection of Personal Data and
Guarantee of Digital Rights (hereinafter, LOPDGDD), is competent to
initiate and resolve this procedure, the Director of the Spanish Agency for
Data Protection.
Likewise, article 63.2 of the LOPDGDD determines that: "The procedures
processed by the Spanish Data Protection Agency will be governed by the provisions
in Regulation (EU) 2016/679, in this organic law, by the provisions
regulations dictated in its development and, insofar as they do not contradict them, with character
subsidiary, by the general rules on administrative procedures."
II
In response to the allegations presented by the respondent entity, it should be noted
the next:
In the first place, the documentation in the file proves that the party
claimed, from the email address: ***EMAIL.1 sent an email
email to the SGT and General Directorates, in which an Excel sheet was attached
where you could see the name, surname, ID, job position of more than 200
public employees and an additional cell to indicate if they wished to carry out a
medical examination.
The defendant has alleged that the referral was made to the email accounts
corporate offices of each organization, which are attended solely by the
secretaries of senior positions in each of them. However, what
occurs in this case does not conform to said scheme, since the information relative to
the claimant is not only sent to his unit, but the complete list of
all departments with the name, surname, ID, job position of more than
200 public employees, was within the reach of all recipient departments
of said email. If minimum security measures have been established in the
sending the list, it could have been sent to each unit only the data of
personnel attached to each of them. However, the complete list was sent to
all. With this, even admitting the possibility that access to the corporate mailbox of
each general directorate was restricted, the truth is that they were revealed to all
units the personal data of personnel not attached to them. Also, the mail
email in question, in turn, drags below, the one that DG Personnel received for
the data collection was carried out. Well, neither one nor the other contain
indications of precautions addressed to recipients so that the collection of
data was collected with the utmost confidentiality, which points to a lack of measures
of security.
In this sense, although email is a communication tool
that facilitates and speeds up the operation of a company, despite its
great benefits such as accessibility, speed and the possibility of attaching files,
it is necessary to define a correct and safe use, since, in some
Sometimes, employees can send confidential documents to those who do not
They had to by mistake, or reveal personal data. In this sense it is very important
make staff and users of corporate mail aware of threats and
provide them with the appropriate tools to make safe use of it.
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In the specific case under review, in relation to the category of data to which
third parties have had access, on the possibility of combining information
referring to a holder of personal data, the Opinion can be brought up
4/2007 of the Working Group of Article 29, "On the concept of personal data"
that analyzes the possibilities of identifying someone through combinations with
other information, starting only from the basic data and combining it with
other.
Specifically, it indicates the following: (...) when we speak of "indirectly"
identified or identifiable, we are referring in general to the phenomenon of
"unique combinations", be they small or large. In cases where, to
At first glance, the available identifiers do not make it possible to single out a person
given, it may still be "identifiable" because that combined information
with other data (whether the controller is aware of them
as if not) will allow distinguishing that person from others. This is where the Directive
refers to "one or several specific elements, characteristic of their physical identity,
physiological, psychological, economic, cultural or social. Some of those features
are so unique that they allow you to identify a person without effort (the "current
President of the Government of Spain"), but a combination of details
belonging to different categories (age, regional origin, etc.) can also be what
quite conclusive in some circumstances, especially if you have access to
additional information of a certain type. This phenomenon has been studied
widely by statisticians, always ready to avoid any
breach of confidentiality (…). So the different pieces come together.
that make up the personality of the individual in order to attribute certain
decisions. (…)
In this case, the Internet search, for example, of the name, surname of one of the
those affected can offer results that combining them with those now accessed
by third parties, allow us access to other applications of those affected or the
creation of personality profiles, which need not have been consented to by
its owner.
This possibility supposes an added risk that has to be assessed and that increases the
requirement of the degree of protection in relation to the safety and safeguarding of the
integrity and confidentiality of these data.
This risk must be taken into account by the data controller who, in
function of this, must establish the necessary technical and organizational measures that
prevents the data controller from losing control of the data and,
therefore, by the owners of the data that provided them.
Consequently, the allegations must be dismissed, meaning that the
arguments presented do not distort the essential content of the offense that
is declared committed nor does it imply sufficient justification or exculpation.
II
previous questions
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The Department of Education, Culture and Sport of the Government of Aragon, like any other
any other public entity, is obliged to comply with Regulation (EU)
2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 27, 2016, regarding the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and the free circulation of these data -RGPD-, and LO 3/2018, of December 5,
bre, Protection of Personal Data and Guarantee of Digital Rights -LO-
PDGDD- regarding the processing of personal data that they carry out,
understanding by personal data, "all information about a natural person
identified or identifiable.
An identifiable natural person is considered to be one whose identity can be determined,
directly or indirectly, in particular by means of an identifier, such as a
name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or
one or several elements proper to physical, physiological, genetic, psychological,
economic, cultural or social of said person.
Likewise, treatment must be understood as “any operation or set of operations
tions made on personal data or sets of personal data, either by
automated procedures or not, such as the collection, registration, organization, structure
ration, conservation, adaptation or modification, extraction, consultation, use, co-
communication by transmission, diffusion or any other form of access authorization,
collation or interconnection, limitation, suppression or destruction”.
Taking into account the foregoing, the Department of Education, Culture and Sport pre-
ta a series of public services, for which it processes personal data of
its employees and citizens.
It carries out this activity in its capacity as data controller, since it is
who determines the purposes and means of such activity, by virtue of article 4.7 of the GDPR:
"responsible for the treatment" or "responsible": the natural or legal person, authority
public authority, service or other body that, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and
means of treatment; if the law of the Union or of the Member States determines
determines the purposes and means of the treatment, the person in charge of the treatment or the criteria
Specific reasons for their appointment may be established by the Law of the Union or of the
Member states.
Article 4 section 12 of the RGPD defines, in a broad way, the "violations of security"
security of personal data" (hereinafter security breach) as "all
those security violations that cause the destruction, loss or alteration
Accidental or illegal transfer of personal data transmitted, stored or processed in
otherwise, or unauthorized communication or access to such data.”
In the present case, there is a personal data security breach in the
circumstances indicated above, categorized as a breach of confidentiality,
whenever the claimed party has disclosed information and data of a personal nature
to third parties, without the express consent of the owner of said data, by attaching to the
e-mail an Excel sheet containing the name, surname, ID, position of
work of more than 200 public employees and an additional cell to indicate if
They wanted to do the medical examination.
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This type of data, as well as any other information that is referred to
individuals, are considered personal data, so their
Treatment is subject to data protection regulations.
According to GT29, a "Breach of confidentiality" occurs when there is
an unauthorized or accidental disclosure of personal data, or access to it
themselves.
It should be noted that the identification of a security breach does not imply the impossibility
sanction directly by this Agency, since it is necessary to analyze the
diligence of managers and managers and security measures applied.
Within the principles of treatment provided for in article 5 of the GDPR, the
integrity and confidentiality of personal data is guaranteed in section 1.f)
of article 5 of the GDPR. For its part, the security of personal data comes
regulated in article 32 of the GDPR, which regulates the security of the treatment.
IV.
Article 5.1.f) of the GDPR
Article 5.1.f) of the GDPR establishes the following:
"Article 5 Principles relating to treatment:
1. Personal data will be:
(…)
f) processed in such a way as to guarantee adequate data security
personal data, including protection against unauthorized or unlawful processing and against
its loss, destruction or accidental damage, through the application of technical measures
or organizational procedures (“integrity and confidentiality”).”
In relation to this principle, Recital 39 of the aforementioned GDPR states that:
“[…]Personal data must be processed in a way that guarantees security and
appropriate confidentiality of personal data, including to prevent access
or unauthorized use of said data and of the equipment used in the treatment”.
The documentation in the file offers clear indications that the
claimed violated article 5.1 f) of the GDPR, principles relating to treatment.
In the present case, according to documentation provided by the claimant and in the absence of
response of the claimed party, it can be verified that, from the direction of
email: ***EMAIL.1 An email has been sent containing the
attached an Excel sheet in which you can see the name, surname, ID,
workplace for more than 200 public employees and an additional cell for
indicate if they wished to undergo a medical examination.
The accredited facts constitute, on the part of the defendant, in his capacity as
responsible for the aforementioned processing of personal data, a violation of the
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principle of confidentiality, by disseminating this information among employees without
certify that he had obtained their consent for that specific
treatment.
Consequently, it is considered that the accredited facts are constitutive of
infringement, attributable to the claimed party, due to violation of article 5.1.f) of the
GDPR.
V
Classification of the infringement of article 5.1.f) of the GDPR
The aforementioned infringement of article 5.1.f) of the GDPR supposes the commission of the infringements
typified in article 83.5 of the GDPR that under the heading "General conditions
for the imposition of administrative fines” provides:
Violations of the following provisions will be sanctioned, in accordance with the
paragraph 2, with administrative fines of maximum EUR 20,000,000 or,
in the case of a company, an amount equivalent to a maximum of 4% of the
total annual global business volume of the previous financial year, opting for
the highest amount:
a) the basic principles for the treatment, including the conditions for the
consent under articles 5, 6, 7 and 9; (…)”
In this regard, the LOPDGDD, in its article 71 "Infractions" establishes that
"The acts and behaviors referred to in sections 4,
5 and 6 of article 83 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, as well as those that result
contrary to this organic law”.
For the purposes of the limitation period, article 72 "Infractions considered very
serious” of the LOPDGDD indicates:
"one. Based on what is established in article 83.5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679,
are considered very serious and will prescribe after three years the infractions that
a substantial violation of the articles mentioned therein and, in particular, the
following:
a) The processing of personal data in violation of the principles and guarantees
established in article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. (…)”
SAW
Article 32 of the GDPR, security of treatment, establishes the following:
"one. Taking into account the state of the art, the application costs, and the
nature, scope, context and purposes of processing, as well as risks of
variable probability and severity for the rights and freedoms of individuals
physical, the person in charge and the person in charge of the treatment will apply technical and
appropriate organizational measures to guarantee a level of security appropriate to the risk,
which may include, among others:
a) the pseudonymization and encryption of personal data;
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b) the ability to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, availability and
permanent resilience of treatment systems and services;
c) the ability to restore availability and access to data
quickly in the event of a physical or technical incident;
d) a process of regular verification, evaluation and assessment of effectiveness
technical and organizational measures to guarantee the safety of the
treatment.
2. When evaluating the adequacy of the security level, particular consideration will be given to
take into account the risks presented by data processing, in particular as
consequence of the destruction, loss or accidental or illegal alteration of data
personal information transmitted, preserved or processed in another way, or the communication or
unauthorized access to such data.
3. Adherence to an approved code of conduct pursuant to article 40 or to a
certification mechanism approved under article 42 may serve as an element
to demonstrate compliance with the requirements established in section 1 of the
present article.
4. The controller and the processor shall take measures to ensure that
any person acting under the authority of the controller or processor and
have access to personal data can only process such data by following
instructions of the person in charge, unless it is obliged to do so by virtue of the Law of
the Union or of the Member States.
The facts revealed imply the lack of technical measures and
organizational by enabling the display of personal data of the claimant
with the consequent lack of diligence by the person in charge, allowing unauthorized access
authorized by third parties.
It should be noted that the GDPR in the aforementioned precept does not establish a list of the
security measures that are applicable according to the data that is the object
of treatment, but it establishes that the person in charge and the person in charge of the treatment
apply technical and organizational measures that are appropriate to the risk involved
the treatment, taking into account the state of the art, the application costs, the
nature, scope, context and purposes of processing, probability risks
and severity for the rights and freedoms of the persons concerned.
In addition, security measures must be adequate and proportionate to the
detected risk, noting that the determination of the technical measures and
organizational procedures must be carried out taking into account: pseudonymization and encryption, the
ability to ensure confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience, the
ability to restore availability and access to data after an incident, process
verification (not audit), evaluation and assessment of the effectiveness of the
measures.
In any case, when evaluating the adequacy of the security level,
particular account of the risks presented by data processing, such as
consequence of the destruction, loss or accidental or illegal alteration of data
personal information transmitted, preserved or processed in another way, or the communication or
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unauthorized access to said data and that could cause damages
physical, material or immaterial.
In this sense, recital 83 of the GDPR states that:
"(83) In order to maintain security and prevent processing from infringing what
provided in this Regulation, the person in charge or in charge must evaluate
the risks inherent to the treatment and apply measures to mitigate them, such as the
encryption. These measures must ensure an adequate level of security, including the
confidentiality, taking into account the state of the art and the cost of its application
regarding the risks and nature of the personal data to be
protect yourself. When assessing risk in relation to data security, considerations should be
take into account the risks arising from the processing of personal data,
such as the destruction, loss or accidental or unlawful alteration of personal data
transmitted, stored or processed in another way, or communication or access not
authorized to said data, susceptible in particular to cause damages
physical, material or immaterial.
Recital 75 of the GDPR lists a series of factors or assumptions associated with
risks to the guarantees of the rights and freedoms of the interested parties:
“The risks to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, serious and
variable probability, may be due to data processing that could cause
physical, material or immaterial damages and losses, particularly in cases in which
that the treatment may give rise to problems of discrimination, usurpation of
identity or fraud, financial loss, damage to reputation, loss of
confidentiality of data subject to professional secrecy, unauthorized reversal of the
pseudonymization or any other significant economic or social harm; in the
cases in which the interested parties are deprived of their rights and freedoms or are
prevent you from exercising control over your personal data; In cases where the data
personal treaties reveal ethnic or racial origin, political opinions, religion
or philosophical beliefs, union membership and genetic data processing,
data relating to health or data on sexual life, or convictions and offenses
criminal or related security measures; in cases where they are evaluated
personal aspects, in particular the analysis or prediction of aspects related to the
performance at work, economic situation, health, preferences or interests
personal, reliability or behavior, situation or movements, in order to create or
use personal profiles; in cases in which personal data of
vulnerable people, particularly children; or in cases where the treatment
involves a large amount of personal data and affects a large number of
interested.”
In this sense, the Internet search, for example, of the name, surnames, ID or
email from one of those affected may offer results that
combining them with those now accessed by third parties, allow us access to other
applications of those affected or the creation of personality profiles, which do not have
why have been consented to by its owner.
The responsibility of the defendant is determined by the lack of measures of
security, since it is responsible for making decisions aimed at implementing
effectively the appropriate technical and organizational measures to guarantee a
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level of security appropriate to the risk to ensure the confidentiality of the data,
restoring their availability and preventing access to them in the event of an incident
physical or technical Likewise, you must know the main risks to which you are
exposed corporate mail every time that privileged access to the environment of the
Mail is usually restricted to several people from the corresponding technical area, for
what the actions of said accesses must be conveniently traced to
detect any anomalous situation, especially those that may imply
confidentiality losses.
Therefore, the accredited facts constitute an infraction, attributable to the
claimed party, for violation of article 32 GDPR.
VII
Classification of the infringement of article 32 of the GDPR
The aforementioned infringement of article 32 of the GDPR supposes the commission of the infringements
typified in article 83.4 of the GDPR that under the heading "General conditions
for the imposition of administrative fines” provides:
Violations of the following provisions will be sanctioned, in accordance with the
paragraph 2, with administrative fines of maximum EUR 10,000,000 or,
in the case of a company, an amount equivalent to a maximum of 2% of the
total annual global business volume of the previous financial year, opting for
the highest amount:
a) the obligations of the person in charge and the person in charge according to articles 8,
11, 25 to 39, 42 and 43; (…)”
In this regard, the LOPDGDD, in its article 71 "Infractions" establishes that
"The acts and behaviors referred to in sections 4,
5 and 6 of article 83 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, as well as those that result
contrary to this organic law”.
For the purposes of the limitation period, article 73 "Infractions considered serious"
of the LOPDGDD indicates:
"Based on what is established in article 83.4 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679,
are considered serious and will prescribe after two years the infractions that suppose a
substantial violation of the articles mentioned therein and, in particular, the
following:
f) The lack of adoption of those technical and organizational measures that
are appropriate to ensure a level of security appropriate to the
risk of treatment, in the terms required by article 32.1 of the
Regulation (EU) 2016/679.”
VIII
Responsibility
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28001 – Madrid sedeagpd.gob.es 12/14
Establishes Law 40/2015, of October 1, on the Legal Regime of the Public Sector, in
Chapter III relating to the "Principles of the Power to sanction", in article 28
under the heading "Responsibility", the following:
"one. They may only be penalized for acts constituting an administrative offense
physical and legal persons, as well as, when a Law recognizes their capacity to
act, the affected groups, the unions and entities without legal personality and the
independent or autonomous patrimonies, which are responsible for them
title of fraud or fault."
Lack of diligence in implementing appropriate security measures
with the consequence of the breach of the principle of confidentiality constitutes the
element of guilt.
IX
Sanction
Article 83 "General conditions for the imposition of administrative fines" of the
GDPR in its section 7 establishes:
"Without prejudice to the corrective powers of the control authorities under the
Article 58(2), each Member State may lay down rules on whether
can, and to what extent, impose administrative fines on authorities and bodies
public establishments established in that Member State.”
Likewise, article 77 “Regime applicable to certain categories of
responsible or in charge of the treatment" of the LOPDGDD provides the following:
"one. The regime established in this article will be applicable to the treatment of
who are responsible or in charge:
(…)
c) The General State Administration, the Administrations of the communities
autonomous entities and the entities that make up the Local Administration.
2. When the managers or managers listed in section 1 commit
any of the offenses referred to in articles 72 to 74 of this law
organic, the data protection authority that is competent will dictate
resolution sanctioning them with a warning. The resolution will establish
likewise, the measures that should be adopted to cease the conduct or to correct it.
the effects of the offense committed.
The resolution will be notified to the person in charge or in charge of the treatment, to the body of the
that depends hierarchically, where appropriate, and to those affected who had the condition
interested, if any.
3. Without prejudice to what is established in the previous section, the data protection authority
data will also propose the initiation of disciplinary actions when there are
enough evidence for it. In this case, the procedure and the sanctions to be applied
will be those established in the legislation on the disciplinary or sanctioning regime that
be applicable.
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Likewise, when the infractions are attributable to authorities and executives, and
accredit the existence of technical reports or recommendations for the treatment that
had not been duly attended to, in the resolution in which the
sanction will include a reprimand with the name of the responsible position and
will order the publication in the Official State or regional Gazette that
corresponds.
(…)
5. They will be communicated to the Ombudsman or, where appropriate, to similar institutions
of the autonomous communities the actions carried out and the resolutions issued
under this article.”
In this case, it is deemed appropriate to sanction the party with a warning.
claimed, for violation of article 5.1.f) of the GDPR and for violation of article 32
of the GDPR, due to the lack of diligence when implementing the appropriate measures
of security with the consequence of the breach of the principle of confidentiality.
X
Measures
Article 58.2 of the GDPR provides: "Each control authority will have all the
following corrective powers indicated below:
d) order the person in charge or person in charge of the treatment that the operations of
treatment comply with the provisions of this Regulation, where appropriate,
in a certain way and within a specified period;”
Likewise, it is appropriate to impose the corrective measure described in article 58.2.d) of the
GDPR and order the claimed party to, within a month, establish the measures
Adequate security measures so that the treatments are adapted to the requirements
contemplated in articles 5.1 f) and 32 of the GDPR, preventing them from occurring if
similar situations in the future.
The text of the resolution establishes which have been the infractions committed and
the facts that have given rise to the violation of the regulations for the protection of
data, from which it is clearly inferred what are the measures to adopt, without prejudice
that the type of procedures, mechanisms or concrete instruments for
implement them corresponds to the sanctioned party, since it is responsible for the
treatment who fully knows its organization and has to decide, based on the
proactive responsibility and risk approach, how to comply with the GDPR and the
LOPDGDD.
Therefore, in accordance with the applicable legislation and assessed the criteria of
graduation of sanctions whose existence has been accredited, the Director of the
Spanish Data Protection Agency RESOLVES:
FIRST: SANCTION the DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, with NIF S5011001D, for an infraction of the
Article 5.1.f) of the GDPR, typified in Article 83.5 of the GDPR.
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SECOND: SANCTION the DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, with NIF S5011001D, for an infraction of the
Article 32 of the GDPR, typified in Article 83.4 of the GDPR.
THIRD: REQUEST the DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS, which implements, within a month, the necessary corrective measures
to adapt its actions to the personal data protection regulations, which
prevent the repetition of similar events in the future, as well as to inform this
Agency within the same term on the measures adopted.
FOURTH: NOTIFY this resolution to the DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS.
FIFTH: COMMUNICATE this resolution to the Ombudsman, in accordance
with the provisions of article 77.5 of the LOPDGDD.
In accordance with the provisions of article 50 of the LOPDGDD, this
Resolution will be made public once the interested parties have been notified.
Against this resolution, which puts an end to the administrative process in accordance with art. 48.6 of the
LOPDGDD, and in accordance with the provisions of article 123 of the LPACAP, the
Interested parties may optionally file an appeal for reversal before the
Director of the Spanish Agency for Data Protection within a period of one month from
count from the day following the notification of this resolution or directly
contentious-administrative appeal before the Contentious-administrative Chamber of the
National Court, in accordance with the provisions of article 25 and section 5 of
the fourth additional provision of Law 29/1998, of July 13, regulating the
Contentious-administrative jurisdiction, within a period of two months from the
day following the notification of this act, as provided for in article 46.1 of the
referred Law.
Finally, it is noted that in accordance with the provisions of art. 90.3 a) of the LPACAP,
may provisionally suspend the firm resolution in administrative proceedings if the
The interested party expresses his intention to file a contentious-administrative appeal.
If this is the case, the interested party must formally communicate this fact through
writing addressed to the Spanish Data Protection Agency, presenting it through
of the Electronic Registry of the Agency [https://sedeagpd.gob.es/sede-electronica-
web/], or through any of the other registries provided for in art. 16.4 of the
aforementioned Law 39/2015, of October 1. You must also transfer to the Agency the
documentation proving the effective filing of the contentious appeal-
administrative. If the Agency was not aware of the filing of the appeal
contentious-administrative proceedings within a period of two months from the day following the
Notification of this resolution would terminate the precautionary suspension.
938-181022
Mar Spain Marti
Director of the Spanish Data Protection Agency
C/ Jorge Juan, 6 www.aepd.es
28001 – Madrid sedeagpd.gob.es
