Court of Appeal - (2021) IECA 53
| Court of Appeal - (2021) IECA 53 | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Court: | Court of Appeal (Ireland) |
| Jurisdiction: | Ireland |
| Relevant Law: | Article 4(11) GDPR Article 5 GDPR |
| Decided: | |
| Published: | 19.02.2021 |
| Parties: | Shawl Property Investments Limited A. and B. |
| National Case Number/Name: | (2021) IECA 53 |
| European Case Law Identifier: | |
| Appeal from: | |
| Appeal to: | |
| Original Language(s): | English |
| Original Source: | (Unapproved).pdf/pdf The Court Services of Ireland (in English) |
| Initial Contributor: | Panayotis Yannakas |
A discussion if the submission to the court of confidential data from a prior proceeding that had been conducted in-camera hearings, constituted a breach of GDPR.
English Summary
Facts
The EBS Building Society (EBS), as lender, offered to advance "A." a loan of up to € 8 million over 25 years to acquisition eight Residential Properties in Dublin, including the contested two houses (referred as "Blackacre" & "Whiteacre" Buildings) which formed the subject matter of the core series of proceedings. In December 2005, an term of the agreement between EBS and "A." has established that the lender hold a fist legal mortage over each of the properties.
The Borrower "A." subsequently failed to meet his obligations to the lender and failed to make any repayments under the mortgages. Up to and including 4 April 2017, "A." was adjudicated bankrupt.
"B." is a former life partner of "A.", but they were never married, and, in consequence, she never was a party to any of the relevant agreements & mortgages.
In 2018, following an assignment of the loan and security to Beltany Property Finance DAC (Beltany), the "Blackacre" & "Whiteacre" buildings were sold by Beltany to the plaintiff, the Shawl Property Investments Limited (Shawl). Shortly before that transaction, "A." was discharged from bankruptcy. At the same time, "B." insist that, arising from the outcome of the family law proceedings, she had a beneficial interest in these properties. As judge Donnelly J. observed, "B." claimed that the family settlement agreement directly attacks the validity of the mortgages, as well as the claim of entitlement to possession.
In December 2018, a group of five men and one woman broke into the "Blackacre" building and changed the locks. At about at same time, a group of men led by "A." broke into the Whiteacre building. In both cases, the intruders were put out by the Police. A few days later, again, "A." accompanied by a group of men and again broke into the Blackacre house and changed the locks. Later, "B." arrived with their daughters. The Police were called for a second time, but on this occasion, "A." argue that "B." was the building owner and denied to leave. "B." insist on being the owner of the building by virtue of a purposed transfer to her by their family Trust, for the benefit of "A."'s teenage daughters.
Lastly, It should be also noted that "A." at some point with his behaviour that made it clear he did not wish to engage in any legal proceedings. That is the reason that someone can notice only submissions and other legal activities by "B.", by the other party but not by "A.".
Dispute
The judgment we are reviewing is an appeal from the order declaring that "A." and "B." have no estate, right, title or interest in these two properties. "B.", among many other arguments, asserted that an unredacted version of the 2015 judgment pleading has been used as legal material by the lender, when the latter was seeking interim injunctions against the couple.
Τo a large extent the case is relavant also to the property and banking law. For the purpose of this privacy review, both abovementioned topics would mention only where it is absolute necessary for the understanding of the salient elements of the actions and pleading between the parties. It should also be noted that under the preliminary review was decided that "B." had not in any other substantive or meaningful way engaged with orders of the trial judge.
About the alleged data breach, "B." placed emphasis on that the Shawl has delivered into open court private data contained details of prior family law proceedings which had been conducted in-camera hearings. She asserted that these were disclosed by the plaintiff without any regard for its in-camera status by way of breach of the strict liability rule of law, by way of data breach and by way of breach of constitutional rights of her family rights.
In "B."'s eyes, that discloses constituted an outright breach of their rights to the actual effect of GDPR, National Data Protection Act, in-camera law, as well as their fundamental rights. In order to proves these allegations, she placed reliance upon Recitals 1, 4 and 7 together of Article 4(11) of GDPR.
Holding
Whelan J., has stated the evidence indicates that the disclosure of the personal data of "A." and "B." via the unredacted judgment may have been made to the court, only to the absolutely necessary degree for supporting the interim and interlocutory injunctions.
Furthermore, Whelan J., observed that even if we had to accept that there was an prohibition on presenting that judgment in a manner identifying the parties outside the enforcement of the order, still she is not convinced there is evidence that can establish proof of such identifying ability.
"B."'s legal argument focused that the alleged breaches of her privacy pleaded by her disclose a reasonable cause of action sufficient to entitle her to pursue the counterclaim and to reverse its dismissal by the High Court. But that is an open matter to the judge to determine when the respondent establishes that it had the data solely for a legitimate purpose within the meaning of the GDPR. In that case, the respondent required the information to properly assert its legal rights, including its right to obtain an emergency injunction. Judge observation also includes that "the material was wholly, exclusively and necessarily procured and deployed for the purposes of establishment of the respondent’s clear title to the properties, defending the baseless claims of B. as well as A". GDPR' Recital 111 provides that provisions should be made where the transfer is occasional and necessary in relation to a legal claim.
It is accepted that a court may, in certain circumstances, lift the in camera rule where it is absolutely necessary. According to the case "J.D. v. S.D. [2013] IEHC 648, [2014] 3 I.R. 483", "[t]here is, almost invariably, a further restriction on the lifting order insofar as non-essential private material should be redacted, and where the lifting of the in camera rule relates to information and documentation pertaining to just one of the parties, then the privacy and business of the other party should be preserved by even more rigorous redaction, with costs orders providing that the burden of such redaction does not fall on an innocent, or less blameworthy, party". So, it clear where the interests of justice require that, it is open to a court to relax the in-camera rule subject to such conditions, including the requirement for redaction. That is the main reason behind the final decision that the alleged privacy breach is frivolous, vexatious and bound to fail, so it must be struck out.
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English Machine Translation of the Decision
The decision below is a machine translation of the English original. Please refer to the English original for more details.
