NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH-2732-2-2023
| NAIH - NAIH-2732-2-2023 | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Authority: | NAIH (Hungary) |
| Jurisdiction: | Hungary |
| Relevant Law: | Article 5(1)(a) GDPR Article 5(1)(b) GDPR Article 5(1) GDPR Article 6(1) GDPR Article 13(1) GDPR Article 13(2) GDPR Article 24 GDPR Article 25 GDPR Article 32(1)(b) GDPR Article 32(2) GDPR |
| Type: | Investigation |
| Outcome: | Violation Found |
| Started: | 19.10.2021 |
| Decided: | 06.02.2023 |
| Published: | 06.02.2023 |
| Fine: | 30000000 HUF |
| Parties: | n/a |
| National Case Number/Name: | NAIH-2732-2-2023 |
| European Case Law Identifier: | n/a |
| Appeal: | Unknown |
| Original Language(s): | Hungarian |
| Original Source: | NAIH (in HU) |
| Initial Contributor: | Ábel Kaszián |
The Hungarian DPA held a beauty salon liable for a major GDPR infringement including employee and client surveillance, mishandling of sensitive data and using data for marketing purposes without proper consent.
English Summary
Facts
The controller was a Budapest-based company that operates the Spandora Beauty Centre (spandora.hu), where facial and body treatments and medical aesthetic procedures are performed in 2 diagnostic rooms and 15 treatment rooms. The controller also distributed cosmetic products.
The DPA received several notifications in which clients and employees of the controller complained that the controller had cameras recording image and sound in all premises (offices, treatment rooms, corridors, reception) at its headquarters.
The complaints also indicated that the controller also engaged in a referral practice whereby guests are asked to provide the names and contact details of their contacts and this information is used to offer free treatments to the data subjects so contacted.
The DPA launched an official investigation on 19 October 2021 and carried out an on-site visit on 20 October 2021. This visit and the explanations of the controller showed the following :
First, during this visit, the DPA examined each camera image separately and found that the cameras were monitoring the staff in the room where they eat, in training rooms and in customer treatment rooms. This implied that clients were often seen in incomplete clothing during treatments. The quality of the images and audio was sufficient to identify the data subjects.
Second, the controller explained that only the manager, the financial manager, the HR manager, and the warehouse manager had access to the recordings. However, according to the on-site visit, the camera images were also seen by the sales manager, who said that he used them to check that the therapists providing the treatments were communicating properly with the clients. The recordings were available on a computer in an unlocked room. To access them, one could click on a shortcut and entering a username which was written on a piece of paper stuck to the monitor.
Third, the consultation forms (which all clients were required to fill in at the reception desk before starting treatment) mentioned the placement of cameras and that the purpose of the monitoring was to protect clients and staff. It however did not mention the recording of audio. According to the controller, the employees were informed about the processing verbally and through the privacy notice. The investigation however showed that there was no mention of the cameras in the privacy notice in force. The controller amended the privacy notice following the opening of the DPA procedure. It stated that the purpose of the camera surveillance was to improve the service and to monitor the work of the employees. During the procedure, the controller added the purposes of service improvement and employee monitoring to the purposes of effective response to possible complaints and protection of property. Finally, it also referred to these processing purposes in its legitimate interest assessment. It also provided information on the location of each camera.
Fourth, the controller stored health data in the client database. This included covid vaccination status, pregnancy, sicknesses. The controller explained that it allowed to keep track of the reasons why a client would cancel an appointment.
Fifth, regarding the legal basis, the controller stated that the signature of the consultation form constituted a consent to the processing for a marketing purpose. Later, the controller held that this processing was based on legitimate interest, and then in a further contradictory declaration, it stated that it did not use guest data for such purposes
Holding
According to the DPA, the controller had not clearly defined the purposes of its surveillance processing, as the purposes indicated to the data subjects in the consultation forms and the purposes described in the information provided by the controller on its website were not consistent with each other, nor were they consistent with the purposes stated in the controller’s declaration to the DPA in the course of the procedure. Furthermore, the controller only referred to the purposes in general terms.
Concerning the privacy notice, the DPA found that it did not comply with the requirements of the GDPR as it did not provide information on the location of each camera and its purpose, the area or object it monitored, or whether the employer was carrying out direct or fixed surveillance with the camera. It also did not provide for the specific duration of the storage of the recordings, the rules for viewing the recordings, or the purposes for which the recordings could be used by the employer.
Consequently, the DPA concluded that the controller had breached the purpose limitation principle under Article 5(1)(b) GDPR, the requirement of transparent processing under Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, and Article 6(1) GDPR by failing to provide a specific legal basis for the processing.
The DPA, therefore, prohibited the processing of data by the camera in operators and in diagnostic and examination rooms and instructed the controller to delete in a documented manner the video recordings made in operators and in diagnostic and examination rooms.
Regarding the people who could access the cameras. the DPA found that the controller did not guarantee the confidentiality of the data processing and did not take measures to protect personal data. Indeed, the images of the cameras and the stored recordings could be easily accessed.
The DPA found that by failing to provide the default settings for the operation of the camera system that minimize data processing, the means necessary to ensure the highest possible level of protection of personal data, the controller violated Article 5(1) GDPR in Article 24 GDPR and Article 25 GDPR, as well as Article 32(1)(b) GDPR and Article 32(2) GDPR, and instructed the controller to take appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure that its processing operations comply with the legal provisions.
Regarding the collection and storage of health data, the DPA recalled that the processing of sensitive data is possible if the data subject has given his or her explicit consent or if the processing complies with Article 9(2) GDPR.
The DPA stressed that consent would be "explicit" if the data subject confirmed his or her consent in some way, and it also means that the data subject is unequivocally aware that the processing will relate to his or her special categories of data and consents to the processing. Since the controller did not demonstrate in its replies either that the processing of certain health data was indispensable for the performance of the services it provides or that it was not otherwise possible to postpone the treatment dates, the DPA concluded that the controller did not lawfully process the personal health data of the data subjects.
The DPA found that the controller had violated Article 6 GDPR and Article 9(2) GDPR by recording the health data of the guests and therefore prohibited the processing of the health data of the guests in connection with the records and ordered the controller to immediately stop recording the health data in the records in its database and to delete the personal health data of the data subjects from the records in a documented manner.
Fourth, the DPA analyzed the use of data for marketing purposes. On 5 April 2022, the controller declared on the legal basis that it processed guest data for marketing purposes based on the consent given in the consultation form, then on 28 September 2022 it declared that the controller processed guest data for marketing purposes based on legitimate interest, and then in a contradictory declaration on 14 October 2022, it stated that it did not use guest data for such purposes, as data processing for marketing purposes only takes place in relation to models used for advertising and employees, then only in the form of videos on social media.
As there was no section in the attached consultation forms that contained consent to direct marketing inquiries and contracts for the shooting of commercials did not constitute processing for the purpose of directly contacting guests, the DPA did not accept the controller's claims that the data subjects who filled in the consultation forms had given their written consent to the processing of their personal data for marketing purposes.
The DPA found that there was no statement or checkbox on the consultation forms to authorize marketing inquiries, so that the data subjects who did not apply for processing online but in person could not be considered to have given their consent voluntarily to marketing inquiries. While the possibility to tick the checkbox is available for online applicants, the DPA did not find in the partner database any indication of which guests had consented to the processing for marketing purposes and which had not.
Nor had the controller provided the DPA with a balance of interests for marketing data processing.
The DPA concluded that, as the controller processed the guests' data for marketing purposes without a legal basis, it had breached Article 6(1) GDPR in relation to this processing. For these reasons, the DPA instructed the controller to cease the unlawful processing and to bring the processing operation into compliance with the legal provisions by justifying the legal basis for the processing of the guests' data for marketing purposes.
In conclusion, the DPA found that the controller had infringed Article 13(1) to (2) of the GDPR by providing incorrect or misleading information to data subjects in its prospectus and consultation form about the processing of their personal data, and therefore the DPA instructed the controller to provide adequate, clear, and transparent information to data subjects about all processing and the circumstances of such processing.
Comment
At the publication of this case summary, the privacy notice in question is still accessible from the website of the controller, for instance the truly illegible camera location drawing is there as well:
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English Machine Translation of the Decision
The decision below is a machine translation of the Hungarian original. Please refer to the Hungarian original for more details.
