UODO (Poland) - DKN.5130.1354.2020
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| UODO - DKN.5130.1354.2020 | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Authority: | UODO (Poland) |
| Jurisdiction: | Poland |
| Relevant Law: | Article 5(1)(f) GDPR Article 24(1) GDPR Article 25(1) GDPR Article 28(1) GDPR Article 28(3)(h) GDPR Article 32(1)(b) GDPR Article 32(1)(d) GDPR Article 32(2) GDPR Article 33(1) GDPR Article 34(1) GDPR Article 83(1) GDPR Article 83(2) GDPR Article 83(3) GDPR Article 83(4)(a) GDPR Article 83(5)(a) GDPR |
| Type: | Investigation |
| Outcome: | Violation Found |
| Started: | |
| Decided: | 17.12.2020 |
| Published: | 17.12.2020 |
| Fine: | 1069850 PLN |
| Parties: | n/a |
| National Case Number/Name: | DKN.5130.1354.2020 |
| European Case Law Identifier: | n/a |
| Appeal: | n/a |
| Original Language(s): | Polish |
| Original Source: | UODO (in PL) |
| Initial Contributor: | Maciej Niezgoda |
The President of the Polish Office for Personal Data Protection (PUODO) imposed a fine of 250. 000 EUR (1.069.850,00 PLN) on the loan company for failing to implement appropriate technical and organizational measures, which resulted in a breach of data confidentiality.
English Summary
Facts
The loan company has reported to the DPA a breach of personal data protection in the form of stealing customer information from its database.
In the proceeding, the DPA established that the breach took place after one of the servers operated by the processing entity (hosting company) was restarted, the appropriate security configuration was not restored. The controller was notified about this by one of the cybersecurity specialists, who detected the vulnerability and indicated sample, publicly available information. The controller, instead of diligently checking his reports and monitoring the processor whether it duly dealt with the case in terms of checking the security, had doubts as to whether this was an attempt to extort other data from him, which he indicated in his correspondence to the processor. As a result, they did not immediately check the identified vulnerabilities in the system and a few days later the data was stolen from this server. The stolen data concerned 140,699 clients of the company. These data included: name and surname, level of education, e-mail address, employment data, e-mail address of the person to whom the client wants to recommend the loan, earnings data, marital status data, telephone number (landline, mobile, previously used telephone number), PESEL number, nationality, NIP number, password, place of birth, correspondence address, registered address, telephone number to the place of work and bank account number.
Dispute
When assessing the first signal of irregularities, did the company take into account the risk related to the processing of personal data resulting from accidental disclosure of personal data? Has the company fulfilled its obligation to ensure the processing of personal data in a manner ensuring their appropriate security from the moment it received the first signal of irregularities? Has the company implemented appropriate technical and organizational measures ensuring adequate security of personal data?
Holding
According to the DPA, when assessing the first signal of irregularities, the company did not take into account the risk related to the processing of personal data resulting from the accidental disclosure of personal data, which constitutes a violation of Art. 32(2) GDPR. DPA also found that the company failed to fulfill its obligation to ensure the processing of personal data in a manner ensuring their appropriate security from the moment it received the first signal of incorrect processing. The PUODO held that the loan company infringed the GDPR provisions, failing to implement appropriate technical and organizational measures, which resulted in a breach of data confidentiality. PUODO imposed a fine of 250.000 EUR.
Comment
DPA noted that the breach would not have occurred if the controller had immediately reacted adequately to the information that the data on its server is unsecured. In the opinion of the PUODO, the controller should maintain the ability to quickly and effectively identify any breaches in order to be able to take appropriate action. In addition, the controller should be able to quickly investigate the incident in terms of whether a data protection breach has occurred and take appropriate remedial action. The DPA also decided that the lack of a sufficiently quick response by the processor to the notification of a vulnerability in the system does not exclude the controller's responsibility for a data protection breach. It is the controller who must be able to detect, remedy and report violations - this is a key element of technical and organizational measures. In the opinion of the PUODO, the company, despite promptly providing the processor with information about a potential vulnerability in the server's security, did not take sufficient action. The investigation showed that the controller briefly analyzed the signal received, did not take it seriously and did not oblige the processor to properly deal with the case. When imposing a penalty for the breach of the confidentiality of personal data as a result of a series of negligence by the controller, PUODO took into account the scale of the breach and the scope of the stolen data.
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English Machine Translation of the Decision
The decision below is a machine translation of the Polish original. Please refer to the Polish original for more details.
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alt="Black eagle emblem"><h2> PRESIDENT<br/> OFFICE OF SECURITY<br/> PERSONAL DATA</h2></div><div class="col-12 col-sm-8 text-right pt-5 pt-sm-0"> Warsaw, December 17, 2020</div></div><h1 class="text-center mb-4 mt-4" style="font-size: 1.5rem;"> DECISION</h1><h2 class="mb-5"> DKN.5130.1354.2020</h2><p> Based on Article. 104 § 1 and art. 105 § 1 of the Act of 14 June 1960 Code of Administrative Procedure (Journal of Laws of 2020, item 256, as amended), art. 7 sec. 1, art. 60, art. 101 and art. 103 of the Personal Data Protection Act of May 10, 2018 (Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1781) and art. 57 sec. 1 lit. a, art. 58 sec. 2 lit. i, art. 83 sec. 1-3, art. 83 sec. 4 lit. a and art. 83 sec. 5 lit. and in connection with Art. 5 sec. 1 lit. f, art. 24 sec. 1, art. 25 sec. 1, art. art. 28 sec. 1, art. 28 sec. 3 lit. h, 32 sec. 1 lit. b and lit. d, art. 32 sec. 2, art. 33 paragraph. 1, art. 34 sec. 1 of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the EU Council 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46 / EC (general regulation on data protection) ( Dz. Urz. UE L 119 of 04/05/2016, p. 1, as amended), after conducting administrative proceedings regarding the violation of the provisions on the protection of personal data by ID Finance Poland Sp. z o. o. in liquidation with its seat in Warsaw at ul. Hrubieszowska 6A, President of the Office for Personal Data Protection</p><p> <strong>1) finding a breach by ID Finance Poland Sp. z o. o. in liquidation with its seat in Warsaw at ul. Hrubieszowska 6A, the provisions of Art. 5 sec. 1 lit. f, art. 25 sec. 1, art. 32 sec. 1 lit. b, art. 32 sec. 1 lit. d and art. 32 sec. 2 of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the EU Council 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46 / EC (General Data Protection Regulation) ( Journal of the EU L 119 of 04/05/2016, p. 1, as amended), hereinafter referred to as "Regulation 2016/679", consisting in the failure to implement by ID Finance Poland Sp. z o. o. in liquidation with its registered office in Warsaw, both in the design phase of the processing process and during the processing itself, appropriate technical and organizational measures corresponding to the risk of violation of the ability to continuously ensure confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience of the personal data processing system, as well as ensuring the ability to effectively and quick identification of a breach of personal data protection and ensuring regular assessment of the effectiveness of these measures, which resulted in obtaining unauthorized access by third parties to the processed personal data, imposes on ID Finance Poland Sp. z oo in liquidation, an administrative fine of PLN 1,069,850.00 (one million sixty-nine thousand eight hundred and fifty zlotys);</strong></p><p> <strong>2) in the remaining scope, the proceedings are discontinued.</strong></p><p align="center"> <strong>SUBSTANTIATION</strong></p><p> ID Finance Poland Sp. z oo in liquidation (hereinafter also referred to as: the "Company" or "administrator") on [...] March 2020 and additionally [...] March 2020, reported to the President of the Personal Data Protection Office (hereinafter also referred to as the "President of the Personal Data Protection Office") protection of personal data of the Company's clients, which has been registered under the number DKN.5130.1354.2020.</p><p> The subject of the Company's activity is granting financial loans with the use of the moneyman.pl website. In the notification, the Company indicated that the breach took place on [...] March 2020 and was found on [...] March 2020 as a result of confirmation of information regarding the possibility of unauthorized access to data, received from a third party. The breach concerned problems related to the operation of the server on which the personal data of 218,657 people were processed. In the supplementary notification of [...] March 2020 and in the letter of [...] March 2020, the Company specified that the data included 140,699 of the Company's customers (the original number was related to, inter alia, the number of records in the database, and not the number of natural persons to whom these data relate) who, after [...] January 2018, have fully or partially completed the registration process on the moneyman.pl website, and these data included: name and surname, level of education, e-mail address , employment data, e-mail address of the person to whom the client wants to recommend a loan, earnings data, marital status data, telephone number (landline, mobile, previously used telephone number), PESEL number, nationality, tax identification number, password, place birth, correspondence address, registered address, telephone number to the place of work and bank account number. The erroneous operation of the server was related to its restart by the processing entity - IDFT based in M. na B., which, under the contract of [...] March 2018, was entrusted with the processing of the above-mentioned data for the purpose of providing hosting services. During the server restart, the settings of the software responsible for the server's security were reset, as a result of which the personal data on the server was publicly available. The database hosted on this server was downloaded and deleted by an unidentified third party that requested the Company to pay remuneration in return for its return. The report indicated that, in order to remedy the breach and minimize the negative impact on data subjects, customers and potential customers had been informed that their login passwords had been reset. In order to minimize the risk of recurrence of the breach, e.g. firewall operation has been restored. At the same time, it was indicated that, in the opinion of the Company, there is a high risk of violating the rights or freedoms of natural persons to whom the data relates. In the supplementary notification, the Company announced that these persons were notified of the infringement on [...] March 2020 by e-mail and text messages (the content of the notification was attached to the supplementary notification).</p><p> In connection with the above, in a letter of [...] March 2020, the President of the Office for Personal Data Protection called ID Finance Poland Sp. with oomin. down:</p><ul><li> transfer of the content of the entrustment agreement with the processing entity involved in the processing that the breach relates to,</li><li> provide the content and date of any correspondence addressed to the Company from third parties with knowledge of the breach in question,</li><li> a detailed description of the personal data breach, description of its finding and presentation of the procedure for identifying and reporting data protection breaches, also in the context of the relationship with the processor,</li><li> indication of the time, channel and content of other correspondence addressed to data subjects in connection with the violation,</li><li> provide an assessment of the effectiveness of reaching the data subjects by e-mail about the breach, and how the Company provides data subjects with effective provision of additional information about the breach as part of the hotline and e-mail address referred to in notification addressed to these persons,</li><li> indication of whether and which the Company and the processor have adopted technical and organizational security measures in accordance with art. 24 and art. 25 of Regulation 2016/679,</li><li> clarification whether, when and how the controller and the processor regularly tested, measured and assessed the effectiveness of technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of personal data processed in ICT systems.</li></ul><p> In response, by letter of [...] March 2020, the Company provided extensive explanations regarding the event itself, including a copy of the correspondence carried out by the Company. The explanations were also accompanied by the full text of the entrustment agreement with attachments, concluded in Warsaw on [...] March 2018 between ID Finance Poland sp. Z oo with its seat in Warsaw and the limited liability company "IDFT" with its seat in M. na B. (hereinafter also referred to as "processor"). The submitted documents also included: Procedure for reporting a breach of personal data protection introduced by order No. [...] of [...] May 2018 of the Management Board of the Company; Instruction on detailed rules for the security and management of the IT system […]; a number of internal procedures and documents used by the Company and the processor as an element of the security and personal data protection system. Moreover, in her explanations, she described in detail the technical and organizational measures applied by both the Company and the processor.</p><p> As can be seen from the collected evidence, the chronology of events was as follows:</p><ul><li> [...] February 2020 at [...] an employee of the processor restarted one of the servers used by the Company. The reboot was due to resource monitoring data that made the server believe that the server was not functioning optimally. After the restart, the processor did not verify the correctness of the security configuration. The indicated date is appropriate for the time when the infringement occurred. In the initial and supplementary notification, the Company had no knowledge of the exact circumstances of the event. This information was provided by the Company in a letter of [...] March 2020, following an analysis by the processor on [...] March 2020.</li><li> [...] March 2020 at […] The company received the first signal of irregularities from an independent cybersecurity consultant - […]. In an e-mail, drafted in English, addressed to both the main e-mail address of the Company and the e-mail address of the data protection officer, the researcher indicated that he had discovered a server with publicly available data of the Company's customers using the moneyman.pl website. The message in question constitutes attachment No. [...] to the Company's letter of [...] March 2020.</li><li> [...] in March 2020, the data protection officer sent the above-mentioned message incl. to the company's finance director with a request for contact to the company's IT service - IDFT. The Company's Finance Director on the same day sent the above-mentioned a message to the director of IDFT with a comment suggesting that it may be a phishing scam. A copy of this message was received, among others, by the company's operational director. The activities of the company's finance director, according to the administrator, were aimed at determining whether the information received was reliable and whether the reply posed a threat to the security of the Company's IT resources.</li><li> [...] in March 2020, the company's chief financial officer again approached the director of IDFT to determine whether the message had been verified. On the same day, IDFT restarted the server, but its configuration, taking into account the proper protection of the environment, was still incorrect.</li><li> [...] in March 2020, an undetermined third party downloaded and deleted the Company's database, leaving information with a ransom demand.</li><li> [...] March 2020 at [...], the editor of the website trustanatrzeciastrona.pl asked the Company by e-mail, indicating the breach of personal data protection in question and the IP address of the server the breach concerns. On the same day, this information was passed on, among others to the company's finance director.</li><li> [...] in March 2020, the company's finance director provided the above-mentioned message to the director of IDFT and the President of the Management Board of the Company.</li><li> [...] March 2020 at [...], the company's finance director received an e-mail (attached to the company's letter of [...] June 2020) from the director of IDFT with information about the identification of the problem and noted that this entity had not previously dealt with such situation. The IDFT employees determined that the breach of confidentiality of personal data processed on the Company's server occurred as a result of incorrect configuration of the firewall after the server restart, i.e. one of the ports remained open. Unauthorized data collection was confirmed, the scale of the breach was determined and remedial actions were taken, i.e. the correct configuration of the server was restored (port closure) and the passwords of the moneyman.pl users were reset. The company has also verified all the servers it uses to determine whether the data processed on these servers is safe. The verification showed that the Company is not threatened with such a risk, in particular with regard to unauthorized access. On the same day, the Company made an initial notification of a personal data breach to the President of the Data Protection Office.</li><li> [...] in March 2020, the Company re-verified all used servers. The conclusions of the verification were the same as those of [...] March 2020.</li><li> [...] in March 2020, the Company sent to the District Prosecutor's Office in Warsaw a notification of suspected crime by an unknown perpetrator in connection with the event of [...] March 2020 (file reference number [...]).</li></ul><p> In the context of the notification of data subjects, the Company indicated that on [...] March 2020, it sent an SMS with the following text: "[o] retrieving the MoneyMan password was successful. The new password is (…) ”, thus indicating the content of the new password. On [...] March 2020, it sent out emails to users with identical content. Another e-mail containing the full content of the notification with the scope of information indicated in art. 34 sec. 2 of Regulation 2016/679, it sent [...] March 2020. By text message of [...] March 2020, addressed to data subjects, the Company informed that "(...) the last password change was carried out automatically and was due to security reasons . More on www.moneyman.pl (...) ”. [...] in March 2020, the Company posted information about the breach on the moneyman.pl home page and created dedicated tabs, in which it clarified the information provided in the text message of [...] March 2020 and information on the breach of personal data protection. Relevant screenshots are attached to the explanations.</p><p> The company, explaining the effectiveness of the breach notification reaching the data subjects, presented a detailed table which is a report listing the dates, channels, type of information and data on the news. As indicated, the table shows that only 4% of entities could not receive information about the infringement provided by e-mail.</p><p> Referring to the effectiveness of providing information to data subjects using the telephone number and e-mail address indicated in the notifications, the Company explained that it delegated additional employees to the Call Center department, informed employees on how to communicate with data subjects , prepared for them answers to basic questions asked by clients in connection with a breach of the protection of their personal data, withheld debt collection calls for a period of three days to facilitate customer contact and on [...] March 2020, suspended the sale of new loans to ensure effective servicing affected customers.</p><p> As it results from the submitted explanations, in the notification of the infringement, the Company indicated that the database in question was not the main database of the Company's customers and potential customers. The company, in a letter dated [...] March 2020, explained that the database contained data of the Company's customers who had fully or partially completed the registration process after [...] January 2018. In addition, it clarified the scope of the data categories. This database, as indicated by the Company, by mistake contained passwords of MoneyMan.pl users, which were stored in plain text. In the main (production) database, passwords are stored in an implicit form.</p><p> In a letter of [...] May 2020, the President of the Personal Data Protection Office notified the Company about the initiation of administrative proceedings, the subject of which is the possibility of the Company, as a data controller, breaching the obligations arising from the provisions of Regulation 2016/679 in the scope of obligations under Art. 5 sec. 1 lit. f, art. 24 sec. 1, art. 25 sec. 1, art. 28 sec. 1, art. 28 sec. 3 lit. h, art. 32 sec. 1, art. 32 sec. 2, art. 33 paragraph. 1 and art. 34 sec. 1. In this notification, the President of the Personal Data Protection Office called on the Company to submit additional explanations, including down:</p><ul><li> explanations why the database concerned by the violation in question also mistakenly stored user passwords in plain text and what was the role of this database, since the passwords are stored in an encrypted form in the main production database of the Company;</li><li> indication of what verification procedures of the processing entity in terms of its compliance with the requirements of Regulation 2016/679 were carried out by the administrator before the conclusion of the data processing entrustment agreement, as well as whether the Company exercised the right to control under art. 28 sec. 3 lit. h of Regulation 2016/679;</li><li> clarification of the circumstances related to the event that led to the breach of personal data protection.</li></ul><p> In response to the notice of initiation of the procedure, by letter of [...] June 2020, the Company indicated that the main purpose of the existence of the database affected by the infringement was to develop and test a script examining the behavior of moneyman.pl users during and after logging into the customer panel ( behavioral analysis). The implementation of such functionality was aimed at increasing data security and minimizing the risk of attacks, identity theft and financial fraud. The company indicated that due to the working nature of this functionality and the access of a limited number of people, the database was not encrypted at the right moment. She stressed that the security measures applied should be identical to those applied in the main base. As can be seen from these explanations, the personal data in the main (production) database is not covered by the personal data breach and despite the deletion of data on [...] March 2020, the controller still had data that allowed him to notify data subjects about breach of personal data protection.</p><p> Referring to the verification of the processing entity in terms of its compliance with the requirements of Regulation 2016/679, the Company indicated that, driven by the need to ensure the correct and professional configuration of servers, it decided to entrust the performance of these tasks to a specialized entity such as IDFT, guided by, inter alia, his extensive experience in providing services to entities from the financial sector, highly qualified employees and a comprehensive approach to customer service. In 2018, IDFT was audited in terms of the Company's service in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 2016/679. The results of this audit constitute an attachment to the letter of [...] June 2020. The company also indicated that IDFT had completed the tasks referred to in the above-mentioned document. Referring to the implementation of the right of control under Art. 28 sec. 3 lit. h of Regulation 2016/679, the Company indicated that the processor immediately provided the administrator with information on the event of [...] February 2020, as well as throughout the term of the entrustment agreement, telephone calls, teleconferences and mutual direct visits were held regularly. In addition, the processor replied to the Company as part of a detailed contractual compliance questionnaire. The completed questionnaire is attached to the letter of [...] June 2020.</p><p> In a letter of [...] June 2020, the Company specified that IDFT applied a firewall to the server affected by the breach, which is able to define network protection policies, traffic filtering, etc. This solution should be considered sufficient to protect the database against violation if its protection features were not unknowingly disabled due to a human error of running an inappropriate configuration script. One of them ([…]) contained a policy reset command for further manual configuration, while another ([…]) did not require any further manual steps. According to the information provided by the processor, the person who made the error had previously been trained in cybersecurity rules and had performed similar tasks regularly for a long time. Moreover, the above-mentioned the person was familiar with the server restart procedure, which in practice comes down to the use of a specific script, according to the supervisor's command. As part of the activities aimed at minimizing the likelihood of a similar event occurring in the future, scripts that require manual configuration were abandoned and the server reset procedure was modified, which was attached to the letter of [...] June 2020.</p><p> As a result of the analysis of the information contained in the reply to the letter informing about the initiation of the procedure, the President of the Office for Personal Data Protection, in a letter of [...] September 2020, asked the Company for clarification whether the audit of the processor carried out in connection with the entry into force of Regulation 2016 / 679 included procedures related to starting new servers, their configuration, resetting and final verification whether technical and organizational measures respond to threats to the data being processed. In a letter of [...] June 2020, the Company indicates that the person who made the error had been performing similar tasks on a regular basis for a long time, therefore the President of the Personal Data Protection Office called on the Company to indicate whether it saw the risks associated with the use of script activation procedures to configure the firewall.</p><p> The company, in response of [...] September 2020, indicated that the script application procedures were also checked during the semi-annual internal audits and assessed as adequate. The human error that caused the breach was impossible to predict and avoid despite taking into account various risk factors. As the company indicates, the normal scenario of the proceeding was automatic script launch, which ensured that all security measures were applied. The incident occurred in connection with a manual server restart where the predefined settings were not triggered.</p><p> <strong>In these facts, the President of the Personal Data Protection Office considered the following.</strong></p><p> Article 5 of Regulation 2016/679 lays down the rules for the processing of personal data that must be respected by all administrators, i.e. entities that independently or jointly with others determine the purposes and methods of personal data processing. According to Art. 5 sec. 1 lit. f of Regulation 2016/679, personal data must be processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of personal data, including protection against unauthorized or unlawful processing and accidental loss, destruction or damage, by appropriate technical or organizational measures ("confidentiality and integrity") . Further provisions of the regulation make this principle more specific.</p><p> According to Art. 24 sec. 1 of Regulation 2016/679, taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of violating the rights or freedoms of natural persons of varying probability and seriousness, the controller implements appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure that the processing is carried out in accordance with this Regulation and to be able to demonstrate it. These measures are reviewed and updated as necessary.</p><p> According to Art. 25 sec. 1 of Regulation 2016/679, both when determining the methods of processing and during the processing itself, the controller implements appropriate technical and organizational measures designed to effectively implement data protection principles (taking into account data protection at the design stage).</p><p> From the content of art. 32 sec. 1 of Regulation 2016/679 shows that the administrator is obliged to apply technical and organizational measures corresponding to the risk of violating the rights and freedoms of natural persons with a different probability of occurrence and the severity of the threat. The provision specifies that when deciding on technical and organizational measures, the state of technical knowledge, implementation cost, nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of violating the rights or freedoms of natural persons with different likelihood and severity should be taken into account. It follows from the cited provision that the determination of appropriate technical and organizational measures is a two-stage process. First of all, it is important to determine the level of risk related to the processing of personal data, taking into account the criteria indicated in art. 32 of Regulation 2016/679, and then it should be determined what technical and organizational measures will be appropriate to ensure the level of security corresponding to this risk. These arrangements, where applicable, in accordance with lit. b and d of this article, should include measures such as the ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience of processing systems and services, as well as regular testing, measurement and evaluation of the effectiveness of technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of processing.</p><p> Pursuant to Art. 32 sec. 2 of Regulation 2016/679, the controller, when assessing whether the level of security is appropriate, takes into account in particular the risk related to the processing, in particular resulting from accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, modification, unauthorized disclosure or unauthorized access to personal data sent, stored or otherwise processed.</p><p> Pursuant to the wording of Art. 33 paragraph. 1 of Regulation 2016/679, in the event of a breach of personal data protection, the controller shall, without undue delay - if possible, no later than 72 hours after finding the breach - notify the supervisory authority, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a breach risk the rights or freedoms of natural persons.</p><p> The provisions of Regulation 2016/679 oblige both controllers and processors to adopt appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure a level of security corresponding to the risk related to the processing of personal data. Moreover, it follows from the above-mentioned provisions and recital 87 of Regulation 2016/679 that the Regulation required the adoption of the above-mentioned measures to immediately identify a personal data breach. This is decisive for determining whether the obligations under Art. 33 paragraph. 1 and art. 34 sec. 1 of Regulation 2016/679.</p><p> The obligation to notify the supervisory authority about the breach and the deadline for its submission is related to the moment when the controller "detects" the breach of personal data protection. The Article 29 Working Party, in the guidelines on reporting personal data breaches pursuant to Regulation 2016/679, adopted on October 3, 2017, last amended and adopted on February 6, 2018 (hereinafter: breach reporting guidelines), indicates that the controller finds the breach as soon as it has obtained reasonable certainty that a security incident has occurred that led to the disclosure of personal data. <strong>However, this issue should be considered in relation to the controller's obligation to maintain the ability to quickly and effectively identify any breaches to ensure that appropriate action can be taken.</strong> In some cases, it may take time to determine whether personal information has been disclosed. <strong>In this context, however, emphasis should be placed on promptly investigating the incident in question to determine whether a personal data breach has actually occurred and, if so, taking remedial action and, if necessary, reporting the breach.</strong></p><p> It should therefore be assumed, as the Article 29 Working Party points out in the Breach Notification Guidelines, that after receiving the first information about a potential personal data breach, from an individual, from another source or after detecting a security incident itself, the controller may conduct a short-term investigation to determine whether a given infringement actually occurred. While, until the end of these proceedings, the controller cannot be considered to have identified a breach, it should be expected <strong>that the preliminary proceedings should start as soon as possible and lead to a determination as soon as possible with a reasonable degree of certainty whether in a given case</strong> a breach <strong>actually occurred. violations,</strong> then a more detailed analysis of the event can be performed. However, in <strong>case of any doubts, taking into account, in particular, the nature and scope of the processed data and the risk related to e.g. accidental disclosure, the controller should notify the supervisory authority of the breach, even if such caution could turn out to be excessive. Recital 85 of Regulation 2016/679 explicitly states that one of the reasons for reporting a breach is the limitation of the related harm to individuals, as</strong> evidenced by the provisions cited above, which specify the principle of confidentiality in Art. 5 sec. 1 lit. f of the Regulation 2016/679, obliging to process personal data in a manner ensuring their appropriate security. As indicated in the Breach Reporting Guidelines, when assessing the risks that may arise from a breach, the controller should take into account the impact of the breach on the rights and freedoms of individuals and the likelihood of their occurrence.</p><p> In the e-mail of [...] March 2020, received by the Company, a fragment of information was presented containing the personal data of the user of the moneyman.pl website, which, in the sender's opinion, is located in the Company's IT infrastructure. This fragment was a partial reflection of the structure of the data categories with their values. Among them was, among others PESEL number, e ‑ mail address and user ID. While in this letter the sender did not indicate the IP address of the server, the incorrect configuration of which led to a breach of personal data protection, in the opinion of the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, the controller did not undertake a thorough analysis and take into account the information contained in this message suggesting that the entire customer database may be made available. Companies. Adopting at least such a perspective should make the Company aware of the scale of the potential breach and negative consequences for its clients that may or have already occurred. Having the above-mentioned information should be an incentive to try to obtain additional information from the sender with due care and to undertake verification activities also on their own. For example, whether the indicated information regarding this one exemplary person actually relates to one of the Company's clients and should not be a reason to take more intensified actions in cooperation with the processor. Unauthorized disclosure of the scope of personal data (indicated in the description of the facts) may undoubtedly result in a high risk of violating the rights or freedoms of natural persons to whom the data relates. In connection with the above, ensuring adequate security of such data should be the subject of special care of the administrator, and each signal about possible irregularities should be thoroughly analyzed.</p><p> In the opinion of the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, the administrator, after receiving the message of [...] March 2020, did not follow the above-mentioned rules. This is indicated, among others, by its redirection by the company's finance director to the director of IDFT with a short comment questioning the sender's intentions and pointing to the so-called "Smart phishing". While the Company was right to immediately forward the message to the processor and based its belief that it was necessary to notify the supervisory body only after confirming its credibility, it does not appear from the evidence gathered that the controller undertook other activities aimed at a quick and effective finding of the infringement, apart from directing [... ] March 2020 a short question to the director of IDFT. If there are circumstances indicating that this information cannot be quickly and effectively verified, taking into account the risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the Company should report the breach to the supervisory authority without undue delay.</p><p> The delay, which, according to the President of UODO, was committed by the administrator between [...] March 2020 and [...] March 2020, when he received another signal about the violation, led to its escalation. The server's vulnerability, detected on [...] March 2020 by an unknown person, resulted in the collection of personal data of 140 699 of the Company's customers, their deletion and leaving a ransom-demand message. Only after the [...] March 2020 message of [...] March 2020 was sent to the director of IDFT, which indicated the legal obligations incumbent on the Company with regard to the date of notification of the supervisory authority, both the Company and the processor undertook intensified verification activities and countermeasures. As is clear from the explanations of the Company, it was not until [...] March 2020 that the IT team of the processor found the causes of the problem after checking the email of [...] March 2020. This leads to the obvious conclusion that it took about 10 days. In addition, as the Company indicated, it was only from [...] March 2020 that the Company's data protection officer began collecting information about the breach.</p><p> Although the Company repeatedly in its explanations in the letters of [...] March 2020 and [...] June 2020, the processor referred to the fact that the processor immediately provided information to the Company about individual events, including on [...] February 2020 r., the collected material shows that this information was provided on an intensified basis and on the initiative of the Company only after [...] March 2020.</p><p> According to the letter of [...] June 2020, the Company has not identified similar irregularities in the past that led to a data protection breach. At the same time, she indicated that the server restart, as a standard procedure, was repeatedly performed. Also, the director of IDFT in an e-mail of [...] March 2020 indicated that so far such serious events had not taken place. In the opinion of the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, the lack of similar events cannot lull the administrator to vigilance and justify the lack of appropriate actions on his part between [...] March 2020 and [...] March 2020.</p><p> The lack of a quick response from the processor does not remove the responsibility of the controller for finding a personal data breach, as the ability to detect breaches, remedy them and report them in a timely manner should be seen as a key element of technical and organizational measures, including any data security policy. . In the opinion of the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, the company, despite the immediate notification of irregularities to the processor, did not take its actions in an appropriate manner. The circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the controller briefly analyzed the message of [...] March 2020, did not treat it with due seriousness and did not oblige the processor to do the same. Undertaking a proper analysis and intensified contact with the processing entity already on [...] March 2020, in which the Company learned about the first irregularities, in the opinion of the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, would allow to find a breach of data protection much faster (as was done after the message received from the editor of one of the websites) and potentially minimize the risk to the rights and freedoms of the Company's customers, including avoiding the event that took place on [...] March 2020.</p><p> In the document presented by the Company entitled "Procedure for reporting personal data breaches", point […] indicates that its purpose is to create a mechanism ensuring timely notification of a personal data breach. Point […], which is the personal data breach notification scheme, indicates that the role of the Data Protection Officer is to analyze the incident and identify the breach and assess the risk for individuals. Point […] indicates the event analysis procedure, in which the Data Protection Officer, as the coordinator, verifies and analyzes the event, involving all units related to a potential data protection breach. In point [...], there are examples of catalogs of events subject to the obligations under Art. 33 and 34 of Regulation 2016/679. Apart from these elements, the document contains many general statements that can be derived directly from the provisions of Regulation 2016/679.</p><p> Thus, with our actions, despite the awareness of what events may result in a breach of personal data protection (the procedure mentions, for example, a malfunctioning of an IT system or a human error), the message from [...] March 2020 was treated by the Company without due diligence. seriousness and contrary to the above-mentioned the procedure and the provisions of Regulation 2016/679, the purpose of which is to create a mechanism ensuring timely notification of a personal data breach. This is evidenced by the question of the data protection officer to one of the employees and the company's finance director to contact the IT team of the processor and the suggestion of the company's finance director in a message to the director of IDFT, indicating the so-called "Smart phishing". The contract for entrusting the processing of personal data of [...] March 2018 in the context of data protection breaches, only in § [...] contains specific obligations of IDFT in the event of a breach of personal data protection, however, their wording and interpretation, in the opinion of the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, is already related to the established breach.</p><p> Both the explanations of the Company and the documents presented by it do not present the procedure of finding a violation. While such a procedure is not explicitly required by any of the provisions of Regulation 2016/679, as indicated in the infringement guidelines and as it results from the provisions of Regulation 2016/679, the controller is obliged to efficiently and quickly identify a data protection breach, and such the procedure can significantly facilitate this.</p><p> From the response to the request to indicate how the controller regularly tested, measured and assessed the effectiveness of technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of personal data in the IT systems affected by the breach, it also does not appear that the aforementioned procedure for reporting breaches was approvals verified in terms of its effectiveness.</p><p> <strong>In view of the above, the Company, when assessing the first signal of irregularities, did not take into account - in the opinion of the President of the Personal Data Protection Office - the risk related to the processing of personal data resulting from accidental disclosure of personal data, which constitutes a violation of Art. 32 sec. 2 of Regulation 2016/679. The evidence collected in the course of these proceedings is also the basis for stating that the Company has failed to fulfill its obligation to ensure the processing of personal data in a manner ensuring their adequate security from the moment it received the first signal of irregularities, which constitutes a breach of the confidentiality principle expressed in Art. 5 sec. 1 lit. f of the Regulation 2016/679. It also failed to implement appropriate technical and organizational measures aimed at the effective implementation of the above-mentioned data protection rules, which is a violation of Art. 25 sec. 1 of Regulation 2016/679 and the effective and quick finding of the infringement, which constitutes a breach of Art. 24 sec. 1 of Regulation 2016/679. In the opinion of the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, the Company did not regularly assess the effectiveness of these measures, which constitutes a breach of Art. 32 sec. 1 lit. d of Regulation 2016/679. Thus, between [...] March and [...] March 2020, its actions contributed to the failure to ensure the ability to continuously ensure confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience of processing systems and services, which constitutes a violation of Art. 32 sec. 1 lit. b of the Regulation 2016/679.</strong></p><p> In connection with the explanations relating to the regular testing, measurement and assessment by the administrator of the effectiveness of technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of personal data in the IT systems affected by the breach, it should be noted that these explanations also do not indicate that the Company acquires customer data service moneyman.pl after [...] January 2018 showed interest in the way in which user passwords are stored in an additional database, which is the subject of a breach. In the opinion of the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, the statement of the Company that the passwords of users were stored in open text by mistake and due to the working nature of this functionality and the access of a limited number of people, the database was not "encrypted" at the right moment is incomprehensible. As indicated by the Company in the explanations of [...] March 2020 and [...] June 2020, the purpose of the existence of the database affected by the infringement was to develop and test a script examining the behavior of moneyman.pl users during and after logging into the customer panel ( behavioral analysis).</p><p> The President of the Personal Data Protection Office indicates that the storage of passwords in IT systems in a classified form (e.g. by using a hash function, also known as hashing) is one of the most common measures to ensure the confidentiality of a password and limit its knowledge only to the person who uses it. In this way, the negative consequences related to the potential risk of using such a password by a person who unauthorized, in connection with other information, reads its content are limited. A person who knows the user's credentials for a particular service can freely access their account. It should be noted that in the case at hand such a situation could lead to, for example, identity fraud, damage to reputation or financial loss. In addition, the user could use the same username (e.g. e-mail address) and password on other websites. Taking into account the categories of data processed by the Company, ensuring the security of this data, it should take such circumstances into account in a special way, as the group of people who may potentially be interested in the obtained certificates for the purpose of unlawful use may be undefined and have negative consequences. for the rights and freedoms of data subjects.</p><p> Although the use of the secret password storage mechanism does not completely eliminate the likelihood that an unauthorized person will reverse the process and obtain the content of the password, its proper execution causes attacks consisting in the so-called breaking passwords turns out to be time consuming and even impractical. The purpose of such a process is, inter alia, obtaining adequate time for taking remedial actions by both the controller and the data subject, <strong>especially in cases where the controller does not find a breach of personal data protection close to its actual occurrence, which took place in the case being the subject of this decision.</strong> Therefore, when deciding on such a solution, the administrator should assess whether the solutions used will actually fulfill their role. While the Company rightly points out in its letter of [...] September 2020 that the relationship with the processor does not imply the obligation to constantly monitor the solutions applied, in the opinion of the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, it is important that the controller, as part of the performance of obligations under Regulation 2016/679, performs periodic verifying that the technical and organizational solutions used have not identified any weaknesses that may affect the risk of violation of the rights or freedoms of data subjects, and the fact that data is processed by a processor does not remove this responsibility from the controller. <strong>In the opinion of the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, this constitutes a violation by the Company of Art. 25 sec. 1 of Regulation 2016/679. It should be indicated that the addressee of Art. 25 sec. 1 of Regulation 2016/679 is only the controller who is obliged to both define the processing methods and during the processing itself, implement appropriate technical and organizational measures, such as e.g. pseudonymisation, designed to effectively implement data protection principles.</strong> It should be emphasized that the concept resulting from this provision is based on the proactive and preventive approach of the controller consisting in ensuring the security of personal data at every stage. The adoption of such solutions by the EU legislator aims to strengthen the confidentiality principle expressed in Art. 5 sec. 1 lit. f of the Regulation 2016/679, in order to ensure the necessary security of the processed data, corresponding to the risks related to their processing. <strong>The lack of actions of the administrator in this regard also constitutes a violation of Art. 24 sec. 1, art. 32 sec. 1 lit. d and art. 32 sec. 2 of Regulation 2016/679 by not taking into account the risk associated with the processing of users' passwords in open form, which in the event of failure to apply other technical and organizational measures to ensure secure processing, in accordance with the above-mentioned the provisions of Regulation 2016/679, provides for the exposure of data subjects to increasing the risk of violating the rights or freedoms of natural persons in the event of a breach of the confidentiality of the data processed.</strong></p><p> In the course of the administrative procedure, despite the irregularities identified by the President of the Personal Data Protection Office which had an impact on the breach of data protection and its late finding, the President of the Personal Data Protection Office did not find a breach of Art. 33 paragraph. 1 of Regulation 2016/679. The content of this provision obliges the controller to notify the supervisory body about the breach of personal data protection after two cumulative conditions are met - a breach is identified which results in a risk of violation of the rights or freedoms of natural persons. / 679, the provisions of Regulation 2016/679 should be interpreted e.g. through the prism of the administrator's ability to efficiently and quickly identify a breach of personal data protection by means of technical and organizational measures. Thus, a breach of obligations imposed on the Company was found on this account. <strong>As a result, the President of the Personal Data Protection Office (UODO) discontinued the administrative proceedings regarding the violation of Art. 33 paragraph. 1 of Regulation 2016/679, which therefore does not constitute the basis for the administration of a fine.</strong></p><p> Pursuant to the wording of Art. 34 sec. 1 of Regulation 2016/679, if the breach of personal data protection may result in a high risk of violation of the rights or freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall notify the data subject of such a breach without undue delay.</p><p> Again, reference should be made to the Breach Notification Guidelines, which indicate that when notifying individuals about a data breach, the controller should be transparent about this and provide information in an efficient and timely manner. When analyzing the meaning of the term "without undue delay" under this provision, it should be assumed that the beginning of the time limit for notifying data subjects is the moment of finding the infringement. The company, as already indicated in this decision, was late in finding the infringement on […] March 2020, which does not remove its liability for the risk of infringement of the rights or freedoms of data subjects resulting from the delay in finding the infringement. However, immediately after the belated finding, the Company, with the help of the processor, started the process of resetting users' passwords and took all necessary steps to inform data subjects efficiently and in a timely manner, including using available information channels and exhaustively demonstrated the effectiveness of the notification delivery. <strong>As a result, the President of the Personal Data Protection Office (UODO) discontinued the administrative proceedings regarding the violation of Art. 34 sec. 1 of Regulation 2016/679, which therefore does not constitute the basis for the administration of a fine.</strong></p><p> Pursuant to the wording of Art. 28 sec. 1 of Regulation 2016/679, if the processing is to be performed on behalf of the controller, he or she uses only the services of such processors that provide sufficient guarantees for the implementation of appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure that the processing meets the requirements of Regulation 2016/679 and protects the rights of data subjects concern. Moreover, pursuant to par. 3 lit. h of this article, the controller has the power to obtain from the processor all information necessary to demonstrate compliance with the obligations set out in art. 28 of the Regulation 2016/679 and has the power to carry out audits, including inspections.</p><p> With the above the conducted analysis shows that the Company should be accused of failing to fulfill its obligations under Art. 5 sec. 1 lit. f, art. 24 sec. 1, art. 25 sec. 1, art. 32 sec. 1 lit. b and d and art. 32 sec. 2 of Regulation 2016/679. However, it is impossible to agree with the position of the Company that its possible liability as an administrator should be considered only in the context of Art. 28 sec. 1 of Regulation 2016/679 and the answer to the question whether the guarantees provided to the controller by the processor were sufficient to justify the use of its services. Obviously, this assessment, as also indicated by the Company, cannot be made only from the perspective of the incident itself, but from the perspective of the possibility of its occurrence and the possibility of a reasonable statement even before the incident occurs that the guarantees are insufficient and the services of other IT experts should be used. The Company also rightly points out that Art. 28 sec. 1 of Regulation 2016/679 requires the use of processors that provide adequate guarantees of compliance, and not continuous monitoring of the solutions applied by this entity.</p><p> In the letters of [...] March, [...] June and [...] September 2020, the Company submitted extensive explanations and numerous documents that regulate the relationship between ID Finance Sp. z o. o. in liquidation and IDFT. From the point of view of the provisions of Art. 28 sec. 1 and art. 28 sec. 3 lit. h of Regulation 2016/679, the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, in the collected evidence, did not find any circumstances that would allow to conclude that IDFT did not provide sufficient guarantees for the security of personal data and did not provide the administrator with all information necessary to demonstrate compliance with the obligations set out in art. 28 of Regulation 2016/679 or prevented the Company from carrying out audits, including inspections. <strong>As a result, the President of the Personal Data Protection Office (UODO) discontinued the administrative proceedings regarding the violation of Art. 28 sec. 1 and art. 28 sec. 3 lit. h of the Regulation 2016/679, which therefore does not constitute the basis for the administration of a fine.</strong></p><p> <strong>Bearing in mind the above findings, the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, exercising his powers specified in Art. 58 sec. 2 lit. and Regulation 2016/679, according to which each supervisory authority has the right to apply, in addition to or instead of other remedial measures provided for in art. 58 sec. 2 lit. ah and lit. j of this Regulation, an administrative fine under Art. 83 of the Regulation 2016/679, having regard to the circumstances established in the proceedings in question, stated that in the case under consideration there were premises justifying the imposition of an administrative fine on the Company.</strong></p><p> When deciding to impose an administrative fine on the Company, as well as determining its amount, the President of the Personal Data Protection Office - pursuant to Art. 83 sec. 2 lit. ak of Regulation 2016/679 - took into account the following circumstances of the case, aggravating and affecting the size of the imposed financial penalty:</p><ol><li> <strong>The nature and gravity of the infringement taking into account the number of people injured (Article 83 (2) (a) of Regulation 2016/679)</strong> - when imposing the penalty, it was important that the number of people affected by the infringement was 140 699 (specified in the supplementary notification from [...] March 2020). In addition, the President of the Personal Data Protection Office took into account that the event of [...] March 2020 caused a high risk of negative consequences in the future for data subjects, resulting from a wide range of data covered by the infringement, a large number of data subjects and undoubtedly ill will of the person who obtained unauthorized access to data, as well as the large-scale and professional nature of data processing by the Company. It should be emphasized that in relation to the above-mentioned of persons, there is still a high risk of unlawful use of their personal data, as the purpose for which the person or unauthorized persons took action resulting in the infringement of personal data protection is unknown. Data subjects may therefore suffer material damage, and the very breach of data confidentiality is also non-pecuniary damage (harm). The data subject may, at the very least, feel the fear of losing control of their personal data, identity theft or identity fraud, and finally financial loss.</li><li> <strong>Duration of the infringement (Article 83 (2) (a) of Regulation 2016/679)</strong> - the collected evidence allowed the President of the Personal Data Protection Office to state that the Company did not take appropriate actions to quickly and efficiently identify the infringement, which resulted in confirmation of the irregularities reported [...] March 2020 only after about 10 days. The delay by the Company has a significant impact on the amount of the penalty imposed by the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, because, as indicated in the justification, appropriate, reliable analysis and intensification of contact with the processing entity already on [...] March 2020, in which the Company learned about the first irregularities, according to the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, would allow to find a breach of data protection much faster (as was done after the message received from the editor of one of the Internet portals) and potentially minimize the risk to the rights and freedoms of the Company's clients, including avoiding an event that occurred [...] March 2020</li></ol><p> At the same time, it should be noted that the duration of the breach consisting in the failure to implement appropriate organizational and technical measures to ensure the security of the processed personal data, i.e. procedures allowing for quick identification of the breach and ensuring regular assessment of the implemented security measures, should be counted from the moment the Company introduces the breach reporting procedure protection of personal data, i.e. from [...] May 2018. However, in the case of a breach involving the failure to take into account the risk related to the processing of users' passwords in an open form, which in the event of failure to apply other technical and organizational measures to ensure secure processing, in accordance with Regulation 2016/679 provides for the exposure of data subjects to an increased risk of violating the rights or freedoms of natural persons in the event of a breach of the confidentiality of the processed data, this period should be counted from [...] January 20 18, i.e. from the date on which the Company's customers have fully or partially completed the registration process at maneyman.pl.</p><p><span style="font-size: 0.8rem;"><strong> </strong>3.<strong> </strong></span><strong><span style="font-size: 0.8rem;">Unintentional nature of the infringement (Article 83 (2) (b) of Regulation 2016/679).</span></strong></p><p> Taking into account the findings in the case being the subject of this decision, it should be stated that the Company committed gross negligence resulting in a breach of the confidentiality of data, which took place on [...] March 2020. Thus, it is a significant circumstance that affects the amount of the administrative penalty.</p><p> <span style="font-size: 0.8rem;">4. <strong>Categories of personal data affected by a breach of personal data protection (Article 83 (2) (g) of Regulation 2016/679)</strong> - data of the Company's customers who, after [...] January 2018, have fully or partially completed the registration process . The scope of the data that is the subject of the infringement (specified in the letter of [...] March 2020) is as follows: name and surname, level of education, e-mail address, employment data, e-mail address of the person whom the client wants to recommend the loan, personal data regarding earnings, data on marital status, telephone number (landline, mobile, previously used telephone number), PESEL number, nationality, NIP number, password (mistakenly, as indicated by the Company, stored in open text), place of birth, correspondence address, registered address , telephone number to the place of work and bank account number. These data do not belong to the special categories of personal data referred to in art. 9 of the Regulation 2016/679, subject to special protection due to their sensitive nature. However, their very wide scope constitutes a significant circumstance aggravating the amount of the administrative penalty.</span></p><p> 5. The <strong>high degree of responsibility of the controller (Article 83 (2) (d) of Regulation 2016/679)</strong> - Considering that it is the controller that has a legal obligation to establish a breach in an efficient and timely <strong>manner</strong> and, in certain situations, to immediately report a breach of personal data protection to the supervisory authority , the findings made by the President of the Personal Data Protection Office allow the conclusion that the Company has not implemented appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of processing of personal data of customers in situations where it receives the first signal about irregularities in the processing of personal data of which it is the administrator.</p><p> The other, indicated in Art. 83 sec. 2 of Regulation 2016/679, the circumstances:</p><ol><li> Actions taken by the Company to minimize the damage suffered by data subjects (Article 83 (2) (c) of Regulation 2016/679) - the Company fulfilled the obligation to notify persons whose data was obtained by an unauthorized person about a breach of their protection personal data referred to in art. 34 of the Regulation 2016/679. However, it did not take any additional (beyond the legal obligation) measures to mitigate or compensate for the harm suffered by the affected persons.</li><li> The manner in which the supervisory authority learned about the breach (Article 83 (2) (h) of Regulation 2016/679) - the breach of personal data protection was reported to the President of the Personal Data Protection Office by the Company, which is the fulfillment by the Company of its obligation referred to in art. 33 of the Regulation 2016/679.</li><li> The company does not apply the approved codes of conduct pursuant to Art. 40 of the Regulation 2016/679 or approved certification mechanisms pursuant to Art. 42 of the Regulation 2016/679.</li><li> In the same case, the measures referred to in Art. 58 sec. 2 of Regulation 2016/679.</li><li> There is no evidence that the Company obtained financial benefits and would avoid losses due to the breach.</li><li> Good cooperation on the part of the Company, which sent explanations within the prescribed period and provided comprehensive answers.</li></ol><p> Taking into account all the above-mentioned circumstances, the President of the Personal Data Protection Office decided that the imposition of an administrative fine on the Company is necessary and justified by the weight, nature and scope of the infringements made by the Company.</p><p> Referring to the amount of the administrative fine imposed on the Company, the President of the Office for Personal Data Protection decided that in the established circumstances of the case - i.e. in view of the violation of several provisions of Regulation 2016/679 (the principle of data confidentiality, expressed in Article 5 (1) (a)) f, and reflected in the obligations set out in Article 24 (1), Article 25 (1), Article 32 (1) (b) and (d) and Article 32 (2)), both Art. 83 sec. 4 lit. a regulation 2016/679, providing, inter alia, for breach of the administrator's obligations referred to in art. 25 and art. 32 of Regulation 2016/679, the possibility of imposing an administrative fine of up to EUR 10,000,000 (in the case of an enterprise - up to 2% of its total annual worldwide turnover from the previous financial year), as well as Art. 83 sec. 5 lit. a regulation 2016/679, according to which violations of, inter alia, the basic principles of processing, including in art. 5 of this regulation are subject to an administrative fine of up to EUR 20,000,000 (in the case of an enterprise - up to 4% of its total annual worldwide turnover from the previous financial year, whichever is higher).</p><p> In view of the above, pursuant to Art. 83 sec. 3 of Regulation 2016/679, the President of the Office for Personal Data Protection determined the total amount of the administrative fine in an amount not exceeding the amount of the penalty for the most serious infringement. In the presented facts, the most serious breach by the Company of the confidentiality principle specified in Art. 5 sec. 1 lit. f of the Regulation 2016/679. This is supported by the serious nature of the breach and the group of people affected by it (140,699 - one hundred and forty thousand six hundred and ninety-nine customers of the Company, ie persons whose data is administered by the Company).</p><p> Pursuant to art. 103 of the Act of May 10, 2018 on the Protection of Personal Data (Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1781), the equivalent of the amounts expressed in euro referred to in Art. 83 of Regulation 2016/679, are calculated in PLN at the average EUR exchange rate announced by the National Bank of Poland in the exchange rate table as of January 28 of each year, and in the event that the National Bank of Poland does not announce the average EUR exchange rate on January 28 in a given year - according to the average the euro exchange rate announced in the nearest exchange rate table of the National Bank of Poland after that date.</p><p> Bearing in mind the above, the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, pursuant to art. 83 sec. 4 lit. a and art. 83 sec. 5 lit. and in connection with Art. 83 sec. 3 of the Regulation 2016/679 and in connection with Art. 103 of the Act of 10 May 2018 on the Protection of Personal Data, for the violations described in the operative part of this decision, imposed on the Company - using the average EUR exchange rate of January 28, 2020 (EUR 1 = PLN 4.2794) - an administrative fine in the amount of PLN 1,069,850.00 (equivalent to EUR 250,000).</p><p> In the opinion of the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, the administrative fine, in the established circumstances of this case, performs the functions referred to in Art. 83 sec. 1 of Regulation 2016/679, i.e. it will be effective, proportionate and dissuasive in this individual case.</p><p> In the opinion of the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, the penalty imposed on the Company will be effective, because it will lead to a state in which the Company will apply such technical and organizational measures that will ensure the level of security for the data processed, corresponding to the risk of violating the rights and freedoms of data subjects and the importance of the accompanying threats. the processing of this personal data. The effectiveness of the penalty is therefore equivalent to the guarantee that the Company, from the moment of the conclusion of these proceedings, will follow the requirements of the provisions on the protection of personal data with the utmost care.</p><p> The applied fine is also proportional to the infringement found, in particular its seriousness, the number of individuals affected by it and the risk they bear in connection with the infringement. In the opinion of the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, the fine imposed on the Company is appropriate taking into account the net revenues of the Company determined for 2019 at the level of PLN 17.7 million and for 2018 at the level of PLN 33.4 million and will not constitute an excessive burden for it. As can be seen from the above amounts, the Company shows ever lower revenues. It should also be emphasized that the Company took steps to terminate its activities by adopting on [...] June 2020 a unanimous resolution of the Extraordinary General Meeting of ID Finance Sp. z o. o. with its seat in Warsaw, on the dissolution of the Company and appointment of its liquidator. At the same time, however, it should be noted that, according to the information corresponding to the current excerpt from the register of entrepreneurs (KRS number: "[...]"), as of December 14, 2020, the only shareholder of the Company is IDFI, SL, legal person, company capital registered under Spanish law with its seat in B.</p><p> Therefore, the amount of the fine was set at such a level that, on the one hand, it would constitute an adequate response of the supervisory authority to the degree of breach of the administrator's obligations, on the other hand, it did not result in a situation in which the necessity to pay a financial penalty would entail negative consequences, such as a significant deterioration of the financial situation. Companies. In the opinion of the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, the Company should and is able to bear the consequences of its negligence in the field of data protection, hence the imposition of a penalty of PLN 1,069,850.00 is fully justified.</p><p> The administrative fine will perform a repressive function in these specific circumstances, as it will be a response to the Company's breach of the provisions of Regulation 2016/679, but also preventive, i.e. it will prevent future violations of the provisions on the protection of personal data by both the Company and other data administrators.</p><p> Bearing the above in mind, the President of the Personal Data Protection Office resolved as in the operative part of this decision. </p><p></p><div class="print-version"><img class="icon32 icon-print" src="/bundles/app/img/ico/print.svg" title="Click here to see the print version." alt="Iokna drukarki"><img class="icon32 icon-back" src="/bundles/app/img/ico/back.svg" title="Click here to go back to the normal version of the website." alt="Iokna powrotu do serwisu"></div><div class="article-metric-button" data-id="1805"> <span><i>2020-12-29</i></span> <img style="margin-top: -0.3rem; margin-left:.3rem;" src="/bundles/app/img/metadane-s3.png"
alt="Metadane artykułu" title="Article metadata" /></div></div><div class="article-metric" id="metric_art_1805"><table class="table table-striped table-bordered"><tbody><tr><td> The sharing entity:</td><td colspan="2"> Control and Infringement Department</td></tr><tr><td> Produced information:</td><td> Jan Nowak</td><td> 2020-12-17</td></tr><tr><td> Introduced 'information:</td><td> Wioletta Golańska</td><td> 2020-12-29 15:07:09</td></tr><tr><td> Recently modified:</td><td> Izabela Pawelczyk</td><td> 2020-12-31 10:16:51</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><script>
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