BAG - 2 AZR 235/21
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| BAG - 2 AZR 235/21 | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Court: | BAG (Germany) |
| Jurisdiction: | Germany |
| Relevant Law: | Article 15(1) GDPR Article 15(3) GDPR § 253(2)(Nr. 2) ZPO |
| Decided: | 16.12.2021 |
| Published: | |
| Parties: | |
| National Case Number/Name: | 2 AZR 235/21 |
| European Case Law Identifier: | |
| Appeal from: | LAG Baden-Wüttenberg 21 Sa 43/20 |
| Appeal to: | |
| Original Language(s): | German |
| Original Source: | openJur (in German) |
| Initial Contributor: | Sara Horvat |
The German Federal Labour Court held that a claim to access personal data under Article 15 GDPR was inadmissible because it used terms which are not included in Article 15(1) GDPR and whose meaning is ambiguous.
English Summary
Facts
The data subject is an employee of the controller. The controller terminated the employment contract because of allegations against the data subject which had been made in a specially set up platform of the controller to uncover mismanagement within its business. The data subject filed a lawsuit against the termination of the contract in which he, among others, requested access to his data under Article 15 GDPR. The data subject won the lawsuit with regard to the termination of the contract. The part relating to Article 15 GDPR was separated from the rest of the lawsuit. The data subject limited its application under Article 15(1), (3) GDPR to data on his "personal performance and conduct" which is "not stored in his personal file".
The Regional Labor Court Baden-Württemberg (Landesarbeitsgericht Baden-Württemberg - LAG Baden-Württemberg) upheld the claim.
Holding
The Federal Labor Court decided that the claim was inadmissible according to § 253(2)(Nr. 2) ZPO (Code of Civil Procedure) since the request to access was not specific enough. The court affirmed that a claim must be so specific that it can be enforced later on, otherwise uncertainty would be created for the defendant and the enforcement authorities. The court further reasoned that the use of terms which are subject to interpretation is only allowed if, on the one hand, further specification is not possible or reasonable for the plaintiff, and, on the other hand, there is no doubt for the parties as to their meaning, so that the scope of the application and the judgment is certain. The court found that it was possible for the data subject to specify its request because his submissions showed that he actually knew which data he wanted access to. Furthermore, it found that "personal performance and conduct" and "not stored in his personnel file" are not sufficient specific terms as they are not defined by law or jurisprudence and don't have a definite common meaning.
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English Machine Translation of the Decision
The decision below is a machine translation of the German original. Please refer to the German original for more details.
BAG, judgment of December 16, 2021 - 2 AZR 235/21
reference
openJur 2022, 4171
Rkr: AmtlSlg: PM:
A complaint, which supplements the wording of Art. 15 Para. 1 Half. 2 GDPR contains terms that require interpretation, the content of which cannot be resolved, is not sufficiently specific.
tenor
1. The judgment of the Baden-Württemberg State Labor Court of March 17, 2021 - 21 Sa 43/20 - is reversed in terms of costs and to the extent that the defendant's appeal was rejected - with the rejection of the plaintiff's appeal.
2. Upon the defendant's appeal, the judgment of the Stuttgart Labor Court of June 5, 2019 - 3 Ca 4960/18 - is further amended and the claim with regard to the claims 4. and 5. is dismissed in its entirety.
3. The plaintiff has to bear the costs of the appeal and revision proceedings. The plaintiff bears 4/9 and the defendant 5/9 of the costs of the first instance proceedings.
facts
Finally, the parties are still arguing about claims for information about personal data processed by the defendant and for the provision of a copy of this data.
The plaintiff most recently worked as head of controlling operations for the use of funds for the defendant. This terminated the employment relationship, citing behavioral reasons, after, among other things. accusations had been made against the plaintiff in one of its whistleblower systems for reporting possible wrongdoing (hereinafter referred to as BPO). The relevant action for protection against unfair dismissal has meanwhile been finally decided in favor of the plaintiff in separate appeal proceedings.
With his lawsuit, the plaintiff also has claims under Art. 15 para. 1 half-sect. 2 and paragraph 3 sentence 1 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation; hereinafter GDPR). His claims are sufficiently specific. In the case of claims for information under data protection law, a particularly generous standard for the specificity of a claim is required. He is essentially, but not exclusively, concerned with his personal performance and behavioral data, insofar as these are stored by the defendant in certain, individually named IT systems. In addition, he particularly requested information about his or a copy of his personal performance and behavioral data in e-mail traffic between an employee of the defendant and him in the period between January 1, 2016 and December 31, 2017, from the person concerned BPO Cases with BPO Case Numbers AL-2012-00134 and AL-2018-00020 and any performance assessments by the Defendant concerning him in the period between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2018. He accepts that it is based on based on the current legal situation, there is a conflict of interest between the protection of whistleblowers and the right to information under the GDPR. If necessary, it should be clarified in the enforcement proceedings whether the defendant is entitled to withhold copies of data because this is necessary to protect third parties.
To the extent that this is of interest in the appeal proceedings, the plaintiff requested:
1. The defendant is sentenced to provide the plaintiff with information about the plaintiff's personal performance and behavior data processed by her and not stored in the plaintiff's personal file, with regard to
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the purposes of data processing,
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the recipients to whom the defendant has disclosed or will disclose the personal data of the plaintiff,
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the storage period or, if this is not possible, criteria for determining the period,
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the origin of the plaintiff's personal data, insofar as the defendant did not collect them from the plaintiff himself and
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the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, as well as meaningful information about the logic involved and the scope and intended effects of such processing.
2. The defendant is ordered to provide the plaintiff with a copy of its performance and behavioral personal data that are the subject of the processing it is undertaking.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the motions lacked specificity as they would not be enforceable if plaintiff prevails. Because the plaintiff designates specific IT systems of the defendant in his pleadings, it is already clear that he is quite capable of specifying his applications. The plaintiff's right to inspect the BPO file is to be limited by the exceptional circumstances of the GDPR and the BDSG with regard to the conflicting interests of third parties. In addition, she had already fulfilled the plaintiff's claims for information by letters dated June 26, 2020 and March 16, 2021.
The labor court upheld the complaint in full - insofar as it was of interest to the appeal proceedings. Upon the defendant's appeal, the regional labor court partially amended the judgment of the first instance, revised the operative part with numerous restrictions, conditions and exemplary cases, otherwise dismissed the complaint and allowed both parties to appeal. With its appeal, the defendant is seeking the complete dismissal of the action, insofar as claims under the GDPR are affected, and the plaintiff's appeal is aimed at restoring the judgment of the first instance.
reasons
The defendant's revision is justified. The regional labor court has appealed against the Art. 15 Para. 1 half. 2 and Para. 3 Sentence 1 GDPR, the judgment of the labor court that supported the plaintiff's applications was wrongly partially rejected, which is why it must be annulled in this respect, Section 562 Para. 1 ZPO. The lawsuit is - insofar as it has reached the appeal - inadmissible and therefore to be dismissed, § 563 Para. 3 ZPO. In contrast, the revision of the plaintiff according to § 561 ZPO iVm. Section 563 (3) ZPO to be rejected.
I. The revisions of both parties are admissible. This also applies if the plaintiff requests a complete annulment of the appeal judgment. The complaint with regard to the part of the judgment rejecting the appeal of the defendant results from the lack of enforceability of the operative part - which he claims - (cf. MüKoZPO/Rimmelspacher 6th ed. Vorb. § 511 Rn. 73; Zöller/Heßler ZPO 34th ed Preliminary to §§ 511 - 541 para. 13; left open in the event of a conviction in accordance with the application without enforceable content BGH April 12, 1995 - XII ZB 50/95 - to II 1 of the reasons).
II. The defendant's revision is justified.
1. The judgment of the regional labor court is incorrect. It violates § 313 Section 1 No. 4 in conjunction with § 253 Para. 2 No. 2 ZPO and is therefore partially overturned to the extent of the complaint of the defendant (§ 562 Para. 1 ZPO).
a) A judgment is subject to rescission if the judgment formula is not sufficiently defined iSv. Section 313 paragraph 1 no. 4 in conjunction with § 253 Para. 2 No. 2 ZPO is (see BAG October 15, 2013 - 9 AZR 573/12 - para. 16; January 15, 2013 - 3 AZR 705/10 - para. 12; BGH May 4, 2005 - I ZR 127/02 - to II 1 of the reasons).
b) The title itself must have a specific or at least determinable content (see BAG May 27, 2015 - 5 AZR 88/14 - para. 40, BAGE 152, 1; May 31, 2012 - 3 AZB 29/12 - paragraph 15). The requirement of the specificity of the verdict - to be checked ex officio - serves the purpose of legal clarity and legal certainty. The extent of the substantive legal force iSv. Section 322 (1) ZPO and thus the effects of the decision must be able to be determined (BAG October 15, 2013 - 9 AZR 564/12 - para. 23). Otherwise, ambiguities about the content of the obligation from the recognition procedure would be shifted to the enforcement procedure, whose task is not to clarify what the debtor's obligation consists of (cf. BAG May 31, 2012 - 3 AZB 29/12 - loc. cit.; 28 February 2003 - 1 AZB 53/02 - on B II 1 of the reasons, BAGE 105, 195; BGH October 13, 2015 - VI ZR 271/14 - para. 19, BGHZ 207, 163). In order to check the specificity of the verdict, the facts and reasons for the decision must also be used if the verdict does not reveal the subject matter of the dispute and thus the scope of legal force (cf. BAG April 10, 2014 - 2 AZR 812/12 - para. 29; 15 October 2013 - 9 AZR 573/12 - para. 17).
c) For constitutional reasons, the debtor must be able to identify the cases in which he can expect coercive measures (cf. BAG May 27, 2015 - 5 AZR 88/14 - para. 44, BAGE 152, 1; February 28, 2003 - 1 AZB 53/02 - to B II 1 of the reasons, BAGE 105, 195). In addition, the rule of law and the resulting requirement for effective legal protection (BVerfG February 12, 1992 - 1 BvL 1/89 - on C I of the reasons, BVerfGE 85, 337) require that substantive legal claims can be effectively enforced.
d) According to this standard, the tenor of the appeal judgment is not sufficiently specific. Irrespective of the question of the specificity of the original complaint (see below, para. 20 et seq.), the verdict is indefinite because in I 1 (information) and I 2 (copy) it states "insofar as not the exceptions regulated in Sections 27 (2), 28 (2), 29 (1) sentence 2 and 34 (1) BDSG" are not enforceable.
aa) By referring to other legal regulations, which in turn contain numerous legal terms that need to be interpreted and further references to other standards, neither the defendant nor an enforcement body can tell which obligation has to be fulfilled. The dispute over the content of the obligation imposed in the defendant's decision would be shifted to the enforcement proceedings, since the parties are currently at odds as to whether the defendant can invoke restrictions on the right to information and copies. This applies in particular to the restriction from Section 29 (1) sentence 2 BDSG ("overriding legitimate interests of a third party"), which the defendant expressly asserted. In the context of any enforcement, a full substantive legal examination of this indefinite legal concept, which is provided with an evaluative element, would have to take place. This is not the task of the enforcement procedure and would also leave the defendant in the dark as to what performance it is obliged to perform according to the verdict.
bb) The facts and reasons for the appeal judgment do not contribute to clarifying the unclear tenor of the judgment. Rather, the Higher Labor Court itself assumes that the exceptions it formulated would lead to disputes being shifted to the enforcement proceedings. His view that this is the only way the employee's legal claim under Art. 15 para. 1 half-sect. 2 GDPR is not convincing because the same questions that should actually be clarified in the decision-making process then have to be answered in the enforcement process. However, this would not offer the plaintiff any better enforceability of his claim. Rather, the decision-making process with oral hearings and the possibility of taking evidence, including party questioning and party hearings, is the way provided by the legislature to formulate a claim as the basis for its subsequent enforcement in the decision with the necessary clarity. This does not call into question the effectiveness of legal protection, but rather makes it possible in the first place.
cc) The decision statement is also vague with regard to the restriction contained there for "information" and "copy", according to which the obligation of the defendant "does not refer to the IT systems My Feedback, My Contribution, Employee Satisfaction, My Points and, in the case of Lead IT, the performance evaluation". It would have to be checked in the enforcement proceedings in which IT system the data relating to the plaintiff is stored. The defendant could - according to the restriction formulated by the regional labor court - refuse to provide information or a copy of the data by pointing out that the data is (also) stored in one of the IT systems mentioned. This limitation of the claims according to the storage location of the data would also lead to an inadmissible shift of the dispute to the enforcement proceedings. The view of the Court of Appeal that the defendant is not obliged to continue looking for data in certain places because - according to its statement - it does not exist there, ultimately bears no relation to the actual claim.
dd) Since the legal error of the appeal judgment already results from its vagueness, it can remain open whether there is also a violation of § 308 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 ZPO because the plaintiff was awarded something other than requested by the regional labor court.
2. On appeal by the defendant, the first-instance judgment - with the exception of the legally binding grandfathering applications - is to be amended and the action to the extent still pending is to be dismissed as a whole. The Senate can decide on this itself, since the matter is ready for a final decision (§ 563 Para. 3 ZPO). The remaining lawsuits, which the plaintiff is continuing to pursue unchanged in the appeal proceedings, are due to a lack of sufficient certainty within the meaning of § 253 Para. 2 No. 2 ZPO inadmissible, so that even issuing a judgment of acknowledgment would not be an option (cf. BGH November 10, 2009 - XI ZB 15/09 - Rn. 15; March 20, 2001 - VI ZR 325/ 99 - to II 1 of the reasons; aA Riemer ZD 2021, 583).
a) The most recent applications made by the plaintiff to 1. and 2. (tenor of the first instance to 3. and 4.) are due to lack of sufficient certainty iSv. § 253 para. 2 no. 2 ZPO inadmissible. The specificity of the complaint is to be examined ex officio in the appeal proceedings (Federal Court of Justice March 9, 2021 - VI ZR 73/20 - para. 15), regardless of the complaint raised throughout by the defendant.
aa) An application for action is sufficiently determined if it describes the claim raised by means of figures or an objective description so specifically that the scope of the judicial decision-making authority (§ 308 Para. 1 ZPO) is clearly defined, content and scope of the substantive legal force of the desired decision ( § 322 Para. 1 ZPO) are recognizable, the risk of the plaintiff possibly being partially defeated is not passed on to the defendant due to avoidable inaccuracy and any enforcement is not burdened with a continuation of the dispute in the enforcement proceedings (BAG April 27, 2021 - 2 AZR 342 /20 - para. 19; BGH November 21, 2017 - II ZR 180/15 - para. 8; November 28, 2002 - I ZR 168/00 - to II 2 b (1) of the reasons, BGHZ 153, 69). It is not sufficient to invoke legal provisions that provide for the claim, rather the consequences resulting from the standards must be taken into account by the plaintiff in the individual case when formulating their claim (cf. BAG April 25, 2001 - 5 AZR 395/99 - to II of the reasons).
bb) The use of terms that require interpretation is only considered if, on the one hand, further specification is not possible or reasonable for the plaintiff and, on the other hand, the parties have no doubts about their content, so that the scope of the application and judgment is certain (Federal Court of Justice December 2nd 2015 - IV ZR 28/15 - para. 8). It must be taken into account here that procedural law is intended to implement substantive law, but not to prevent it from being enforced. As a result, in case of doubt, complaints must be interpreted in such a way that corresponds to the content of the substantive claim being pursued (Federal Court of Justice December 2, 2015 - IV ZR 28/15 - para. 10). However, an application that merely repeats the legal text is generally not suitable for settling a specific dispute between the parties with legal force (cf. Federal Labor Court of July 9, 2013 - 1 ABR 17/12 - para. 15, 18; April 25, 2001 - 5 AZR 395/99 - to II of the reasons; BGH December 21, 2011 - I ZR 190/10 - para. 12).
cc) The last application made by the plaintiff to 1. (tenor of the first instance to 3.) does not meet the certainty requirements required under § 253 Para. 2 No. 2 ZPO, since it - in addition to the wording of Art. 15 Para. 2 GDPR - terms that require interpretation are used, the content of which the parties have doubts about (“performance and behavioral data”). Furthermore, the exception of a storage location in the application ("not stored in the plaintiff's personal file") makes it unclear what information is ultimately required.
(1) The wording "performance and behavioral data" is an indefinite legal term whose (enforcement law) scope is unclear in the present case. The plaintiff does not want any information about "all" stored personal data, which the wording of Art. 15 Para. 1 Half. 2 GDPR would include. He only wants information about "performance and behavior data", but not about those that are stored in his personnel file. The parties also do not agree on which data is collected by this. Contrary to what the regional labor court thinks, recourse to the case law of the Federal Labor Court on § 87 Para. 1 No. 6 BetrVG does not lead to a specificity of the applications. The aforementioned standard collects data collected by "technical devices" that are "designed to monitor the behavior or performance of workers". Even if one wanted to adopt the assumption that "behaviour" and "performance" - which are not to be further differentiated within the scope of § 87 Para. 1 No. 6 BetrVG (cf. Fitting BetrVG 30th ed. § 87 Rn. 221) - is about an "action or omission carried out or controlled by the will of the employee" (cf. BAG March 11, 1986 - 1 ABR 12/84 - to B II 3 b of the reasons, BAGE 51, 217), would not clarify the content of the claim. Such data is typically part of the personnel file, but the data contained there is excluded from the application. It is not clear which data this should then include. It could be about assessments or opinions expressed by other employees about the plaintiff (cf. on Directive 95/46/EC but ECJ July 17, 2014 - C-141/12 and C-372/12 - para. 45 f., 48, where the fact is pointed out that the person concerned can request information about the stored "factual basis", but not about the "analysis" based on it) or information that may deviate from the "concept of performance and behavior", as is the case with a mere exchange of e-mails will often be the case. Since the defendant has indicated to the plaintiff which data - in particular with regard to whistleblowers - it does not disclose to him, he would have had all the more opportunity to specify which information he still desires. The plaintiff has - it seems - clear ideas about which data he is requesting information about, but does not name them clearly. In doing so, he avoidably leaves it unclear which specific action he is requesting from the defendant and inadmissibly shifts the question of what information the defendant is supposed to provide to the enforcement proceedings.
(2) Contrary to what the plaintiff says in his reasoning on the appeal, in his pleading of June 4, 2020 he did not limit his request to specifically designated personal data. Rather, in this pleading, he explained to the doubts about certainty expressed by the regional labor court that the applications were sufficiently specific and did not need to be specified. Furthermore, he stated - alternatively - that he was essentially, but not exclusively, concerned with certain individual contents. In view of this, the plaintiff has not made any limitation of his claim, but only named individual examples, which are not intended to be conclusive.
(3) The Senate does not ignore the fact that, for reasons of effective legal protection, there must be a way that is based on Art. 15 para. 1 half-sect. 2 GDPR to also enforce the following claim procedurally. Procedural law is intended to implement substantive law, but not prevent it from being enforced (cf. BGH December 2, 2015 - IV ZR 28/15 - para. 10). In contrast to the right to be provided with a copy according to Art. 15 Para. 3 Sentence 1 GDPR, it should be noted in particular that the claimant only wants to obtain the information through his request for information that provides a more precise description of what is being said about him personal data is stored (cf. BGH December 2, 2015 - IV ZR 28/15 - para. 9; cf. on the priority of "information" over the right to a "copy" also BAG April 27, 2021 - 2 AZR 342/20 - para. 25).
(a) Whether it is permissible in view of the special nature of the right to information determined by Union law for the employee - insofar as he has not yet received any information from the employer - to make a claim based on the pure wording of Art. 15 para. 1 half-sect. 2 DSGVO-oriented application without further specification can remain open in the present case. The plaintiff did not do this, but included conditions and categorizations in his application ("performance and behavioral data"; "not stored in the personnel file...") which did not result in a "minus" from the claim he had formulated but an "Aliud" to the content of the claim according to Art. 15 para. 1 half-sect. 2 GDPR. It would be inadmissible to "mentally" delete the application limitations and the defendant according to the wording of Art. 15 Para. 2 GDPR, because this would be a violation of § 308 Para. 1 Sentence 1 ZPO.
(b) The plaintiff also failed to take into account that the defendant provided him with information during the appeal proceedings in a letter dated June 26, 2020. In addition, the defendant already provided information on written employee surveys regarding process number AL-2018-00020 of the BPO whistleblower system in the first instance proceedings. Nevertheless, the plaintiff neither based his applications on "complete" information (leaving open whether such an application would be possible, BGH June 15, 2021 - VI ZR 576/19 - para. 32) nor took the information provided as an opportunity to ( remaining) desire to specify.
dd) The application for 2. (tenor of the first instance for 4.) is also inadmissible. A merely abstract naming of the desired "copy" repeating the wording of Art. 15 Para. 3 Sentence 1 GDPR and adding the criteria "performance and behavior" that require interpretation does not meet the requirements of an iSv. § 253 para. 2 no. 2 ZPO sufficiently specific claim. In the event of a conviction, it would be unclear to which personal data the conviction would specifically relate and when the claim would be fulfilled (cf. BAG April 27, 2021 - 2 AZR 342/20 - para. 20).
(1) The terms "performance and behavioral data" are - as already described above under para. 24 ff. for the request for information - vague legal terms whose (enforcement law) scope is completely unclear. The parties also do not agree on which data is collected by this. This is all the more true as the plaintiff in the appeal proceedings also related his request to the example of e-mail correspondence with an employee of the defendant in a certain period of time, in which it is not obvious that all e-mails with "performance and conduct" of the plaintiff. Finding out which e-mails are affected would also inadmissibly shift the dispute to the enforcement proceedings.
(2) Irrespective of this, the application for the provision of a "copy" proved to be inadmissible, even if the obscuring element of "performance and behavioral data" was ignored, since it was sufficiently specific within the meaning of § 253 para. 2 no. 2 ZPO is missing. Unlike possibly the right to information according to Art. 15 Para. 1 Halbs. 2 GDPR, where a mere repetition of the wording of the standard could also be considered as a permissible application, since the claimant is initially concerned with obtaining information on further specification, this is sufficient in the case - as here outside of a class action (§ 254 ZPO) asserted - claim from Art. 15 para. 3 sentence 1 DSGVO in principle not.
(a) The request to be provided with a "copy" is to be understood, in the absence of any further provisions, that the defendant has to provide the plaintiff with either a paper printout or an electronic copy of the data (cf. BAG April 27, 2021 - 2 AZR 342/20 - para. 17).
(b) Even in this concrete interpretation, the application is not sufficiently specific. The mere repetition of the wording of Art. 15 Para. 3 Sentence 1 GDPR does not indicate which personal data is required to be copied. A subsequent conviction would not be enforceable (see BAG April 27, 2021 - 2 AZR 342/20 - para. 21; also Schulte/Welge NZA 2019, 1110, 1112). The personal data are not described in such a way that in the enforcement proceedings there would be no doubt as to what the order to hand over a copy specifically refers to and thus when the claim would be fulfilled if data falling into this category were handed over (cf. BAG 27 April 2021 - 2 AZR 342/20 - para. 18). This would avoidably shifting the dispute between the parties to enforcement. In order to avoid this, the plaintiff - insofar as he is unable to give a more precise description himself - is obliged to enforce his request by means of a class action lawsuit (§ 254 ZPO). This is initially to provide information about which personal data the defendant is processing, in the second stage, if necessary, to provide an affidavit that the information is correct and complete, and finally to provide a copy of the data resulting from the information (cf. BAG April 27, 2021 - 2 AZR 342/20 - para. 20). This applies all the more in the present case because the defendant has already given the plaintiff a (at least partial) copy of the personal data it believes it has processed, which was not taken into account until the very end when the related complaint was drafted.
(c) The obligation of the person responsible to keep a processing record according to Art. 30 GDPR does not change anything about the vagueness of the application (aA without further justification König CR 2019, 295, 296). A processing directory according to Art. 30 GDPR does not contain a list of the specific personal data processed, but only a description of the corresponding categories (Art. 30 Para. 1 Sentence 2 Letter c GDPR). The content of the processing directory is also not apparent from an application that merely repeats the wording of Art. 15 (3) sentence 1 GDPR.
ee) One on the interpretation or validity of Union law iSv. Art. 267 TFEU for a preliminary ruling is not required with regard to the claim under Art. 15 (3) sentence 1 GDPR. The Senate has already justified this in detail in its decision of April 27, 2021, which is also known to the parties, to which reference is made to avoid repetition (cf. BAG April 27, 2021 - 2 AZR 342/20 - para. 22 ff.) . The statements there are based on the right to information from Art. 15 para. 1 half-sect. 2 GDPR. The basic requirement of specificity of the claim, which is not met by the unclear limitation to "performance and behavioral data" "that are not stored in the plaintiff's personal file", would apply to all claims for benefits in the same way under national law. Whether the principle of effectiveness could be satisfied by considering an application based on the mere wording of the norm as sufficient - at least in cases of a complete refusal of information - does not require a decision in the present case.
ff) Pursuant to Section 563 (3) ZPO, the Senate can make its own final decision on the inadmissibility of the complaint. There is no need to refer the matter back to the regional labor court for a new hearing and decision (Section 563 (1) sentence 1 ZPO). The question of the admissibility of the claims has already been dealt with extensively in the first and second instance. In response to a corresponding request from the regional labor court, the plaintiff stated in the appeal proceedings that his requests were sufficiently specific and did not require any further specification. He also represented this view in the appeal proceedings. A relevant specification of the applications is therefore not to be expected in a continued appeal process.
b) In the present case, due to the inadmissibility of applications 1 and 2 (tenor of the first instance 3 and 4), no decision is required as to whether they are global applications (BAG January 17, 2019 - 6 AZR 17/18 - Rn 29, BAGE 165, 48; September 17, 2013 - 1 ABR 26/12 - paragraph 8 et seq.; October 27, 2010 - 7 ABR 36/09 - paragraph 35; October 13, 2009 - 9 AZR 139/08 - Margin no. 23, BAGE 132, 195) and these - in the event of their admissibility - would have to be dismissed as unfounded, because the defendant has already provided information and copies on individual topics, so that a repeated unlimited service is not required could. Likewise, there is no need to discuss what effects the objection to performance raised by the defendant would have (cf. BGH June 15, 2021 - VI ZR 576/19 - para. 19 f.).
3. There is no need to deal with the procedural objections raised by the defendant because the action remains unsuccessful even without taking them into account.
III. The revision of the plaintiff is not justified and was according to § 561 in connection with Section 563 (3) ZPO to be rejected. The appeal judgment turns out to be a violation of § 313 Para. 1 No. 4 in conjunction with § 253 Para. 2 No. 2 ZPO as incorrect in law (cf. para. 10 et seq. above) - as the plaintiff rightly complains - and is therefore to be set aside. Nevertheless, the plaintiff does not succeed with his actual request for revision - a restoration of the first instance decision. Rather - contrary to the assumption of the labor court - the original claim is to be dismissed in this respect. The complaints are inadmissible (cf. para. 20 et seq. above). As a result, the plaintiff's appeal is unsuccessful.
IV. The unsuccessful plaintiff has to bear the costs of the appeal and revision proceedings, Section 91 Paragraph 1, Section 97 Paragraph 1 ZPO. The costs of the first-instance proceedings are to be shared proportionately in view of the legally binding grandfathering applications pursuant to Section 92 (1) sentence 1 ZPO.
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