ICO (UK) - Cabinet Office
From GDPRhub
| ICO (UK) - Cabinet Office | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Authority: | ICO (UK) |
| Jurisdiction: | United Kingdom |
| Relevant Law: | Article 5(1)(f) GDPR Article 32(1) GDPR Article 33(1) GDPR Paragraph 15(1), Part 2, Schedule 2 Data Protection Act 2018 |
| Type: | Investigation |
| Outcome: | Violation Found |
| Started: | |
| Decided: | 15.11.2021 |
| Published: | 02.12.2021 |
| Fine: | 500000 GBP |
| Parties: | Cabinet Office |
| National Case Number/Name: | Cabinet Office |
| European Case Law Identifier: | n/a |
| Appeal: | n/a |
| Original Language(s): | English |
| Original Source: | Information Commissioner's Office (in EN) |
| Initial Contributor: | MH |
The UK DPA (ICO) imposed a fine of approximately €585,739 (GBP 500,000) on the Cabinet Office for a data breach in violation of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR. The New Years 2020 Honours List was published including postal addresses for the recipients of the Honours.
English Summary
Facts
On 27 December 2019, the UK Cabinet Office (department of the Government of the United Kingdom) published the content page of the New Years 2020 Honours List on its website. The content page contained a link to a CSV file version of the Honours list that was not adequately edited to remove personal data. The CSV file contained the postal address of Honours recipients in a column that had been “hidden” rather than completely “deleted” from the CSV file. Despite the various steps taken before publishing the CSV file, no one within the Cabinet Office teams working on the Honours List noticed that the column was only “hidden”. The column was still there and became apparent again once the CSV file was made available online on gov.uk.
The Cabinet Office was alerted of the data breach by a member of the Government Communications Team. The Cabinet Office then republished the content page without the link to the CSV file. However, anyone who had the exact URL to the CSV file already could still access it despite this change. This is because documents cannot be removed from the gov.uk website once they have been published.
The issue was escalated and eventually the CSV file was permanently deleted around 2 hours and 30 minutes after it was first made available. It was found that the CSV file was accessed 3872 times from 2798 IP addresses.
The Cabinet Office alerted affected data subjects within 48 hours of the data breach and submitted a Personal Data Breach Report to the ICO within 72 hours of becoming aware of the breach.
The Cabinet Office confirmed there was no written process in place to approve documents containing personal data prior to being published to ensure the content was suitably redacted. Additionally, the Cabinet Office’s page for best practice on data handling had not been updated for six months despite the implementation of a new software used to produce the Honours List (which contained a column for addresses). There were various other security concerns identified in an independent review commissioned by the Cabinet Office (accessibility of data to team members that do not need to have access; lack of testing of software to ensure they are robust enough; lack of monitoring of training for staff).
Holding
The United Kingdom Data Protection Authority (ICO) held that the Cabinet Office had contravened Article 5(1)(f) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) when erroneously publishing the CSV file containing the data subjects’ postal addresses.
The ICO also considered that the Cabinet Office had infringed Article 32(1) GDPR as it did not have appropriate technical and organisational measures in place to ensure an appropriate level of security.
The ICO investigated the Exemption within Paragraph 15(1) of Part 2 of Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act 2018, which excludes the application of various rights and obligations to personal data processed for the purposes of conferring an honour or dignity (given by the Government under the name “the Crown”). Article 5 is listed as a provision that the data controller would not have to comply if the exemption applied. However, the ICO deemed that this did not apply as the contravention of Article 5(1)(f) as the erroneous publication of addresses was a result of a data security incident (rather than rights and obligations).
The ICO considered that a monetary penalty was appropriate given:
- the number of individuals affected;
- the damage or harm (eg distress and/or embarrassment); and
- failure to apply reasonable technical and organisational measures to mitigate any breach
It also considered the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement. Despite the short time frame of availability (2.5 hours), there was a substantial amount of views (3872 times) and the Honours List was a high-profile event that attracts interest. The ICO also considered that the address of high profile people was disclosed as a result. The ICO highlighted that the breach caused distress to some of the affected individuals (3 complaints were received from affected data subjects)
The ICO considered the fact that the infringement was negligent. Staff members had been given verbal reminders to remove personal data from files, but there was no written process on how to remove said personal data. There was also no specific approval process in place to ensure personal data was adequately removed from documents intended for publication.
The ICO identified steps taken by the controller to mitigate damage suffered by data subjects. This included:
- removing the CSV file completely after 2.5 hours;
- 2.5 hours was a short time frame for accessibility; and
- most access occurred prior to the CSV file being completely deleted (when just the link was removed). This indicated that the first steps taken by the Cabinet Office were generally successful, even if the CSV file was still technically accessible in other ways.
The Cabinet Office also took steps to inform data subjects within 48 hours of the breach and ensured that the Police took steps to assess the risk of the affected data subjects. The ICO found that the Cabinet Office took steps to prevent further dissemination of the data, for example by ensuring screenshots of the List posted on Twitter were removed.
The ICO also highlighted the steps taken by the Cabinet Office to reduce the likelihood of similar events occurring in the future. For example, reviewing technical processes, issuing guidance on removing personal data, providing training sessions to staff members, engaging in an independent review of data handling policies, processes, practice and culture.
Additionally, the ICO found that the data breach stemmed from a build error of the new software used to produce the Honours List. This generated the list to include postal address data in error. Accordingly, the Cabinet Office was responsible for the breach as the Digital and Technology team built the system. Lack of training and guidance available for staff members, including those in the Digital team, was also an important factor.
The ICO therefore imposed a fine of approximately €585,739 on the Cabinet Office as an effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalty.
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English Machine Translation of the Decision
The decision below is a machine translation of the English original. Please refer to the English original for more details.
ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
DATA PROTECTION ACT 2018
SUPERVISORY POWERS OF THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
MONETARY PENALTY NOTICE
To: Cabinet Office
Of: 70 Whitehall, London, SW1A 2AS
1. The Information Commissioner ("the Commissioner") has decided to
issue the Cabinet Office with a penalty notice pursuant to section 155
of the Data Protection Act 2018 ("DPA"). This penalty notice imposes
an administrative fine on the Cabinet Office, in accordance with the
Commissioner's powers under Article 83 of the GDPR. The amount of
the penalty is £500,000 (five hundred thousand pounds).
2. The penalty is being issued because of contraventions by the Cabinet
Office of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) of the GDPR in that, on 27-28
December 2019, the Cabinet Office in error published on GOV.UK a CSV
file which included full correspondence (postal) addresses of-data
subjects (all of whom were 2020 New Year Honours recipients),
resulting in a disclosure of personal data. This was a breach of Article
5(1)(f) of the GDPR as the Cabinet Office did not process personal data
in a manner that ensured appropriate security of the personal data.
Further, at the time of and in the run up to the aforementioned breach,
the Cabinet Office did not have in place appropriate technical and
organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the
risk associated with the processing of data for the purpose of the 2020
New Year Honours List in breach of Article 32(1) of the GDPR.
I ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
3. This penalty notice explains the Commissioner's reasons for imposing
such a penalty, and for the amount of the penalty. Prior to issuing this
penalty notice, the Commissioner carefully considered the Cabinet
Office's Response to Notice of Intent dated 16 September 2021.
Legal Framework
4. The Cabinet Office is a data controller for the purposes of the GDPR and
DPA 2018 because it determines the purposes and means of the
processing of the personal data associated with this incident (Article
4(7) of the GDPR).
5. "Personal data" is defined by Article 4(1) of the GDPR to mean:
"any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person ('data subject'); an identifiable natural person is one who
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference
to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location
data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the
physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity of that natural person"
6. "Processing" is defined by Article 4(2) of the GDPR to mean:
"any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal
data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated
means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring,
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use,
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available, alignment or combination, restriction,erasure or
destruction"
2 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
7. Data controllers are subject to various obligations in relation to the
processing of personal data as set out in the GDPR and DPA 2018. They
are obliged by Article 5(2) of the GDPR to adhere to the data processing
principle set out in Article 5(1).
8. Article 5(1)(f) of the GDPR provides that personal data shall be:
"processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the
personal data, including protection against unauthorised or
unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or
damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures
('integrity and confidentiality')".
9. Article 32 of the GDPR provides:
"(1) Taking into account the state of the art, the costs of
implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of
processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for
the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller and the
processor shall implement appropriate technical and
organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate
to the risk, including inter alia as appropriate:
(a) the pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data;
(b) the ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, integrity,
availability and resilience of processing systems and services;
(c) the ability to restore the availability and access to personal
data in a timely manner in the event of a physical or technical
incident;
3 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
(d) a process for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating the
effectiveness of technical and organisational measures for
ensuring the security of the processing.
(2) In assessing the appropriate level of security account shall be
taken in particular of the risks that are presented by processing,
in particular from accidental or unlawful destruction, loss,
alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to personal data
transmitted, stored or otherwise processed."
10. The Commissioner is the supervisory authority for the United Kingdom
as provided for by Article 51 of the GDPR.
11. By Article 57(1) of the GDPR, it is the Commissioner's task to monitor
and enforce the application of the GDPR.
12. By Article 58(1)(d) of the GDPR, the Commissioner has the power
to notify controllers of alleged infringements of the GDPR. By Article
58(2)(i), the Commissioner has the power to impose an administrative
fine in accordance with Article 83 in addition to or instead of the other
corrective measures referred to in Article 58(2), depending on the
circumstance of each individual case.
13. By Article 83(1), the Commissioner is required to ensure that
administrative fines issued in accordance with Article 83 are effective,
proportionate and dissuasive in each individual case.
14. Article 83(2) goes on to set out a number of factors to which the
Commissioner should have regard when deciding whether to impose an
administrative fine and deciding on the amount of the administrative
fine in each individual case.
4 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
15. The DPA 2018 contains enforcement provisions in part 6 which are
exercisable by the Commissioner. Section 155 DPA 2018 provides in
relevant part:
"(1) If the Commissioner is satisfied that a person-
(a) has failed or is failing as described in section 149(2), (3), (4)
or (5),...
the Commissioner may, by written notice, require the person to
pay to the Commissioner an amount in sterling specified in the
notice.
(2) Subject to subsection (4), when deciding whether to give a
penalty notice to a person and determining the amount of the
penalty, the Commissioner must have regard to the following, so
far as relevant-
(a) to the extent that the notice concerns a matter to which
the UK GDPR applies, the matters listed in Article 83(1) and
(2) of the UK GDPR
,,
16. Section 149(2) DPA 2018 provides in relevant part:
"The first type of failure is where a controller or processor has
failed, or is failing, to comply with any of the following:
(a)e provision of Chapter II of the UK GDPR or Chapter 2 of
Part 3 or Chapter 2 of Part 4 of this Act (principles of
processing)
,,
5 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
Background Facts
Overview
17. On Friday 27 December 2019 at 22:e 0 the Cabinet Office published the
content page for the New Year 2020 Honours List on GOV.e K. This was
completed via a scheduled automatic publication set up by the Cabinet
Office Publishing Team.
18. The content page as published contained a link to a comma-separated
values ("CSV") file version of the Honours list, which in error included
the correspondence (postal) addresses of Honours recipients. This
resulted in an unauthorised disclosure affecting - data subjects
19. The Cabinet Office Press Office was alerted to the data breach by a
member of the Government Communications Team who had "identified
the data breach by chance". After becoming aware of the breach, at
22: 59 on 27 December 2019 the Cabinet Office Publishing Team
republished the content page removing the link to the CSV file.
However, as files uploaded onto GOV.e K are automatically cached on a
content delivery network, the file continued to be accessible online to
people who had the exact webpage URL.
20. The Cabinet Office contacted the Government Digital Service (GDS) at
23: 34 for GDS to assist with removing the CSV file, as although the
Cabinet Office can edit pages and remove links, they cannot remove
documents from the GOV.e K website once they have been published.
-the issue was escalated within GDS and support was obtained
6 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
from a developer. This resulted in the CSV file being permanently
deleted at 00: 51 on 28 December 2019.
21. Therefore, in total, the CSV file containing the postal address data was
accessible from 22: 30 on 27 December 2019 to 00: 51 on 28 December
2019 - a period of two hours and 21 minutes. During that time the CSV
file was accessed 3,872 times from 2,798 IP addresses.
22. Although the file was accessible via the cache until 00: 51, the Cabinet
Office Publishing Team republished the content page at 22: 59 which
removed the link to the file. The Cabinet Office's logs show most of the
access to the file (72%) occurred in the initial period before the link
was removed and access declined over time.
23. Affected data subjects were contacted within 48 hours of the data
breach via email or telephone (if data subjects did not have an email
address, the email had bounced back, or if there was an out-of-office
message) where possible on 28 and 29 December 2019. Approximately
11 data subjects were not contactable via either telephone or email and
needed a hard copy letter to be posted to them. Following this, a hard
copy letter was posted to all affected data subjects on 30 December
2019.
24. The Cabinet Office submitted a Personal Data Breach Report to the ICO
within 72 hours of becoming aware of the data breach in accordance
with Article 33(1) of the GDPR.
7 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
Circumstances surrounding the data breach
25. The Honours and Appointments Secretariat ("HAS") in the Cabinet
Office coordinates the Honours system and processes all public
nominations.
26. A new IT system was introduced within HAS in 2019.
was built between January and June 2019 and was in use
from July 2019. The 2020 Honours round was the first to use the new
system.
27. The report which generated the CSV file was incorrectly
formulated to include postal address data which it should not have done
and was not an element requested in the original build requirements.
The Cabinet Office's Digital and Technology Team was responsible for
building the system.
28. Although testing took place on the report by the Cabinet
Office's Digital and Technology Team and the HAS Operations Team,
the postal address column went unnoticed during the testing process
which the Cabinet Office has said they believe was due to the large
number of fields in the spreadsheet and the focus on ensuring the list
of successful Honours recipients was accurate.
29. A 'desk note' of instructions had been produced to articulate the
process for running the reports which produce the final
Honours lists. These instructions were available to employees via
Google Drive. However, these instructions reflected the
report as it should have been set up and did not include a check to
ensure personal data that should not have been included therein was
removed.
8 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
30. On 19 December 2019, the error with the report incorrectly
including postal address data was identified by the HAS Operations
Team. However, due to short timescales between finalising
amendments to the list and the deadline for giving the lists to the Press
Office for publication "the decision was taken to amend the output as
opposed to the report build itself".
31. On 23 December 2019 following certain changes to the Honours list, a
second report was run to generate the CSV file for publication. This was
completed by an employee not usually responsible for the process. This
employee "was aware that postal address information should not be in
the report and altered it to hide the information". Due to this, the CSV
file incorrectly included postal address data which had been hidden but
was still contained in the document as it had not been deleted. The
Cabinet Office has subsequently stated "we acknowledge that the
information should have been deleted". This version of the CSV file was
sent to the Press Office on the same date.
32. On 24 December 2019 a opened and reviewed the
documents sent to the Press Office on 23 December 2019 and identified
formatting errors which needed correcting. The
emailed the HAS Operations team on 24 December 2019 to highlight
the formatting errors. The Cabinet Office said inclusion of the postal
address data was not identified by the as it was not
visible. In relation to this event, the Cabinet Office said, "In retrospect,
this incident should have then automatically triggered a formal review
point to check that the final version was correctly amended."
9 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
33. On 24 December 2019 a third and final report was run
to make the corrections requested by the . This report
again generated a CSV file incorrectly including postal address data.
34. As the postal address data was hidden, the employee sending the
document to the Press Office on 24 December 2019 thought the postal
address data had been removed when "in reality it was still there and
became visible when the document was uploaded to gov.uk". When
asked if it was the same employee who hid the data as who sent the
document to the Press Office, the Cabinet Office confirmed two people
were involved in the process.
35. The Cabinet Office's internal investigation report said the email sent to
the Press Office on 24 December 2019 "was copied to the -
- and a small number of HAS members, but did not include the
relevant Director or senior press office staff". The Cabinet Office
confirmed that the copied into the email was the same
person who identified the formatting errors with the version produced
on 23 December 2019. However, the was on annual
leave on 24 December 2019 when the final version was sent to the
Press Office.
36. The Press Office received the final version of the CSV file on 24
December 2019, which incorrectly included the postal address data. It
is understood the covering email "indicated that the previous issue had
been resolved". The final CSV file was not opened by the Press Office
before they completed a web publication form and sent this and the
documents they had received to the Digital Team for publication on the
same date, as they relied upon reassurance from the HAS in the
covering email that the document was the final version. The Cabinet
10 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
Office stated that "the press office and digital teams were not
responsible for reviewing the data for sensitivities of this type".
37. On 27 December 2019 the Press Office checked with the HAS that there
had been no further changes and were told by the that
this was correct. Therefore they "assumed that the document was still
the final version to publish".
38. On 27 December 2019, the work to prepare the publication was
completed by the Digital Team. At this point the Digital Team checked
with the Press Office that there had been no changes to the documents.
Checks for formatting, accessibility standards and correct functionality
were completed by the Digital Team as per the standard process.
However, these did not include any assessment of the substance, "as
the team is not best placed to make any judgements" on the content
and "it is clear that the documents need to be final signed-off versions".
The documents were subsequently included in the content page for
automatic publication.
39. The Cabinet Office has stated that "it has always been standard practice
for the [HAS] Team to undertake a final review of the list documents
before publication to ensure, for example, that there is no sensitive
data present and that the information is presented in the correct
format. This review is not intended to require or result in extensive
amendments, as that would indicate that the underlying data had been
incorrectly entered in the database or that the report had been set up
wrongly". However, the Cabinet Office confirmed there was no specific
or written process in place in the HAS to sign-off or approve documents
containing personal data prior to being sent for release to ensure the
content was suitable for publication.
11 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
40. The Cabinet Office's internal investigation report included three
recommendations for improvement following the incident,
demonstrating certain measures were not present at the time the data
breach occurred:
a. Recommendation 1: That the Honours IT system is updated and
re-tested to ensure that a publication-ready document is
produced when the report is run, which does not include
address or other sensitive data. The Desk Instructions should
be amended to ensure the report is always checked so that it
only ever includes data that can be published.
b. Recommendation 2: Ensure clear line of accountability for sign
off for documents that will be published and that there are clear
instructions in the email, which give sufficient detail so others
can check.
c. Recommendation 3: Press Office and Digital Communications
ensure that the process for removing documents published in
error is clearly understood, including for out of hours.
41. An independent review led by Adrian Joseph and commissioned by the
Cabinet Office reviewed wider data handling processes/practices within
the Cabinet Office. That review includes the following observations:
"Breaches, such as the one that impacted New Year's Honours
recipients in December 2019, are too easily assigned to human
error where a greater consistency of process, controls and culture
across Cabinet Office could have reduced the risk systemically.
There is a significant risk that further and more impactful breaches
12 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
will occur as the amount of personal data being handled by the
Department increases.
The Cabinet Office identified two main factors that had contributed
to the breach: the introduction of a new IT software package,
which had included an additional field with individuals' addresses;
and a lack of clarity about sign-off processes for the final versions
of the documents that went online, and in the context of the new
IT system."
42. The review also highlighted the following concerns relevant to the
incident:
a. Whilst different documents exist on the Cabinet Office's intranet
page regarding best practice on data handling, these
documents are not regularly updated or promoted throughout
the Department; "The GDPR Hub, for example, has not been
updated since May 2019".
b. There appear to be issues with access restrictions which are
"often imposed too late and there are examples of personal
data being accessible to whole teams".
c. Cabinet Office structures regularly change with new business
units often being stood up to deliver on urgent political
priorities. "The pace required to deliver on these priorities was
cited by some business units and stakeholders as potentially
compromising the disciplines of good personal data handling".
d. Some teams have built additional checks into their processes,
including validating data being transferred between
Government Departments, "however, in some instances it
would be possible to eliminate human error altogether by fixing
failings in IT systems. For example, in one software system it
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Information Commissioner's Office
is possible to accidentally send personal information about one
individual to another, unconnected, individual whose details are
also held in the same system".
e. "Interviewees raised a number of concerns around the
procurement of new software to run their data handling
processes. Some said that financial considerations meant that
off-the-shelf solutions were chosen to run processes that, given
their complexity, warranted bespoke solutions".
f. "Another concern raised by a number of teams was that
software had not undergone sufficiently robust or extensive
testing in advance of being rolled out. The reasons cited
included lack of both staff and money, lack of expertise within
the commissioning teams, and projects being rolled out too
quickly in order to meet Ministerial commitments. In all
instances considered by the Review these risks had been signed
off by senior managers or Ministers".
g. "...training is not monitored across the organisation. One team
interviewed for the Review had set up their own training log,
but most did not actively monitor which members of their teams
had completed the training".
Apology
43. On 7 January 2020, the Minister for the Cabinet Office made a
statement to Parliament by which the Cabinet Office gave a public
apology in relation to the incident.
Notice of Intent
44. On 4 August 2021, in accordance with section 155(5) and paragraphs
2 and 3 of Schedule 16 DPA 2018, the Commissioner issued the Cabinet
14 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
Office with a Notice of Intent to impose a penalty under section 155
DPA 2018. The Notice of Intent described the circumstances and the
nature of the personal data in question, explained the Commissioner's
reasons for the proposed penalty of £600,000, including what she
regarded as the aggravating and mitigating factors, and invited written
representations from the Cabinet Office.
45. On 16 September 2021, the Cabinet Office provided written
representations in response to Notice of Intent. The key representations
made by the Cabinet Office were:
a. the level of the fine is disproportionate to the scale of the breach
(particularly taking into account that of the addresses revealed
the majority were already readily accessible in the public
domain);
b. the proposed penalty does not take into account the extensive
immediate and long-term action taken by the Cabinet Office to
mitigate the consequences of the breach and was not
determined in accordance with the statutory guidance reflected
in the Commissioner's Regulatory Action Policy;
c. the proposed penalty does not adequately reflect the statement
made to Parliament by the Minister for the Cabinet Office on 7
January 2020 and the apology contained within that statement
and this statement does not appear to have been taken into
account adequately when the Notice of Intent was formulated;
and
d. The breaches do not warrant an administrative penalty and that
another sanction such as that set out Article 58(2)(b) GDPR
would be more appropriate.
15 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
46. The Cabinet Office's representations have been considered in full. Having
taken these representations and all other factors into account, the
Commissioner has decided to issue a monetary penalty in the sum of
£500,000.
Breaches of GDPR
Contravention of Article 5(1)(f) of the GDPR
47. Article 5(1)(f) of the GDPR has been contravened as the Cabinet Office,
the controller, published the CSV file on GOV.e K which included full
correspondence (postal) addresses of data subjects in error,
resulting in a disclosure of personal data.
48. By Article 5(2) it is the controller who is responsible for and must be
able to demonstrate compliance with Article 5(1).
Contravention of Article 32 of the GDPR
49. Article 32(1) of the GDPR has been contravened as the Cabinet Office,
the controller, did not have in place appropriate technical and
organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the
risk associated with the processing of data for the purpose of the 2020
New Year Honours List.
Exemptions
50. Paragraph 15 (1) of Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the DPA 2018 provides:
16 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
"The listed GDPR provisions do not apply to personal data
processed for the purposes of the conferring by the Crown of any
honour or dignity."
51. Paragraph 6 of Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the DPA 2018 provides (emphasis
added):
"In this Part of this Schedule, "the listed GDPR provisions" means
the following provisions of the GDPR (the rights and obligations in
which may be restricted by virtue of Article 23(1) of the GDPR)-
(a) Article 13(1) to (3) (personal data collected from data subject:
information to be provided);
(b) Article 14(1) to (4) (personal data collected other than from
data subject: information to be provided);
(c) Article 15(1) to (3) (confirmation of processing, access to data
and safeguards for third country transfers);
(d) Article 16 (right to rectification);
(e) Article 17(1) and (2) (right to erasure);
(f) Article 18(1) (restriction of processing);
(g) Article 19 (notification obligation regarding rectification or
erasure of personal data or restriction of processing);
(h) Article 20(1) and (2) (right to data portability);
(i) Article 21(1) (objections to processing);
(j) Article S (general princip les) so far as its provisi ns
correspond to the rights and obligations provided for in the
provisions mentioned in sub-paragraphs (a) to (i).e
52. The contravention of Article 5(1)(f) of the GDPR in the present case
arises from a data security incident not from the rights and obligations
at paragraph 6(a)-(i) of Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the DPA 2018 - the
exemption therefore does not apply.
17 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
The Regulatory Action Policy
53. When deciding to impose a monetary penalty and when setting the
amount of that penalty, the Commissioner had regard to and acted in
accordance with the Regulatory Action Policy.
54. In deciding to impose a monetary penalty, the Commissioner had
regard to all of the factors set out on page 24 of the Regulatory Action
Policy and assessed this case objectively on its own merits. In all the
circumstances, a monetary penalty was considered appropriate given:
a. the number of individuals affected;
b. there was a degree of damage or harm (which may include
distress and/or embarrassment); and
c. there was a failure to apply reasonable measures to mitigate
any breach (or the possibility of it).
55. In setting the amount of the penalty, the Commissioner applied the five
step approach set out in the Regulatory Action policy:
a. At step 1, the Commissioner determined that there were no
discernible financial gains identified or losses avoided in relation
to the incident.
b. At step 2, the Commissioner had regard to the scale and
severity of the breach by taking into account the considerations
identified in sl 55(2)-(4) DPA 2018.
c. At step 3, the Commissioner determined that there were no
additional aggravating factors.
18 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
d. At step 4, the Commissioner determined that in view of the
factors set out below, an amount should be added to the
penalty otherwise payable in order to act as a deterrent.
e. At step 5, the Commissioner determined that there were no
other factors (including ability to pay) on which to reduce the
amount of the monetary penalty.
Article 83(2) GDPR
56. The Commissioner has considered the factors set out in Article 83(2)
GDPR in deciding whether to impose a penalty and when deciding on
the amount of the penalty as follows:
Nature, gravity and duration of the infringement
57. The data breach was a security incident whereby the confidentiality of
personal data (postal addresses) was compromised by inclusion in the
CSV file that was published in the public domain. The data breach was
caused by or contributed to by the absence of appropriate technical and
organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the
risk associated with the processing of the data in breach of Article
32(1).
58. The CSV file which contained the postal address data was live and
publicly accessible in the public domain via GOV.e K for two hours and
21 minutes, - a relatively short duration. However, during the period
in which the CSV file was accessible, where it could be either viewed in
a web browser or downloaded, it was accessed 3,872 times from 2,798
unique IP addresses. Further, the Cabinet Office was well aware that
the New Year's Honours list is a high-profile event which attracts
considerable interest such that publication of this data set would place
19 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
the associated data in the public domain in a high demand arena, with
accesses likely to take place quickly and on a relatively large scale.
59. Although the data disclosed was basic personal identifiers and, in error,
location data (i.e. postal addresses) as opposed to more sensitive data
such as special category data or criminal conviction data, the personal
data disclosed related to - data subjects across the United
Kingdom who are from a broad range of professions and include various
high profile peopThe personal data was published in the public
domain and therefore accessible to anyone, as opposed to for example,
being disclosed to other individuals who also had a high profile and
therefore who would likely hold a shared interest in keeping the data
secure.
60. The Cabinet Office confirmed that 207 data subjects out of a total of
- affected had postal addresses that were not obviously in the
public domain prior to the breach.
20 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
64. The Cabinet Office has stated that it has been informed by policee
that there is no information to suggest an increased risk
in relation to any persons as a result of the data breach.
65. There is, however, evidence that the data breach has caused distress
to some of the affected data subjects. The ICO has received three
complaints from affected data subjects raising personal safety concerns
resulting from the breach. The Cabinet Office has also been contacted
by 30 affected data subjects with 27 of those contacts relating to
concerns about the possible impact on the individual's personal safety,
largely as a result of pre-existing considerations.
66. The Cabinet Office also acknowledged in its initial breach report that
the data breach gave rise to a possible increase in vulnerability to
identity fraud, caused by the combination of names, postal addresses
and, in a number of instances, the type of work they undertake being
published.
21 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
67. The Cabinet Office further stated that "To our knowledge, there has
been a single instance, on 29 December, of a badly-redacted screenshot
of the data being posted on Twitter. We asked Twitter to remove the
tweet as a violation of their terms of service and this was carried out
the same day"and "there is no evidence that the personal data involved
in this incident has been inappropriately disseminated more widely, or
indeed at all"
68. In all the circumstances, the data breach was serious and could easily
have been avoided. Further, the Cabinet Office had not implemented
appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of
security appropriate to the risk. The gravity of the failure was, then,
very high.
Intentional or negligent
69. The infringements were negligent.
70. The data breach had the potential to occur due to a build error with the
newly introduced IT system within the HAS. Specifically,
the report which generated the CSV file was incorrectly
formulated to include postal addresses in error. The original build
requirements did not include a postal address field. The erroneous
inclusion of the postal address data was not identified when the report
was tested by Cabinet Office staff.
71. However, the error with the report functionality including the postal
address data was identified by the HAS Operations Team on 19
December 2019. This date is before the data breach occurred and
presented the Cabinet Office with the opportunity to implement
22 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
measures to sufficiently mitigate the risk and protect the data. The
Cabinet Office did not do so.
72. Upon identification of the error with the report functionality "the
decision was taken to amend the output as opposed to the report build
itself". This was because of the short timescales between finalising
amendments to the list and the deadline for giving the lists to the Press
Office. Due to this decision, any outputs generated from the report
would therefore continue to include the postal address data in error
which would have left the data open to the risk of inadvertent
publication. This is demonstrated by the data breach later taking place.
73. The ICO queried if all employees within the HAS were made aware of
the requirement to remove the personal data (postal address data)
before processing the generated reports once the error with the
report was identified by the HAS Operations Team. The
Cabinet Office confirmed only 22 people have access to the
system. Information about the report functionality was relevant to only
five members of the HAS Operations Team. These five employees were
verbally advised of the requirement to remove the postal address data.
However, employees were not issued any guidance on how to remove
the data. The Cabinet Office said as "was a new system, and
in effect a new process, the team were responsible for identifying
solutions to the issues identified throughout the process"
74. Employees relied on the desk note to produce the reports
which did not reflect the report as it was set up, and did not include a
check to ensure personal data that should not have been included was
removed.
23 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
75. Additionally, there was no specific or written sign-off process in place
in the HAS before sending documents containing personal data for
release to ensure the content was suitable for publication, even after
formatting errors were identified in the second version of the CSV file
when it was delivered via email to the Press Office. In relation to the
formatting errors with the second version of the CSV file, the Cabinet
Office said, "In retrospect, this incident should have then automatically
triggered a formal review point to check that the final version was
correctly amended".
76. The Cabinet Office had the opportunity on at least two occasions to
implement measures to mitigate the risk and protect the data from a
potential breach; firstly when the error with the report functionality
including postal address data was identified by the HAS Operations
Team on 19 December 2019, and secondly when the
identified formatting errorswith the second version of the CSV file sent
to the Press Office on 23 December 2019.
Action taken by the data controller to mitigate the damage
suffered by data subjects
77. The Cabinet Office has undertaken a number of appropriate and
effective remedial measures after becoming aware of the data breach
as follows:
To contain the incident
a. Once the data breach was identified the Cabinet Office
subsequently removed the link to the file on the content page
and contacted GDS to remove the file from cache.
24 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
b. The Cabinet Office's logs show the majority of access to the file
occurred in the initial period before the link was removed at
22: 59 and access declined over time until the file was
permanently deleted. This demonstrates that the immediate
attempts to remove access to the data likely contributed to
reducing the level of access after this point.
c. The file was accessible from 22: 30 on 27 December 2019 to
00: 51 on 28 December 2019 (two hours and 21 minutes) which
is a short duration. It is however noted that the quick
identification of the incident was due to a member of the
Government Communications Team identifying the data breach
by chance.
To inform data subjects
d. Affected data subjects were contacted within 48 hours of the
data breach via email or telephone where possible on 28 and
29 December 2019. Approximately 11 data subjects were not
contactable via either method and needed a hard copy letter
posted to them. Following this, a hard copy letter was posted
to all affected data subjects on 30 December 2019.
e. The HAS established a rota to answer recipient queries between
08:e 0-20:e 0 for the two weeks following the data breach.
To attempt to mitigate potential and actual damage caused to the data
subjects
f.
25 ICO.
g. After being informed, actions were undertaken by the Police -
to assess the risk to the affected data
subjects in their area/region/locality. Where additional actions
were required, this was taken forward by the relevant Police
force - where appropriate. This included a reminder of
security advice, data subjects being advised to contact 101
(excluding those who had contacted the HAS with specific
issues) and placing additional protective flags at data subjects
addresses etc. National Police Coordination Centre circulated a
guidance document to all Police forces which could be circulated
to individual Honours recipients wanting additional advice.
To identify and prevent further dissemination of the personal data
26 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
h. GDS used analytics to ascertain the extent of access to the data
and were commissioned by the Cabinet Office to provide advice
on further digital tracking and possible mitigation actions.
i.Cabinet Office staff monitored social media and arranged for a
Twitter post which showed a screenshot of the data to be
removed.
j.
k. Internet monitoring was carried out by Police colleagues
for the first week and a half following the
breach. Simultaneously, the Government continues to carry out
its own monitoring which the ICO were told on 29 January 2020
will "remain for the foreseeable future". "This monitoring tracks
instances of the data appearing online and seeks to identify
obvious instances of the data being shared".
To reduce the likelihood of a similar event occurring in the future
I.GDS undertook a full incident review, including a review of
checks on the publisher tool and incident handling. This review
looked at how the escalation process works, publisher training,
and technical changes that could have mitigated impact. This
resulted in the caching time frame being reduced from 24 hours
to 30 minutes for attached documents.
27 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
m. A number of actions have been undertaken in the Honours
system specifically, this includes reviewing the overall security
of the system and permission levels, an operational process
review, the approvals process, reviewing the desk note of
instructions, and creating a new report generated from their
database which does not include postal information.
Additionally,all employees in the HAS refreshed their
Responsible for Information e-Learning after the breach.
n. Cabinet Office has confirmed "The report functionality in
question has been amended to remove address data so that
this does not arise in the future. Approvals processes for use
from the (current) Birthday 2020 honours round will include a
check to ensure that all documents for publication are checked
for personal and sensitive data even when they should not
contain it". The Cabinet Office have also provided a document
with 16 action points where all except two have either had the
work completed or they are currently in the process of doing
so.
o. The Communications Team were taking action to ensure that
anyone who has not recently undertaken training does so as
soon as possible.
p. An independent review in the Cabinet Office led by Adrian
Joseph OBE focusing on data handling policies, processes,
practice and culture has been completed (dated March 2020)
which includes recommendations for improvement.
28 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
Degree of responsibility
78. The data breach stems from a build error with a newly introduced IT
system within the HAS. Specifically, the report which
generated the CSV file was incorrectly formulated to include postal
address data in error. The original build requirements did not include a
postal address field.
79. The Cabinet Office's Digital and Technology team were responsible for
building the system:
a. The system was implemented under the agile project
development process, with development being completed in
periods called 'sprints' in which specific elements of the system
were built, tested and approved. Required system functionality
and any changes needed are articulated in project development
software called JIRA which provides the audit trail for
development.
b. In relation to JIRA, the Cabinet Office said "User stories are
defined and put into sprints for development. Each story
outlines the requirements with clearly defined acceptance
criteria. Stories are developed in a testing environment, then
moved into the 'Testing' column where an internal functional
test is carried out against the acceptance criteria. Once it has
passed this test it moves into 'Product Owner Sign Off' where a
member of the business unit checks the story. When the story
has passed these checkpoints it moves to 'Done' and is
deployed to the production environment. If necessary a training
session is carried out with the business unit to walk through the
story".
29 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
c. The period of the build between January and June 2019 was
completed in two weeklong sprints and once the new IT system
was in use from July 2019, the sprints became one month long.
d. The agile sprints included the delivery of system training to
employees which included training on specific issues and was
completed on numerous occasions throughout the year.
Members of the Digital and Technology team were
simultaneously co-located within the Honours Operations team
for two days each week for several months to assist with issues,
and all employees involved in this data breach knew how to use
and had received training on the report functionality.
e. The report functionality went through several tests
and iterations before it reflected the correct candidates for the
final Honours list. The report was tested by the both the Cabinet
Office's Digital and Technology Team and the HAS Operations
Team.
f. Not all staff in the HAS have access to the system,
which is a measure to control access to the material it contains.
Only 22 employees have access.
80. Accordingly, there were measures in place regarding the initial building
and testing of the system/report. However, the error with
the functionality of the report including postal address data
was not identified during this process.
81. There were also other measures in place within the Cabinet Office/HAS
including:
30 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
a. The Cabinet Office had mandatory data protection training in
place prior to the incident, which was primarily comprised of
the Civil Service e-Learning course 'Responsible for
Information'. This training had been completed by employees
in the HAS. Each unit provides a six-monthly Information
Assurance return which confirms that employees have
completed training. The Cabinet Office said the training is part
of induction to [the HAS] and a record is kept of completion.
b. There is a data hub on the Cabinet Office's intranet with
guidance concerning all elements of the GDPR; information
assurance (managing of information risks) including relating to
the collection and sharing of personal data; the mandatory
training; templates for data processing and privacy notices; and
applied examples of best practice. The Cabinet Office said
information is drawn to employees' attention via mechanisms
such as a short cut to the hub on the intranet front page and
staff communications. There are also additional, non
mandatory, learning courses about other elements of data
handling on Civil Service Learning.
82. However:
a. When asked what percentage of Cabinet Office employees had
completed the mandatory data protection training in the two
years prior to the incident, the Cabinet Office confirmed there
are seven modules in the "Responsible for Data" e-Learning
which were completed between 3,517 and 4,070 times in the
period encompassing the data breach. They were unable to
provide a percentage but estimated take up of the training is
31 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
widespread "but could vary between roughly half and most of
the staff in the department at any given time".
b. Employees in the Press Office and Digital Team, who were also
involved in the process of the data being published, had not
received data protection training in the last two years.
c. There was a 'desk note' of instructions which articulated the
process for running the reports which produce the
final Honours lists available to employees via Google Drive.
However, the desk note reflected the report as it
should have been set up. It did notinclude a check to ensure
personal data that should not have been present was removed.
d. The Cabinet Office said the data hub does not cover redaction
of documents to remove personal data and that "Staff in the
Secretariat were not explicitly trained on this point, in part
because had the report been set up correctly, it should not have
been necessary". However, in mitigation to the above they said
"However, as part of their wider data training, they were aware
that postal address information constituted personal data which
should not be disclosed".
This is particularly relevant to the data breach, as the employee
involved believed that hiding the data in the CSV file involved in
the data breach was a sufficient method to remove it.
e. There was no specific or written sign-off process in place in the
HAS before sending documents containing personal data for
release to ensure the content was suitable for publication, even
after formatting errors were identified with the second version
32 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
of the CSV file when delivered via email to the Press Office. In
relation to the identification of the formatting errors, the
Cabinet Office said, "In retrospect, this incident should have
then automatically triggered a formal review point to check that
the final version was correctly amended".
f. As set out above, the error with the report functionality
including the postal address data was identified by the HAS
Operations team on 19 December 2019 before the data breach
occurred, which presented the Cabinet Office with the
opportunity to implement measures to sufficiently protect the
data and mitigate the risk of it being handled incorrectly in
error. The data breach later occurring demonstrates the risk of
the postal address data being handled incorrectly was not
sufficientlymitigated by appropriate technical and/or
organisational measures. If the Cabinet Office had introduced
further measures following the identification of the error with
the report, they could have reduced the likelihood of
the postal address data being disclosed in error. Examples of
such measures include:
i. Amending the desk note to include robust and
prescriptive instructions on the correct method to remove
the postal address data in the CSV file generated which
was not to be included in the list publication.
ii. Implementing a sign-off procedure to check the postal
address data had been removed correctly, in accordance
with the instructions provided above, before delivering
the final version to the Press Office for publication.
33 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
83. The nature of the publication of the Honours list is and was such that
the document may need regular changes, possibly at the last minute.
This, coupled with the fact that some of the data on the spreadsheet
referred to vulnerable (to reflect the terminology adopted by the
Cabinet Office) or high-profile individuals, meant that the security
measures involved should, in order to demonstrate effective
organisational and technical controls, have been more detailed and
taken greater care to address the risks presented in the processing of
the data set, including its eventual publication.
Any relevant previous infringements
84. No relevant previous infringements have been identified.
The degree of cooperation with the Commissioner
85. The Cabinet Office has been cooperative and responsive with the ICO's
investigation. In particular:
a. The initial Personal Data Breach Report for the data breach was
submitted within 72 hours of becoming aware, in line with
Article 33 (1) of the GDPR.
b. Two conference calls took place between the ICO and the
Cabinet Office early-on in the ICO's investigation.
c. The Cabinet Office have answered four rounds of written
enquiries sent by the ICO albeit some of the responses were
not as clear as they might have been.
d. The Cabinet Office have been open with the ICO regarding the
failures/factors which contributed to the data breach.
34 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
The categories of personal data affected by the infringement
86. The data disclosed was location data (i.e. postal addresses). Some of
the data affected was already in the public domain. However, numerous
postal addresses which were not in the public domain were made public
by the data breach. There were 207 such entries with addresses - which
is not an insubstantial amount.
The manner in which the infringement became known to the
Commissioner
87. The infringement became known to the Commissioner as a result of the
Cabinet Office submitting a Personal Data Breach Report to the ICO
within 72 hours of becoming aware of the data breach in accordance
with Article 33(1) of the GDPR.
Where measures referred to in Article 58(2) have previously
been ordered against the controller or processor concerned with
regard to the same subject-matter, compliance with those
measures
88. Not applicable.
Adherence to approved codes of conduct pursuant to Article 40
or approved certification mechanisms pursuant to Article 42
89. Not applicable.
Aggravating and mitigating factors
35 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
90. Beyond the matters referred to above there were no other significant
factors that aggravate or mitigate the infringement.
Deterrent Effect
91. The Cabinet Office is a long-established organisation at the heart of
government that processes a variety of data across a range of activities.
It has the standing, access to resource and expertise, and
sophistication to provide a high standard of organisational and technical
measures in comparison to, for example, a small private sector
organisation or a small public authority. Organisations that have the
means to do so, are expected to take the most stringent possible
preventative measures. The Cabinet Office would have incurred very
little, if any, cost in implementing a procedure that could have
prevented the data breach.
92. Further, the honours list is an annual process involving high profile and
vulnerable individuals. The Cabinet Office should have been more aware
of the need for strong security arrangements. Following an external
review initiated by the Cabinet Office, cultural challenges were
identified in regard to data protection requirements.
93. For the avoidance of doubt, the Cabinet Office has not been held to a
higher standard than another like controller, merely a high standard in
relation to an important and high-profile processing activity undertaken
by it. The Cabinet Office has the standing, access to resource and
expertise, and sophistication to provide a high standard of
organisational and technical measures. The penalty reflects the Cabinet
Office's breach when considered in that context, albeit some reduction
has been made to the penalty to reflect the Cabinet Office's
representations with regard to deterrent effect.
36 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
Reducing the amount to reflect anymitigating factors, including ability
to pay
94. The Commissioner is not aware of any financial hardships or factors
that would reduce the Cabinet Office's ability to pay. Whilst the
Response to the Notice of Intent refers to the current strain on public
finances including as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, no specific
figures or details were provided in relation to the extent of any such
strain or hardship on the Cabinet Office. Nor does the Commissioner
consider there are any other factors that should lead to a reduction in
the penalty amount.
95. The spending and budget of the Cabinet Office was previously
understood to be in excess of £1 billion in 2019/20. However, in the
Response to the Notice of Intent, the Cabinet Office stated that the
appropriate budget amount was £381 million. The Commissioner
accepts that £381 million is the appropriate budget figure. For the
avoidance of doubt, the Cabinet Office's spending/budget has not been
used in any sort of mechanistic fashion to determine the penalty
amount. Rather it was considered that the Cabinet Office is of sufficient
size to be able to withstand the proposed penalty. This position holds
true even on the basis of the Cabinet Office's budget being £381 million.
96. Taking into account all of the above, the Commissioner is of the view
that a penalty in the sum of £500,000 is effective, proportionate and
dissuasive.
Summary and decided penalty
97. For the reasons set out above, the Commissioner has decided to impose
a financial penalty on the Cabinet Office.
37 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
98. Taking into account all of the factors set out above, the Commissioner
has decided to impose a penalty in the amount of £500,000 (five
hundred thousand pounds).
Payment of the penalty
99. The penalty must be paid to the Commissioner's office by BACS transfer
or cheque by 14 December 2021 at the latest. The penalty is not kept
by the Commissioner but will be paid into the Consolidated Fund which
is the Government's general bank account at the Bank of England.
100. There is a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights)
against:
(a) the imposition of the monetary penalty and/or;
(b) the amount of the penalty specified in the monetary penalty
notice.
101. Any notice of appeal should be received by the Tribunal within 28 days
of the date of this monetary penalty notice.
102. Information about appeals is set out in Annex 1.
103. The Commissioner will not take action to enforce a monetary penalty
unless:
• the period specified within the notice within which a monetary
penalty must be paid has expired and all or any of the monetary
penalty has not been paid;
38 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
• all relevant appeals against the monetary penalty notice and any
variation of it have either been decided or withdrawn; and
• period for appealing against the monetary penalty and any variation
of it has expired.
104. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the monetary penalty is
recoverable by Order of the County Court or the High Court.
Scotland, the monetary penalty can be enforced in the same manner
as an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution
issued by the sheriff court of any sheriffdom in Scotland.
Dated the 15th day of November 2021
Elizabeth Denham
Information Commissioner
Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 SAF
39 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
ANNEX 1
RIGHTS OF APPEAL AGAINST DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER
1. Section 55B(S) of the Data Protection Act 1998 gives any person
upon whom a monetary penalty notice has been served a right of
appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights) (the 'Tribunal')
against the notice.
2. If you decide to appeal and if the Tribunal considers:e
a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in
accordance with the law; or
b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of
discretion by the Commissioner, that she ought to have exercised
her discretion differently,
the Tribunal will allow the appeal or substitute such other decision as
could have been made by the Commissioner. In any other case the
Tribunal will dismiss the appeal.
3. You may bring an appeal by serving a notice of appeal on the
Tribunal at the following address:
General Regulatory Chamber
HM Courts & Tribunals Service
PO Box 9300
Leicester
LE1 8DJ
Telephone: 0203 936 8963
Email: grc@justice.gov.uk
40 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
a) The notice of appeal should be sent so it is received by the
Tribunal within 28 days of the date of the notice.
b) If your notice of appeal is late the Tribunal will not admit it
unless the Tribunal has extended the time for complying with this
rule.
4. The notice of appeal should state:e
a) your name and address/name and address of your
representative (if any);
b) an address where documents may be sent or delivered to
you;
c) the name and address of the Information Commissioner;
d) details of the decision to which the proceedings relate;
e) the result that you are seeking;
f) the grounds on which you rely;
g) you must provide with the notice of appeal a copy of the
monetary penalty notice or variation notice;
h) if you have exceeded the time limit mentioned above the
notice of appeal must include a request for an extension of time
and the reason why the notice of appeal was not provided in
time.
41 ICO.
Information Commissioner's Office
5. Before deciding whether or not to appeal you may wish to consult
your solicitor or another adviser. At the hearing of an appeal a party
may conduct his case himself or may be represented by any person
whom he may appoint for that purpose.
6. The statutory provisions concerning appeals to the First-tier
Tribunal (Information Rights) are contained in section 55B(S) of, and
Schedule 6 to, the Data Protection Act 1998, and Tribunal Procedure
(First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009
(Statutory Instrument 2009 No. 1976 (L.20)).
42
