IMY (Sweden) - DI-2021-4664: Difference between revisions

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=== Facts ===
=== Facts ===
The data subject wanted to assist their cousin in receiving an order from an e-commerce group (controller). For this purpose, the cousin used the data subject’s postal address. According to the controller, the cousin used the data subject’s first name, surname, street name, street number and postcode for creating an user account. This new customer profile was then merged with the account of the data subject. When the data subject tried to log into their own account, it was either deleted or blocked. However, the cousin could access the data subject’s purchase history using the new account. In other words, the cousin got access to the personal data of the data subject with the newly created account, whereas the data subject was locked out of the original account. The data subject considered this a lack of safety.
The data subject was locked out of an existing user account at an e-commerce site (controller) and personal data was disclosed to an unauthorised third party. A family member (cousin) created a new account, using the personal data of the data subject. This new account was then merged with an existing account of the data subject (original account). The controller stated that this was its “merge customer profiles” process. When a new profile was created that contained personal data already present in an existing account, the new and the old profile would be merged. This was done for the purpose of limiting the processing of personal data and to prevent the use of a social security number as an identifier.


The data subject contacted the controller’s customer service but the controller did not provide a solution for the problem.  
However, the data subject was now unable to log into the original account. The family member got access to the data subject’s purchase history, because this information had been transferred to the new account. The data subject contacted the controller’s customer service but the controller did not provide a solution. The controller stated that the cousin only gotten access to the data subject’s purchase and return history and no other information. The controller had taken steps to ensure that purchase history was no longer available when the ‘merge process’ was activated. It was also working on implementing further security measures in the future.  


The controller stated that it had a process called “merge customer profiles”. In case a new customer profile was created and contained identical data already registered in an existing customer profile, the existing customer profile was then merged with this new account. The controller stated that the purpose of this process was to merge user accounts if there was a reason to assume that an user did not remember their login details and had registered a new account for this reason. This was done in order to limit the processing of personal data and to prevent the use of a social security number as an identifier. 
The data subject filed a complaint at the Norwegian DPA, which transferred the complaint to the Swedish DPA. The latter was the lead supervisory authority in this decision pursuant to Article 56 GDPR. The concerned supervisory authorities were located in Norway, Denmark and Finland.  
 
According to the controller, when the accounts were merged and the cousin tried to place an order, an e-mail was sent to the previously registered e-mail address, so that the ordering process could be interrupted if the wrong person had attempted to place the order. When the data subject contacted the controller and stated that the order was placed by someone else (the cousin), the controller temporarily blocked the account.
 
The controller also stated that at the time the merging of the accounts took place, the cousin only got access to the data subject’s purchase and return history. There was no access to invoices, payment card details or other information on payments. After receiving an inspection letter from the DPA, the controller had also taken steps to ensure that purchase history was no longer available when the ‘merge process’ was activated. It was also working on implementing security measures in the future. The controller would also contact the data subject to provide information on how to unblock the account. 
 
The data subject filed a complaint at the Norwegian DPA, which transferred the complaint to the Swedish DPA. The latter was the lead supervisory authority in this decision pursuant to [[Article 56 GDPR]]. The concerned supervisory authorities were located in Norway, Denmark and Finland.


=== Holding ===
=== Holding ===

Revision as of 11:53, 9 November 2022

IMY - DI-2021-4664
LogoSE.png
Authority: IMY (Sweden)
Jurisdiction: Sweden
Relevant Law: Article 5(1)(f) GDPR
Article 32(1) GDPR
Article 58(2)(b) GDPR
Type: Complaint
Outcome: Upheld
Started:
Decided: 29.03.2022
Published:
Fine: n/a
Parties: Ellos Group AB
National Case Number/Name: DI-2021-4664
European Case Law Identifier: EDPBI:SE:OSS:D:2022:352
Appeal: n/a
Original Language(s): English
Original Source: EDPB (in EN)
Initial Contributor: n/a

In an Article 60 GDPR procedure, the Swedish DPA determined that the controller violated Article 32(1) GDPR by failing to provide an appropriate level of security for the internal handling of customers' accounts.

English Summary

Facts

The data subject was locked out of an existing user account at an e-commerce site (controller) and personal data was disclosed to an unauthorised third party. A family member (cousin) created a new account, using the personal data of the data subject. This new account was then merged with an existing account of the data subject (original account). The controller stated that this was its “merge customer profiles” process. When a new profile was created that contained personal data already present in an existing account, the new and the old profile would be merged. This was done for the purpose of limiting the processing of personal data and to prevent the use of a social security number as an identifier.

However, the data subject was now unable to log into the original account. The family member got access to the data subject’s purchase history, because this information had been transferred to the new account. The data subject contacted the controller’s customer service but the controller did not provide a solution. The controller stated that the cousin only gotten access to the data subject’s purchase and return history and no other information. The controller had taken steps to ensure that purchase history was no longer available when the ‘merge process’ was activated. It was also working on implementing further security measures in the future.

The data subject filed a complaint at the Norwegian DPA, which transferred the complaint to the Swedish DPA. The latter was the lead supervisory authority in this decision pursuant to Article 56 GDPR. The concerned supervisory authorities were located in Norway, Denmark and Finland.

Holding

The DPA held that any processing of personal data must comply with the principles in Article 5 GDPR. One of these principles is the requirement of security under Article 5(1)(f) GDPR (‘integrity and confidentiality’). Article 32 GDPR regulates the security of processing.

The DPA determined that the controller violated Article 32(1) GDPR by failing to take appropriate measures to ensure an appropriate level of security for the “merge process”. The DPA determined that, after supervision started on may 21 2021, the controller had taken steps to ensure that the purchase history was no longer available upon activation of the “merge customer process” and intended to take security measures. The DPA determined that there were no reasons to doubt the use of the “merge customer” process, based on its purpose of limiting processing, after the mentioned improvements had been made by the controller.

However, the DPA found that the “merge process” (prior to the start of supervision by the DPA on 21 May 2021) was designed that a customer’s purchase and return history could be made available to unauthorised persons by creating a new account with an existing customer’s first name, surname, street name, street code and postal code. Because this information was publicly available in open sources, information on customers’ buying habits was not sufficiently protected against unauthorised disclosure. The DPA determined that this deficiency should have been detected at an early stage prior to the start of the processing of personal data. Therefore, the controller violated Article 32(1) GDPR.

The DPA reprimanded the controller pursuant of Article 58(2)(b) GDPR and held that this was a minor infringement (recital 148 GDPR). It considered amongst other things that the controller had taken measures to protect information about customers’ buying habits from unauthorised disclosure. Also, neither sensitive nor integrity-sensitive data was involved.

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English Machine Translation of the Decision

The decision below is a machine translation of the English original. Please refer to the English original for more details.

1(5)







                                                                      Notice: This document is an unofficial translation of the
                                                                      Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection’s (IMY) final
                                                                      decision 2022-03-29, no. DI-2021-4664. Only the Swedish
                                                                      version of the decision is deemed authentic.






Ref no:
DI-2021-4664, IMI case no.      Supervision under the General Data
134632
                                Protection Regulation – Ellos Group

Date of final decision:
2022-03-29                      AB

Date of translation:
2022-03-31


                                Final decision of the Swedish Authority for

                                Privacy Protection (IMY)


                                The Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection (IMY) finds that Ellos Group AB has
                                processed personal data in breach of Article 32(1) of the General Data Protection
                                                    1
                                Regulation (GDPR) by failing to take appropriate technical and organizational
                                measures until 21 May 2021 to ensure an appropriate level of security for the
                                company’s “merge customer” process.     2


                                The Authority for Privacy Protection issues Ellos Group AB a reprimand pursuant to
                                Article 58(2)(b) of the GDPR for the infringement of Article 32(1) of the GDPR.


                                Report on the supervisory report


                                The Authority for Privacy Protection (IMY) has initiated supervision regarding Ellos
                                Group AB (Ellos or the company) due to a complaint. The complaint has been

                                submitted to IMY, as responsible supervisory authority for the company’s operations
                                pursuant to Article 56 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The

                                handover has been made from the supervisory authority of the country where the
                                complainant has lodged their complaint (Norway)     in accordance with the Regulation’s
                                provisions on cooperation in cross-border processing.


                                The investigation in the case has been carried out through correspondence. In the light
                                of a complaint relating to cross-border processing, IMY has used the mechanisms for

                                cooperation and consistency contained in Chapter VII GDPR. The supervisory
                                authorities concerned have been the data protection authorities in Norway, Denmark
                                and Finland.

Postal address:
Box 8114

104 20 Stockholm
Website:
www.imy.se
                                1
E-mail:                         protection of natural persons with regard to he processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
imy@imy.se                      and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
Phone:                          2The “Merge customer” process means hat two or more accounts on a website canto one, in case a
08-657 61 00                    person establishes several accounts with the same personal data.Privacy Protection Authority    Our ref: XXX                                                                           2(5)
                                Date:2022-03-29






                                The complaint
                                It is stated in the complaint that the complainant wished to assist their cousin in

                                receiving an order from Ellos. The cousin therefore used the complainant’s postal
                                address when placing the order. A few days later, when the complainant tried to log
                                into their Ellos account, the account was deleted or blocked. The complainant’s cousin

                                was then able to access, through their account, the complainant’s purchase history.
                                The complainant has been in contact with the company’s customer service but has not
                                had the problem solved. The complainant considers that there is a lack of safety. The

                                complainant also states that they could have had their credit card details registered in
                                their customer account, which they did not have.


                                What Ellos has stated
                                Ellos has mainly stated the following.


                                Ellos is the data controller for the processing to which the complaint relates.


                                The company has a process called “merge customer” which means that when a new
                                customer profile is created and the new profile consists of identical data already
                                registered in an existing customer profile, the existing customer profile is merged with

                                the new one. In creating an account, the complainant’s cousin used the complainant’s
                                first name, surname, street name, street number and postcode. The complainant’s
                                customer profile was then merged with the new customer profile created by the
                                complainant’s cousin.


                                According to the company, the purpose of the “merge customer” process is to merge
                                user accounts if there is reason to assume that a customer does not remember their

                                login details and therefore registers again. This is done in order to limit the processing
                                of personal data by the company to updated and current data. The process was
                                introduced as a more privacy-friendly option when the GDPR entered into force, in

                                order not to use social security numbers as an identifier.

                                When the accounts of the complainant and their cousin were merged and the cousin

                                tried to place an order from the new account, an e-mail was sent to the previously
                                registered e-mail address, i.e. the complainant’s e-mail, so that the ordering process
                                could be interrupted if the wrong person had attempted to place the order. When the

                                complainant contacted Ellos and stated that the order was placed by someone else
                                (the cousin), the account was temporarily blocked.


                                At the time when the “merge customer” process took place, the complainant’s cousin
                                did get access to the complainant’s purchase and return history. However, the cousin
                                did not have access to invoices, payment card details or other information on

                                payments.

                                Ellos states that, after receiving IMY’s inspection letter, it has taken steps to ensure

                                that the purchase history is not available in case the “merge customer process” is
                                activated. Ellos further states that it is working on implementing corresponding security
                                measures regarding access to the return history. According to the company, the

                                implementation is expected to be completed in the near future.

                                The company also states that they intend to contact the complainant in order to
                                provide information on how the complainant can lift the block on its account.Privacy Protection Authority    Our ref: XXX                                                                           3(5)
                                Date:2022-03-29






                                Justification of the decision


                                Applicable provisions, etc.

                                Any processing of personal data must comply with the fundamental principles set out

                                in Article 5 of the GDPR. One of these is the requirement of security under Article
                                5(1)(f). It follows that personal data must be processed in such a way as to ensure
                                appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or
                                unlawful processing and accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate

                                technical or organisational measures.

                                Article 32 regulates the security of processing. Paragraph 1 requires the controller,

                                taking into account the latest developments, the costs of implementation and the
                                nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing, as well as the risks, of varying
                                probability and severity, to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, to take

                                appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security
                                appropriate to the risk.

                                According to Article 32(2), when assessing the appropriate level of security, account

                                shall be taken in particular of the risks that are presented by processing, in particular
                                from accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or
                                access to personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed.


                                Assessment of the Authority for Privacy Protection (IMY)

                                Has the company infringed Article 32(1) of the General Data Protection

                                Regulation?

                                IMY notes, first of all, that Ellos Group AB, after the supervision started on 21 May

                                2021, has taken steps to ensure that the purchase history is not available upon
                                activation of the “merge customer process” and intends to take measures to ensure
                                that the return history is not available. The investigation has not shown that there is
                                reason for IMY to question the use of the “merge customer” process based on the

                                company’s purpose of limiting the company’s processing to current and updated
                                personal data, after the abovementioned improvements have been made.


                                However, IMY has found that the “merge customer process” prior to the start of
                                supervision on 21 May 2021 was designed in such a way that a customer’s purchase
                                and return history could be made available to unauthorised persons by creating a new

                                account with an existing customer’s first name, surname, street name, street code and
                                postal code. Since the information required to create a new account was publicly
                                available in open sources, for example in online directory services, information on
                                customers’ buying habits has not been sufficiently protected against unauthorised

                                disclosure. According to IMY’s assessment, the deficiency should have been detected
                                at an early stage prior to the start of the processing of personal data. Ellos Group AB
                                has thus processed personal data in breach of Article 32(1) of the GDPR.


                                Choice of corrective measure

                                It follows from Article 58(2)(i) and Article 83(2) of the GDPR that the IMY has the

                                power  to impose administrative fines in accordance with Article 83. Depending on the
                                circumstances of the case, administrative fines shall be imposed in addition to or in
                                place of the other measures referred to in Article 58(2), such as injunctions andPrivacy Protection Authority    Our ref: XXX                                                                             4(5)
                                Date:2022-03-29






                                prohibitions. Furthermore, Article 83(2) provides which factors are to be taken into
                                account when deciding on administrative fines and in determining the amount of the

                                fine. In the case of a minor infringement, as stated in recital 148, IMY may, instead of
                                imposing a fine, issue a reprimand pursuant to Article 58(2)(b). Factors to consider is

                                the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case, such as the nature, gravity
                                and duration of the infringement and past relevant infringements.


                                IMY notes the following relevant facts. The company has taken measures to protect
                                information about customers’ buying habits from unauthorised disclosure. Neither
                                sensitive nor integrity-sensitive data has been involved. The infringement was

                                committed negligently, affected one person and, when the company understood the
                                complainant's intention, it took action. IMY has not previously established that the
                                company has infringed the GDPR.


                                Against this background IMY considers that it is a minor infringement within the
                                meaning of recital 148 and that Ellos Group AB must be given a reprimand pursuant to

                                Article 58(2)(b) of the GDPR.

                                This finaldecision has been made by the specially appointed decision-maker

                                            after presentation by legal advisor               .Privacy Protection Authority     Our ref: XXX                                                                              5(5)
                                 Date:2022-03-29






                                 How to appeal


                                 If you want to appeal the decision, you should write to the Authority for Privacy
                                 Protection. Indicate in the letter which decision you appeal and the change you

                                 request. The appeal must have been received by the Authority for Privacy Protection
                                 no later than three weeks from the day you received the decision. If the appeal has
                                 been received at the right time, the Authority for Privacy Protection will forward it to the
                                 Administrative Court in Stockholm for review.


                                 You can e-mail the appeal to the Authority for Privacy Protection if it does not contain
                                 any privacy-sensitive personal data or information that may be covered by

                                 confidentiality. The authority’s contact information is shown in the first page of the
                                 decision.