| LG Ellwangen - 6 O 65/24 | |
|---|---|
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| Court: | LG Ellwangen (Germany) |
| Jurisdiction: | Germany |
| Relevant Law: | Article 15(1) GDPR Article 15(3) GDPR § 254 ZPO |
| Decided: | 03.09.2024 |
| Published: | |
| Parties: | |
| National Case Number/Name: | 6 O 65/24 |
| European Case Law Identifier: | ECLI:DE:LGELLWA:2024:0903.6O65.24.00 |
| Appeal from: | |
| Appeal to: | Unknown |
| Original Language(s): | German |
| Original Source: | Landesrecht BW (in German) |
| Initial Contributor: | la |
A court held that a data subject had the right under Article 15 GDPR to get information in a certain data format, provided the controller has no extra cost. It doesn’t matter if the data subject wants to use this information in a lawsuit that is not GDPR related.
English Summary
Facts
The Maltesian controller operates an online gambling platform. The data subject is a former customer of the controller. By way of an action by stages, the data subject sued the controller first to provide the controller with the information under Article 15 GDPR and, on the second stage, to pay an amount that is to be numbered after obtaining the claimed information from the controller.
During the relevant timespan, the controller operated it platform under a Maltesian gambling licence, but did not have a licence in the German land of Baden-Württemberg. The data subject claims that he was not aware of this legal situation and therefore wants money back that he paid to the controller.
Holding
The court held that payment data as well as data concerning the data subject’s usage of the platform were personal data as they were clearly linked to the data subject. Otherwise, the court concluded, the controller, who deems is offering legal, wouldn’t have been able to provide its service to the data subject. Therefore, the data subject was identifiable under Article 4(1) GDPR.
Under Article 15(3)(3) GDPR, the information has to be provided in a commonly used electronic form, if the data subject makes his request by electronic means. Neither Article 15 nor Article 12 GDPR specify any certain format; but one can derive from the said norms that the data subject had a right to choose between electronic, written or other form of information. Where the legal literature concludes that data copies only have to be provided in the format they are already in without any editing, the court disagrees with this position. The court rather points to the obligation of providing the information in an electronic form under Article 15(3)(3) GDPR that includes an obligation to convert data to a commonly used electronic format.
Even though there is no explicit statement in the GDPR about who can choose the commonly used format. However, in a case, where no extra cost of converting or editing the format arises for the controller, the court held that the data subject can choose the format. This is due to the intention of the right to information under Article 15 GDPR, that made it necessary that the provided information is easy to read, which falls in line with the transparency principle from Article 12(1)(1) GDPR.
Furthermore, it would be contradictory if the Article 15(3)(3) GDPR gave the data subject the right to demand information in an electronic form while leaving the format entirely up to the controller.
Additionally, the court sees no contradiction to Article 20 GDPR because the intention of Article 15 GDPR is the effective pursuit of the data subject’s legal interests. This makes it necesary that in the case of electronic submission of the information the data subject is able to read it.
The court further made it explicit that, following the CJEU’s opinion in C-307/22, no reason for a request under Article 15 GDPR needs to be given. Also, a specific reason for such a request that is not within the aims of the GDPR is irrelevant to the right.
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English Machine Translation of the Decision
The decision below is a machine translation of the German original. Please refer to the German original for more details.
Staged action for information in preparation of an application aimed at the repayment of stakes made in the context of online gambling Principle 1. In the absence of a contractual claim to this effect, international jurisdiction with regard to a staged action aimed at the repayment of stakes made in the context of online gambling is not based on Articles 17 (1) (c) and 18 (1) of the Brussels I Regulation, but arises directly from Article 79 (2) sentence 2 of the GDPR. 2. Article 15 (1) and (3) sentence 3 of the GDPR give the data subject the right to request information concerning them in a specific file format (in this case: Excel), provided that this does not result in additional costs for the controller. 3. The assertion of a right to information based on the General Data Protection Regulation is not precluded by the fact that the plaintiff specifically requests the information to substantiate an application for the repayment of stakes made in the context of online gambling. Such an approach cannot be classified as an obvious abuse of law. Tenor 1. The defendant is ordered to provide the plaintiff with information about the data processed in the context of the customer relationship between the parties, in particular on the following questions: a) Which personal data of the plaintiff does the defendant process? b) For what purpose(s) does the defendant process this data? c) Where does this data come from? d) Has the defendant transmitted this data to third parties or does the defendant plan to transmit it to third parties? If so, to whom, when and for what purpose? e) The complete payment and gaming history of all gaming accounts of the plaintiff must be provided in machine-readable Excel format. f) How long will the defendant process the data? g) Has the defendant created a profile regarding the plaintiff? If so, what was the content and how was this profile created? 2. The decision on costs is reserved for the final decision. 3. The judgment is provisionally enforceable, but with regard to the tenor of point 1. letter e) only against security in the amount of €500.00. Decision The value in dispute is set at €6,000.00. Facts Paragraph 1 The plaintiff is asserting claims against the defendant, a provider of online-based games of chance based in the Republic of Malta, in connection with his participation in these games. By way of a staged action, the parties are currently arguing at the first stage about the plaintiff's claims for information. The plaintiff intends to use the information claimed to quantify the second stage claim for reimbursement of lost stakes in the games of chance offered online by the defendant. Paragraph 2 The defendant offered games of chance online and accessible to everyone in Germany on the basis of a Maltese license to that effect. At the time of the plaintiff's activity on the internet platform operated by the defendant, which extended into the calendar year 2021, the defendant did not have a license issued by the competent German authorities to offer games of chance over the internet in the territory of the state of Baden-Württemberg. The website operated by the defendant for the purpose of offering games of chance could also be displayed in German, and advertising offers that were placed on streaming websites, among other things, were also in German, as were the defendant's general terms and conditions. Technical measures to prevent or at least make it more difficult for people from the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany or for people residing within the Federal Republic of Germany to register were not implemented by the defendant. Paragraph 3 For the purpose of participating in the games of chance organized by the defendant, the plaintiff maintained a user account with the defendant, stating his address as shown in the heading, and from there made deposits in favor of the defendant in an amount that is currently unquantified. The deposits were not made via a bank account, but via prepaid or voucher cards. The plaintiff estimates his losses, which can be calculated taking into account the deposits made and winnings payouts received, as part of the defendant's gambling offer at around €6,000.00. Paragraph 4 The plaintiff claims that he made payments to the defendant in the belief that its offer was legally permissible. It was only at a later date that his current legal representatives made him aware of the illegality of the gambling offer. Paragraph 5 In a letter from his legal representatives dated January 17, 2023, the plaintiff requested the defendant to provide him with information within one month about the data concerning him processed by the defendant in accordance with the claim now made at the first stage under item 1. The defendant did not respond to this in the following period. Paragraph 6 The plaintiff is of the opinion that the Ellwangen (Jagst) Regional Court has international and local jurisdiction because he himself participated in the defendant's gambling offer as a consumer from Germany, the website in question was in German and was aimed at the local market, Article 17 paragraph 1 letter c) of the Brussels I Regulation. With regard to claims for payment arising from unlawful acts, the court's jurisdiction also arises from Article 7 no. 2 of the Brussels I Regulation. Paragraph 7 Based on the plaintiff's status as a consumer and his habitual residence in the Federal Republic of Germany, German substantive law applies to the contractual relationships underlying the present legal dispute in accordance with Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Rome I Regulation. Paragraph 8 The plaintiff is convinced that the gambling and betting contracts he concluded with the defendant are void due to a breach of a statutory prohibition pursuant to Section 134 of the German Civil Code (BGB) and that the amounts of money he paid in connection with them must be repaid in accordance with the principles of unjust enrichment, Section 812 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 Variant 1 of the German Civil Code (BGB). Given that the defendant did not have permission from a competent German authority to offer gambling on the Internet, the defendant violated Section 4 Paragraph 4 of the GlüStV 2012, which is in line with EU law, particularly since the games of chance offered by the defendant fell under the total ban of Section 4 Paragraph 4 of the GlüStV 2012 and an exception pursuant to Section 4 Paragraph 5 of the GlüStV 2012 was therefore not an option. Marginal number 9 The claim for unjust enrichment asserted at the second level is not contradicted by Section 762 Paragraph 1 Sentence 2 of the German Civil Code, nor Section 817 Sentence 2 of the German Civil Code or Section 242 of the German Civil Code: Marginal number 10 The former is not applicable due to the lack of opening up the scope of application of the norm due to the present violation under Section 134 of the German Civil Code. There is already no valid gaming contract. Marginal number 11 With regard to Section 817 Sentence 2 of the German Civil Code, the subjective requirements are lacking, in particular the plaintiff cannot be held liable for criminal liability under Section 285 of the German Criminal Code. In this regard, there is no intentional conduct on the part of the plaintiff, since he had no knowledge of the illegality of the defendant's offer at the time of his participation in it. Marginal number 12 The defendant cannot claim priority protection of legitimate expectations in the sense of Section 242 of the German Civil Code (BGB) due to its own violation of applicable law. The norm of Section 242 of the German Civil Code, which is to be interpreted narrowly as an exception, must not result in the defendant, who made its gambling offer available to the plaintiff purely out of its own desire to make a profit and in contravention of Section 4 Paragraph 4 of the GlüStV 2012, being able to keep the sums of money obtained in this context. This result runs counter to the meaning and purpose of Section 4 Paragraph 4 of the GlüStV 2012. Marginal number 13 In addition, due to the deliberate offering of illegal gambling by the defendant, there are tort claims under Section 823 Paragraph 2 of the German Civil Code in conjunction with the protective law of Section 4 Paragraph 4 of the GlüStV 2012. Marginal number 14 All of the claims asserted are ultimately not time-barred, since the plaintiff was unaware of the illegality of the defendant's offer at the time of the payments he made due to the lack of a valid German gambling license. The limitation period only began to run when he became aware of it in 2021. In addition, given the targeted orientation of the defendant's offer to the German market, the plaintiff cannot be accused of grossly negligent ignorance of the illegality. Marginal number 15 The claim for information asserted against the defendant at the first stage is based on the EU law norm of Art. 15 GDPR. Paragraph 16 The plaintiff requests: Paragraph 17 1. The defendant is ordered to provide the plaintiff with information about the data processed in the context of the customer relationship between the parties, in particular on the following questions: Paragraph 18 a) Which personal data of the plaintiff does the defendant process? Paragraph 19 b) For what purpose(s) does the defendant process this data? Paragraph 20 c) Where does this data come from? Paragraph 21 d) Has the defendant transmitted this data to third parties or does the defendant plan to transmit it to third parties? If so, to whom, when and for what purpose? Paragraph 22 e) The complete payment and gaming history of all gaming accounts of the plaintiff must be provided in machine-readable Excel format. Margin number 23 f) How long will the defendant process the data? Margin number 24 h) Has the defendant created a profile of the plaintiff? If so, what is the content and how was this profile created? Margin number 25 2. At the second stage of the action, the defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff an amount resulting from the information and yet to be quantified. Margin number 26 After service of the action, the defendant acknowledged the information claims asserted against it in accordance with point 1. letters a) to d) and f) and g) of the statement of claim in a written submission dated August 31, 2023. Margin number 27 The defendant also requests that Margin number 28 the action be dismissed. Margin number 29 It believes that the plaintiff's request for information has no legal basis unless acknowledged by the defendant. In particular, this does not pursue a legitimate purpose, but serves solely to prepare a lawsuit for the reimbursement of gambling stakes paid in the form of the claim in section 2. This is a breach of trust and abusive exercise of rights by the plaintiff against the defendant, whose licensed offer he had previously accepted, and is therefore solely about establishing and maintaining a breach of trust business model of "gambling without risk". Against this background, the plaintiff's request for information in section 1. letter e) of the claim does not pursue the goal of becoming aware of the processing of his personal data and of checking its legality within the meaning of the General Data Protection Regulation. Even with regard to the other, albeit recognized, claims for information, there are no interests of the plaintiff worthy of protection within the meaning of the General Data Protection Regulation, but these requests only serve to conceal the plaintiff's abusive intentions towards the defendant. Paragraph 30 The defendant cannot be blamed for not having received a license from the relevant German authorities. Rather, it was excluded from being granted a license to operate gambling services over the Internet by the relevant German authorities, in violation of European Union law. It made its offer legally available in Germany on the basis of the Maltese license in exercise of the freedom to provide services enshrined in primary law of the European Union, Article 56 TFEU. Paragraph 31 Ultimately, in the defendant's view, the plaintiff cannot demand reimbursement of the stakes paid. Since the plaintiff had positive knowledge of the requirement for a license for the defendant's offer under German law, the demand for repayment is precluded by the condiction bar under Section 817 Sentence 2 of the German Civil Code. A teleological reduction of this norm is therefore out of the question; in any case, Section 242 of the German Civil Code precludes the demand for repayment of the gambling stakes paid. Paragraph 32 The defendant also takes the view that the present legal dispute should be suspended in view of the questions of Union law that arise, in particular regarding the scope of the right to information pursuant to Art. 15 GDPR in connection with the non-data protection objectives pursued by the plaintiff, and that a preliminary ruling procedure should be initiated before the Court of Justice of the European Union. In any case, the outcome of the preliminary ruling procedure of the Koblenz Higher Regional Court, file number: C-672/22, must be awaited, especially since the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court has also submitted a corresponding question to the Court of Justice of the European Union in the meantime as part of a request for a preliminary ruling. Paragraph 33 For further details of the respective party submissions, reference is made to the parties' written submissions in the court files, together with any attachments, and to the minutes of the oral hearing of September 7, 2024. In the context of this, the court heard the plaintiff personally on the matter, Section 141 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. With regard to the details of the oral hearing and the result of the party hearing, reference is again made to the minutes of the meeting of September 7, 2024. Reasons for the decision Paragraph 34 1) The action is admissible and justified with regard to the claim for information asserted by the plaintiff at the first stage. The plaintiff can request the requested information from the defendant in the form requested on the basis of Art. 15 (1), (3) GDPR. Paragraph 35 a) The action is initially admissible. In particular, there are no objections to the filing of a staged action under Section 254 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The adjudicating regional court is also the competent court to decide on the present case. Marginal number 36 aa) The jurisdiction of the deciding court arises first of all from Section 71 Paragraph 1 GVG in conjunction with Section 23 No. 1 GVG, taking into account a jurisdictional value in dispute of more than €5,000.00. It can remain open whether the jurisdictional value in dispute in the case of a staged action is to be calculated by adding both the performance and the preparatory claims in accordance with Section 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see, for example, Brandenburg Higher Regional Court, decision of November 15, 2001 – 1 AR 44/01, marginal no. 9; OLG Hamm, decision of September 6, 2016 – I-32 SA 49/16, marginal no. 21; OLG Hamm, decision of September 6, 2016 – I-32 SA 50/16, marginal no. 24, each cited according to juris) or rather, assuming economic identity, only the claim with the highest value is decisive (see, for example, KG Berlin, decision of April 25, 2019 – 2 AR 12/19, marginal no. 9; KG Berlin, decision of April 4, 2024 – 2 UH 11/24, para. 8, each cited according to juris). Even if one were to assume the latter view, taking into account the then decisive (still unquantified) application for performance under item 2 of the action, a jurisdictional value in dispute of more than €5,000.00 must be assumed. Para. 37 In this respect, the court's determination of the value in dispute pursuant to Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure is subject to the court's discretion to determine this in accordance with the plaintiff's interests. In the statement of claim dated March 17, 2023, the value in dispute is provisionally stated as €6,000.00 with regard to the prospective claim for payment. Although this value may not be binding for the court, it nevertheless has considerable weight in the judicial determination of the value in dispute according to case law (cf. BGH, decision of October 8, 2012 - X ZR 110/11, marginal no. 4; OLG Stuttgart, decision of January 3, 2023 - 4 AR 4/22, marginal no. 18; OLG Stuttgart, decision of February 6, 2023 - 4 W 103/22, marginal no. 19; OLG Frankfurt, decision of July 11, 2024 - 6 W 54/24, marginal no. 4, each cited according to juris). If the payment request made at the second stage is specifically quantified, the amount of money then stated is decisive (cf. Zöller/Herget, Civil Procedure Code, 35th edition 2024, § 3 ZPO marginal no. 16.112; BeckOK ZPO/Wendtland, 53rd edition 01.07.2024, ZPO § 3 marginal no. 25; MüKoZPO/Wöstmann, 6th edition 2020, ZPO § 3 marginal no. 73). Since there are no indications of a deviation from the plaintiff's estimate of €6,000.00 and the court is also sufficiently aware from a large number of similar proceedings that the amount of the repayment claims is sometimes (in some cases considerably) higher than an amount of €6,000.00, the jurisdiction of the court must in any case be assumed to be that of the regional court. Paragraph 38 bb) The international jurisdiction of the Ellwangen (Jagst) Regional Court with regard to the right to information asserted at the first stage is based on Article 79, paragraph 2, sentence 2 of the GDPR, regardless of the plaintiff's legal opinion. According to this norm, the person affected by data processing can also bring an action against the controller of the same in the courts of the Member State in which he has his habitual residence, unless, which is not relevant here, the authority of a Member State has taken action in the exercise of its sovereign powers. Paragraph 39 α) Both the material and the territorial scope of application of the General Data Protection Regulation must be affirmed in the present case. Paragraph 40 In view of the fact that the plaintiff undisputedly provided personal information to the defendant via the Internet when creating his user account, it can be assumed that the processing was at least partially automated, Article 2, paragraph 1 of the GDPR. All computer-aided processing of personal data is to be included here (cf. Ehmann/Selmayr/Zerdick, 3rd ed. 2024, GDPR Art. 2 para. 3; i.e. also Schaffland/Wiltfang/Schaffland/Holthaus, General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)/Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG), 10th supplementary delivery 2024, Art. 2 EUV 2016/679 para. 3; BeckOK DatenschutzR/Bäcker, 49th ed. 01.08.2023, GDPR Art. 2 para. 3; Paal/Pauly/Ernst, 3rd ed. 2021, GDPR Art. 2 para. 5), especially since, according to Recital 15, a "technology-open", and therefore far-reaching, approach was chosen. The exceptions set out in Article 2(2) GDPR, which are not apparent in the present case, are to be interpreted accordingly narrowly (cf. ECJ, judgment of 16 July 2020, Facebook Ireland and Schrems, C-311/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, para. 84; ECJ, judgment of 24 February 2022, Valsts ieņēmumu dienests (processing of personal data for tax purposes), C-175/20, ECLI:EU:C:2022:124, para. 40; already on Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC, see also ECJ, judgment of 11 December 2014, Ryneš, C-212/13, EU:C:2014:2428, para. 29; ECJ, judgment of 27 September 2017, Puškár, C-73/16, EU:C:2017:725, para. 38; ECJ, judgment of 15 July 2018, Jehovan todistajat, C-25/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:551, para. 37). Paragraph 41 According to Article 3(1) GDPR, the regulation is also applicable geographically, since the defendant is already indisputably based in the Republic of Malta as a Member State of the European Union. It can be assumed that the necessary storage, and therefore processing, of the data provided by the plaintiff also takes place directly within the framework of this branch. The court is convinced that maintaining a company headquarters reflects the required degree of permanence of the establishment as well as the effective exercise of economic activities in the Member State in question (see this requirement with regard to Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 95/46/EC ECJ, judgment of 1 October 2015, Weltimmo, C-230/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:639, para. 29; ECJ, judgment of 28 July 2016, Verein für Konsumenteninformation, C-191/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:612, para. 77). In this respect, it must be assumed that the defendant also carries out the data processing required to operate its services via its company headquarters. Paragraph 42 β) The court has no doubt that the plaintiff, whose statement - which has remained undisputed anyway - is the basis, is initially to be classified as a data subject. According to the legal definition in Article 4 No. 1 GDPR, this is an identified or identifiable natural person whose personal data is the subject of a processing operation. The person himself must be able to be identified at least directly or indirectly, in particular by assignment to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more special characteristics that express the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person. Paragraph 43 In any case, it can be inferred from the plaintiff's statement that he assumes that the defendant processed the plaintiff's personal data as part of his participation in its gambling offer. In particular, the plaintiff stated that he had, for example, provided his address when creating a user account with the defendant. In view of the fact that the defendant has acknowledged the vast majority of the plaintiff's claims for information, the court has no doubt that the plaintiff is identifiable to the defendant in this respect, especially since the court is aware from other similar cases that a user account created must first be verified due to the payment transactions between the player and the game provider, and thus the identifiability required by Art. 79(2) sentence 2 GDPR must be ensured. Paragraph 44 According to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, such direct identifiability of the plaintiff by the defendant is not necessary anyway. Rather, with reference to Recital 26 of the General Data Protection Regulation, all personal data that could only be attributed to a natural person by using additional information are considered to be information about an identifiable natural person (see ECJ, judgment of 2 March 2023, Norra Stockholm Bygg, C-268/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:145, para. 57; ECJ, judgment of 5 December 2023, Nacionalinis visuomenės sveikatos centras, C-683/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:949, para. 58; ECJ, judgment of 7 March 2024, IAB Europe, C-604/22, ECLI:EU:C:2024:214, para. 39). It can be assumed that a person's residential address can lead to their identification, taking into account further information that does not even have to be in the hands of the defendant (cf. again ECJ, judgment of March 7, 2024, IAB Europe, C-604/22, ECLI:EU:C:2024:214, para. 40; also already on Art. 2 lit. a) Directive 95/46/EC ECJ, judgment of October 19, 2016, Breyer, C-582/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, para. 43). In this respect, reference is made, for example, to the link with an IP address that may have been collected. Paragraph 45 Since the processing of personal data is also a prerequisite for the asserted right to information under Article 15(1) GDPR, this is a doubly relevant fact, so that the plaintiff's argument regarding the admissibility of the action must be assumed to be correct in this respect anyway. This applies in particular to the extent that international jurisdiction is affected (cf. OLG Frankfurt, judgment of 12 September 2012 - 9 U 36/11, marginal no. 30; Saarland Higher Regional Court Saarbrücken, judgment of 28 April 2022 - 4 U 91/21, marginal no. 55; Saarland Higher Regional Court Saarbrücken, judgment of 12 May 2022 - 4 U 81/21, marginal no. 46; also OLG Stuttgart, judgment of 25 July 2011 - 5 U 60/11, marginal no. 14, each cited according to juris). Paragraph 46 γ) With regard to the right to information, the defendant acts unproblematically as the controller within the meaning of Art. 4 No. 7 GDPR, i.e. it is the (in this case legal) person who decides, at least jointly with others, on the purposes and means of processing personal data. This also follows, unless already implied by the plaintiff's request for information to the defendant, from the fact that the defendant has indicated that it is itself in a position to provide the requested information by acknowledging the majority of the claims for information. Paragraph 47 This also corresponds to the Union legislator's aim of ensuring effective and comprehensive protection of the data subject through a broad interpretation of the concept of controller (see ECJ, judgment of 5 December 2023, Nacionalinis visuomenės sveikatos centras, C-683/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:949, para. 58; ECJ, judgment of 7 March 2024, IAB Europa, C-604/22, ECLI:EU:C:2024:214, para. 39; on the former Article 2(b) of Directive 95/46/EC, see ECJ, judgment of 13 May 2014, Google Spain and Google, C-131/12, CLI:EU:C:2014:317, para. 34; ECJ, judgment of 5 June 2018, Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein, C-210/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:388, para. 28; ECJ, judgment of 29 July 2019, Fashion ID, C-40/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:629, para. 66). Anyone who, like the defendant, is in a position to respond substantively to a request for information such as the present one must logically have the relevant information and be able to decide for themselves how it is used. Paragraph 48 δ) The fact that the plaintiff, within the meaning of Article 79, paragraph 2, sentence 2 GDPR in conjunction with Article 79, paragraph 1 GDPR, is of the opinion that his rights under the General Data Protection Regulation have been violated in this case due to the failure to provide information in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 1 GDPR is also obvious in view of the plaintiff's undisputed statement that the defendant has not fulfilled his claim in this regard. This, in turn, is sufficient. The wording of Article 79(1) GDPR does not require the actual existence of a violation and in this respect corresponds to German case law on the assumption of doubly relevant facts in the context of the examination of international jurisdiction (see again OLG Frankfurt, judgment of September 12, 2012 - 9 U 36/11, marginal no. 30; Saarland Higher Regional Court of Saarbrücken, judgment of April 28, 2022 - 4 U 91/21, marginal no. 55; Saarland Higher Regional Court of Saarbrücken, judgment of May 12, 2022 - 4 U 81/21, marginal no. 46; also OLG Stuttgart, judgment of July 25, 2011 - 5 U 60/11, marginal no. 14, each cited according to juris). Paragraph 49 ε) With regard to the justification of the international jurisdiction of the court hearing the case, Articles 17(1)(c) and 18(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, which were cited by the plaintiff, are not relevant. Paragraph 50 The fact that both the website and the general terms and conditions of the defendant were indisputably designed in German does indeed constitute an orientation towards the German market within the meaning of Article 17(1)(c) of the Brussels I Regulation. According to case law, the mere possibility of using a language other than that commonly used in the trader's Member State can constitute an indication that the trader's activities are directed towards other Member States (see ECJ, judgment of December 7, 2010, Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, ECLI:EU:C:2010:740, para. 84; also OLG Cologne, judgment of November 17, 2023 – I-19 U 123/22, para. 21; OLG Cologne, decision of November 30, 2023 – 19 U 92/23, para. 4; OLG Cologne, judgment of 19 January 2024 – 19 U 48/23, para. 4, each cited according to juris). It also remained unchallenged that the plaintiff was acting as a consumer, especially since contracts concluded by an individual such as the present one without any apparent connection to a professional or commercial activity or objective and independently of such solely for the purpose of covering his own needs for private consumption are generally subject to the special provisions of Art. 17 of the Brussels I Regulation (see ECJ, judgment of 10 December 2020, Personal Exchange International, ECLI:EU:C:2020:1015, para. 30; ECJ, judgment of 20 October 2022, ECLI:EU:C:2022:807, ROI Land Investments, para. 53; ECJ, judgment of 9 March 2023, Wurth Automotive, ECLI:EU:C:2023:185, para. 23). Marginal number 51 However, at the first stage, which is decisive in this case, the plaintiff is not asserting a claim arising from a contract with the defendant, Article 17 paragraph 1 of the Brussels I Regulation. According to the action, the plaintiff does not base his claim for information on a contractual basis. Rather, he relies solely on Article 15 of the GDPR, which is a statutory claim. In this respect, there is already no consumer contract justifying the claim for information. Marginal number 52 cc) Since the plaintiff is undisputedly resident in M., i.e. in the district of the decisive regional court of Ellwangen (Jagst), this court also has local jurisdiction in accordance with Section 44 paragraph 1 sentence 2 of the Federal Data Protection Act. Although Article 79 (2) sentence 2 of the GDPR does not itself regulate local jurisdiction, the German federal legislature has implemented the norm accordingly with regard to local jurisdiction, taking into account the plaintiff's habitual residence (cf. Gola/Heckmann/Lapp, 3rd ed. 2022, BDSG § 44 marginal no. 2; Kühling/Buchner/Bergt, 4th ed. 2024, BDSG § 44 marginal no. 1; Sydow/Marsch/Kreße, DS-GVO/BDSG, 3rd ed. 2022, BDSG § 44 marginal no. 2). In this respect, a person's place of residence corresponds to their place of residence (cf. Schaffland/Wiltfang/Schaffland/Holthaus, General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)/Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG), 10th supplementary delivery 2024, Art. 79 EUV 2016/679 marginal no. 8; Kühling/Buchner/Bergt, 4th edition 2024, GDPR Art. 79 marginal no. 17). Marginal number 53 dd) The action is also admissible as a staged action within the meaning of Section 254 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For the legally specific cases of accounting, submission of an inventory of assets or submission of an affidavit, it is recognized that a staged action can also be considered if a claim for information is asserted in preparation for further legal action, regardless of the legal basis (cf. BeckOK ZPO/Bacher, 53rd Ed. 01.07.2024, ZPO § 254 Rn. 3; Musielak/Voit/Foerste, 21st Ed. 2024, ZPO § 254 Rn. 2; Saenger/Saenger, Civil Procedure Code, 10th Ed. 2023, § 254 ZPO Rn. 4). In this respect, the right to information under Art. 15 GDPR is also covered by the standard (cf. Anders/Gehle/Anders, 82nd ed. 2024, ZPO § 254 marginal no. 12; Zöller/Greger, Code of Civil Procedure, 35th ed. 2024, § 254 ZPO marginal no. 2). Paragraph 54 b) Insofar as the defendant has acknowledged the plaintiff's claims for information raised against it, it was to be convicted in accordance with its admission without a judicial review of the merits, Section 307, sentence 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This is because with the admission the defendant disposes of the subject matter of the dispute in such a way that the court is prevented from examining the subject matter of the dispute originally presented to it (cf. BGH, decision of November 10, 2009 - XI ZB 14/09, para. 15; BGH, decision of November 10, 2009 - XI ZB 15/09, para. 15; BGH, decision of July 18, 2013 - IX ZB 41/12, para. 7, each cited according to juris). Marginal number 55 c) Insofar as there is still a dispute over the existence of an obligation on the part of the defendant to provide the plaintiff with a complete payment and gaming history of all of his gaming accounts in a machine-readable Excel format in accordance with his claim under point 1. letter e), the action is justified. The plaintiff has a corresponding claim under Article 15 paragraph 1, paragraph 3 GDPR. Marginal number 56 aa) The fact that the provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation are applicable in this case both in terms of substance and space, Articles 2 paragraph 1, 3 paragraph 1 GDPR, was already discussed in the context of the admissibility review. Reference can be made to the affirmative statements in this regard in order to avoid repetition. Marginal number 57 bb) According to Article 15 (1) GDPR, the data subject not only has the right to request confirmation from the controller as to whether personal data concerning him or her is being processed, but also, if this is the case, a right to information about this personal data. Insofar as the plaintiff requests the complete payment and gaming history concerning him or her in a machine-readable Excel format, this is personal data of the plaintiff covered by the standard. Marginal number 58 α) It has also already been determined in the context of the admissibility review that the plaintiff is to be classified as a data subject within the meaning of Article 4 No. 1 GDPR and the defendant as a controller under Article 4 No. 7 GDPR. Marginal number 59 β) The information requested about the plaintiff's payment and gaming history is also personal data within the meaning of Article 15 (1) GDPR in conjunction with Article 4 No. 1 GDPR. Marginal number 60 Based on the legal definition of Art. 4 Para. 1 GDPR, the provision covers both personal information used in context, such as identification features (e.g. name, address and date of birth), external characteristics (such as gender, eye color, height and weight) or internal states (e.g. opinions, motives, wishes, beliefs and value judgments), as well as factual information such as financial and property relationships, communication and contractual relationships and all other relationships of the data subject with third parties and their environment (cf. OLG Cologne, judgment of July 26, 2019 – I-20 U 75/18, marginal no. 304; LG Stuttgart, judgment of November 4, 2020 – 18 O 333/19, marginal no. 56; LG Münster, judgment of December 3, 2020 – 115 O 220/18, marginal no. 30; LG Hamburg, judgment of July 6, 2023 – 302 O 24/23, marginal no. 47, each cited according to juris). This broad definition also takes into account the fact that, due to the development of information technology with its comprehensive processing and linking options, there is no longer any irrelevant data (cf. OLG Stuttgart, judgment of June 17, 2021 - 7 U 325/20, marginal no. 58; OLG Stuttgart, judgment of June 17, 2021 - 7 U 419/20, marginal no. 59; LG Munich I, judgment of April 6, 2020 - 3 O 909/19, marginal no. 94; LG Stuttgart, judgment of November 4, 2020 - 18 O 333/19, marginal no. 56, each cited according to juris). Paragraph 61 Against this background, it will hardly be justifiable that payments received by the plaintiff and any distributions of winnings to him recorded by the defendant do not constitute personal data in this respect. The same applies to the gaming history. Not only is this information generated through communication or at least the intended contractual relationship between the parties, but particularly with regard to payment transactions, information is recorded not only about the plaintiff's financial circumstances, but also his preferred payment methods as an expression of his economic personality. Both the payment transactions with the plaintiff and his gaming history are in any case linked to his user account and can therefore be assigned to the plaintiff. The defendant, which for its part assumes that its offer is legal, would otherwise not have been able to meet its own assumed obligations to the plaintiff. In order to ensure that any winnings are actually paid out to the plaintiff, the defendant had to ascertain his identity and assign the gaming transactions leading to the winnings to him. In view of these circumstances, the plaintiff is also identifiable within the meaning of Art. 4 No. 1 GDPR. Marginal number 62 γ) Finally, in view of the factual submissions that have remained undisputed in this respect, it can be assumed that the defendant is processing the data. Art. 4 No. 2 GDPR defines this as any operation or series of operations carried out with or without the aid of automated procedures in connection with personal data, such as the collection, recording, organization, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or any other form of provision, comparison or linking, restriction, erasure or destruction. Marginal number 63 Even the fact that the plaintiff only provides his own residential address to the defendant when creating his user account is a consequence of data collection by the defendant, since a corresponding registration tool is of course provided for this purpose. Since the plaintiff subsequently had access to the defendant's offer via his user account, the data provided in this context must necessarily have been recorded, stored and linked by the defendant. Otherwise, recurrent access to the user account using a user name and password that must be chosen regularly would not be possible at all. Paragraph 64 δ) The court is convinced that, with regard to the still disputed right to information, the plaintiff also has the right to request that the requested information be submitted in the requested machine-readable Excel format, Art. 15 (3) Sentence 3 GDPR. According to the above-cited standard, when a request for information is made electronically, the information in question must first be made available in a common electronic format. Neither Art. 15 (3) GDPR nor Art. 12 (1) Sentence 2 GDPR deal with the specific file format of the information to be transmitted. From a summary of the standards, it initially only follows that the controller is granted the right to choose between electronic, written or other forms of transmission. In this respect, the view is sometimes taken in the literature that, within the framework of Art. 15 Para. 3 GDPR, data copies should only be issued in the form in which the data concerned is available to the controller, without the need for any processing (cf. Paal/Pauly/Paal, 3rd ed. 2021, GDPR Art. 15 para. 37; Simitis/Hornung/ Spiecker gen. Döhmann/Dix, Datenschutzrecht, 1st ed. 2019, Art. 15 GDPR para. 29; BeckOK DatenschutzR/ Schmidt-Wudy, 49th ed. 01.08.2024, GDPR Art. 15 para. 83.2; Plath/Kamlah, DSGVO/BDSG/TTDSG, 4th ed. 2023, Art. 15 GDPR para. 16). Paragraph 65 This is not entirely convincing, however. Rather, the obligation to transmit data electronically when submitting an application electronically puts this into perspective, Article 15, paragraph 3, sentence 3 of the GDPR. In this respect, representatives of the above opinion also recognize a right to convert existing data into a common electronic format in the case of electronic application (cf. Plath/Kamlah, DSGVO/BDSG/TTDSG, 4th ed. 2023, Art. 15 DSGVO Rn. 18; Simitis/Hornung/Spiecker gen. Döhmann/Dix, Datenschutzrecht, 1st ed. 2019, Art. 15 DSGVO Rn. 31; BeckOK DatenschutzR/Schmidt-Wudy, 49th ed. 01.08.2024, DSGVO Art. 15 Rn. 83.1; also Kühling/Buchner/Bäcker, 4th ed. 2024, DSGVO Art. 15 Rn. 44d; Schaffland/Wiltfang/Schaffland/Holthaus, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (DS-GVO)/Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG), 10th supplementary delivery 2024, Art. 15 EUV 2016/67 para. 45), so that it seems inconsistent to generally say that the information must only be transmitted in the form available to the controller. This would also contradict the spirit and purpose of the right to information, which is intended to enable the data subject to check whether data concerning him or her is correct and is being processed in a lawful manner, as well as to effectively exercise his or her rights under this regulation (see ECJ, judgment of 4 May 2023, Austrian Data Protection Authority, C-487/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:369, paras. 34, 39; ECJ, judgment of 26 October 2023, FT, C-307/22, ECLI:EU:C:2023:811, para. 73). Marginal number66 Article 15(3) sentence 3 of the GDPR does not expressly regulate whether and to what extent the data subject may request that information concerning him or her be sent in a specific file format, in this case Excel. However, such a right is sometimes recognized as long as this does not entail additional costs for the controller (see again Simitis/Hornung/Spiecker gen. Döhmann/Dix, Data Protection Law, 1st ed. 2019, Article 15 of the GDPR marginal no. 31). The court agrees with this with regard to the meaning and purpose of the right to information. This is because an effective exercise of the rights of the data subject within the meaning of the cited case law requires that the data in question be as easy to read as possible (see also Ehmann/Selmayr/Ehmann, 3rd ed. 2024, Article 15 of the GDPR marginal no. 68). This can also be inferred from the principle of transparency enshrined in Article 12, Paragraph 1, Sentence 1 of the GDPR. In addition, it would seem to make little sense if the data subject should have the option of expressly requesting electronic transmission under Article 15, Paragraph 3, Sentence 3 of the GDPR, but the specific format of the transmission is entirely at the discretion of the controller. Paragraph 67 According to the court, this does not contradict Art. 20 GDPR. In this respect, it should not be overlooked that the right to information under Art. 15 (1) GDPR is intended to enable the data subject to effectively exercise his or her rights under the regulation (see again ECJ, judgment of 4 May 2023, Austrian Data Protection Authority, C-487/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:369, paras. 34, 39; ECJ, judgment of 26 October 2023, FT, C-307/22, ECLI:EU:C:2023:811, para. 73). However, this in turn requires, particularly in the case of electronic transmission, that a file format is chosen that can also be read by the data subject (see above Ehmann/Selmayr/Ehmann, 3rd ed. 2024, GDPR Art. 15 para. 68). If the data subject's choice with regard to the file format were to be recognized solely within the framework of Art. 20 GDPR, the effective exercise of rights would ultimately be made dependent on the requirements of Art. 20 Para. 1 GDPR in addition to the requirements of Art. 15 Para. 1 GDPR and the right to information under Art. 15 Para. 1 GDPR would thus be limited beyond the purpose of the standard and beyond its wording. Paragraph 68 cc) Regarding the defendant's objection that the plaintiff's request for information is an abuse of law in light of the intended preparation of the assertion of a claim for reimbursement against the defendant, the court sees no legal grounds to deny the asserted claim for information. Paragraph 69 On the question of whether or to what extent the existence of a request for information pursuant to Article 15(1) GDPR depends on the reasons pursued in asserting it, the Court of Justice of the European Union has since expressly stated that a request for information does not need to be justified, i.e. that it can in principle be made without reason, and that the pursuit of such objectives as those laid down in the General Data Protection Regulation is not necessary (see ECJ, judgment of 26 October 2023, FT/BW, C-307/22, ECLI:EU:C:2023:811, paras. 38, 51). Both the Federal Court of Justice (cf. BGH, judgment of March 5, 2024 - VI ZR 330/21, marginal no. 20, cited according to juris) and subsequently the various higher courts (cf. OLG Koblenz, partial judgment of July 20, 2023 - 10 U 1633/22, marginal no. 61; OLG Cologne, judgment of August 10, 2023 - I-15 U 184/22, marginal no. 32; OLG Nuremberg, judgment of November 29, 2023 - 4 U 347/21, marginal no. 83; OLG Braunschweig, decision of January 12, 2024 - 2 U 106/22, marginal no. 14, each cited according to juris) have since adopted this interpretation of applicable Union law in their consistent case law. It is therefore irrelevant whether the plaintiff is pursuing a purpose not mentioned in the General Data Protection Regulation with the right to information asserted at the first stage here. Paragraph 70 The court hearing the case cannot agree with the contrary statements made by the Mönchengladbach Regional Court (cf. LG Mönchengladbach, partial judgment of March 6, 2024 - 6 O 134/23, not published), to which the defendant relies. It is therefore not clear from the reasons for the judgment there why the Mönchengladbach Regional Court does not consider Art. 15 GDPR to be relevant with regard to the plaintiff's asserted request for information. The partial judgment there does not deal with the issue in more detail. To the extent that the Mönchengladbach Regional Court further denies a right to information due to a lack of information gap with the argument that it is known to the court that the plaintiff there can trace payments to the defendant himself using his (bank) data, which is generally available to him, so that for this reason too a right to information based on this is ruled out, the court hearing the case cannot agree with this for various reasons. Firstly, the assumption of the Mönchengladbach Regional Court cannot be transferred to the present case, since the plaintiff has stated without contradiction that he did not process his payments to the defendant via a bank account, but primarily via prepaid cards. While account data can possibly be reconstructed retrospectively via the credit institutions that hold the account, the court making the decision is not aware that this also applies to the same extent to prepaid cards. On the other hand, the argument of the Mönchengladbach Regional Court that, as long as the plaintiff has the opportunity to obtain the requested information by other means, this cannot be demanded from the defendant, is also not convincing. Article 15 paragraph 1 of the GDPR does not require the asymmetry of information to be bridged between the data subject and the controller. Since the right to information does not have to be justified and can also legitimately pursue purposes unrelated to data protection (cf. again cf. ECJ, judgment of 26 October 2023, FT/BW, C-307/22, ECLI:EU:C:2023:811, paras. 38, 51; BGH, judgment of 5 March 2024 – VI ZR 330/21, para. 20; OLG Koblenz, partial judgment of 20 July 2023 – 10 U 1633/22, para. 61; OLG Cologne, judgment of 10 August 2023 – I-15 U 184/22, para. 32; OLG Nuremberg, judgment of 29 November 2023 – 4 U 347/21, para. 83; OLG Braunschweig, decision of 12 January 2024 – 2 U 106/22, para. 14, each cited according to juris), the court is convinced that a mere possible simplification of one's own work, which the assertion of a right to information against the defendant entails in comparison to one's own compilation of the necessary information, can also be regarded as a legitimate aim. Paragraph 71 At most, in the case of an obvious abuse of law, it could be assumed that a right to information would ultimately be unfounded, especially since Art. 12 para. 5 sentence 2 lit. b) GDPR expressly provides for the possibility of refusing to comply with a request for information in the case of an obviously unfounded or excessive request. Whether the assertion of the right to information constitutes an abuse of law in view of the long-term goal already set out in the action of reclaiming the funds that the plaintiff paid to the defendant as part of his participation in online gambling offered by the defendant ultimately depends on the assessment of the possible abuse of law of the relevant claims for reclaim themselves. The obvious abuse of law in asserting such claims alone can conflict with a prior right to information under Art. 15 (1) GDPR, since otherwise the right to information, which in principle exists to a large extent according to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, would be restricted without sufficient legal grounds. Irrespective of the question of whether any claims for repayment exist in this case, the fact that the predominant case law of the higher courts (cf. most recently KG Berlin, decision of 21 July 2023 – 18 U 37/22; Brandenburg Higher Regional Court, judgment of 16 October 2023 – 2 U 36/22; Thuringian Higher Regional Court, judgment of 17 October 2023 – 7 U 1091/22; OLG Cologne, judgment of 17 November 2023 – I-19 U 123/22; OLG Oldenburg (Oldenburg), judgment of 30 November 2023 – 1 U 14/23; OLG Karlsruhe, judgment of 19 December 2023 – 19 U 14/23; OLG Karlsruhe, judgment of 22 December 2023 – 19 U 7/23; OLG Karlsruhe, judgment of December 19, 2023 – 19 U 48/23; OLG Bamberg, judgment of February 27, 2024 – 10 U 22/23 e; OLG Stuttgart, judgment of April 12, 2024 – 5 U 149/23; OLG Cologne, judgment of May 6, 2024 – 19 U 70/23; OLG Cologne, judgment of May 6, 2024 – 19 U 76/23; OLG Cologne, judgment of May 6, 2024 – 19 U 82/23; OLG Cologne, judgment of May 6, 2024 – 19 U 97/23; OLG Cologne, judgment of May 6, 2024 – 19 U 112/23; OLG Cologne, judgment of May 6, 2024 - 19 U 132/23; OLG Stuttgart, judgment of May 24, 2024 - 5 U 74/23; OLG Stuttgart, judgment of May 24, 2024 - 5 U 101/23, each cited according to juris) has not yet assumed that such actions constitute an abuse of law, that such obviousness does not exist. Furthermore, the First Civil Senate of the Federal Court of Justice has also provisionally taken a corresponding position in its advisory decision of March 22, 2024 (see in particular with regard to the argument of "gambling without risk" BGH, decision of March 22, 2024 - I ZR 88/23, para. 36, cited according to juris). Marginal number 72 2) Against the background of the principle of unity of the cost decision, the decision on costs was to be reserved for the final judgment (cf. MüKoZPO/Musielak, 6th ed. 2020, ZPO § 301 marginal no. 37; BeckOK ZPO/Elzer, 53rd ed. 01.07.2024, ZPO § 301 marginal no. 68; Zöller/Feskorn, Civil Procedure Code, 35th ed. 2024, § 301 ZPO marginal no. 21). Marginal number 73 3) The decision on provisional enforceability finds its legal basis in § 708 No. 1 ZPO, insofar as provisional enforceability without security was stated with regard to the partial recognition judgment. Paragraph 74 Furthermore, the order to provide security in this regard is based on Section 709 sentence 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure with regard to the tenor of paragraph 1 letter e). In the court's opinion, the amount of the security sufficiently takes into account any claim for damages by the defendant under Section 717 Para. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, taking into account a slight percentage surcharge with regard to any damage caused by enforcement or delay (see on this standard OLG Hamm, partial judgment of January 9, 2019 - I-12 U 123/18, marginal no. 13, cited according to juris; Anders/Gehle/Schmidt, 82nd ed. 2024, Code of Civil Procedure Section 709 marginal no. 5; MüKoZPO/Götz, 6th ed. 2020, Code of Civil Procedure Section 709 marginal no. 4; Saenger/Kindl, Code of Civil Procedure, 10th ed. 2023, Section 709 marginal no. 2). With regard to the decisive claim for damages, the court based its decision on the amount that would correspond to the defendant's expenditure in connection with providing the requested information. This corresponds to the highest court rulings, according to which the amount of security in the event of a conviction to provide information is to be determined according to the expected expenditure in terms of time and costs of the conviction to provide information (see BGH, decision of July 13, 2017 - I ZB 94/16, marginal no. 30; BGH, decision of March 1, 2018 - I ZB 97/17, marginal no. 18; BGH, judgment of July 14, 2022 - I ZR 121/21, marginal no. 26; also OLG Stuttgart, judgment of December 12, 2023 - 12 U 216/22, marginal no. 137, each cited according to juris). The court assumed that the defendant, who, as the court knows, had been confronted with similar requests for information in other proceedings, should be able to provide the requested information in the relevant file format without any major effort. In any case, given the large number of similar requests, finding the relevant data would be more of a routine task, so that a small surcharge had to be made simply to cover any necessary conversion of the file. The court therefore considers an amount of €500.00 to be sufficient. Margin number 75 4) The determination of the value in dispute is based on Sections 39 Paragraph 1, 44, 48 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 GKG in conjunction with Section 3 ZPO. The fee value in dispute is therefore based on the higher of the associated claims, in this case the payment request for item 2 of the claim, which has not yet been quantified. Marginal number 76 In principle, in an action for payment, the amount of money stated in the relevant application is decisive (cf. Zöller/Herget, Code of Civil Procedure, 35th edition 2024, § 3 ZPO marginal no. 16.112; BeckOK ZPO/Wendtland, 53rd edition 01.07.2024, ZPO § 3 marginal no. 25; MüKoZPO/Wöstmann, 6th edition 2020, ZPO § 3 marginal no. 73). Insofar as a figure has not yet been given in this case, but the plaintiff has provisionally stated a value of €6,000.00, the court sees no reason to deviate from this figure, either positively or negatively. According to § 3 ZPO, the court has to set the value at its own discretion in accordance with the interests of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's provisional value must be taken into account in this regard. This is because, although not binding, such a value statement nevertheless has considerable weight for the judicial determination of the value in dispute according to case law (cf. BGH, decision of October 8, 2012 - X ZR 110/11, marginal no. 4; OLG Stuttgart, decision of January 3, 2023 - 4 AR 4/22, marginal no. 18; OLG Stuttgart, decision of February 6, 2023 - 4 W 103/22, marginal no. 19; OLG Frankfurt, decision of July 11, 2024 - 6 W 54/24, marginal no. 4, each cited according to juris). However, the court currently lacks concrete evidence to deviate from this statement in this case. This was also already presented in the context of the discussion of subject-matter jurisdiction. Marginal number 77 The right to information under point 1 of the claim falls short of this value and is therefore not decisive for determining the value in dispute. Because, as in this case, the information is intended to prepare and facilitate the assertion of the claim for benefits, the value of the right to information is usually only a fraction of the claim for benefits (cf. BGH, decision of September 19, 2007 – IV ZR 226/06, marginal no. 5; BGH, decision of October 12, 2011 – XII ZB 127/11, marginal no. 14; BGH, decision of October 14, 2015 – IV ZB 21/15, marginal no. 9, each cited according to juris). The exact quantification is not important in the light of Section 44 GKG. Paragraph 78 5) Contrary to the defendant's opinion, there is no need to suspend the proceedings or to suspend the proceedings and refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU. Paragraph 79 A reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union under Article 267(3) TFEU is not necessary if it can be established that the question raised is not relevant, that the relevant provision of Union law has already been interpreted by the Court of Justice in the sense of an acte éclairé, or that the correct application of Union law is so obvious that there is no room for reasonable doubt, thus a so-called acte clair exists (see most recently ECJ, judgment of 18 October 2011, C-128/09 to C-131/09, C-134/09 and C-135/09, Boxus and others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:667, para. 32; ECJ, judgment of 9 September 2015, C-160/14, Ferreira da Silva e Brito and others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:565, para. 38; ECJ, judgment of 1 October 2015, C-452/14, Doc Generici, ECLI:EU:C:2015:644, para. 43). Paragraph 80 Taking into account the decision already issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding the possibility of successfully making a claim for information on the basis of the General Data Protection Regulation even in connection with objectives that are not provided for in the recitals of the Regulation (see again ECJ, judgment of 26 October 2023, FT/BW, C-307/22, ECLI:EU:C:2023:811, paras. 38, 51), it can be assumed that the legal question raised by the defendant regarding the exclusion of the right to information due to possible abusive pursuit of objectives that are not related to data protection has since been clarified. In this respect, there is no need to submit the question that has already been answered again, especially since the adjudicating court, which does not have the final say in the present case, is not obliged to submit it anyway under Article 267(3) TFEU. Paragraph 81 Nor is there any need to suspend the proceedings in view of the request for a preliminary ruling from the Koblenz Higher Regional Court, which was submitted on October 27, 2022 and was named by the defendant. The Court of Justice of the European Union will not answer the questions raised after it deleted the proceedings under case number C-672/22 by order of April 18, 2023 (see ECJ, order of April 18, 2023, BZ/DKV Deutsche Krankenversicherung AG, C-672/22, ECLI:EU:C:2023:403). The legal dispute before the referring court had been terminated elsewhere. The preliminary ruling proceedings with a similar thrust initiated by the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court, according to the defendant, also do not require the present proceedings to be suspended. In any case, this would not be procedurally economical in view of the action being ready for a decision in the first stage, especially since the court hearing the case, as explained, sees no legal grounds for a corresponding request for a preliminary ruling anyway. Since the defendant has neither submitted the decision of the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court nor stated its file number, it cannot be ruled out that this request for a preliminary ruling was made before the cited decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the requirements for a right to information under Art. 15 GDPR and may no longer be up to date.
