Rb. Noord-Holland - AWB-20 2618
|Rb. Noord-Holland - AWB-20_2618|
|Court:||Rb. Noord-Holland (Netherlands)|
Article 8 ECHR
|Parties:||Tax and Customs Administration|
|National Case Number/Name:||AWB-20_2618|
|European Case Law Identifier:||ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2020:8440|
|Original Source:||Rechtspraak.nl (in Dutch)|
The District Court of North-Holland (Rb. Noord-Holland) held that the way in which the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration has organised its proceedings doesn't constitute a breach of Article 8 ECHR, as such interference in an individual's right to privacy is consistent with the requirements of Article 8 para. 2.
English Summary[edit | edit source]
Facts[edit | edit source]
The plaintiff received a tax assessment from the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration (i.e. a letter in which it tells you how much you have to pay). She didn’t agree with its content, and therefore submitted an objection. The Tax and Customs Administration rejected the objection and maintained the assessment and the tax decision. So the plaintiff filed an appeal.
One of the grounds for appeal argued by the plaintiff was that her privacy (as enshrined in the GDPR) has been violated as estbalished in other proceedings. Different stages of the tax levy and objection processes have indeed been assigned to different organisational units established in different locations, which gave the plaintiff an unpleasant feeling that her details were everywhere. As a result, a relatively large number of people were required to gain access to her information.
Dispute[edit | edit source]
Does the way the tax levy and objection processes of the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration have been designed violate the plaintiff's privacy?
Holding[edit | edit source]
The District Court interpreted the plaintiff's argument as an appeal on the basis of the right to privacy as enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (rather than the GDPR).
In the District Court's opinion, the tax levy and objection processes constitute in itself an interference with an individual's right to privacy by the public authorities. After all, the Tax and Customs Administration collects and stores large amounts of information of a private nature in that context. Such interference is reinforced by the fact that various stages of the tax levy and objection processes were assigned to different organisational units.
However, not all interference with an individual's right to privacy constitutes a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR. This is not the case if the interference is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. (Article 8(2) of the ECHR).
According to the Court,
(1) The way in which the Tax and Customs Administration has organised its proceedings (assigning different stages of the tax levy and objection processes to different organisational units established in different locations) is regulated by the law (Article 3 of the Tax and Customs Administration Implementation Regulations 2003). It therefore meets the requirement of a legal basis.
(2) This type of organisation was prompted by the desire to shape the activities of the Tax and Customs Administration as efficiently as possible and enable greater flexibility. This makes the measure necessary in a democratic society in the interest of the economic well-being of the country.
In view of the foregoing, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's right to privacy has not been violated and the appeal was dismissed as unfounded.
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English Machine Translation of the Decision[edit | edit source]
The decision below is a machine translation of the Dutch original. Please refer to the Dutch original for more details.
Ruling North-Holland District Court Place of session Haarlem Administrative law Case number: HAA 20/2618 judgment of the single chamber of 27 October 2020 in the case between drs. [X] , residing at [Z] , plaintiff, and the inspector of the Belastingdienst/Particulieren, Amsterdam office, defendant. Process Process The plaintiff lodged a complaint with the defendant. Since the defendant did not take a decision on the matter, the claimant served him with a notice of default and subsequently brought an action for failure to take a decision in time. The plaintiff also gave notice of default to the defendant for failing to impose an income tax and national insurance contributions (IB/PVV) assessment for the year 2018 in time. She also brought an action in that regard. The defendant subsequently imposed on the claimant an IB/PVV assessment for the year 2018, calculated on the basis of a taxable income from work and home of € 15,025. In doing so, he issued an order in respect of tax interest, in which an amount of € 3 was paid in tax interest. The claimant lodged both an objection and an appeal against this assessment and the interest decision. By ruling on the objection, the defendant has maintained the assessment and the decision on tax interest. The plaintiff has also lodged an appeal. The defendant submitted a statement of defence. The claimant submitted further documents before the hearing. Copies of these documents were provided to the defendant. The investigation at the hearing took place on 5 August 2020 in Haarlem. The claimant appeared. The defendant was represented by [A] and mr. [B] . Considerations Facts 1. The plaintiff was born on [...] . 2. The claimant's income in the year 2018 consisted of a payment under the Participation Act in the amount of € 15,229. 3. By letter of 17 December 2018, the claimant submitted a request for data erasure to the defendant under the General Data Protection Regulation (AVG). An appeal is currently pending before the District Court of Amsterdam. 4. On 29 March 2019, the claimant's IB/PVV for the year 2018 was received by the defendant. 5. By letter dated 29 October 2019, the defendant requested additional information from the claimant following her IB/PVV declaration for the year 2018. The claimant provided this information by letter of 6 November 2019. 6. On 6 November 2019, the plaintiff also served notice of default on the defendant for failing to rule on a complaint filed by the plaintiff on 30 September 2019 at the offices of the Tax and Customs Administration, Amsterdam. 7. By letter dated 8 November 2019, the defendant informed the plaintiff that its notice of default does not relate to an application within the meaning of Article 1:3 of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht, Awb), so that it is not entitled to assess the right to a penalty payment. According to the letter, this notification is not subject to objection or appeal. 8. By letter of 11 November 2019, the defendant informed the claimant of its intention to derogate from its IB/PVV declaration for the year 2018. 9. By letter dated 20 November 2019, the plaintiff responded to the defendant's intention and asked him to issue a provisional judgment in accordance with her declaration. 10. By letter of 29 November 2019, the claimant responded to the defendant's letter of 8 November 2019. The subject matter of this letter is mentioned: "Your letter dated 8 Nov 2019 regarding IGS. Objection". 11. On 5 December 2019, the defendant announced that it would impose the IB/PVV assessment for the year 2018 in accordance with its letter of 11 November 2019. 12. By letter of 9 December 2019, the plaintiff lodged an appeal with the District Court of Amsterdam against the defendant's refusal to make a (correct) decision. The Court of Amsterdam registered this appeal under case number AMS 19/6551 and requested plaintiff by letter of 10 December 2019 to send a copy of the notice of default. By letter of 18 December 2019, the plaintiff sent the notice of default of 6 November 2019 and the letter of the defendant of 8 November 2019 to the Court of Amsterdam. 13. By letter of 8 December 2019, received by the defendant on 12 December 2019, the plaintiff objected to the letter of 5 December 2019. The defendant interpreted this letter as an objection to the IB/PVV assessment still to be imposed for the year 2018, and maintained the processing of the objection. 14. By letter of 20 January 2020, the plaintiff served notice of default on the defendant on the ground that it had not yet issued the IB/PVV assessment for the year 2018 and had failed to rule on the objection of 8 December 2019. 15. On 22 January 2020, the District Court of Amsterdam forwarded the appeal which it had registered under case number AMS 19/6551 to the District Court because it considered that it lacked jurisdiction. The court registered this case under case number HAA 20/2618. 16. By letter of 23 January 2020, the defendant informed the claimant that its notice of default of 20 January 2020 does not relate to an application within the meaning of Article 1:3 of the General Administrative Law Act (Awb), because filing a declaration is not an application. As a result, he is not entitled to assess the right to a penalty payment. According to the letter, this notification is not subject to objection or appeal. 17. By letter of 2 February 2020, the claimant brought a 'direct action' before the court 'concerning IB 2018', complaining, inter alia, that the defendant had not issued an IB/PVV assessment for the year 2018. The claimant also referred to the letter of formal notice of 20 January 2020. The Court included this letter in the case file number HAA 20/2618. 18. On 5 March 2020, the defendant imposed on the claimant the assessment IB/PVV for the year 2018. This assessment includes a refund of € 79 (including tax interest to be reimbursed). 19. By letter of 5 March 2020, the claimant lodged an appeal against this attack with the court. The Court also included this letter in the case file number HAA 20/2618. 20. On 12 March 2020, the defendant asked the plaintiff to state the reasons for her objection of 12 December 2019. By letter of 15 March 2020, the claimant responded and asked the defendant to agree to a direct appeal. 21. On 27 March 2020, the defendant gave its decision on the objection of 12 December 2019. 22. By letter of 6 April 2020, received at the Court on 7 April 2020, the plaintiff supplemented her appeal in the case with number HAA 20/2618, commenting, inter alia, on the judgment on the objection. Admissibility of the action 23. Before assessing the points of contention between the parties, the court will assess the admissibility of the appeal ex officio. 24. From the plaintiff's letters received by the court, the court concludes that the plaintiff appeals against the defendant's subsequent decisions: The absence of a decision on the claimant's complaint lodged with the defendant on (Default notice from plaintiff dated 6 November 2019); The non-imposition of IB/PVV assessment for the year 2018 (plaintiff's formal notice of 20 January 2020); Failure to rule on the objection of 8 December 2019 (plaintiff's formal notice of 20 January 2020); The IB/PVV assessment imposed on the claimant by the defendant for the year 2018, dated 5 March 2020; Judgment on defendant's objection of 27 March 2020. 25. The Court considers as follows in this respect. No appeal may be lodged against a decision on the handling of a complaint about the conduct of an administrative body on the basis of Article 9:3 of the General Administrative Law Act (Awb). Since failure to take a decision in time pursuant to Section 6:2(1)(b) of the General Administrative Law Act is equated with a decision, no appeal may be lodged against it either. Insofar as the appeal is directed against the failure to reach a decision on the claimant's complaint, the appeal is therefore inadmissible. For reasons of procedural economy, the court will pronounce the declaration of inadmissibility itself. An assessment, although not a decision on application, is considered a decision within the meaning of Section 6:2, first paragraph, opening words and letter b, of the Awb, so that the absence of such an assessment is assimilated to a decision against which, pursuant to Section 8:1 of the Awb read in conjunction with Section 26 of the Algemene Wet inzake rijksbelastingen (AWR), an appeal may be lodged with the administrative court (see the judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 June 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP8929). Pursuant to Section 7:1(1)(f) of the General Administrative Law Act (Awb), it is not necessary to first go through the objection procedure in such a case. In the plaintiff's letter of 2 February 2020, the court reads an appeal against the lack of assessment IB/PVV for the year 2018. However, it follows from the aforementioned judgment of the Supreme Court that such an appeal is inadmissible if the appeal is filed before the administrative body is in default. In a case such as the present, this is not the case if the assessment has been issued before the expiry of the statutory period prescribed in article 11, paragraph 3 of the AWR. As will be considered below, the assessment IB/PVV for the year 2018 has in fact been issued within that period in respect of the claimant. This means that the appeal is also inadmissible to that extent. The same applies to the appeal against the absence of a decision on an objection relating to the IB/PVV assessment for the year 2018 and the accompanying interest decision. As will be considered below, the defendant did not exceed the time-limit for lodging an appeal and was therefore not at fault. The action is therefore also inadmissible to that extent. It follows from the foregoing that, in principle, an appeal is possible in respect of the IB/PVV assessment imposed on the claimant for the year 2018, dated 5 March 2020, and the accompanying decision concerning tax interest. However, the person granted the right to lodge an appeal with an administrative court must lodge an objection before lodging an appeal (Article 7:1(1) of the General Administrative Law Act). To the extent that the claimant wished to lodge a direct appeal against the assessment and the decision on tax interest, her appeal is therefore inadmissible. However, the appeal is admissible to the extent that the claimant has lodged an appeal against the decision on the objection of 27 March 2020, which relates to the aforementioned assessment and order. The Court reads such an appeal in the plaintiff's letter of 6 April 2020, which is also directed against the judgment on objection. 26. The foregoing means that the appeal is only admissible to the extent that it is directed against the judgment on objection relating to that IB/PVV assessment for the year 2018 and the decision on tax interest thereon. Dispute 27. In dispute is the answer to the following questions: - Was the attack imposed in good time? - Did the defendant decide on the claimant's objection in due time? - Is there a right to deduct costs related to legal proceedings? - Is there a right to deduct specific healthcare costs? - If the costs relating to legal proceedings and healthcare costs are not deducted from Box 1 income, can they be taken into account as debts in Box 3? - Has the defendant violated the plaintiff's privacy? - Has the defendant compiled the file correctly? - Has the defendant infringed the general principles of good administration? Assessment of the dispute Attack imposed in good time? 28. The plaintiff takes the view that the attack was established too late. 29. The defendant takes the view that the attack was imposed within the period of time allowed for its imposition. 30. Article 11(3) of the AWR stipulates that the power to determine the tax assessment lapses three years after the time at which the tax debt has arisen. Pursuant to Section 11, paragraph 4, of the AWR, an income tax liability arises at the time when the period for which the tax is levied ends. 31. The period of taxation in this case is the tax year 2018. This period shall end on 31 December 2018. This means that the defendant had the power to issue an assessment until 31 December 2021. The assessment was dated 5 March 2020 and in these proceedings it was neither stated nor revealed that the assessment was not notified to the claimant until after that date. The District Court is therefore of the opinion that the assessment was issued on time. A timely decision on an objection? 32. The plaintiff argues that there was no decision on the objection. Therefore, the appeal of 2 February 2020 concerns the failure to issue a decision. 33. The defendant takes the view that the objection could only be dealt with after the attack had been imposed. That was done on 5 March 2020. The judgment on the objection was rendered on 27 March 2020 and is therefore timely. 34. The court first of all holds that in her letter of 2 February 2020, the plaintiff appeals against the failure to rule on her objection to the defendant's letter of 5 December 2019. As considered above, her appeal is inadmissible to that extent. 35. To the extent that the plaintiff wishes to argue that the contested judgment on the objection of 27 March 2020 was not rendered in time, the court will consider as follows. Pursuant to Section 7:10(1) of the General Administrative Law Act (Awb), an administrative body must decide in a case such as the present within six weeks, counting from the day after the day on which the period for lodging the notice of objection has expired. Pursuant to Section 22j of the AWR, this period commences with the date of the assessment (5 March 2020) and not with the receipt of the notice of objection on 12 December 2019. In view of the above, the period expired on 16 April 2020, so that the decision on the objection was made within the deadline. Costs of legal proceedings 36. In her IB/PVV return for the year 2018, the claimant deducted an amount of € 1,323 in legal costs. These costs have been classified in the declarations under the deductible costs of periodic benefits. The claimant is of the opinion that these costs reduce her ability to pay and should therefore be deducted. 37. The defendant did not allow this amount to be deducted. He disputes that the costs were incurred to acquire, collect and maintain the distribution pursuant to the Participation Act. 38. The plaintiff is right to point out that income tax is intended by the legislator as a means of taxation (see, for example, Parliamentary Papers II 1998/99, 26 727, no. 3, pp. 4-7). However, it is not the case that this intention of the legislator already means that the claimant is entitled to deduct costs which reduce her ability to pay. Various regulations in the Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001 (Income Tax Act 2001) (including the personal deductions to which the claimant is entitled) take account of certain limitations on capacity. It is up to the legislator to determine which limitations are taken into account and which are not. The legislator's decision not to make a statutory provision for the type of costs plaintiff faces cannot in principle be called into question in court, because the court may under no circumstances assess the inner value or fairness of the law (Article 11 of the General Provisions Act). Nor is the judge free, in the given constitutional relations, to assess the law against the general principles of law, should the principle of force majeure already be taken into account (cf. the judgment of the Supreme Court of 14 April 1989, ECLI:NL:HR:1989:AD5725). 39. The claimant has entered the legal costs incurred in her tax return in the field of deductible expenses in respect of periodic benefits. This field relates to the costs that are charged on benefits and benefits in kind in so far as they have been incurred for the acquisition, collection and maintenance of those benefits and benefits in kind (Article 3.108 of the Wet IB 2001). In order to be able to deduct such costs, the claimant must demonstrate that she has incurred the costs of acquiring, collecting and maintaining her benefits. In the opinion of the court, she has failed to do so in the face of the substantiated dispute by the defendant. The court can in fact deduce from the documents of the proceedings what kind of costs are involved (court registry costs, travel expenses, registered letters, postage stamps, etc.), but not to what extent these costs were incurred for proceedings to acquire, collect and maintain the benefit under the Participation Act. The court understands from the plaintiff's documents that these are not only proceedings relating to a benefit, but also, for example, proceedings in the field of taxes, care allowance and youth care. However, the court cannot deduce from the documents what part of the costs relate to the proceedings in relation to a benefit. 40. The court therefore concludes that the costs incurred by the plaintiff in the year 2018 for the various legal proceedings are not deductible. Specific healthcare costs 41. In the claimant's IB/PVV declaration for the year 2018 an amount of € 1,669 in specific healthcare costs has been deducted. According to the claimant, these costs were incurred on the prescription of a physician. According to the claimant, in view of her income and ability to pay, it would not be balanced to exclude the costs of deduction. She argues that if she did not pay those costs, she would be left out in the open. 42. The defendant takes the view that it has correctly established the deduction in respect of specific healthcare costs. According to the defendant, a collection premium (€ 583.37) and expenses for proceedings at Stichting Klachten en Geschillen Zorgverzekeringen (€ 56.20) do not constitute healthcare costs. For the other costs the defendant has eliminated payment costs and excess. Only the uninsured dental costs to the amount of € 454.56 will then remain. To these costs the defendant applies a threshold of € 251. This leaves a deductible amount of € 204. 43. Load-carrying factors, as considered above, can only be taken into account in the determination of the attack if there is a legal basis for doing so. In the case of healthcare costs, this basis can be found in Article 6.1, second paragraph, opening words and letter d, read in conjunction with Article 6.17 of the Personal Income Tax Act 2001. In the case of claimant pursuant to Article 6.20, first paragraph, opening words and letter b, of the Personal Income Tax Act 2001, these costs will only be taken into account to the extent that, after application of the increase pursuant to Article 6.19 of the Personal Income Tax Act 2001, they together exceed 1.65% of the aggregate income before application of the personal deduction. For plaintiffs in 2018 this threshold amounts to € 15,229 * 1.65% = € 251. 44. The Court is of the opinion that the costs which - as far as the parties are not in dispute - fall under the policy excess and the collection costs charged by the healthcare insurer do not constitute specific healthcare costs within the meaning of Article 6.17 of the IB 2001 Act. Premiums for healthcare insurance and payments to the healthcare insurer pursuant to the policy excess do not constitute specific healthcare costs within the meaning of Article 6.18(1) of the Wet IB 2001 (Individual Healthcare Insurance Act, IB 2001). The same applies, in the District Court's opinion, to collection costs in respect of such payment obligations to the healthcare insurer, to the extent that collection costs can be regarded as expenditure incurred due to sickness or invalidity at all (as required by Article 6.17(1) of the Wet IB 2001). 45. In the opinion of the court, costs for a procedure before a Disputes Committee fall outside the enumeration of Article 6.17(1) of the Personal Income Tax Act 2001 and are therefore not eligible for deduction as specific healthcare costs. 46. In view of the foregoing, the court is of the opinion that the defendant was right to set the deductible specific healthcare costs for the year 2018 at € 204. Box 3 47. The claimant has entered debts in box 3 in her declaration. This was wrongly not taken into account, according to the claimant. She further argues that if the costs of legal proceedings and medical expenses are not deducted in box 1, they must be taken into account as debts in box 3. 48. The defendant takes the view that the box 3 power cannot be negative. Since the claimant has no assets in box 3, it is irrelevant, in the defendant's view, whether debts in box 3 should be taken into account. 49. It is correct in itself that amounts owed by the claimant on 1 January 2018 which are not taken into account in box 1 or box 2 are deductible in box 3. To this end, Article 5.3(1) of the Personal Income Tax Act 2001 stipulates that the basis of return for box 3 consists of the value of the assets less the value of the debts. Article 5.2, first paragraph, of the Personal Income Tax Act 2001 stipulates that the joint basis of savings and investments is equal to the joint basis of return at the beginning of the calendar year (reference date) of the taxpayer and its partner insofar as this joint basis of return exceeds the tax-free assets of the taxpayer and its partner. 50. However, these provisions also show that tax is only levied in Box 3 if the balance of assets and liabilities exceeds the tax-exempt assets. Since there is no dispute between the parties that, on 1 January 2018, the plaintiff had no assets worth more than the tax-exempt assets (€30,000) and that the plaintiff was not subject to box 3 tax in these years, the deduction of debts in box 3 cannot lead to an amendment of the contested decisions for the plaintiff. Therefore, the court is not entitled to adjudicate on those debts. Privacy 51. The plaintiff complains that her privacy has been violated. She received the request to file a complaint from Breda and the provisional attack from Doetinchem. She stated that she had to correspond with the defendant on five to nine different veins. This gives the plaintiff an unpleasant feeling, because she gets the idea that her details are everywhere. For this reason she also started AVG proceedings against the defendant. The claimant concludes that the invasion of her privacy must lead to the destruction of the attacks. 52. The defendant refers in this respect to the AVG proceedings pending before the District Court of Amsterdam and disputes that a possible invasion of privacy could lead to the annulment of the attacks, because there is no legal basis for this. 53. The court interprets the plaintiff's argument as an appeal to the right to respect for privacy, as enshrined in Article 10 of the Constitution (Gw) and Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).The court thus understands the claimant's argument that she does not so much object to the levying of income tax per se, but rather to the way in which the levy and objection processes at the Tax and Customs Administration have been designed, and in particular the fact that different stages of these processes have been assigned to different organisational units established in different locations. 54. In the opinion of the court, the levying of the current Dutch income tax constitutes in itself an interference in the privacy of the public authorities. After all, the defendant collects and stores large amounts of information of a private nature in that context. Moreover, the interference is reinforced by the fact that the defendant has assigned various stages of the levy and objection processes to different organisational units of the Tax and Customs Administration. As a result, a relatively large number of different officials are required to gain access to the information of a private nature referred to above. In this case, as far as the court has been able to establish, the plaintiff has received mail from the Tax and Customs Administration/Particulieren, the Amsterdam office, the Tax and Customs Administration/Particulieren, Team IGS office Arnhem and the Tax and Customs Administration, Heerlen office (apparently the organisational unit Central Administrative Processes). In view of the claimant's argument, the District Court will only deal with the latter aspect of the interference. 55. Not all invasions of privacy constitute a violation of Article 10 of the GP and Article 8 of the ECHR. This is not the case if the interference is provided for by law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, the prevention of disorder and crime, the protection of health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (Article 8(2) of the ECHR). 56. In the opinion of the court, the way in which the Tax and Customs Administration has organised its proceedings under the law has been formalised. Article 3(2) of the AWR states that ministerial regulations shall lay down rules on the main lines of the organisation of the National Tax Administration and on the inspector to whom a taxpayer falls. The subdivision of the Tax and Customs Administration into the various organisational divisions with which the claimant has corresponded is regulated in Article 3 of the Tax and Customs Administration Implementation Regulations 2003. The inspector to which the claimant belongs is laid down in Article 11(1) of the Tax and Customs Administration Implementation Regulation 2003. It does not follow from these regulations that the Tax and Customs Administration/Particulate organisational unit has a centralised default notice team in Arnhem. As the establishment of the Tax and Customs Administration/Particulieren organisational unit is provided for by law itself, the court does not see this as a breach of the requirement of a legal basis. 57. According to the regulator, the method of organisation described above is motivated by the desire for greater flexibility in the work of the Tax and Customs Administration (see the decree of the State Secretary for Finance of 19 December 2002, no. WDB2002/835 M, Netherlands Government Gazette 2002, 247 / p. 19, p. 5). In this way, the court understands the regulator's intention with the new, partially centralised organisational form of the Tax and Customs Administration to shape the Tax and Customs Administration's work processes as efficiently as possible. This, in the opinion of the court, makes the measure necessary in a democratic society in the interest of the economic well-being of the country. The court therefore concludes that the claimant's right to respect for her privacy has not been violated. It is not for the court to answer the question of how restoration of rights within the meaning of Article 13 of the ECHR should take shape. Composition of the dossier 58. The plaintiff has complained about the composition of the file in this case. She feels that this is always going wrong. For example, she does not see her own appeal between the documents accompanying the defence. In addition, the defendant in this case has also referred to proceedings number 19/6551 and has also added documents from those proceedings to the file. This appears to the plaintiff to be a deliberate deception, because that is a completely different procedure. All in all, according to the claimant, the composition of the file is selective. 59. According to the defendant, the Court of Amsterdam issued the number AMS 19/6551 and the case was then forwarded to the court and registered there under the number HAA 20/2618. The proceedings are therefore the same. 60. The court states first and foremost that pursuant to Section 8:42(1) of the General Administrative Law Act the defendant must send the documents relating to the case to the court. He has done this in his statement of defence. The court has no reason to assume that the defendant has not sent all documents relating to the case. Nor, in the opinion of the court, does that obligation go so far as to require a defendant administrative body to send an appeal submitted in the proceedings in question to the administrative court. Such a course of affairs would not be efficient, given the circumstance that a defendant administrative body correctly receives the notice of appeal from the administrative court (cf. Section 6:14(2) and Section 8:42(1) of the General Administrative Law Act). 61. The summary of the facts included at the beginning of this judgment shows that the District Court of Amsterdam forwarded the file with number AMS 19/6551 to the District Court because it considered itself to have no jurisdiction. The District Court registered this file under case number HAA 20/2618. Thus, as the defendant rightly argues, it concerns the same procedure, so that there is no unlawful merging of files. General principles 62. The plaintiff has serious suspicions of fraud. The plaintiff has therefore reported the matter to the Public Prosecution Service on several occasions. The plaintiff claims that the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and other principles of good administration have been infringed. She complains that the defendant's decisions, and in particular his deviation from the declaration, were insufficiently reasoned. 63. The court emphasises that the trial of criminal offences is not entrusted to the administrative courts. However, in these proceedings, the court may decide whether the defendant has infringed general principles of good administration, including the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and the duty to state reasons. However, the court has not established what the breaches alleged by the plaintiff consist of, nor has it become plausible that she has been adversely affected by them. The court therefore sees no reason to annul or reduce the contested decisions. Slotsom 64. In view of the foregoing, the appeal should be dismissed as unfounded in so far as it is directed against the judgment on the objection of 27 March 2020. For the rest, the appeal should be dismissed as inadmissible. Legal costs 65. There are no grounds for an order to pay costs. Decision The court: - Dismisses the action as unfounded in so far as it is directed against the judgment on appeal of 27 March 2020; and - dismisses the remainder of the action as inadmissible. This judgment was delivered by Mr C. Maas, judge, in the presence of Mr M. van Doesburg, registrar. The judgment was rendered on 27 October 2020. As a result of measures surrounding the coronavirus, this decision was not pronounced at a public verdict hearing. As soon as public pronouncement is possible again, this verdict will, if necessary, still be pronounced in public. court clerk Copy sent to parties on: Legal remedy To the extent that this judgment dismisses as inadmissible the appeal against the failure to decide on the claimant's complaint, the parties may lodge an appeal against this judgment within six weeks after it was sent to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, Postbus 20019, 2500 EA The Hague, the Netherlands. (Further information www.raadvanstate.nl) For the rest, the parties may lodge an appeal against this ruling with the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam (tax chamber), PO Box 1312, 1000 BH Amsterdam, within six weeks of dispatch. When lodging an appeal, the following must be observed: 1. a copy of this judgment will be submitted with the notice of appeal. 2. the notice of appeal must be signed and state at least the following: a. the name and address of the appellant; b. a date; c. a description of the decision against which the appeal has been lodged; d. the grounds for the appeal.