VG Köln - 6 K 3228/19
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| VG Köln - 6 K 3228/19 | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Court: | VG Köln (Germany) |
| Jurisdiction: | Germany |
| Relevant Law: | Article 6(1)(f) GDPR Art. 5(1)(S. 2) GG (German Constitution) |
| Decided: | 15.02.2022 |
| Published: | |
| Parties: | Bild Haus der Geschichte |
| National Case Number/Name: | 6 K 3228/19 |
| European Case Law Identifier: | ECLI:DE:VGK:2022:0215.6K3228.19.00 |
| Appeal from: | |
| Appeal to: | |
| Original Language(s): | German |
| Original Source: | NRWE - Case Law Data Base of Nordrhein-Westfalen (in German) |
| Initial Contributor: | Sara Horvat |
The Cologne Administrative Court held that the German journalist's right to information ("pressrechtlicher Auskunftsanspruch") may override the right to privacy under the GDPR.
English Summary
Facts
On November 9, 1989, Günter Schabowski, member and spokesman for the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED - party in power in the eastern part of Germany during the cold war) read out the new travel regulations of the German Democratic Republic (DDR) at a press conference live on television. During the press conference he was asked by an Italian and German reporter about the date when the new regulations will come into force. Mr. Schabowski, looking a little perplexed at first, answers "To my knowledge - that is immediately, without delay". The new travel regulations allowed people to travel to foreign countries, especially Western countries, more easily than before. Immediately after the press conference thousands of East-Berlin's residents were flocking to the border, demanding their opening. The wall dividing Germany fell.
The piece of paper, also known as the "Schabowski Note", from which Mr. Schabowski was reading the new travel regulations is now owned by the "Haus der Geschichte" Foundation in Bonn. The Foundation had bought the note in 2015 for 25,000 euros. The seller demanded anonymity, which the Foundation also assured him. But the path of how the note came to the first and later to the second seller, who sold it to the Foundation, is not completely clear.
Mr. Schabowski´s family said that the Note was given to someone to take a closer look at it, but never given away permanently, they have asked the person to give it back, which did not happen.
A journalist from the “Bild” Newspaper filed a lawsuit to disclose the wording of the agreement between the Foundation and the second seller and the name of both sellers. The Foundation refused to provide the information on the grounds that the seller had been promised anonymity as part of the contract. This provision was binding only between the second seller and the Foundation, the first seller did not insist on anonymity.
Holding
The Administrative Court of Cologne (Verwaltungsgericht Köln - VG Köln) held that the Foundation was obliged to disclose the names of both sellers to the journalist, but not the wording of the agreement.
The court reasoned that the journalist could invoke the right to information ("pressrechtlicher Auskunftsanspruch") under Article 5(1)(S. 2) GG (German Constitution) which outweighs the second seller's interest to anonymity. The fact that the foundation promised anonymity to the second seller cannot derogate the journalist's right to information. The court also found that GDPR does not prevent the claimant from exercising their basic right. In this regard the court referred to Article 6(1)(f) GDPR to highlight this point, although not directly applicable to public bodies.
Eventually, the court held that the Foundation was not obliged to disclose the wording of the agreement with the second seller because this would amount to an access to files, which is not covered by the right of the press to information.
Comment
If there is a duty to provide such information under German law, the Court may have applied Article 6(1)(c) GDPR to come to a similar conclusion.
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English Machine Translation of the Decision
The decision below is a machine translation of the German original. Please refer to the German original for more details.
1fact
2The parties involved are arguing about a right to information under press law.
3The plaintiff is a journalist and chief reporter at a national daily newspaper. As a foundation under public law, the defendant is the sponsor of the House of History of the Federal Republic of Germany.
4The plaintiff researches the acquisition of the so-called "Schabowski note" by the defendant. This document is the speaking slip from which Günter Schabowski, a member of the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) at the press conference on November 9, 1989, read a new regulation for travel by GDR citizens to western countries that he knew enter into force after "immediately, without delay". This statement led to the unplanned opening of the Berlin Wall a few hours later.
5The defendant added the "Schabowski note" to her collection in 2015 after she had purchased it from a seller by means of a purchase agreement for a purchase price of EUR 25,000. This second seller had previously acquired the “Schabowski note” from a first seller who was also not identified by name. The defendant is aware of the names of both persons (first and second seller).
6In an e-mail dated April 23, 2015, the plaintiff contacted the defendant for the first time and asked for information under press law on the question “From which person did the House of History obtain the so-called. ‘Schabowski note’ acquired?”. Following a corresponding request from the defendant, the defendant's second seller then informed the defendant in a letter dated May 4, 2015 that he would not give his consent for his personal data to be passed on. He assumes that Ms. S.'s promise of December 2, 2014 not to publish his personal data in connection with the purchased "Schabowski note" is still valid. Otherwise the purchase contract would not have come about. However, should the defendant - as announced - have to revoke their commitment, he offers to reverse the contract of December 2, 2014. With a note dated May 7, 2015, which does not contain the signature of Department Manager III, an employee of the defendant recorded that the seller had, during the telephone sales negotiations on November 27 and 28, 2014 and when the object of purchase was handed over on November 4, 2014. December 2014 asked to remain anonymous and after consultation with the head of department III she agreed to do so verbally. In an e-mail dated May 15, 2015, the defendant informed the plaintiff that it could not comply with his request for information because the information he requested conflicted with legitimate public and private interests worthy of protection. She explained that the second seller wanted to remain anonymous and that he had been promised this. She - the defendant - is dependent on the legitimate and customary confidentiality expectations both with regard to the specific individual case and the great public interest in making this exhibit accessible to the general public in the context of the exhibition, as well as with a view to the future acquisition of other exhibits correspond. Otherwise it would not have been possible to acquire the “Schabowski note”. In addition, there is a risk that the second seller will reverse the purchase if his anonymity is not maintained. This consequence is neither in the public interest nor compatible with the purpose of the foundation defined in § 2 Paragraph 1 of the law establishing a foundation “House of History of the Federal Republic of Germany”. In addition to these public interests, there is also the protection of the seller's personal rights. On May 15, 2015, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit with the file number 6 K 2928/15 before the adjudicating court, with the application that the defendant be ordered to provide him with information about the person from whom she had acquired the "Sprechzettel von Schabowski". With a brief dated May 19, 2015, the plaintiff withdrew this action.
7In an email dated May 8, 2019, the plaintiff sent the defendant a renewed request for information under press law, in which he asked for information on the following questions:
81. In April 2015, the House of History Foundation announced that it had purchased the Schabowski note for 25,000 euros. What is the name of the person from whom the Schabowski note was purchased?
92. As is well known, Günther Schabowski's widow demands the release of the note and claims ownership of the document. Will the House of History return the Schabowski note to the family, or will it pay compensation to the family?
103. How did the person from whom the House of History acquired the Schabowski note come into possession or control of the Schabowski note?
114. In what form was the purchase of the Schabowski note between the Haus der Geschichte and the seller fixed in writing in a contract or agreement and what is the content of this contract or the agreement worded?
125. In what form has the House of History researched the provenance of the Schabowski note and with what results?
13In an e-mail dated May 14, 2019, the defendant stated with regard to question 1 that they had acquired the "Schabowski-Zettel" by means of a sales contract in which the seller had confirmed that, unencumbered by the rights of third parties, he was the legal owner of the note. The seller asked the foundation not to publish his name. Publishing personal data could infringe the general right of personality and the seller's right to informational self-determination. Should he continue to insist on the mention of the name, the seller would have to be involved in the process and, on the basis of the seller's statement, the decision would have to be made as to whether the name could be disclosed. With regard to question 2, the defendant stated that Irina Schabowski and her son Jan had requested the release of the note in a letter from their lawyers dated June 5, 2015. The defendant objected to Ms. Schabowski's request through her lawyers on June 29, 2015. There was no further correspondence. The defendant answered question 3 with the information that the “Schabowski note” had also been sold to the last owner of the note by means of a purchase contract. Question 4 has already been answered under point 1. It is a normal purchase contract of an object. With regard to question 5, the defendant explained that before purchasing it, it had checked the authenticity of the note, independently of the assurances given by third parties, using material and writing samples, among other things, and the tests had confirmed that the note was genuine. Appropriate sales contracts exist for the provenance.
14 Then, on May 21, 2019, the plaintiff filed an action with file number 6 K 3228/19, with which he originally requested that the defendant be ordered to provide him with information on the following questions:
151. In April 2015, the House of History Foundation announced that it had purchased the Schabowski note for 25,000 euros. What is the name of the person (seller) from whom the defendant acquired the Schabowski note?
162. Who sold the Schabowski note to the seller beforehand?
173. What is the text of the agreement between the seller and the defendant?
18Also on May 21, 2019, the plaintiff requested “inspection in the form of a copy of all purchase contracts regarding the so-called Schabowski note”, citing Section 1 (1) of the Freedom of Information Act (IFG). This application was made after the required third-party participation process had been carried out, in which the secondary seller objected to the transfer of personal data relating to the purchase contract via the "Schabowski note" by email dated June 18, 2019 and against the background that the prerequisite for handing over the "Schabowski note" Zettels” to the defendant, the anonymity of the seller, announced the rescission of the purchase contract, while the first seller agreed to an inspection of the purchase contract concluded between him and the second seller, rejected by decision of March 30, 2020. The plaintiff is pursuing the IFG application under file number 13 K 5228/19.
19In a letter dated March 31, 2020, the plaintiff asked the defendant to provide information under press law on the following questions:
201. What is the name of the person ("second seller") who sold the so-called Schabowski note from the House of History Foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany?
212. What is the name of the person ("first seller") from whom the second seller bought the so-called Schabowski note?
22In a letter dated April 16, 2020, the defendant explained that it had already explained to the plaintiff in previous contexts that and why it was prevented from naming the second seller. These impediments continue to exist and also prevent the name of the first seller from being disclosed, especially since this is also personal data for the second seller. It also does not act to hide the name of the second seller and his identity, but on the basis of legitimate confidentiality concerns that are worthy of protection and outweigh any interest in information on the part of the plaintiff. The fact that the first seller, in contrast to the second seller, agreed to an inspection of the contract he had concluded with the second seller does not change anything. In addition - as already explained several times - the suspicion that she - the defendant - is buying stolen goods is without basis. An overriding public interest in information can neither be justified by such an unfounded suspicion nor by the consent of the first seller.
23On April 20, 2020, the plaintiff filed the action with the file number 6 K 1949/20, with which he originally sought the ordering of the defendant to provide him with information on the following questions:
241. What is the name of the person ("second seller") who sold the so-called Schabowski note from the House of History Foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany?
252. What is the name of the person ("first seller") from whom the second seller acquired the so-called Schabowski note?
26According to instructions from the court, the plaintiff withdrew the first claim in proceedings 6 K 1949/20 and the second claim in procedure 6 K 3228/19 with briefs dated April 23 and April 29, 2020 respectively. In addition, on April 20, 2020, the plaintiff filed an application for the granting of interim legal protection with the defendant's application by way of an interim order to provide him with information on the questions
271. What is the name of the person ("second seller") who sold the so-called Schabowski note from the House of History Foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany?
282. What is the name of the person ("first seller") from whom the second seller acquired the so-called Schabowski note?
29 to grant. With a decision of August 13, 2020 in procedure 6 L 737/20, the Chamber rejected the application for lack of a reason for the order. The appeal raised against this was rejected by the Higher Administrative Court for the State of North Rhine-Westphalia (OVG NRW) by decision of July 23, 2021 in procedure 15 B 1270/20.
30By decision of January 14, 2022, the chamber combined the proceedings 6 K 3228/19 and 6 K 1949/20 after hearing the parties involved for a joint hearing and decision.
31In support of his action, the plaintiff essentially argues that Article 5(1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law (GG) is a sufficiently specific basis for claims for interference with the right to informational self-determination. Furthermore, the balance is in his favour. The sole reason for exclusion is the protection of personal data. With regard to the first seller, it is obvious that no private interest worthy of protection stands in the way, since the person concerned has already consented to inspecting the purchase contract, which contains his name and address. By naming the name of the first seller, the right to informational self-determination of the second seller is not violated. The name of the first seller is not personal data of the second seller. It is irrelevant that the first seller would in principle be able to name the person of the second seller. Because the second seller has no right to absolute secrecy from the first seller. Moreover, the defendant's consideration that the first seller would disclose the name of the second seller was purely speculative. From the disclosure of the name of the first seller, no reference can be made to the name or other information of the second seller. Also with regard to question 1, which asks for the name of the secondary seller, the public interest in information outweighs the private interest of the secondary seller. It is undisputed that the "Schabowski note" is of considerable political and historical importance and that the public and the Federal Republic have a great interest in a large museum in the legal form of a federal foundation, which is financed from the budget of the Minister of State for Culture , only acquire exhibits in a lawful manner. Museums are required to conduct appropriate provenance research to ensure the legal origin of the exhibits. The public has an interest in clarification of the background to the acquisition not only if there are actual indications of an unlawful acquisition. The origin of the "Schabowski note" is more than doubtful, since Mr. Schabowski expressly stated that he never gave the note away, but rather unsuccessfully requested it back. The sale was therefore against the express will of the original owner. In any case, the arguments of the defendant offer factual indications of unlawful conduct by those involved. This impression is reinforced by the extremely low purchase price. The mere fact that the lawful acquisition and ownership is insured in the purchase contract falls short, since a purchase contract can contain many things without this having to be actually or legally correct. It is also irrelevant that the Schabowski family is currently not asserting its rights to the note. Against this background, the public has a great interest in clarifying the history of origin. On the other hand, the interest of the second seller, whose name is disclosed only affects his social sphere, has to take a back seat. By concluding the contract, the second seller moved in public. Therefore, there is only a minor interference with an important public interest. The information given to him alone does not justify any publicity at all. The basic assumption of the defendant that, in order to do justice to the purpose of the foundation, it is dependent on acquiring new exhibits without public control and with the guarantee of complete anonymity, is doubted on its part. In the present case, the second seller voluntarily contracted with the defendant in its function as a public law foundation and not as a private buyer. At least in cases where - as here - there are concrete indications of an illegal acquisition of an exhibit, the defendant may not invoke guaranteed anonymity. The purchase of unencumbered exhibits is not affected by this, and the defendant's foundation purpose is not endangered. The Respondent's submission that the second seller could endeavor to reverse the contract if the name was disclosed was speculative. It is neither clear why he should do this nor on what legal basis he should be able to withdraw from a contract that has been concluded. Insofar as, according to the defendant, the promise of anonymity for the second seller was a condition that should bring the business to a standstill or collapse, it is difficult to understand why the second seller is then satisfied with a verbal promise on the phone and when the exhibit is handed over should have given. The presentation of a memorandum, which was created almost six months after the alleged agreement on anonymity, undermines the defendant's allegations. Behind a contractual agreement on anonymity there must be an interest worthy of protection, which would be violated by the information. The defendant has not shown such a thing in the present case. Question 3 is a legitimate request for information. The right to information is condensed into a right to inspect the authority's documents if the requested information can only be given completely and truthfully by inspecting these documents. These conditions are present here. In the present case, he is requesting information about the content of a purchase contract. Since it is inherent in contracts that they are complex and detailed in terms of content, the exact wording can be decisive for understanding and interpreting the contract. Therefore, for complete information on the content of the contract, only information on the wording is complete and truthful. Only then is the form of information considered appropriate and appropriate for the press. Furthermore, it can be assumed that the defendant will not answer the question about the content of the contract truthfully and will keep the most important passages of the contract secret.
32The plaintiff is now still applying
33 to order the defendant to provide him with information on the following questions:
341. In April 2015, the House of History Foundation announced that it had purchased the Schabowski note for 25,000 euros. What is the name of the person (seller) from whom the defendant acquired the Schabowski note?
352. What is the name of the person ("first seller") from whom the second seller acquired the so-called Schabowski note?
363. What is the text of the agreement between the seller and the defendant?
37 The defendant requests that
38 to dismiss the lawsuit.
39As justification, she essentially argues that the press's direct constitutional right to information does not provide a sufficient basis for an encroachment on the right to informational self-determination. In any case, the protection of the informational self-determination of the secondary seller has priority over the claimant's asserted interest in information. The right to protection of informational self-determination is not only affected by question 1, which is directly related to the name of the second seller, but also by question 2, which is related to the name of the first seller. The name of the first seller is also personal data of the second seller, since the first seller is a contractual partner of the second seller. The personal reference relating to the second seller also results from the fact that by naming the name of the first seller, it may be possible to find out the name of the second seller, for example by asking the first seller who is then known by name or possibly otherwise. For the question of personal reference, it is irrelevant whether the second seller has a right to keep his name secret against the first seller, or whether the first seller would disclose his name. Rather, the personal reference of information already exists when the person concerned is identifiable, i.e. when a relationship can be established between the information and the person through a number of further processing steps or through additional knowledge. In the present case, it is possible to use the name of the first seller to draw conclusions about the person of the second seller and to identify him. It cannot be ruled out that the first seller will mention the name of the second seller. By naming the name of the first seller, the personal date of the second seller is also revealed, that he has contracted with the first seller, who is then known by name. With the schematic reference to the supposedly "only" affected social sphere, the plaintiff underestimated the intensity of the interference in the right to informational self-determination at issue here. Because if information is provided, the secondary seller must expect not only to lose control over some of his personal data, but also to be dragged into the mass media public, against his will and without his behavior having given cause to do so. In addition to the interest of the secondary seller in protecting his right to informational self-determination, the public interest of the defendants in the fulfillment of their foundation purpose. With regard to the “Schabowski note”, the purpose of the foundation and the interest in its promotion, which is also legally standardized, are affected in two respects. The assurance of anonymity was given verbally at several express requests from the second seller during the telephone sales negotiations and the handover of the "Schabowski note" in addition to the written purchase contract, which did not contain a written form clause. It was a mandatory condition for the second seller to enter into sales negotiations and conclude the purchase contract. The indispensability of the promise of anonymity was also repeated by the second seller on the occasion of the first request for information in 2015 and the third-party participation procedure in 2019. Without the guarantee of anonymity, it would not have been possible to acquire the original “Schabowski note” and it would not have become part of the exhibition. In all probability it would then (still) not have been possible to make it accessible to the public in any other way, but would have ended up in a private collection, which would have led to the loss of an object of outstanding historical importance for the cultural memory of the Federal Republic. In addition, the secondary seller held out the prospect of rescission of the purchase contract if the defendant did not keep her promise of anonymity. The fulfillment of the purpose of the foundation also requires, in all individual cases, that the seller, especially when a seller - as here - insists that his name not be made public and that the exhibit cannot be obtained in any other way, can make corresponding promises and also keep them. Otherwise, unlike the private collections and museums with which it competes directly for the acquisition of exhibits, it would not be reliable with regard to maintaining the confidentiality of sellers and would therefore not be competitive in this respect. As a result, their ability to acquire further exhibits of outstanding historical importance in order to achieve their legally defined purpose of the foundation would be permanently impaired. In addition, the second seller did not enter the sphere of the state. Rather, the state had become active on the private market through her - the defendant. In any case, personal data are not less worthy of protection per se because they are voluntarily disclosed to the public sector and not collected by force. Furthermore, the plaintiff's assertion that there are indications that she - the defendant - acquired the "Schabowski note" directly or indirectly from an unauthorized person or even illegally, is not correct. As already explained several times, she carefully checked the provenance and authenticity of the “Schabowski note” as part of the acquisition. There was a purchase contract in which the second seller confirmed that he was the legal owner of the note, unencumbered by the rights of third parties. The second seller also acquired the note by means of a purchase contract; this is in front of her. Since there was no further correspondence after the defendant rejected the Schabowski family's request for return on June 29, 2015, there were no indications that the Schabowski family would still assert rights to the note. The fact that the first seller agreed to an inspection of the purchase contract relating to him and the second seller speaks against the fact that the first seller could not have been an authorized person. The purchase price of 25,000 euros is not so low that it would raise doubts about the legality of the purchase. Reasons that could give rise to skepticism in the case of a "secret" sale among private individuals and a price below the market level would not be present in the case of a sale to a public body. A claim for information on question 3 is already contradicted by the fact that the plaintiff is not pursuing a request for information, but a request for inspection of the files. This follows in particular from the fact that the plaintiff demands notification of the wording of the agreement between the seller and the defendant. Such a file inspection request does not constitute a permissible request for information. Irrespective of this, in the case of a contract content, the other requirements for consolidation are also not met. The fear expressed by the plaintiff that the defendant would not provide complete and truthful information - should it be legally obliged to do so - is unfounded. The mere fact that the defendant had pointed out possible attempts to reverse the purchase contract in the event of information cannot be used to conclude that the defendant would only incompletely or untruthfully comply with a legally established right to information.
40Because of the further details of the facts and the dispute, reference is made to the content of the court files (6 K 3228/19 and 6 K 1949/20), the content of the court files on the procedure 6 L 737/20 and the content of the administrative processes involved.
41reasons for the decision
42 To the extent that the plaintiff withdrew the complaints in relation to the second claim in the procedure 6 K 3228/19 and the first claim in the original further procedure with the file number 6 K 1949/20, the procedure was to be discontinued, § 92 para . 3 sentence 1 of the Administrative Court Code (VwGO).
43Furthermore, the lawsuit, which is admissible as a general action for performance, is admissible, but only partially justified.
44The basis for the plaintiff’s request for information is the press’s direct constitutional right to information under Article 5(1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law.
45Only when access to information is unimpeded in principle, the press is able to effectively perform its function in a free democracy. The meaning and purpose of the obligation to provide information that basically follows from this is to enable the press to receive comprehensive and truthful information about events of public interest in the state sector, and thus to be able to inform the public accordingly. In this way, citizens can obtain accurate, comprehensive information that would otherwise remain hidden from them, but which could be important for a balanced assessment of the issues that are essential for forming an opinion.
46Cf. Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG), decision of 27 July 2015 - 1 BvR 1452/13 -, juris, para. 14; OVG NRW, judgment of September 10, 2019 - 15 A 2751/15 -, juris, para. 63 with further references; Administrative Court (VG) Cologne, judgment of July 11, 2019 - 6 K 5480/18 -, juris, para. 36 with further references.
47The fundamental right to freedom of the press gives members of the press a direct constitutional right to information from federal authorities in the absence of a statutory regulation by the federal legislature, insofar as the state press laws are not applicable to them - as here - due to conflicting legislative competence of the federal government.
48Cf. Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG), judgment of September 19, 2019 - 6 A 7.18 -, juris, para. 13 with further references; Resolution of October 26, 2017 - 6 VR 1.17 -, juris, para. 17 with further references; Decision of March 16, 2016 - 6 C 65.14 -, juris, para. 13; OVG NRW, judgment of September 10, 2019 - 15 A 2751/15 -, juris, para. 65 with further references; VG Cologne, judgment of July 11, 2019 - 6 K 5480/18 -, juris, para. 38 with further references; VG Berlin, decision of September 23, 2019 - 27 L 98.19 -, juris, para. 90 with further references.
49Due to the right to information enshrined in Article 5(1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law, press representatives can request specific official information on sufficiently specific questions, provided the information is available at the authority and there are no conflicting legitimate legitimate interests of private or public bodies in confidentiality that are worthy of protection. The constitutionally direct right to information requires the press's interest in information to be weighed against conflicting interests worthy of protection in individual cases, although an assessment of the press's interest in information is fundamentally out of the question. In addition, the substantive content of the claim must not fall short of that of the claims for information that are essentially the same in terms of content and are aimed at weighing up the claims under the state press laws. The decisive factor is whether the press's interest in information conflicts with legitimate interests of such weight that exclude the right to information under press law.
50Cf. BVerfG, decision of July 27, 2015 - 1 BvR 1452/13 - , juris, para. 12; BVerwG, judgment of September 19, 2019 - 6 A 7.18 -, juris, para. 13 with further references; Resolution of October 26, 2017 - 6 VR 1.17 -, juris, para. 18 with further references; Decision of March 16, 2016 - 6 C 65.14 -, juris, para. 16 et seq.; OVG NRW, judgment of September 10, 2019 - 15 A 2751/15 -, juris, para. 69 with further reference; VG Cologne, judgment of July 11, 2019 - 6 K 5480/18 -, juris, para. 46 with further references; VG Berlin, decision of September 23, 2019 - 27 L 98.19 -, juris, para. 90 with further references.
51 Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not result otherwise in this respect.
52Cf. BVerwG, judgment of September 19, 2019 - 6 A 7.18 -, juris, para. 43 with further references; BVerwG, decision of October 26, 2017 - 6 VR 1.17 -, juris, para. 18 with further references; OVG NRW, judgment of September 10, 2019 - 15 A 2751/15 -, juris, para. 69 with further references; VG Cologne, judgment of July 11, 2019 - 6 K 5480/18 -, juris, para. 34 with further references; VG Berlin, decision of September 23, 2019 - 27 L 98.19 -, juris, para. 90 with further references.
53 In the present case, the plaintiff is a journalist. With the questions “What is the name of the person from whom the Schabowski note was purchased?”, “What is the name of the person (“first seller”) from whom the second seller acquired the so-called Schabowski note?” and “How is the content of this contract or the wording of the agreement?” of the defendant, who has the relevant information, also asked sufficiently specific questions.
54The constitutionally direct right of press representatives to information ends where there are legitimate interests of private or public bodies in the confidentiality of information that are worthy of protection.
55Cf. OVG NRW, judgment of September 10, 2019 - 15 A 2751/15 -, juris, para. 75 with further references; VG Cologne, judgment of July 11, 2019 - 6 K 5480/18 -, juris, para. 42 with further references; VG Berlin, decision of September 23, 2019 - 27 L 98.19 -, juris, para. 100.
56The interests which, after being weighed against the information interest of the press, justify a public interest in the secrecy of information that is worthy of protection and can accordingly limit the press’s constitutionally direct right to information, are to be presented by the defendant and are to be fully upheld by the court in factual and legal terms check.
57Cf. BVerwG, judgment of September 19, 2019 - 6 A 7.17 -, juris, para. 16.
Based on this, the plaintiff has a right to information only in relation to the information requested in questions 1 and 2.
59I. First of all, the information requested in Questions 1 and 2 on the names of the first and second seller interferes with the second seller’s general right of personality in the form of the right to informational self-determination under Art. 2 (1) in conjunction with Art. 1 (1) GG .
60 This guarantees the authority of the individual to determine the disclosure and use of his personal data.
61Cf. Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of December 15, 1983 - 1 BvR 209/83 and others -, juris, paras. 146, 149.
According to the definition in Art. 4 No. 1 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), personal data in this sense is all information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person; an identifiable natural person is one who, directly or indirectly, in particular by means of assignment to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more special features, expresses a physical, physiological, genetic, psychological, economic, cultural or social identity of this natural person can be identified.
63 Measured against this, the requested information about the name of the second seller and the name of the first seller is information about personal data of the second seller. Because the information about the name of the second seller itself is information that relates to a natural person who is then identified. The information about the name of the first seller relates to a then identifiable natural person.
64In order to determine whether a natural person is identifiable, according to recital 26 of the GDPR, all means which are reasonably likely to be used by the controller or another person to identify the natural person, directly or indirectly, should be taken into account. In determining whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the individual, all objective factors, such as the cost and time of identification, should again be considered, taking into account the technology and technological developments available at the time of processing are taken into account.
65 Based on this, in the present case there is overwhelming evidence that the second seller, in the event that the name of the first seller is disclosed, taking into account the information already known here, that the second and first seller signed a purchase contract for the " Schabowski-Zettel”, which could be used to identify the resulting possible conclusions (such as the business and private environment of the first seller). It is also obvious that the plaintiff would contact the first seller to identify the person of the second seller and would ask him for the name of the second seller. Since, due to a lack of other knowledge, it can be assumed that no agreement on anonymity was made between the first and second seller, it is by no means unlikely that the first seller would disclose the name of the second seller.
If the plaintiff requests information about this personal data of the second seller and the latter has also objected to the disclosure of this data in the context of the third party participation procedure, the provision of the requested information constitutes an encroachment on the right to informational self-determination of the second seller.
67In the form of Article 5(1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law, there is sufficient authorization for the intervention in the second seller’s right to informational self-determination associated with the provision of information.
68The right to informational self-determination is not guaranteed without restrictions. The individual does not have a right in the sense of absolute, unrestricted control over his data; Rather, he is a personality that develops within the social community and is dependent on communication. Information, even if it is personal, represents an image of social reality that cannot be assigned exclusively to the person concerned. As has been emphasized several times in the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, the Basic Law has decided the tension between the individual and the community in the sense of the community-relatedness and community-bonding of the individual. In principle, therefore, the individual must accept restrictions on his right to informational self-determination in the overriding general interest.
69According to Article 2(1) of the Basic Law, these restrictions require a legal basis from which the prerequisites and the scope of the restrictions result clearly and are recognizable to the citizen and which thus corresponds to the rule of law requirement of legal clarity. The legislature must also observe the principle of proportionality in its regulations. This principle, which has constitutional status, follows from the essence of fundamental rights themselves, which, as an expression of the citizen's general right to freedom from the state, may only be restricted by public authority to the extent that it is indispensable for the protection of public interests.
70Cf. Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of December 15, 1983 - 1 BvR 209/83 -, juris, para. 150 f. m.w.N.; BVerwG, judgment of September 27, 2018 - 7 C 5.17 -, juris, para. 15; Judgment of January 25, 2012 - 6 C 9.11 -, juris, paragraph 27;
71These requirements are met here in the case of the press’s constitutionally direct right to information under Article 5(1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law. This constitutes a sufficient authorization basis for encroachments on the fundamental rights of third parties.
72 So BVerwG, judgment of September 18, 2019 - 6 A 7.18 -, juris, para. 22 mwN, as well as for interventions in Art .41; see also Schemmer, information procurement by the media: legal bases and claims, AfP 2020, 1 (3) = juris, para. 14.
73Data protection requirements do not conflict with this. Contrary to the opinion of the defendant, there is no lack of an authorization basis that satisfies data protection concerns. Rather, this can be seen in the press’s direct constitutional right to information under Article 5(1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law itself, which is supplemented by data protection requirements. To supplement, namely to fill out the content and specify the right to information under press law in such a way that the requirements of the statutory reservation for an interference with the right to informational self-determination are satisfied, the provision of Art. 6 para. 1 subpara. 1 letter f GDPR can be used. According to this, the processing is lawful if the processing is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the person responsible or a third party, provided that the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject, which require the protection of personal data, do not prevail, in particular if it is the data subject is a child. This provision is not applicable to official activities, because the transmission of personal data in the private and consequently less controlled area requires an express legal decision. However, insofar as this decision was basically made by the legislature, nothing stands in the way of a transfer of the material requirements formulated there for the required form of content, which satisfies the basic data protection requirements.
74So on the right to information under press law according to Art. 4 BayPrG: BVerwG, judgment of September 27, 2018 - 7 C 5.17 -, juris, para. 20 ff.
75 Admittedly, the press's direct constitutional right to information from Article 5(1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law, which is applicable here, lacks a basic statutory decision by the federal legislature. However, this is not detrimental to the power to process personal data in question, since the federal legislature's inactivity is compensated for by classifying the duty of state agencies to provide the press with information as part of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press. The opposite view taken by the defendant is also not compatible with the premise already mentioned above, that the material content of the direct constitutional right to information must not fall short of that of the right to information under the state press laws.
76 In a next step, in the case of a right to information under press law - in the same way as with claims for injunctive relief against press publications - the need for protection and the protection worthiness of the personal data must be determined.
On the one hand, a distinction must be made as to whether the intimate, private or social sphere is affected. In specifying the principle of proportionality, this distinction serves as a point of reference for assessing the intensity of the violation of fundamental rights and for weighing the reasons justifying this violation. Interventions in the social sphere are permitted under simplified conditions, so that the protection of personality goes less far than in cases where intimate and private spheres are affected. The social sphere includes all participation in public life, i.e. the circumstances in which the individual comes into contact with others.
78Cf. BVerwG, judgment of September 27, 2018 - 7 C 5.17 -, juris, 33. Furthermore, Bavarian Administrative Court, decision of November 8, 2021 - 7 CE 21.1531 -, juris, para. 14.
79On the other hand, the nature of the personal information in question must be taken into account when assessing the confidentiality interests of the data subject.
80Cf. OVG Berlin Brandenburg, judgment of March 20, 2012 - OVG 12 B 27.11 -, juris, para. 25.
81 Based on this, the information requested here on the names of the first and second seller is initially to be assigned to the social sphere of the second seller, since a person generally comes into contact with others using their name.
82Furthermore, with regard to the need for protection, a distinction must be made between the requested information on personal data.
83In this respect, the direct information about the name of the second seller is likely to be in greater need of protection than the requested information about the name of the first seller, which should only lead to an identification of the second seller through further steps.
84 When weighing up the situation, it must also be taken into account that, contrary to the opinion of the defendant, the second seller would not be dragged into mass media publicity simply by providing information, although the provision of information already encroaches on his right to informational self-determination. Because the provision of information is not automatically accompanied by a media publication of the name of the second seller by the plaintiff.
85Cf. on this BVerwG, judgment of March 28, 2012 - 6 C 12.11 -, juris, para. 35 f.
86A publication of the name is also not necessarily to be expected, since the plaintiff needs the requested information (only) for research purposes in order to clarify the further background of the acquisition of the "Schabowski note" and the name of the second seller in itself is not relevant in view of this should be of importance. In any case, the proper journalistic use of information provided is fundamentally the responsibility of the media itself. Based on the information to be provided by the defendant, the plaintiff will have to independently check whether and, if so, to what extent and in what manner the information obtained should be published is consistent with its journalistic duties of care in protecting the personal rights of the second seller.
87Cf. on this BVerwG, judgment of April 26, 2021 - 10 C 1.20 -, juris, para. 39 f.
88The legitimate interest of the secondary seller must be weighed against the information interest of the press, which consists in clarifying the background to the acquisition of the "Schabowski note", which would only be possible through the sought-after information on the name. In view of the fact that the defendant is financed from state funds and exhibits are thus also acquired with state funds, there is an important public interest in fully clarifying the background to the acquisition.
89Cf. on increased publicity in questions relating to the use of public funds: BVerwG, judgments of September 27, 2018 - 7 C 5.17 -, juris, para. 35, and of April 26, 2021 - 10 C 1.20 -, juris, para. 34 .
In addition, one of the constitutionally secured tasks of the press is to report investigatively – within the limits of what is permissible – on suspicions of high public interest. Because possibilities, probabilities and suspicions also belong to social reality, which is to be processed and informed about, which is the characteristic, freedom and task of the press.
91Cf. BVerwG, judgment of October 13, 2020 - 2 C 41.18 -, juris, para. 61 with further references.
92The interest of the press in information does not outweigh the interest of the secondary seller simply because there would be concrete indications of a violation of applicable law when the note was sold.
93Because the interest of the press in information would outweigh the interest of the secondary seller in the protection of his personal data, in particular if there are concrete indications that the law in force was violated when the note was sold.
94Cf. BVerwG, judgment of March 16, 2016 - 6 C 65.14 -, juris, para. 24.
From the Chamber's point of view, there are no such concrete indications of a violation of applicable law when the ticket is sold. On the one hand, Schabowski's wife stated that she never gave the note away, but only gave it to acquaintances to look through, who did not return it despite repeated requests. On the other hand, the circumstances indicate that the first seller agreed to inspect the purchase contract and that there was no further correspondence with the family after the Schabowski family's request for return dated June 5, 2015 and the defendant's rejection of the same on June 29, 2015. against the loss of the note and an unlawful acquisition by the defendant. The plaintiff was not able to convincingly demonstrate to the Chamber that the sales price of EUR 25,000 is intended to represent concrete evidence of an unauthorized sale by the second seller.
96In the context of the assessment to be made, the Chamber initially assumes, setting aside existing doubts, that anonymity has been agreed with the second seller. It can be inferred from the statements of the second seller of May 4, 2015 and June 18, 2019, submitted most recently in the court proceedings, that he attaches considerable importance to the - orally given - promise of anonymity by the defendant. At the same time, given the importance of the promise of anonymity for the second seller, which is presented as being extremely important, it seems at least strange that the contracting parties only want to have the promise of anonymity verbally agreed in addition to the written purchase contract (which does not contain a written form clause) and that this promise apparently only appears in one The note dated May 7, 2015, i.e. after the first press inquiry, which also does not contain any visible signature of department head III (see paragraph 2 of the note), has found its way into the file. Nevertheless, the anonymity agreed with the second seller does not mean that the interest in secrecy outweighs the public interest in information. Because the promise of anonymity as such is not suitable to be held against a request for information under press law. The secrecy of the name of the second seller is also not of overriding importance either for reasons of the second seller's interest in anonymity or for the public interest of the defendants in the fulfillment of their foundation purpose.
97An area exception – which cannot be weighed up – for promises of anonymity made by the defendant in connection with the purchase of exhibits is not to be recognised. The legitimacy of confidentiality interests, which can conflict with the constitutional right to information, is determined depending on the regulatory leeway that the legislature has when designing official information obligations. The right to information is therefore excluded by confidentiality interests, which the legislature is likely to standardize as a reason for exclusion for the given factual constellation. The decisive factor is whether the legislature would be entitled to give priority to the interest in confidentiality concerned over the interest in information of the press for the given factual constellation.
98 cf. BVerwG, judgment of March 25, 2015 - 6 C 12.14 -, juris, para. 26 f.; OVG NRW, decisions of April 3, 2019 - 15 B 1850/18 -, juris, para. 15, and of March 17, 2017 - 15 B 1112/15 -, juris, para. 29.
99Effective, functional press activity requires that its representatives receive adequate information from government agencies on matters they consider to be of public interest. It would not be compatible with the great importance of the press for the formation of public opinion in a democracy to adopt a restrictive approach in this regard. Under special circumstances, the legislature is entitled to exempt individual official functional areas from the obligation to provide information. But he is not authorized to exempt entire administrative areas. The constitutionally recognized mediation and control mandate of the press is only adequately taken into account if - apart from individual official functional areas of a special character - grounds for exclusion have a specific design with which the legislature takes account of specifically outlined opposing interests to be protected, limited to that The extent to which a need for protection can actually be identified from a material point of view.
100Cf. BVerwG, judgment of March 25, 2015 - 6 C 12.14 -, juris, para. 30 with further references.
Measured against this, the legislature would not be authorized to protect the personal data of the contractual partners without any exception against informational access by the press in the area of the defendants, based on the given constellation of the acquisition of exhibits with a promise of anonymity, i.e. to standardize them as a reason for exclusion that cannot be weighed up . The defendant has already failed to demonstrate that it is absolutely dependent on the guarantee of anonymity towards its contractual partners in its work. The defendant's analogous representation that it corresponds to the expectation of participants in the market for trade in exhibits to be able to promise and maintain anonymity if desired, is not convincing. The defendant leaves it at abstract statements about alleged confidentiality expectations of the market participants, without providing any reliable information about the reasons or the frequency of such anonymity expectations, which are decisive for the conclusion of the transaction. In addition, the fact that the defendant would otherwise be able to respond to requests for information under press law simply by assuring confidentiality, regardless of the interests pursued, would preclude a general priority of the interest in confidentiality over the interest in information of the press, which cannot be weighed up to their business partners, which is incompatible with the constitutionally recognized mediation and control mandate of the press.
The individual interest in anonymity of the second seller does not outweigh the interest in information of the plaintiff. No reasons have been presented to the Board for keeping the name of the second seller secret, beyond the second seller's mere desire for anonymity. In particular, the defendant has not been able to demonstrate that the acquisition of the "Schabowski note" is one of the constellations described in detail in the letter of January 7, 2022, in which - from the defendant's point of view - the protection of personal data in individual cases is such It is of particular importance that the preservation of anonymity may also appear to be justified in relation to the right to information under press law. In the absence of information, it is therefore not possible for the court to assess what particular adverse effects the disclosure of his identity would have on the second seller. The interest of the secondary seller, which is essentially limited to defending against an intrusion into his social sphere, must take second place to the justified interest in information of the press.
103The defendant's public interest in the fulfillment of its foundation purpose does not prevent the answer to questions 1 and 2 either. According to § 2 paragraph 1 of the law establishing a foundation "House of the History of the Federal Republic of Germany" (HdGSstiftG), the purpose of the foundation is to present the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, including the German Democratic Republic, in an exhibition, documentation and information center Inclusion of the prehistory and development history and impart knowledge about this. It is not apparent that the fulfillment of this purpose of the foundation would be jeopardized by the fact that the defendant would have to provide the press with information about the identity of its contractual partners upon request, even if anonymity was agreed. As already explained, it cannot be assumed that the defendant must necessarily be able to guarantee confidentiality when acquiring exhibits. The defendant is also not an authority which, due to the area of responsibility assigned to it, would be dependent on the secrecy of the identity of its "business partners". Unlike the authorities for the protection of the constitution, criminal prosecution authorities, youth welfare offices, financial authorities, etc., the defendant does not insist that, in order to fulfill their tasks, they could be dependent on keeping the identity of people with whom they work together secret at their request to keep. Even if, in individual cases, the seller of a potential exhibit made the conclusion of the transaction dependent on the defendant's ability to issue and comply with a promise of anonymity, the Chamber cannot draw the conclusion that the fulfillment of the legally defined purpose of the foundation would be jeopardized to a relevant extent . Such a threat cannot be seen without further ado in the failure of contract negotiations, in the failure of a promised contract to materialize or in the other sale of an individual exhibit. In particular, the defendant was not able to plausibly explain to the court that, due to the lack of a promise of anonymity, it would not be possible to acquire historically significant exhibits for its exhibitions, beyond isolated cases. Irrespective of this, there can hardly be any question of a threat to the fulfillment of the foundation's purpose if the alleged impairment of competitiveness when purchasing exhibits relates (only) to a part of the foundation's purpose defined in § 2 Para. 1 HdGstiftG and the in § 2 Para. 2 HdGstiftgG refers to the tasks of the defendant.
104Furthermore, the defendant cannot successfully claim that there is a risk that the purchase contract for the "Schabowski note" would have to be reversed and the note would disappear from the collection as a historically significant exhibit. It may be left open how seriously the announcement of the second seller's request for reversal should be taken in the event that information is provided, since any reversal could no longer prevent the disclosure of his name to the plaintiff anyway. This disadvantageous consequence of the requested provision of information cannot be given overriding weight because the reversal results from a promise of anonymity which the defendant, in its capacity as part of the public sector and in the use of public funds, does not comply with for legal reasons in view of its obligation to provide information to the press can. Otherwise, the promise of anonymity as such would already become an instrument of general refusal to provide information, which is excluded for the reasons set out above.
105II. In the case of the request for information pursued with question 3, there is already a lack of a permissible request for information by the plaintiff. Because in this respect it is only formally a request for information, while in substance the limit to the inspection of files has been exceeded.
106 The freedom of the press guaranteed in Article 5(1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law entails, among other things, public authorities’ obligation to provide information, as explained.
107Cf. Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of August 5, 1966 - 1 BvR 586/62 -, juris, para. 38.
108According to the case law of the Federal Administrative Court, the fundamental right to freedom of the press does not, in principle, guarantee the use of files by inspecting official files or a copy of official files.
109Cf. BVerwG, judgment of November 27, 2013 - 6 A 5.13 -, juris, para. 24; see also OVG NRW, judgment of May 8, 2018 - 15 A 2080/15 -, juris, para. 16; Resolutions of September 29, 2017 - 15 B 778/17 -, juris, para. 50, of June 29, 2017 - 15 B 200/17 -, juris, para. 74, and of March 17, 2017 - 15 B 1112/ 15 –, juris, para. 65.
110 The distinction expressed therein between permissible requests for information and inadmissible requests for inspection of files must also apply if an applicant - as here - expressly requests only the provision of information, but the fulfillment of this claim is actually or at least analogously based on the inspection of the basis underlying documents.
111Cf. OVG NRW, judgment of May 8, 2018 - 15 A 2080/15 -, juris, para. 18; Resolutions of September 29, 2017 - 15 B 778/17 -, juris, para. 54 et seq., and of March 17, 2017 - 15 B 1112/15 -, juris, para. 70.
112The manner in which the information is provided is at the discretion of the agency responsible for providing information, also taking into account Article 5(1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law, whereby the form of the information must be suitable for the press and must be complete and correct.
113Cf. OVG NRW, resolutions of June 29, 2017 - 15 B 200/17 -, juris, para. 76, and of December 18, 2013 - 5 A 413/11 -, juris, para. 39, each with further references.
114The latter may lead in individual cases to the fact that the right to information exceptionally condenses into a right to inspect files or to be provided with copies if other forms of access to information would be inappropriate with regard to the requested information and only in this way can complete and truthful knowledge of the facts be conveyed.
115Cf. OVG NRW, decision of June 29, 2017 - 15 B 200/17 -, juris, para. 78 with further references; VG Gelsenkirchen, judgment of May 20, 2019 - 20 K 2021/18 -, juris, para. 92.
However, the prerequisite for this is that, given the current situation, it is still a (permissible) request for information.
117Cf. on this OVG NRW, judgment of May 8, 2018 - 15 A 2080/15 -, juris, para. 24; Resolutions of September 29, 2017 - 15 B 778/17 -, juris, para. 59, and of March 17, 2017 - 15 B 1112/15 -, juris, para. 72; Administrative Court for the State of Baden-Württemberg, decision of July 1, 2015 - 1 S 805/15 -, juris, para. 39.
118 This is not the case here according to the standards mentioned.
119Because in question 3 the plaintiff requests that the wording of the agreement between the seller and the defendant be reproduced. As a result, his request is presented as a request for inspection of the files in the corresponding purchase contract.
120 Also taking into account the decision of the Federal Administrative Court of January 30, 2020 - 10 C 18.19 - a different assessment of the request for information is not appropriate. In doing so, the Chamber does not assume that the Federal Administrative Court has now generally rejected the judgments of the higher courts that expressly or in substance aim to inspect files as inadmissible requests for information, but has ultimately confirmed the principles presented and applied here.
121Cf. in detail VG Cologne, judgment of June 9, 2020 - 6 K 9484/17 -, juris, para. 76 ff., and decision of August 5, 2021 - 6 L 575/19 -, juris, para. 41.
122Insofar as the plaintiff has withdrawn the lawsuit, the decision on costs follows from Section 155 (2) VwGO. Otherwise, the decision on costs is based on Section 155 (1) sentence 1 VwGO.
123The appeal was not allowed because the requirements of Section 124a (1) sentence 1 in conjunction with Section 124 (2) No. 3 or No. 4 VwGO are not met. In particular, the case is of no fundamental importance, since the legal question of whether the constitutional right to information under press law represents a sufficient basis for interference with the right to informational self-determination has been clarified by a supreme court and the weighting of promises of anonymity in the context of weighing up the conflicting interests is only accessible to individual case consideration .
124 Instructions on legal remedies
125The parties involved are entitled to appeal against this judgment to the Higher Administrative Court for the State of North Rhine-Westphalia if it is permitted by the latter. The appeal is allowed only if
1261271. there are serious doubts as to the correctness of the judgment,
1282. the case presents particular factual or legal difficulties,
1293. the case is of fundamental importance,
1304. the judgment deviates from a decision of the Higher Administrative Court, the Federal Administrative Court, the Joint Senate of the highest federal courts or the Federal Constitutional Court and is based on this deviation or
1315. a procedural violation subject to the assessment of the court of appeal is asserted and exists on which the decision can be based.
132The admission of the appeal is to be applied for in writing within one month after service of the judgment at the Cologne Administrative Court, Appellhofplatz, 50667 Cologne. The request for leave to appeal must specify the contested judgment.
133The reasons for which the appeal is to be allowed must be presented within two months of the full judgment being served. The justification must be submitted in writing to the Higher Administrative Court for the State of North Rhine-Westphalia, Aegidiikirchplatz 5, 48143 Münster, unless it has already been submitted with the application.
134On the obligation to transmit documents as electronic documents in accordance with §§ 55a, 55d Administrative Court Code - VwGO - and the regulation on the technical framework of the electronic Legal transactions and via the special electronic official mailbox (Electronic Legal Transactions Ordinance - ERVV).
135Before the Higher Administrative Court and in the case of procedural acts that initiate proceedings before the Higher Administrative Court, each party involved must be represented by a legal representative. Attorneys at law or legal teachers at a state or state-recognized university in a member state of the European Union, another state party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area or Switzerland who are qualified to hold judicial office are authorized representatives and also employees of public authorities and legal entities or employees of other authorities or legal entities under public law who are qualified to hold judicial office. In addition, the persons who are otherwise designated in § 67 Para. 4 of the Administrative Court Code are admitted.
136The application should be submitted in duplicate. If an electronic document is submitted, no copies are required.
137Furthermore, the following is issued without the participation of the honorary judges
138Resolution
139The value of the disputed item is increased
€1405,000.00
141fixed.
142reasons
143The value of the disputed item is set at EUR 5,000. The value in dispute corresponds to the statutory value in dispute at the time the action is filed (Section 52 (2) of the Court Costs Act - GKG -).
144 Instructions on legal remedies
145A complaint against this decision can be lodged in writing or for the record with the clerk of the office at the Cologne Administrative Court, Appellhofplatz, 50667 Cologne.
146The complaint must be filed within six months after the decision on the main matter has become final or after the proceedings have otherwise been resolved. If the amount in dispute has been determined later than one month before the end of this period, it can still be filed within one month after the delivery or informal notification of the determination resolution.
147On the obligation to transmit documents as electronic documents in accordance with §§ 55a, 55d Administrative Court Code - VwGO - and the regulation on the technical framework of the electronic Legal transactions and via the special electronic official mailbox (Electronic Legal Transactions Ordinance - ERVV).
148The complaint is only admissible if the value of the object of the complaint exceeds 200 euros.
149The notice of appeal should be submitted in duplicate. If an electronic document is submitted, no copies are required.
