VG München - M 32 K 20.2879

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VG München - M 32 K 20.2879
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Court: VG München (Germany)
Jurisdiction: Germany
Relevant Law: Article 6(2) GDPR
Article 6(3) GDPR
Article 86 GDPR
Decided: 30.06.2021
Published:
Parties:
National Case Number/Name: M 32 K 20.2879
European Case Law Identifier:
Appeal from:
Appeal to:
Original Language(s): German
Original Source: VG München (in German)
Initial Contributor: n/a

The Administrative Court of Munich ruled that personal data in documents that are in the possession of an authority or a public body should be able to be disclosed to the public by this authority or body, if this is provided for in Union law or Member State law.

English Summary[edit | edit source]

Facts[edit | edit source]

The main legal question in this case was whether a data controller is obliged to grant data subjects access to certain official documents, including environmental information in connection with an approved geothermal probe, in light of the applicable Bavarian Environmental Information Act (BayUIG).

In order to balance the interests of the controller (i.e. confidentiality) with the public interest (i.e. access to information), the national legislator should pay attention to the recitals of the GDPR and to Article 86 GDPR which concerns public access to official documents, as well as Article 6(2) GDPR and Article 6(3) GDPR which provides Member States with the possibility to adopt specific provisions allowing for certain types of processing activities. In light of Recital 154 and Article 86 GDPR, it appears that the GDPR requires the principle of public access to official documents to be taken into account when it is applied. Public access to official documents can be viewed as a public interest.

The ruling court has no concerns that the national provisions of the BayUIG in question, an information access law in accordance with Article 6, Paragraph 2, last half-sentence, Paragraph 3, Clause 3, last half-sentence, Article 86 GDPR, are compatible with the provisions of the GDPR (for the conformity of the VIG with the GDPR see BayVGH, Bv 15.4.2020 - 5 CS 19.2087 - juris Rn. 25; for the conformity of the IFG, UIG and VIG with the GDPR see Schnabel in Simitis / Hornung / Spiecker gen.Döhmann, Datenschutzrecht, 1st edition 2019, Rn. 41 ff.) And therefore the information access granted here according to the BayUIG does not contradict the GDPR.

Holding[edit | edit source]

The Administrative court of Munich points out the relevant facts about the relation of the GDPR to European and National Information Access Claims. There are no provisions of the EU GDPR to conflict with the right to information according to the BayUIG. Like all EU regulations, the GDPR enjoys direct validity and priority over national law in all member states. It must therefore be taken into account when using the BayUIG.



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English Machine Translation of the Decision[edit | edit source]

The decision below is a machine translation of the German original. Please refer to the German original for more details.

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Title:
Right to information access according to the BayUIG (affirmed), no obviously abusive application, impairment of interests worthy of protection not presented, concept of emission in the BayUIG, compatibility of the BayUIG with the GDPR, information access friendliness of the GDPR, damage caused by geothermal probe drilling, action for failure to act
Standard chains:
BayUIG Art. 3
BayUIG Art. 7 Paragraph 2 No. 1
BayUIG Art. 8 Paragraph 1 No. 1
GDPR Art. 2 and 4
GDPR Art. 6 Para. 1 Subpar. 1 lit. c and e
GDPR Art. 6 Para. 2 and 3
GDPR Art. 86
VwGO § 75
Keywords:
Right to information access according to the BayUIG (affirmed), no obviously abusive application, impairment of interests worthy of protection not presented, concept of emission in the BayUIG, compatibility of the BayUIG with the GDPR, information access friendliness of the GDPR, damage caused by geothermal probe drilling, action for failure to act
Reference:
BeckRS 2021, 19903


tenor


I. The defendant is obliged to grant the plaintiffs access to the following environmental information in accordance with the Bavarian Environmental Information Act (BayUIG):



the application made by the party summoned or by the party acting on their behalf for a permit to carry out a geothermal probe drilling on the property of the party summoned L.str. ... in ... R.-E., including all attachments;



the expert opinion (s) issued in this approval procedure by the Water Management Office R .;



the drilling permit issued by the Miesbach District Office in this approval procedure.



II. The defendant has to bear the costs of the proceedings. The summoned party bears her extrajudicial costs herself.



III. The decision on costs is provisionally enforceable. The defendant may avert enforcement by providing security or deposit in the amount of the enforceable amount, unless the plaintiff has previously provided security in the same amount.

Offense

1
On the basis of the Bavarian Environmental Information Act (BayUIG), the plaintiffs request the defendant to have access to information in connection with an approved geothermal probe drilling on a neighboring property belonging to the summoned party.


2
On October 11, 2016 at around 8 a.m., a geothermal probe borehole approved by the responsible district administration began in the northwest corner of the new building on the property of the party invited. At around 7.30 p.m. that day, the street on the property sank in the middle at the level of house number…. An approximately circular crater with a diameter of approx. 20 m and a depth of approx. 1.4 m formed. The plaintiffs' neighboring properties were also affected. The plaintiffs are asserting six-figure damages against the summoned party. Only part of it has been taken over by their builders' liability insurance.


3
In preparation for a civil action - this has now been filed - the plaintiffs have turned to the district office and requested, in a letter from their representative dated October 21, 2019, on the basis of the BayUIG, access to more detailed information about the approved drilling, as stated in the operative part. In a letter dated March 26, 2020, the authorized representatives reminded them to deal with their application.


4th
After the memory also remained fruitless, the plaintiff's agent brought an action at the Munich Administrative Court on June 29, 2020 and requested


5
to condemn the defendant to access information, as can be seen from the operative part.


6th
In its statement of September 4, 2020, the district office announced that it was prepared in principle to provide information, but wanted to hear the summoned person beforehand about the consideration of their concerns. The formal hearing was opened with a letter dated September 2, 2020 to the party invited. In this letter, the invited party is asked to indicate whether the desired access to information would impair their interests worthy of protection, since personal data would be disclosed.


7th
After the hearing, the District Office requested in its response of September 18, 2020,


8th
reject the complaint.


9
It refers to the letter of the authorized representative of the summoned party dated September 8, 2020 during the hearing, in which he opposes the provision of information. The interests of his client worthy of protection are "impaired, especially since personal data are to be disclosed." The client's intellectual property rights, copyrights or company or trade secrets are not seen as affected; possibly this applies to the construction companies involved. But you want to first take a look at the coveted information yourself. If necessary, in consultation with the court, the party summoned would make these documents available to the court and all other parties involved, including the plaintiff. In a letter dated September 14, 2020, the district office made these documents available to the authorized representative of the summoned party. At the request of the court on May 21, 2021, the agent informed by letter of June 4, 2021 that, even after inspection of the files, the summoned objected to the information given to the plaintiff. In its response, the District Office justifies its rejection of the application with the reason for rejection according to Art. 7 Para. 2 No. 1 BayUIG. The filing of the application is clearly in violation of the law, since the plaintiffs' interest only applies to the purely private-law compensation process, which has nothing to do with the intention of the BayUIG to contribute to the heightening of environmental awareness, the free exchange of opinions and the improvement of environmental protection. There is no apparent public interest. The application also fails because of Art. 8 Para. 1 No. 1 BayUIG, because disclosing the information would reveal personal data of those invited and thereby impair their interests worthy of protection. The disclosure of the data on the company carrying out the drilling also relates to personal data of the invited parties within the meaning of Art. 4 No. 1 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), as this allows conclusions to be drawn about their economic circumstances. There is no apparent public interest that could justify this impairment. The right of those summoned to informational self-determination outweighs the plaintiffs' purely private interest in information, which is contrary to the purpose of the BayUIG.


10
In his statement of April 29, 2021, the agent of the plaintiff protested against the allegation of the abuse of the request for information. The standardized purpose of the BayUIG does not exclude an application for the purpose of pursuing claims under civil law. Incidentally, the plaintiffs are also concerned with making a contribution to environmental awareness. They would intend to educate the public about the dangers associated with geothermal drilling. The reason for rejection according to Art. 8 Para. 1 Clause 1 No. 1 BayUIG was not given, since it was already excluded under Art. 8 Para. 1 Clause 2 BayUIG, because the present issue was about environmental information in the form of emissions. Apart from that, the district office did not adequately explain why the disclosure of the data would affect the interests of the invited parties worthy of protection. In any case, the plaintiffs' interest in information would prevail. The summoned party refused to settle claims under civil law. The plaintiffs are dependent on the coveted information to conduct the process.


11
Pursuant to Section 101 (2) VwGO, all those involved waived an oral hearing.


12th
For further details, reference is made to the court and official files.

Reasons for decision

13
The lawsuit is successful.


14th
I. The action is admissible.


15th
The lawsuit could be filed without the existence of a decision by the defendant regarding the right to information. This allows the provision of § 75 sentence 1 VwGO, according to which, if an application to carry out an administrative act has not been factually decided within a reasonable period of time without sufficient reason, an action can be brought immediately (so-called action for failure to act, here in the form of the so-called . Execution action). The action cannot be brought before the end of three months from the application for the administrative act to be carried out, unless a shorter period is required due to special circumstances of the case (Section 75 sentence 2 VwGO). The decision on access to information according to the BayUIG is an administrative act, as far as a body that is obliged to provide information in accordance with Art. 2 Para. 1 No. 1 BayUIG is addressed (cf. Art. 6 BayUIG). The authority must decide on the right to access information within a maximum of two months (Art. 3 Para. 3 BayUIG, Art. 6 Para. 1 BayUIG). It can be left open whether the three-month period according to § 75 sentence 2 VwGO should be reduced to this two-month period due to this statutory maximum processing period. Because the three-month period had long expired since the submission of the proper, in particular sufficiently specific information access request on October 21, 2019 at the relevant point in time when the lawsuit was filed on June 29, 2020.


16
II. The action is also well founded.


17th
According to the BayUIG, the plaintiffs have a right to information from the defendant regarding the environmental information specified in more detail in the operative part, Section 113 (5) sentence 1 VwGO.


18th
The legal basis for the claim is Art. 3 Para. 1 BayUIG. According to the BayUIG, every person has the right to free access to environmental information, which a body obliged to provide information in the sense of Art. 2 Para. 1 BayUIG has, without having to demonstrate a legal interest. As the defendant's authority, the District Office is the body subject to the obligation to provide information within the meaning of Art. 2 Para. 1 BayUIG and also has the requested information from the drilling permit procedure within the meaning of Art. 2 Para. 3 BayUIG. The term environmental information is defined in Art. 2, Para. 2 BayUIG. In particular, according to Art. 2 Para. 2 No. 3 lit. a BayUIG environmental information, regardless of how it is stored, all data on measures or activities that relate to environmental components within the meaning of Art. 2 Para. 2 No. 1 BayUIG or affect or likely to affect factors within the meaning of Art. 2 Para. 2 No. 2 BayUIG. A drilling permit is such a measure because it has an impact on the condition of the soil as an environmental component, Art. 2 Para. 2 No. 1 Alt. 4 BayUIG. Furthermore, the right to information must be asserted with a sufficiently specific application to the body responsible for providing information, Art. 4 Paragraphs 1 and 2 BayUIG. That too happened here.


19th
There are no grounds for rejection according to Art. 7 or 8 BayUIG to conflict with the claim to information given thereafter (see nos. 1 and 2 below). Access to information also does not contradict the GDPR (see No. 3 below).


20th
1. There is no reason for rejection according to Art. 7 Paragraph 2 No. 1 BayUIG.


21
According to Art. 7 Para. 2 No. 1 BayUIG, an application must be rejected if it was obviously made improperly, unless the public interest in the disclosure outweighs it.


22nd
The District Office's argument is correct that it is the intention of the BayUIG to heighten general environmental awareness, to enable the free exchange of opinions and public participation in decisions, and thereby to improve environmental protection. Therefore, the pursuit of a claim to information for other reasons, such as here to prepare or conduct a private law process, is in fact not covered by this legal intention. However, that is not the point. The decisive factor - as the plaintiff rightly refers to - is whether the motives of the legislature were reflected in the standard text of the BayUIG. That's not the case. According to Art. 1 Para. 1 BayUIG, it is (only) the purpose of the law to create the legal framework for free access to environmental information for agencies that are obliged to provide information and for the dissemination of this environmental information. A further normative earmarking of the right to information is not stated in Art. 1 BayUIG or otherwise in the BayUIG. The right to information is normatively open to the pursuit of other purposes as well. The legislature obviously assumes that the access to information operated for purposes other than intended can in effect promote the legal concern. From this point of view, the claimant's request for information, which is based on the preparation or conduct of a process, cannot be classified as (obviously) abusive.


23
This result is supported by the case law of the Federal Administrative Court on the Federal Freedom of Information Act (IFG). The Federal Administrative Court has decided that an application for access to information may only be rejected as a legal abuse in narrowly defined exceptional cases (BVerwG, U.v. 12/15/2020 - 10 C 24.19 - juris Rn. 12 ff.). The objection to inadmissible exercise of the law is only justified if the applicant is not concerned with the information sought, but rather exclusively pursues other purposes that are disapproved by the legal system. These prerequisites are given, for example, if the request for information pursues the purpose of paralyzing the authority that is obliged to provide information. In addition, the applicant does not have to show his interest in information; it is presumed by the law. It is up to the authority that is obliged to provide information to prove the opposite against this presumption. The considerations of the Federal Administrative Court can be transferred to the BayUIG, which is a special information law for the area of environmental information and is structurally similar to the IFG. According to this, it is forbidden to qualify the plaintiff's request for information as (obviously) improper. Preparing or conducting civil proceedings is a legitimate purpose in a constitutional state for which obtaining the information sought can be helpful.


24
Incidentally, the plaintiffs in the process - without being obliged to do so - stated another reason for their request for information, namely to educate the public about possible dangers from geothermal energy. This purpose should not be the primary focus of the plaintiffs. Certainly, however, a concern that runs parallel to the intentions of the BayUIG has been brought forward, about the seriousness of which there are no well-founded doubts.


25th
2. There is no reason for rejection according to Art. 8 Paragraph 1 Clause 1 No. 1 BayUIG.


26
According to Art. 8 Para. 1 Clause 1 No. 1 BayUIG, an application must be rejected insofar as the disclosure of the information reveals personal data and thereby adversely affects the interests of the data subjects that are worthy of protection, unless the data subjects have consented or the public interest in the Announcement predominates.


27
a. This reason for rejection is not excluded because of the emissions clause of Art. 8 Para. 1 Clause 2 BayUIG.


28
According to Art. 8 Para. 1 Clause 2 BayUIG, access to environmental information on emissions cannot be refused on the grounds stated in Art. 8 Para. 1 Clause 1 No. 1 and 3 BayUIG.


29
The term emission is not legally defined in the BayUIG - as in the Federal Environmental Information Act (UIG). The law uses the term in the context of the definition of environmental information in Art. 2 Para. 2 BayUIG, specifically in Art. 2 Para. 2 No. 2 BayUIG. According to this, environmental information is also, regardless of how it is stored, all data on factors such as substances, energy, noise and radiation, waste of all kinds as well as emissions, discharges and other releases of substances into the environment that relate to the environmental components in the sense of Art. 2 Para. 2 No. 1 BayUIG affect or likely to affect. From the phrase "other releases of substances into the environment" it can be concluded that the element of the emissions is a special case of the characteristic of the release of substances into the environment (see the same definition in Section 2 (3) No. 2 UIG BVerwG, Uv 9/24/2009 - 7 C 2.09 - juris; the Federal Administrative Court even concludes that the substances must come from a plant; also VG Braunschweig, Uv 12/12/2012 - 2 A 1033/12 - juris). The crater at issue here, which was created as collateral damage to the geothermal probe bore and damaged the plaintiffs' properties, is not such a material emission. The subsidence has nothing to do with the release of separate particles of matter from the property of the summoned to the property of the plaintiff. There was no transfer of fabric particles. Rather, the condition of the plaintiffs' properties was directly changed due to purely natural law and physical conditions. One arrives at the same result if one wanted to use the definition in Section 3 (2) BImSchG to define the term “emissions” in the BayUIG (and also in the UIG) (so for the UIG Karg in BeckOK InfoMedienR, 32. Ed. 1.2.2021, UIG Section 2 marginal numbers 87-95.1). According to this, emissions in the sense of the BImSchG are the air pollution, noises, vibrations, light, heat, rays and similar phenomena emanating from a system. The subsidence did not originate from a "facility", nor from a non-stationary facility (Karg loc. In the opinion of the court making the decision, the BayUIG's protective purpose for the concept of emission requires, in addition to the already mentioned material quality of the emission and the characteristic of material transfer, a certain period of repetition and duration of the effect of the emission in the environment, so that suddenly and unintentionally occurring - singular - individual phenomena such as the formation of craters as collateral damage from drilling work on a property are conceptually excluded from the outset.


30th
b. The prerequisites for the reason for rejection according to Art. 8 Para. 1 Clause 1 No. 1 BayUIG do not exist.


31
aa. The coveted information is, as the District Office correctly explains, personal data of those invited.


32
The term personal data is used in Art. 8 Para. Sentence 1 No. 1 BayUIG, but is not defined here or elsewhere in the BayUIG. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation - GDPR) is to be used for the definition of the term (for details on the influence of the GDPR on the interpretation and application of the BayUIG, see No. 3 below; cf. also the application order in Art. 2 of Bavarian Data Protection Act - BayDSG). According to Art. 4 No. 1 GDPR, personal data is all information that relates to an identified or identifiable natural person. The data available in the files of the District Office for the drilling permit are personal data of the party invited, a natural person. The factual circumstances documented in the files are directly related to the summoned party because of their specificity and can easily be assigned to them.


33
bb. This personal data of the summoned party would be revealed by disclosing the requested information. However, this fact alone does not suffice for the fulfillment of the prerequisites for the rejection reason according to Art. 8 Para. 1 Clause 1 No. 1 BayUIG. According to its wording, it is additionally necessary (“and”) that the disclosure would adversely affect the interests of the summoned party that are worthy of protection. Insofar as the district office and probably also the representatives of the summoned parties as well as voices in the literature on the practically identical reason for refusal according to Section 9 Paragraph 1 Clause 1 No. 1 UIG take the view that this additional condition is obsolete because the disclosure of the personal data Data on a relevant impairment of the interests of the person concerned, detached from the individual situation of the person concerned, lead (see for the voices in the literature, for example Karg op. Uv February 12, 2015 - OVG 12 B 13/12 - NVwZ-RR 2015, 801, 802); VG Hamburg, U.v. February 25, 2004 - 7 K 1422/03 - juris Rn. 57; Reidt / Schiller in Landmann / Rohmer, environmental law, work status: EL December 2020, UIG § 9 marginal number 13). It would amount to a disregard for the clear wording of the law and violate the logic of the norms. If the law had already considered the disclosure of personal data to be sufficient for the reason for refusal, there would have been no need to formulate a further condition. It would not be compatible with the principles of proper legal interpretation to deny recognition to the clear legislative will without really valid reasons. Such reasons are neither stated nor otherwise evident. The already mentioned influence of the GDPR on the interpretation and application of the BayUIG does not lead to an application-related modification of the additional condition (see no.3 below). Likewise, an "indicative effect" of the disclosure of personal data for the fulfillment of the further standard component, which reverses the burden of presentation and proof, cannot be inferred from the law, neither according to its wording nor its meaning and purpose.


34
Neither the district office in the court proceedings nor the party summoned in the court proceedings and in the - subsequently held - hearing before the district office in accordance with Art. 8 (1) sentence 3 BayUIG made any substantive statements regarding the existence of this additional condition. Although the district office had expressly asked the invited party in its hearing letter of September 2, 2020 (p. 38 dA) to inform them of any interests worthy of protection, the reaction was limited to the succinct statement that "interests worthy of protection are being adversely affected, especially since personal data is disclosed “(See letter from the authorized representative of the summoned party to the district administration office dated September 8, 2020, p. 42 dA). The lecture of the District Office in its response from September 18, 2020 (page 41 of the dA) consists of an abstract reference to the right to informational self-determination, which is always violated by the disclosure of personal data, and in the remark, probably alluding to the ongoing civil litigation, that the summoned party is threatened with a five-digit claim for damages. These points of view, however, were not put forward by the party summoned. In any case, this argument lacks the necessary substance. Basically, the argument only takes the position rejected above. It remains unclear where the complaint, which was not addressed by the party summoned by a claim for damages, is supposed to lie.


35
In the absence of individual and case-by-case explanations, the factual feature of the impairment of interests worthy of protection through the disclosure of personal data is not fulfilled. Therefore, the reason for rejection according to Art. 8 Paragraph 1 Clause 1 No. 1 BayUIG does not exist.


36
cc. For the sake of completeness, the court wants to state that even if an impairment of interests worthy of protection had been adequately demonstrated by the disclosure of the personal data of the summoned party, the reason for rejection would nevertheless be in accordance with the clause of Art. 8 (1) sentence 1 half. 2 BayUIG could have been excluded. According to this clause, the application may not be rejected if the person concerned has consented - which is not the case here - or the public interest in the disclosure outweighs.


37
For the balancing of the private interest in confidentiality with the public interest in disclosure, reference should be made to the opening clauses of the GDPR for the national legislators, in particular to the special processing situations according to Chapter IX of the regulation, which according to Art. 86 GDPR also includes public access to official documents , namely on Art. 6 Para. 2 last half-sentence GDPR, Art. 6 Para. 3 Sentence 3 last half-sentence GDPR and Art. 86 GDPR. These regulations indicate a certain information accessibility of the GDPR. According to recital (EC) 154 to Art. 86 GDPR, the regulation enables the principle of public access to official documents to be taken into account when it is applied (sentence 1 of the EC). Public access to official documents can be viewed as a public interest (sentence 2 of the EC). Personal data in documents that are in the possession of an authority or a public body should be able to be disclosed to the public by this authority or body, provided this is provided for in Union law or in the law of the member states to which it is subject (sentence 3 of the EC) . It follows that, given the above-mentioned balancing of the private interest in discretion, the public interest in access to information is likely to prevail.


38
3. The right to information according to the BayUIG is not opposed to any provisions of the EU GDPR.


39
Like all EU regulations, the GDPR enjoys direct validity and priority over national law in all member states. It must therefore be taken into account when using the BayUIG.


40
a. The material scope of the GDPR is now open. According to Art. 2 Para. 1 GDPR, the regulation applies to the fully or partially automated processing of personal data as well as to the non-automated processing of personal data that are or are to be stored in a file system.


41
As already mentioned above, the term “personal data” is defined in Art. 4 No. 1 GDPR and is immediately relevant here. According to Art. 4 No. 2 GDPR, "processing" is any process carried out with or without the help of automated processes or any such series of processes in connection with personal data such as the collection, recording, organization, ordering, storage, adaptation or Modification, reading, querying, use, disclosure by transmission, distribution or any other form of provision, comparison or linking, restriction, deletion or destruction. The disclosure of environmental information on the basis of the BayUIG is processing within the meaning of Art. 4 No. 2 GDPR, namely in the processing modality of "disclosure by transmission".


42
According to Art. 4 No. 6 GDPR, a "file system" is any structured collection of personal data that is accessible according to certain criteria, regardless of whether this collection is managed centrally, decentrally or according to functional or geographical criteria. The files of the district office for drilling permit meet the concept of a file system, as they make the data accessible according to certain criteria, namely via the process file number consisting of certain codes (for the property of official files as a file system according to the GDPR, see the instructive explanations of the VG Gelsenkirchen, Uv 27.4 .2020 - 20 K 6392/18 - juris para. 63 - 74).


43
b. In Art. 6 para. 1 subpara. 1 lit. a to f, sub-para. 2 GDPR, six different conditions are finally formulated for the lawful processing of personal data - here in the processing modality of the transmission of data on the basis of the BayUIG. At least one of these conditions must be met. In the present case, the legal status according to Art. 6 para. 1 subpara. 1 lit. a (consent of the data subject to data processing). Relevant are the facts according to Art. 6 para. 1 subpara. 1 lit. c and e GDPR. According to Art. 6 para. 1 subpara. 1 lit. c GDPR, the processing is lawful if the processing is necessary to fulfill a legal obligation to which the person responsible is subject. According to the definition in Art. 4 No. 7 GDPR, the person responsible is the natural or legal person, authority, institution or other body that, alone or jointly with others, decides on the purposes and means of processing personal data. The district office is responsible here, as it decides on the disclosure of the coveted information within the framework of the BayUIG. According to Art. 6 para. 1 subpara. 1 lit. The delimitation of these two legality facts is fluid in the event that, as here, the person responsible is a public body (see on the one hand for the special information access according to the Federal Consumer Information Act - VIG - BayVGH, Bv 15.4.2020 - 5 CS 19.2087 - juris Rn. 25 , in which recourse is made to Art. 6 Para. 1 Subpara. 1 lit. c GDPR; on the other hand, for the national information access laws, generally Schiedermair in BeckOK DatenschutzR, 35. Ed. 1.11.2020, GDPR Art. 86 Rn Art. 6 para. 1 sub-para. 1 lit. e DSGVO is appealed; for the interdependence of the two facts see also Buchner / Petri in Kühling / Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, 3rd edition 2020, DS-GVO Art. 6 Rn. 114,115 ). In any case, the principle of necessity, which encompasses data protection and reinforces consent, is suitable for both facts (see Buchner / Petri, loc. Cit., Paragraph 15).


44
Which result would result here if only the legality regulation of Art. 6 Para. 1 GDPR would be taken into account is irrelevant. This is because the limited opening clause in favor of the member states according to Art. 6 Para. 2 and 3 GDPR must still be considered, which allows the Member States to exercise a certain amount of power, especially when it comes to so-called special processing situations according to Chapter IX of the GDPR, including Art 6 para. 2 last half-sentence, paragraph 3 sentence 3 last half-sentence, Art. 86 GDPR also includes public access to official documents. In addition to the freedom of information laws under Union law, this also applies to national freedom of information and access to information laws such as the BayUIG. As explained in more detail above (see no. 2 b cc above), these provisions of the GDPR speak of an information accessibility of the GDPR, which is also reflected in the interpretation of the concept of necessity and the concept of public interest in the permissions of Art. 6 Para. 1 GDPR and tends to lead to an affirmation of a right to access information in accordance with national regulations (see recital (EC) 154 to Art. 86 GDPR, in particular sentences 2 and 3 of the EC).


45
The ruling court has no concerns that the national regulation of the BayUIG in question, an information access law according to Art. 6, Paragraph 2, last clause, Para. 3, Clause 3, last clause, Art. 86 GDPR, is compatible with the provisions of the GDPR (for the conformity of the VIG with the GDPR see BayVGH, Bv 15.4.2020 - 5 CS 19.2087 - juris Rn. 25; for the conformity of the IFG, UIG and VIG with the GDPR see Schnabel in Simitis / Hornung / Spiecker gen.Döhmann, Datenschutzrecht, 1st edition 2019, Rn. 41 ff.) And therefore the information access granted here according to the BayUIG does not contradict the GDPR.


46
4. After all of this, the action had to be upheld. As the defendant, the defendant has to bear the costs of the proceedings, Section 154 (1) VwGO. The summoned party bears her extrajudicial costs herself, as she did not submit a substantive application and thus did not run into a cost risk, Section 154 (3) VwGO in conjunction with Section 162 (3) VwGO.


47
The decision on the provisional enforceability of the cost decision is based on Section 167 VwGO in conjunction with Sections 708 No. 11, 711 ZPO.

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