VGH München – 11 ZB 19.991

G München – 11 ZB 19.991
Court:	VG München (Germany)
Jurisdiction:	Germany
Relevant Law:	Article 5(1)(d) GDPR Article 6(1)(f) GDPR Article 23(1)(d) GDPR
Decided:	09.03.2020
Published:	n/a
Parties:	Unknoww vs investigating police in administrative offence proceedings
National Case Number:	11 ZB 19.991
European Case Law Identifier:	n/a
Appeal from:	Administrative Court Regensburg, Ruling from 17.04.2019 - RN 3 K 19.267
Language:	German
Original Source:	Bayern.Recht (DE)

The Administrative Court of Munich ruled by order that the transfer of personal dates of the responsible driver to the police is permissible in accordance with Art. 6 (1) subparagraph 1 letter f GDPR. After weighing up the interests of the driver and the police authority, the court decided that the transfer of personal data was in the public interest, as the police had the task of preventing, investigating, detecting or prosecuting criminal offences in accordance with Art. 23 (1) lit. d GDPR. The procedure was also compatible with the principle of purpose limitation within the meaning of Article 5 para. 1 lit. b GDPR.

English Summary

Facts

In September 2018, a traffic offence was committed with the vehicle registered to the applicant. A witness questionnaire sent to him remained unanswered, and during a telephone interview in November 2019, the plaintiff stated that he recognized a former employee, but refused to disclose her personal data for data protection reasons.

In a later hearing, the plaintiff informed the police that an electronic driver's logbook existed, but that the consent of the data subject had to be obtained in each case for the data to be passed on, even in administrative offence proceedings. With regards to former employees, this proved to be difficult.

The District Office of Freyung-Grafenau then obliged him by notice to hand over the logbook to the District Office for inspection at any time upon request and to keep it for six months after expiry of the period for which it must be kept. The plaintiff challenged this decision before the Regensburg Administrative Court, but the challenge was unsuccessful because the court was of the opinion that the decision did not violate the GDPR and was also not disproportionate.

Dispute

In September 2018, a traffic offence was committed with the vehicle registered to the applicant. A witness questionnaire sent to him remained unanswered, and during a telephone interview in November 2019, the plaintiff stated that he recognized a former employee, but refused to disclose her personal data for data protection reasons.

In a later hearing, the plaintiff informed the police that an electronic driver's logbook existed, but that the consent of the data subject had to be obtained in each case for the data to be passed on, even in administrative offence proceedings. With regards to former employees, this proved to be difficult.

The District Office of Freyung-Grafenau then obliged him by notice to hand over the logbook to the District Office for inspection at any time upon request and to keep it for six months after expiry of the period for which it must be kept. The plaintiff challenged this decision before the Regensburg Administrative Court, but the challenge was unsuccessful because the court was of the opinion that the decision did not violate the GDPR and was also not disproportionate.

Holding

The court found that the issue in the present case is not whether the claimant was obliged to provide the data, but whether he was entitled to do so (as the defendant correctly pointed out).

According to settled case law, notification of a traffic offence committed with a vehicle constitutes an obligation for the owner of the vehicle to cooperate, as far as possible and reasonable, in identifying the responsible driver. This also applies even if he is not obliged to name the driver, for example because he has a right to refuse to give evidence or testify.

The court further found that it was also not doubtful that the GDPR and the Federal Data Protection Act did not prevent the transmission of driver data to the Police Administration Office, a data processing in the sense of Art. 4 No. 2 GDPR. The court thus ruled in favour of the defendant and referred to the fact that, irrespective of the opening of the factual scope of application of the GDPR - in any event a transfer of the personal data of the responsible driver to the police would have been permissible under Article 6 para. 1, second subparagraph, letter f GDPR in order to safeguard the legitimate interests of the Police Administration Office, a third party within the meaning of Article 4 No. 10 GDPR, when weighed against the interests of the drivers. Authorities have a legitimate interest in fulfilling the tasks incumbent upon them in the public interest, which according to Art. 23 para. 1 letter d GDPR include the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences, including administrative offences. The transmission authority is also compatible with the principle of purpose limitation (Article 5 paragraph 1 letter b GDPR), since the purpose of the data storage in connection with the driving of the vehicle includes the processing of official or judicial penalties. After a compatibility check pursuant to Art. 6 para. 4 GDPR, even a change of purpose would be permissible. Contrary to the opinion of the plaintiff, he was not subject to any information obligations in this context.

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English Machine Translation of the Decision

The decision below is a machine translation of the original. Please refer to the German original for more details.

VGH Munich, decision of 09.03.2020 - 11 ZB 19.991
Titles:
Isolated legal aid application - Logbook
Standard chains:
VwGO § 166 para. 1 p. 1
ZPO § 114 para. 1 p. 1, § 121 para. 1
StVZO § 31a paragraph 1 p. 1, paragraph 3
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 Art. 5 para. 1 lit. d, Art. 6 para. 1 subpara. 1 lit. f, Art. 23 para. 1 lit. d
guiding principles:
1 If an intended application for legal protection is settled before lis pendens and the possible filing of an action for a declaration of continuation is also out of the question, there is no longer any room for legal aid and an isolated legal aid application remains unsuccessful. In this respect, the relevant point in time for assessment is not the point in time when the application for legal aid is mature enough to be granted, but the point in time of the court's decision on the legal aid application. (marginal 12) (editorial motto)
(2) According to the consistent case law of the higher courts, notification of a traffic violation committed with a vehicle constitutes an obligation for the owner of the vehicle to cooperate, within the scope of what is possible and reasonable, in identifying the responsible driver; this also applies if he is not obliged to name the driver, for example because he has the right to refuse to give evidence or testify (see BayVGH BeckRS 2019, 8672 marginal no. 16 mwN). The order to keep a logbook does not presuppose either unlawful conduct or fault on the part of the vehicle owner in the non-detectability of the driver. (marginal 19) (editorial motto)
3) According to Art. 6 para. 1 subpara. 1 lit. f of the Basic Data Protection Regulation (DSGVO), the disclosure of personal data of the responsible driver to the police is permissible when weighed against the interests of the driver in order to safeguard the legitimate interest of the police authority in fulfilling the tasks incumbent upon it in the public interest, which according to Art. 23 para. 1 lit. d DSGVO include the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences including administrative offences. If data is stored in connection with driving a vehicle, the transmission authorisation is also compatible with the principle of purpose limitation as defined in Article 5(1)(b) DPA. (marginal no. 20) (editorial guiding principle)
Buzzwords:
isolated legal aid application, driver's logbook, execution of the intended legal protection request, relevant time of assessment, obligation of the vehicle owner to cooperate, right to give evidence or refuse to give evidence, illegal behaviour, fault, basic data protection regulation, authority to transmit, fulfilment of official tasks, principle of purpose limitation
Lower court:
VG Regensburg, judgment of 17.04.2019 - RN 3 K 19.267
Place where it was found:
BeckRS 2020, 4488
 
Tenor
The application for legal aid is rejected.
Reasons
I.
1
The applicant seeks legal aid in respect of the proposed application for leave to appeal, which concerns an action against a driver's logbook.
2
On 10 September 2018, the motor vehicle ... * ... ... registered in the name of the plaintiff ... * ... on the A3 federal motorway at a speed of 116 km/h was only 20 m away and thus less than 4/10 of half the speedometer value (58 m). The photograph taken by the police showed a woman driving the vehicle.
3
A witness questionnaire dated October 31, 2018, sent to the plaintiff for completion, was not returned. During a telephone interview with the plaintiff by the police on November 22, 2018, he stated that he recognized a former employee, but refused to disclose her personal data for data protection reasons.
4
The preliminary proceedings were discontinued by order dated 10 December 2018.
5
During the hearing on an intended logbook requirement, the plaintiff submitted in a letter dated 21 January 2019 that the vehicles registered on him had an electronic logbook. In accordance with the EU Data Protection Basic Regulation, employee data may only be disclosed to third parties with express written consent, even in the case of administrative offenses. New employment contracts already provide for this provision. In the case of old contracts, this approval must be obtained in each case. For employees who are no longer employed by the company, this is sometimes difficult.
6
By decision dated February 11, 2019, the Freyung-Grafenau District Office, based on § 31a, Subsection 1, Sentence 1, StVZO, ordered the plaintiff to keep a logbook for the vehicle with the registration number ... * ... ... and any replacement vehicle for a period of twelve months and obligated him to hand over the logbook to the District Office for inspection at any time upon request and to keep it for six months after the time for which it is to be kept.
7
The plaintiff challenged this decision at the Regensburg Administrative Court on February 18, 2019. At the same time, he applied for interim relief. By order dated March 15, 2019 (RN 3 p. 19,266), the Administrative Court rejected the urgent application. After waiving an oral hearing, it also dismissed the action. The reasons for the ruling state that the requirements of § 31a StVZO are fulfilled. The plaintiff's vehicle had committed a significant traffic offence which, according to No. 3.2.3 of Annex 13 to the FeV, No. 12.6 of the catalogue of fines and No. 12.6.2 of Table 2 of the Annex to the catalogue of fines, would have been punishable by entry of a point in the register of fitness to drive and a fine of EUR 100. It had not been possible to identify the driver of the vehicle within the limitation period. It is true that the plaintiff, as the vehicle owner, had not been informed within two weeks of the traffic offence being committed. However, this was harmless if the exceeding of the time frame had not been the cause of the impossibility of identifying the driver, e.g. if the owner did not name the driver although he could clearly remember him, if a photo sufficient for identification had been presented to him or if the offence had been committed with a company vehicle in a business context. This had been the case here. The investigating authority could regularly dispense with time-consuming, hardly promising further clarification measures if the vehicle owner was recognisably unwilling to cooperate in the clarification of the traffic offence. The Basic Data Protection Regulation (DSGVO) is probably not directly applicable to police investigations, or at least data processing is justified according to the requirements of this Regulation even without the consent of the person concerned. The exception to the scope of application (Article 2.2(d) DPA) also covered administrative offences. In addition, data collection from the plaintiff would also be subject to the provisions of Article 6.1(e) DSGVO in conjunction with Article 6.1(b) DSGVO. Article 2, 28.2 no. 2 BayDSG without the consent of the data subject, since the processing in the context of the administrative offence proceedings is necessary for the performance of a task which is in the public interest or is carried out in the exercise of official authority which has been assigned to the person responsible. If the DSGVO had been applicable, the plaintiff would have been entitled to a licence under Article 6.1 letter. c DSGVO, the plaintiff would have been entitled to surrender the personal data even without the consent of the person concerned, as this would have been necessary to fulfil his legal obligation to cooperate in identifying the vehicle owner. He had not been able to invoke the DSGVO against the investigating police. Nor did the DSGVO preclude the preventive maintenance of a logbook. The ordered duration of twelve months was not disproportionate in view of the fact that it was a company vehicle which could be used to a considerable extent by several persons.
8
On 14 May 2019, the applicant lodged an 'appeal' and, at the same time, applied for 'procedural assistance' in that regard. Due to an accident at work and the resulting reduced ability to work, he was unable to pay the costs of the proceedings on his own. The requirements of sec. 24 para. 1 no. 1 BDSG were not fulfilled and no other legal basis was relevant. Thus, a transfer of data to the prosecution authority was inadmissible. Since this provision only provides for the permissibility of the transfer, but not for an obligation to do so, and since the police authority, unlike the public prosecutor's office, for example, is not legally obliged to transfer data, it had to be waived for the time being. Even if there were an obligation to transfer personal data to the prosecution authorities, Article 6.1.1 (1) of the Basic Law would also be applicable in addition to § 24 of the Federal Data Protection Act. c DSGVO would also apply. If a data transfer had been possible under the DSGVO, the information pursuant to Article 13.3 DSGVO would have had to be provided to the data subject first. Neither the police nor the criminal prosecution authorities could explain any threat to the investigative measures or state a legal basis on the basis of which the prior information of the data subjects could have been dispensed with. In view of the complexity of the matter and the lack of a trend-setting judiciary on this subject, he was to be granted procedural assistance.
9
The defendant replied that the application for legal aid for the intended admission procedure should be rejected. For the applicant was wrong in his assumption that there was no authority or right to transmit the name of the driver to the Police Administration Office for the purpose of prosecuting an administrative offence. It is true that the DSGVO applies to the transmission of driver data to the police administration office if it is assumed that the administrative offence was actually committed in the course of the business use of the vehicle. In this case, Article 2.2(2)(b) of the DSGVO was applicable. c DSGVO was not relevant here. Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the competent authorities for the purpose of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of sentences and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, does not apply, since no data processing by an authority is involved in this data transfer to an authority (Article 1(1) of Directive (EU) 2016/680, Paragraph 45 sentence 1 of the Federal Data Protection Act). The authority to transmit follows from Article 6.1, second subparagraph, letter f of the DPA, according to which for a private individual (cf. Article 6.1, second subparagraph, DSGVO e contrario) the processing, i.e. also the transmission (cf. Article 4, no. 2, DSGVO), is permissible in order to safeguard the legitimate interests of a third party, unless the interests of the data subject, in this case the driver of the vehicle, outweigh those of the data subject. Third parties were legal persons or authorities (cf. Art. 4 No. 10 DSGVO), including the police administration office investigating the case. It was obvious that authorities had a legitimate interest in fulfilling the tasks incumbent upon them in the public interest. Tasks in the public interest were in particular the tasks referred to in Article 23.1 letter d of the DPA (see Article 23.1 letter e of the DPA, which refers to other important objectives in the public interest), and hence also the prosecution of criminal offences. Criminal offences within the meaning of Article 23.1 letter d of the DPA are - as the court of first instance correctly pointed out in another context on page 10 of the grounds for the judgment - also administrative offences. The weighing up of interests was at the expense of the driver of the vehicle, since nobody was granted an overriding interest in being spared prosecution for a criminal offence or administrative offence. Article 6.1(1)(e) DSGVO was not relevant. Private individuals could only invoke this provision if the power to access personal data had been conferred on them in the public interest or as an exercise of official authority. They must therefore - which is not the case here - act in place of an authority. The applicability of Article 6.1(1)(f) of the DPA could not be countered by the argument that the duty of a witness to give evidence did not exist vis-à-vis the police administration office or the police, but only before a court (§ 48.1 of the DPA). 1 sentence 2 StPO in conjunction with § 46.1 OWiG), before the public prosecutor's office (§ 161a StPO in conjunction with § 46.1 OWiG) and in the case of an underlying summons from the public prosecutor's office (§ 163.3 StPO in conjunction with § 46.1 OWiG). The above-mentioned duties to provide information are sector-specific regulations ("more specific provisions") within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 2 DSGVO, which as implementing provisions are subject to Article 6 paragraph 1, subparagraph 1, letter. c DSGVO as implementing provisions. However, the standards only regulated the more extensive obligations to provide information, not the previous level of the right to provide information which is at issue here. Nor does the power to transmit (the right to transmit) conflict with the principle of purpose limitation (Article 5(1)(b) of the DPA), since there is no other purpose. The purpose of the (mental or actual) data storage that took place in connection with driving the vehicle was the driving of the vehicle. This also included possible subsequent proceedings, such as the settlement of claims in connection with accidents or the settlement of official or judicial sanctions. However, even if one wanted to assume a change of purpose, this would in any case be the result of a compatibility check according to Art. 6 para. 4 Old Law. 3 DSGVO, because such data processing is in any case readily foreseeable by the data subject on the basis of the factual context (Art. 6 para. 4 letter b DSGVO) (Art. 6 para. 4 letter a DSGVO). Sec. 24.1 No. 1 of the Federal Data Protection Act mentioned by the plaintiff constituted an implementing provision within the meaning of Article 6.4 Old Law. 2 DSGVO, which enables additional national deviations from the purpose, the compatibility test under Article 6.4, old version, which is directly enshrined in the DSGVO. 3 DSGVO, which is directly enshrined in the DSGVO, and which must also remain unaffected in terms of competence law. No conclusion to the contrary could be drawn from § 24.1 no. 1 BDSG. The information duties cited by the plaintiff could not affect his authority to transmit from the outset. Moreover, such information duties would not have been triggered by the transmission. For the plaintiff, they were ruled out because there was no change of purpose pursuant to Art. 13 para. 3 DSGVO. For the police they would not exist according to Art. 28 para. 1 sentence 1 no. 1, para. 3 no. 2 BayDSG.
10
For further details, reference is made to the court files of both instances and to the administrative files submitted.
II.
11
The application for legal aid for the admission procedure is unsuccessful.
12
Insofar as the main issue, such as the obligation to keep a logbook, has in the meantime been settled by the passage of time (cf. Art. 43 para. 2 BayVwVfG; BayVGH, B.v. 9.12.2013 - 11 ZB 13.1748 - juris marg. no. 12 f. ), there is no longer any room for legal aid, irrespective of whether or not an action should still be brought (see OVG NW, B.v. 12 January 2010 - 18 E 1195/09 - DÖV 2010, 572 = juris para. 3; NdsOVG, B.v. 6 November 2009 - 11 PA 290/09 - juris para. 3; OVG Berlin-Bbg, B.v. 12.1.2009 - 10 M 56.08 - juris nr. 3). Legal aid will in principle be granted for the future. If the intended application for legal aid is settled before the matter is pending, the isolated legal aid application will be unsuccessful (Wache in MK zur ZPO, 5th ed. 2016, § 114 marginal 102; Fischer in Musielak/Voit, ZPO, 16th ed. 2019, § 114 marginal 17; Bader in Bader/Funke-Kaiser/Stuhlfauth/von Albedyll, VwGO, 7th ed. 2018, § 166 marginal 32). In this respect, the relevant date of assessment is not that of the maturity for grant, but that of the court's decision on the application for legal aid, because costs for the intended and already completed legal action have not yet been incurred at all (see OVG NW, B.v. 12 January 2010 loc. cit. para. 7). Moreover, an application for legal aid for the filing of an action which has been settled in the main proceedings and is therefore inadmissible would be unfounded because the legal proceedings no longer offer sufficient prospects of success. The granting of legal aid for the possible filing of an action for a declaration of continuation is also out of the question here, because there are indications of the existence of an interest in a declaration of continuation, in particular from the recognised aspects of the risk of recurrence, the interest in rehabilitation or a far-reaching encroachment on fundamental rights by an administrative act, which is typically settled before the possibility of obtaining legal protection before the administrative court (see BVerfGE 101, 361 (2)). BVerwG, U.v. 16 May 2013 - 8 C 22.12 - Buchholz 310 § 113.1 VwGO no. 41 = juris margin no. 12 et seq.; BayVGH, B.v. 18 July 2016 - 11 ZB 16,299 - juris margin no. 15 et seq.
13
To the extent that the main proceedings, here with regard to the obligations to hand over and keep records, have not been resolved, the application for legal aid is unfounded because the intended application for admission does not promise a sufficient prospect of success (Paragraph 166(1), first sentence, of the VwGO in conjunction with Paragraph 114(1), first sentence, and Paragraph 121(1) of the ZPO). The plaintiff's economic need is therefore irrelevant.
14
Contrary to its wording, the Senate did not interpret the letter of 10 May 2019 from the applicant, who was not represented by a lawyer, as a lodging of an inadmissible appeal against the judgment of the Court of First Instance served on him on 14 April 2019, but as an application for legal aid in respect of an application for leave to appeal lodged by a lawyer. The applicant has not raised any objections to that interpretation. It is in his interest, because the lodging of the appeal would be inadmissible because it has not been admitted by the Administrative Court (§ 124.1, § 124a.4 VwGO) and the plaintiff could neither lodge nor apply for the appeal in person due to lack of the ability to postulate (see § 67.4 sentences 1 and 2 VwGO). If legal aid is granted, reinstatement in the period for appeal under § 124a.4 sentence 1 VwGO must in principle also be granted, since the risk of costs until a decision is reached on an application for legal aid which is in due time and form must regularly be recognised as an obstacle within the meaning of § 60.1 VwGO (Bier/Steinbeiß-Winkelmann in Schoch/Schneider/Bier, VwGO, as at July 2019, § 60 marginal nos. 17, 35).
15
For legal aid to be granted, it is usually sufficient that the prospects of success are open or that difficult legal questions which have not yet been clarified by the highest court are relevant to the decision (BVerfG, B.v. 13.3.1990 - 2 BvR 94/88 - BVerfGE 81, 347 = juris 2.) However, there are not sufficient prospects of success if success in the main action is not absolutely ruled out, but the chance of success is only a remote one, or if there are concrete and comprehensible indications that the taking of evidence will very probably be to the detriment of the applicant (cf. BVerfG, B.v. 20 February 2002 - 1 BvR 1450/00 - NJW-RR 2002, 1069 = juris nr. 12; B.v. 29 September 2004 - 1 BvR 1281/04 - NJW-RR 2005, 140 = juris nr. 14).
16
Measured against this, the requirements for the granting of legal aid are not met, since the reason for admission under Paragraph 124(2)(1) of the VwGO (serious doubts as to the correctness of the judgment) invoked by the applicant on the merits is not given and other reasons for admission are not apparent.
17
Pursuant to Section 31a (3) of the Straßenverkehrs-Zulassungs-Ordnung (StVZO) of 26 April 2012 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 679), as last amended by the Ordinance of 23 March 2017 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 522), the vehicle keeper shall, upon request, hand over the logbook for inspection at any time at the place specified by the issuing body to the person ordering the logbook or to the body or other persons designated by the issuing body, and shall keep the logbook for six months after expiry of the period for which it must be kept. These ancillary obligations share the legal fate of the driver's logbook, the order of which, pursuant to § 31a, para. 1, sentence 1 of the German Road Traffic Licensing Regulations (StVZO), requires that the identification of a driver was not possible after a violation of traffic regulations.
18
The Administrative Court was right to assume this. The plaintiff's vehicle constitutes a significant traffic offence (§ 4 Para. 1, § 49 Para. 1 No. 4 StVO, § 24 StVG, No. 3.2.3 of Annex 13 to the FeV in conjunction with § 1 BKatV in conjunction with No. 12.6 Annex to the BKatV (catalogue of fines), No. 12.6.2 of Table 2 of the Annex to the BKatV). The police were unable to identify the driver responsible within the limitation period, although their investigations were sufficient in view of the plaintiff's lack of cooperation.

19
As the defendant rightly pointed out, the issue in the present case was not whether the applicant was obliged to transfer the data of his former employee responsible for the traffic offence, but whether he was entitled to do so. According to the consistent case law of the higher courts, notification of a traffic violation committed with a vehicle justifies the obligation for its owner to cooperate in determining the responsible driver of the vehicle to the extent possible and reasonable (BayVGH, B. 3.5.2019 - 11 ZB 19.213 - juris marg. 16; SächsOVG, B.v. 10.1.2020 - 6 B 297/19 - juris marg. 3; OVG NW, B.v. 10.9.2019 - 8 B 774/19 - juris marg. 5; B.v. 15.5.2018 - 8 A 740/18 - DVBl 2018, 961 = juris para. 33; ThürOVG, B.v. 20.9.2018 - 2 EO 378/18 - VRS 134, 317 = juris para. 7). This also applies if he is not obliged to name the driver, for example because he has a right to refuse to give evidence or testify (see BayVGH, loc.cit. m.w.N.). The order pursuant to § 31a para. 1 sentence 1 StVZO does not presuppose either that the vehicle owner behaves unlawfully or that he is at fault for the non-detectability of the driver (cf. NdsOVG, B.v. 14.1.2019 - 12 ME 170/18 - NJW 2019, 1013 = juris Rn. 17 with further details). With insufficient cooperation, he "merely" cuts off the objection that it would have been possible to identify the driver of the vehicle after the traffic violation if the prosecuting authority had continued its investigation (NdsOVG, loc.cit.).
20
It is also not in doubt that Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (Basic Data Protection Regulation - DSGVO; OJ L 119, 4.4.2009, p. 1) will not apply to the processing of personal data in the EU. 5.2016, p. 1) and the Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG) of 30 June 2017 (BGBl I p. 2097) did not preclude the transmission of driver data to the Police Administration Office, a data processing within the meaning of Article 4 No. 2 DSGVO. In this respect, reference can be made to the defendant's detailed reply of 12 June 2019, according to which - irrespective of the opening of the material scope of application of the DSGVO - a transfer of the personal data of the responsible driver to the police in accordance with Article 6 paragraph 1, second subparagraph, letter f DSGVO would have been permissible in any event in order to safeguard the legitimate interests of the Police Administration Office, a third party within the meaning of Article 4 No. 10 DSGVO, when weighed against the interests of the vehicle drivers. Authorities have a legitimate interest in fulfilling the tasks incumbent upon them in the public interest, which according to Art. 23 para. 1 letter d DSGVO include the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences, including administrative offences. The transmission authority is also compatible with the principle of purpose limitation (Article 5 paragraph 1 letter b DSGVO), since the purpose of the data storage in connection with the driving of the vehicle includes the processing of official or judicial penalties. After a compatibility check pursuant to Art. 6 para. 4 DSGVO, even a change of purpose would be permissible. Contrary to the opinion of the plaintiff, he was not subject to any information obligations in this context.
21
The decision is unappealable (§ 152 (1) VwGO).