Article 31 GDPR
Legal Text
The controller and the processor and, where applicable, their representatives, shall cooperate, on request, with the supervisory authority in the performance of its tasks.
Relevant Recitals
Commentary
Article 31 GDPR obliges controllers, processors, and their representatives to cooperate with the supervisory authority ("SA").
The purpose of this provision is to facilitate the SA’s fulfilment of its duties under the GDPR. Article 31 GDPR can be categorised as a largely declaratory provision, as the relationship between controllers, processors and their representatives on the one hand and the supervisory authorities on the other is regulated in more detail in several other provisions of the GDPR.[1]
Consequently, Article 31 GDPR can mainly be read as a supporting provision to Articles 57 and 58 GDPR, which outlines the tasks and powers of the SA and establishes a corresponding obligation upon controllers and processors to cooperate (e.g. Article 58(1)(f) GDPR grants a supervisory authority the power to obtain access to the premises of the controller and / or processor).
It should be noted that the obligation to cooperate only applies in relation to the SA's performance of its tasks.[2]
Controller, processor and representative
Addressees of the obligation to cooperate with the SA are controllers (Article 4(7) GDPR), processors (Article 4(8) GDPR), and, where applicable, their representatives (Article 4(17) GDPR). See the commentary on the respective provision for more information on each of those actors.
In situations with various different actors in connection to a processing activity (e.g. a controller and its processor), these actors should agree on how to coordinate in case the SA requests their cooperation (e.g. in the processing agreement under Article 28 GDPR).[3]
While the data protection officer (if appointed) is not directly subject to this provision, Article 39(1)(d) GDPR provides for a similar obligation for them.
Cooperate with the supervisory authority
On request
Article 31 GDPR provides for a general duty of controllers, processors and their representatives to cooperate with the SA. However, this obligation is subject to a request from the SA, as highlighted by the provision's wording ("on request").[4]
This distinguishes this obligation from other provisions of the GDPR which necessitate proactive action on the part of the controller or processor, for instance, Articles 33 and 36 GDRP.[5] To illustrate, Article 36 GDPR obliges the controller to consult the competent SA, where the controller considers the processing to be high risk and has not adopted mitigating measures to reduce the risk. Therefore, Article 36 GDPR places a cooperative burden upon the controller without the SA having to take prior action, as the controller is obliged to assess the nature of its processing activities, and in the event that they are high risk and the controller cannot mitigate this risk, the controller must then consult the SA.
Article 31 GDPR stands in opposition to such obligations since it requires a prior action of the SA. Hence, Article 31 GDPR can be said to impose a general duty of cooperation which arises when a request is made by a supervisory authority that relates to the fulfilment of its tasks.
Since a failure to cooperate with the SA can be subject to a fine under Article 83(4)(a) GDPR, the SA's request should be sufficiently clear and precise in order to enable the receiver of the request to comply with it.[6] The request should also include an appropriate deadline to comply.[7]
Fulfilment of its tasks
In this regard, Article 31 GDPR must be read in line with Articles 57 and 58 GDPR. Article 57 GDPR outlines the extensive tasks afforded to SAs, while Article 58 GDPR establishes the correspondingly extensive investigative powers granted to SAs under the GDPR. The wording of the provision clearly notes that the SA’s request is to further the performance of its tasks.
Following from this, the content and scope of a supervisory authority’s request is constricted by Article 57 GDPR, which exhaustively lists its tasks. Therefore, the request must be formulated precisely in relation to the fulfilment of a SA’s tasks, subject to the principle of proportionality.[8] A request that falls outside the scope of Article 57 GDPR should be deemed inadmissible for the purposes of Article 31 GDPR.[9]
The fact that the SA's request must be related to its tasks under Articles 57 GDPR does not mean that there must be a specific reason or initial suspicion by the SA in order to make a request.[10]
Article 31 GDPR can also be read as a supporting provision to the SA's powers under Article 58 GDPR. However, it is generally accepted that the SA's powers also directly oblige the controller, processor or representative without the need of another provision providing for such obligation. Additionally, SAs already have options to enforce any failure on the part of the controller, processor or representative.[11]
In practice, this means that when a SA uses its powers under Article 58 GDPR (e.g. orders a controller to provide information it requires for the performance of its task - Article 58(1)(a) GDPR) the controller's obligation to comply arises directly from Article 58 GDPR. However, Article 31 GDPR provides for a parallel obligation to cooperate. It is subject to dispute, if Article 31 GDPR can even broaden the scope of the cooperation in the sense of imposing administrative procedural cooperative burdens.[12] This reading of Article 31 GDPR is supported by the language of Article 83(4)(a) GDPR which categorises Article 31 GDPR as an 'obligation' of the controller and processor.
According to this view, in addition to imposing a general duty of cooperation, Article 31 GDPR also acts as a 'gap filling' provision for Article 58 GDPR. In particular, where the supervisory authority requires a controller or processor to take an action, which is not included within its powers to make an order for under Article 58 GDPR, it may rely on Article 31 GDPR to do so. The SA should make it clear if it requests the cooperation under Article 31 GDPR, Article 58 GDPR or another provision.[13] In practice, this reading suggests that a request made solely under Article 31 GDPR would be of the same binding nature as an order made by a supervisory authority in the exercise of its powers under Article 58 GDPR.[14]
For example: A SA receives a complaint by a data subject claiming a violation of their right to erasure under Article 17 GDPR. The SA is in accordance with Article 57(1)(f) GDPR tasked with the handling of the complaint. In the course of the complaint procedure it asks the controller to give a statement and provide relevant information. If the controller fails to respond, it could be considered a violation of Article 31 GDPR.
Shall cooperate
Article 31 GDPR obliges a controller, processor, and representative to cooperate with a request by the SA. The cooperation could refer to an active behaviour (disclosure of documents) or the tolerance of an action by the SA (provide the SA access to the a premise).[15] This is not the case if the SA asks for a voluntary cooperation.[16]
The cooperation will often take place via a data protection officer (if appointed) in accordance with Article 39(1)(d) GDPR.[17]
Is is subject to debate, whether recipients of a request by a SA can avoid to fully comply with the request in order to protect their interests. For instance, if documents that are subject to business secrets can be redacted.[18]
Further, Article 31 GDPR is surrounded by the question whether a controller, processor, or representative might lawfully refuse to cooperate with a request made by the SA. In other words, the question where the duty to cooperate find its limits in light of the the right against self-incrimination.[19]
The right against self-incrimination stems from Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights ('ECHR') and is found in Union law under Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights ('the Charter'). This privilege does not protect against the making of an incriminating statement, but rather protects against the obtaining of evidence by coercion or threat of sanction.
Infringements of the GDPR and the sanctions issued in response to any such infringements often have the capacity to be criminal in nature. Thus, in certain circumstances, GDPR infringements may give rise to the applicability of this right, as Member States are permitted to legislate criminal sanctions for infringements of the GDPR (Recital 149). Consequently, in certain jurisdictions infringements of the GDPR may give rise to criminal liability. Moreover, the imposition of a significant fine (or the threat of such a fine) may equally give rise to the right against self-incrimination.
Article 31 GDPR gains an independent significance as it is included in the GDPR’s sanctions framework through Article 83(4) GDPR.[20] Article 83(4) GDPR provides that the infringement of Article 31 GDPR may be subject to administrative fines up to €10 million, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 2% of the total worldwide annual turnover. CJEU case law demonstrates that administrative fines may be considered criminal if they serve a punitive purpose and have a high degree of severity, regardless of the fine’s classification as administrative under national legislation.[21] Therefore, if a request made under Article 31 GDPR gives rise to circumstances which invoke the right against self-incrimination, it is widely accepted by commentators that the right against self-incrimination takes precedence.[22]
Commentators have suggested that the practical application of this reading would mean that Article 31 GDPR cannot be invoked by a SA to induce a controller or processor to make an admission which would give rise to criminal liability, instead a supervisory authority must use its own investigative powers to establish facts which are incumbent on itself to prove.[23]
While the CJEU has yet to rule on the interaction between Article 31 GDPR and the right against self-incrimination, similar lines of reasoning were taken by the Court in relation to the duty to cooperate in the context of competition law.[24] The leading case in this regard, Orkem, establishes that:
"[W]hile the Commission is entitled [. . .] to compel an undertaking to provide all necessary information concerning such facts as may be known to it and to disclose to it, if necessary, such documents relating thereto as are in its possession, even if the latter may be used to establish against it or an-other undertaking, the existence of anti-competitive conduct, it may not, by means of a decision calling for information, undermine the rights of defence of the undertaking concerned.
Thus, the Commission may not compel an undertaking to provide it with answers which might involve an admission on its part of the existence of an infringement which it is incumbent on the Commission to prove."
[[1]], margin number 34 et seq.
It is debatable whether the Court would interpret the interaction between Article 31 GDPR and the right against self-incrimination along the same lines as in Orkem. Nonetheless, under European Union law, any reading of legislative acts of the European Union must respect the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, as they constitute general principles of Union law (Article 6(3) Treaty on the European Union). Therefore, the restriction of the duty to cooperate under Article 31 GDPR by the right against self-incrimination is not in question; however, what is in question is the precise degree to which the duty is restricted once the right against self-incrimination arises.
Supervisory authority
Beneficiary of this provision is the SA (Article 4(21) GDPR) which is enabled to request controllers, processors and, where applicable, their representatives to cooperate for the performance of the SA's tasks. For more information on the SA see commentary on Articles 4(21) and 51.
Only the competent SA can invoke Article 31 GDPR and request cooperation from the controller, processor and representative.[25]
Decisions
→ You can find all related decisions in Category:Article 31 GDPR
References
- ↑ Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 1 and 4 (C.H. Beck 2024, 4th Edition) with further references.
- ↑ Bogendorfer, in Knyrim, DatKomm, Article 31 GDPR, margin numbers 1 (Manz 2022).
- ↑ Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 6 (C.H. Beck 2024, 4th Edition).
- ↑ Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 8 (C.H. Beck 2024, 4th Edition).
- ↑ Raum, in Ehmann, Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 4 (C.H. Beck 2024, 3rd Edition).
- ↑ Raum, in Ehmann, Selmayr, DSGVO, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 6 (C.H. Beck 2024, 3rd Edition).
- ↑ Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 11 (C.H. Beck 2024, 4th Edition).
- ↑ Raum, in Ehmann, Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 31 GDPR, margin numbers 6 (C.H. Beck 2024, 3rd Edition); Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin numbers 11 (Beck 2024, 4th edition).
- ↑ Compare Bogendorfer, in Knyrim, DatKomm, Article 31 GDPR, margin numbers 18 (Manz 2022).
- ↑ Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 11 (C.H. Beck 2024, 4th Edition); Polenz, in Simitis, Hornung, Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Datenschutzrecht, Article 31 GDPR, margin numbers 9 (NOMOS 2025, 2nd Edition).
- ↑ Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 5 (C.H. Beck 2024, 4th Edition).
- ↑ Regarding this discussion see, Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 5 et seqq. (Beck 2024, 4th edition).
- ↑ Compare Polenz, in Simitis, Hornung, Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Datenschutzrecht, Article 31 GDPR, margin numbers 7 (NOMOS 2025, 2nd Edition).
- ↑ Opposing opinion: Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 8 (C.H. Beck 2024, 4th Edition).
- ↑ Bogendorfer, in Knyrim, DatKomm, Article 31 GDPR, margin numbers 4 (Manz 2022).
- ↑ Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 12 (C.H. Beck 2024, 4th Edition).
- ↑ Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 12 (C.H. Beck 2024, 4th Edition).
- ↑ See Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 14 (C.H. Beck 2024, 4th Edition); Polenz, in Simitis, Hornung, Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Datenschutzrecht, Article 31 GDPR, margin numbers 5 (NOMOS 2025, 2nd Edition).
- ↑ ECtHR Guide 2018: European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Criminal Limb)’ (31 August 2022), 42.
- ↑ Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 5 (Beck 2024, 4th edition); Klug in Gola, Heckmann, DS-GVO, Article 31, margin number 3 (Beck 2022, 3rd edition).
- ↑ Case C-27/22, Volkswagen Group Italia and Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 14 September 2023, para 55 (available here); Case C-97/21, MV – 98, 4 May 2023 (available here).
- ↑ Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 14 (Beck 2020, 3rd edition); Kotschy, in Kuner, Bygrave, Docksey, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary, Article 31 GDPR, p. 628 (Oxford University Press 2020); Zierbarth in Sydow, Marsch, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 10 (Beck 2022, 3rd edition).
- ↑ Zierbarth in Sydow, Marsch, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 10 (Beck 2022, 3rd edition).
- ↑ Kotschy, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 31 GDPR, p. 628 (Oxford University Press 2020).
- ↑ Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 7 (C.H. Beck 2024, 4th Edition).