Article 31 GDPR: Difference between revisions

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The wording of Article 31&nbsp;GDPR, “on request,” distinguishes the duty to cooperate under this provision from other provisions of the GDPR which necessitate proactive action on the part of the controller or processor, for instance, Articles 33 and 36 GDRP.<ref>''Raum,'' in Ehmann, Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 4 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd Edition).</ref> To illustrate, Article 36&nbsp;GDPR obliges the controller to consult the competent supervisory authority, where the controller considers the processing to be high risk. This Article places a cooperative burden upon the controller without the supervisory authority having to take prior action, as the controller is obliged to assess the nature of its processing activities, and in the instance that they are high risk, the controller must then consult the supervisory authority.
The wording of Article 31&nbsp;GDPR, “on request,” distinguishes the duty to cooperate under this provision from other provisions of the GDPR which necessitate proactive action on the part of the controller or processor, for instance, Articles 33 and 36 GDRP.<ref>''Raum,'' in Ehmann, Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 4 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd Edition).</ref> To illustrate, Article 36&nbsp;GDPR obliges the controller to consult the competent supervisory authority, where the controller considers the processing to be high risk. This Article places a cooperative burden upon the controller without the supervisory authority having to take prior action, as the controller is obliged to assess the nature of its processing activities, and in the instance that they are high risk, the controller must then consult the supervisory authority.


Article 31&nbsp;GDPR stands in opposition to its proactive counterparts. Ehmann et al. contend that it would be wrong to interpret the duty of cooperation under Article 31&nbsp;GDPR as imposing ''“administrative procedural cooperative burdens”'' on controllers and processors, as Articles such as 36 do.<ref>''Raum,'' in Ehmann, Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 5 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd Edition).</ref> Hence, Article 31&nbsp;GDPR can be said to impose a general duty of cooperation which arises when a request is made by a supervisory authority that relates to the fulfilment of its tasks. In this regard, Article 31 must be read in line with Articles 57 and 58 GDPR. Article&nbsp;57&nbsp;GDPR outlines the extensive tasks afforded to supervisory authorities, while Article&nbsp;58&nbsp;GDPR establishes the correspondingly extensive investigative powers granted to supervisory authorities under the Regulation.
Article 31&nbsp;GDPR stands in opposition to its proactive counterparts. Raum contends that it would be wrong to interpret the duty of cooperation under Article 31&nbsp;GDPR as imposing ''“administrative procedural cooperative burdens”'' on controllers and processors, as Articles such as 36 do.<ref>''Raum,'' in Ehmann, Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 5 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd Edition).</ref> Hence, Article 31&nbsp;GDPR can be said to impose a general duty of cooperation which arises when a request is made by a supervisory authority that relates to the fulfilment of its tasks. In this regard, Article 31 must be read in line with Articles 57 and 58 GDPR. Article&nbsp;57&nbsp;GDPR outlines the extensive tasks afforded to supervisory authorities, while Article&nbsp;58&nbsp;GDPR establishes the correspondingly extensive investigative powers granted to supervisory authorities under the Regulation.


The wording of the provision clearly notes that the supervisory authority’s request is to further the performance of its tasks. Following from this, the content and scope of a supervisory authority’s request is constricted by Article&nbsp;57&nbsp;GDPR, which exhaustively lists its tasks. Therefore, the request must be formulated precisely in relation to the fulfilment of an authority’s tasks, subject to the principle of proportionality.<ref>''Raum,'' in Ehmann, Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 31 GDPR, margin numbers 6-11 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd Edition); ''Hartung'', in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin numbers 7-11 (Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref> A request that falls outside the scope of Article 57&nbsp;GDPR should be deemed inadmissible for the purposes of Article&nbsp;31&nbsp;GDPR.  
The wording of the provision clearly notes that the supervisory authority’s request is to further the performance of its tasks. Following from this, the content and scope of a supervisory authority’s request is constricted by Article&nbsp;57&nbsp;GDPR, which exhaustively lists its tasks. Therefore, the request must be formulated precisely in relation to the fulfilment of an authority’s tasks, subject to the principle of proportionality.<ref>''Raum,'' in Ehmann, Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 31 GDPR, margin numbers 6-11 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd Edition); ''Hartung'', in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin numbers 7-11 (Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref> A request that falls outside the scope of Article 57&nbsp;GDPR should be deemed inadmissible for the purposes of Article&nbsp;31&nbsp;GDPR.  


Article 31&nbsp;GDPR can be read as a supporting provision to Article 58&nbsp;GDPR. In practice, this means that when the Article is relied upon in conjunction with an order made under Article 58&nbsp;GDPR, no additional legal obligations are imposed on the controller, as these obligations stem from orders made under Article 58&nbsp;GDPR. However, Kühling et al. note that when a supervisory authority makes a request that relies ''solely'' on Article 31&nbsp;GDPR which contains no corresponding order under Article 58&nbsp;GDPR, the request has the capacity to give rise to a more extensive duty to cooperate, in the sense of imposing administrative procedural cooperative burdens.<ref>''Hartung'', in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 5 (Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref> This reading of Article 31&nbsp;GDPR is supported by the language of Article 83(4)(a)&nbsp;GDPR which categorises Article&nbsp;31&nbsp;GDPR as an “obligation” of the controller and processor. In addition to imposing a general duty of cooperation, Article 31&nbsp;GDPR also acts as a “gap filling” provision for Article 58&nbsp;GDPR. In particular, where the supervisory authority requires a controller or processor to take an action, which is not included within its powers to make an order for under Article 58&nbsp;GDPR, it may rely on Article 31&nbsp;GDPR to do so. In practice, this reading suggests that a request made solely under Article 31&nbsp;GDPR would be of the same binding nature as an order made by a supervisory authority in the exercise of its powers under Article 58&nbsp;GDPR.
Article 31&nbsp;GDPR can be read as a supporting provision to Article 58&nbsp;GDPR. In practice, this means that when the Article is relied upon in conjunction with an order made under Article 58&nbsp;GDPR, no additional legal obligations are imposed on the controller, as these obligations stem from orders made under Article 58&nbsp;GDPR. However, Hartung notes that when a supervisory authority makes a request that relies ''solely'' on Article 31&nbsp;GDPR which contains no corresponding order under Article 58&nbsp;GDPR, the request has the capacity to give rise to a more extensive duty to cooperate, in the sense of imposing administrative procedural cooperative burdens.<ref>''Hartung'', in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 5 (Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref> This reading of Article 31&nbsp;GDPR is supported by the language of Article 83(4)(a)&nbsp;GDPR which categorises Article&nbsp;31&nbsp;GDPR as an “obligation” of the controller and processor. In addition to imposing a general duty of cooperation, Article 31&nbsp;GDPR also acts as a “gap filling” provision for Article 58&nbsp;GDPR. In particular, where the supervisory authority requires a controller or processor to take an action, which is not included within its powers to make an order for under Article 58&nbsp;GDPR, it may rely on Article 31&nbsp;GDPR to do so. In practice, this reading suggests that a request made solely under Article 31&nbsp;GDPR would be of the same binding nature as an order made by a supervisory authority in the exercise of its powers under Article 58&nbsp;GDPR.


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Zierbath has suggested that the practical application of this reading would mean that Article 31 cannot be invoked by a supervisory authority to induce a controller or processor to make an admission which would give rise to criminal liability, instead a supervisory authority must use its own investigative powers to establish facts which are incumbent on itself to prove.<ref>''Zierbarth'' in Sydow, Marsch, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 10 (Beck 2022, 3rd edition). </ref>
Zierbath has suggested that the practical application of this reading would mean that Article 31 cannot be invoked by a supervisory authority to induce a controller or processor to make an admission which would give rise to criminal liability, instead a supervisory authority must use its own investigative powers to establish facts which are incumbent on itself to prove.<ref>''Zierbarth'' in Sydow, Marsch, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 10 (Beck 2022, 3rd edition). </ref>


While the CJEU has yet to rule on the interaction between Article 31 and the right against self-incrimination, similar lines of reasoning were taken by the Court in relation to the duty to cooperate in the context of competition law.<ref>''Kotschy,'' in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 31 GDPR, p. 628 (Oxford University Press 2020).</ref> The leading case in this regard, ''Orkem,'' establishes that:
While the CJEU has yet to rule on the interaction between Article 31 and the right against self-incrimination, similar lines of reasoning were taken by the Court in relation to the duty to cooperate in the context of competition law.<ref>''Kotschy,'' in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 31 GDPR, p. 628 (Oxford University Press 2020).</ref> The leading case in this regard, ''Orkem,'' establishes that:<blockquote>''“[W]hile the Commission is entitled . . . to compel an undertaking to provide all necessary information concerning such facts as may be known to it and to disclose to it, if necessary, such documents relating thereto as are in its possession, even if the latter may be used to establish against it or an-other undertaking, the existence of anti-competitive conduct, it may not, by means of a decision calling for information, undermine the rights of defence of the undertaking concerned.'' ''Thus, the Commission may not compel an undertaking to provide it with answers which might involve an admission on its part of the existence of an infringement which it is incumbent on the Commission to prove.”''<ref>Case C-374/ 1987, ''Orkem'', para. 34-35.</ref></blockquote>It is debatable whether the Court will interpret the interaction between Article 31 and the right against self-incrimination along the same lines as in ''Orkem''. Nonetheless, under European Union law, any reading of legislative acts of the European Union must respect the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, as they constitute general principles of Union law (Article 6(3) TEU). Therefore, the restriction of the duty to cooperate under Article 31 by the right against self-incrimination is not in question; however, what is in question is the precise degree to which the duty is restricted once the right against self-incrimination arises.
 
''“[W]hile the Commission is entitled . . . to compel an undertaking to provide all necessary information concerning such facts as may be known to it and to disclose to it, if necessary, such documents relating thereto as are in its possession, even if the latter may be used to establish against it or an-other undertaking, the existence of anti-competitive conduct, it may not, by means of a decision calling for information, undermine the rights of defence of the undertaking concerned.''
 
''Thus, the Commission may not compel an undertaking to provide it with answers which might involve an admission on its part of the existence of an infringement which it is incumbent on the Commission to prove.”''<ref>Case C-374/ 1987, ''Orkem'', para. 34-35.</ref>
 
It is debatable whether the Court will interpret the interaction between Article 31 and the right against self-incrimination along the same lines as in ''Orkem''. Nonetheless, under European Union law, any reading of legislative acts of the European Union must respect the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, as they constitute general principles of Union law (Article 6(3) TEU). Therefore, the restriction of the duty to cooperate under Article 31 by the right against self-incrimination is not in question; however, what is in question is the precise degree to which the duty is restricted once the right against self-incrimination arises.


==Decisions==
==Decisions==

Revision as of 07:16, 20 October 2023

Article 31 - Cooperation with the supervisory authority
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Chapter 10: Delegated and implementing acts

Legal Text


Article 31 - Cooperation with the supervisory authority

The controller and the processor and, where applicable, their representatives, shall cooperate, on request, with the supervisory authority in the performance of its tasks.

Relevant Recitals

Recital 80: Designated Representative
Where a controller or a processor not established in the Union is processing personal data of data subjects who are in the Union whose processing activities are related to the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union, or to the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union, the controller or the processor should designate a representative, unless the processing is occasional, does not include processing, on a large scale, of special categories of personal data or the processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences, and is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, taking into account the nature, context, scope and purposes of the processing or if the controller is a public authority or body. The representative should act on behalf of the controller or the processor and may be addressed by any supervisory authority. The representative should be explicitly designated by a written mandate of the controller or of the processor to act on its behalf with regard to its obligations under this Regulation. The designation of such a representative does not affect the responsibility or liability of the controller or of the processor under this Regulation. Such a representative should perform its tasks according to the mandate received from the controller or processor, including cooperating with the competent supervisory authorities with regard to any action taken to ensure compliance with this Regulation. The designated representative should be subject to enforcement proceedings in the event of non-compliance by the controller or processor.

Recital 82: Maintenance and Availability of Records
In order to demonstrate compliance with this Regulation, the controller or processor should maintain records of processing activities under its responsibility. Each controller and processor should be obliged to cooperate with the supervisory authority and make those records, on request, available to it, so that it might serve for monitoring those processing operations.

Commentary

Generally, the purpose of Article 31 GDPR is to facilitate the supervisory authority’s fulfilment of its duties under the GDPR. Article 31 GDPR can be categorised as a “largely declaratory” provision,[1] as the regulation of the relationship between controllers and processors and the supervisory authorities is explicitly done through several other provisions of the GDPR. Consequently, Article 31 GDPR can mainly be read as a supporting provision to Article 58 GDPR, which outlines the extensive powers of the supervisory authority and establishes a corresponding obligation upon controllers and processors to tolerate.[2]

Cooperation

On request

The wording of Article 31 GDPR, “on request,” distinguishes the duty to cooperate under this provision from other provisions of the GDPR which necessitate proactive action on the part of the controller or processor, for instance, Articles 33 and 36 GDRP.[3] To illustrate, Article 36 GDPR obliges the controller to consult the competent supervisory authority, where the controller considers the processing to be high risk. This Article places a cooperative burden upon the controller without the supervisory authority having to take prior action, as the controller is obliged to assess the nature of its processing activities, and in the instance that they are high risk, the controller must then consult the supervisory authority.

Article 31 GDPR stands in opposition to its proactive counterparts. Raum contends that it would be wrong to interpret the duty of cooperation under Article 31 GDPR as imposing “administrative procedural cooperative burdens” on controllers and processors, as Articles such as 36 do.[4] Hence, Article 31 GDPR can be said to impose a general duty of cooperation which arises when a request is made by a supervisory authority that relates to the fulfilment of its tasks. In this regard, Article 31 must be read in line with Articles 57 and 58 GDPR. Article 57 GDPR outlines the extensive tasks afforded to supervisory authorities, while Article 58 GDPR establishes the correspondingly extensive investigative powers granted to supervisory authorities under the Regulation.

The wording of the provision clearly notes that the supervisory authority’s request is to further the performance of its tasks. Following from this, the content and scope of a supervisory authority’s request is constricted by Article 57 GDPR, which exhaustively lists its tasks. Therefore, the request must be formulated precisely in relation to the fulfilment of an authority’s tasks, subject to the principle of proportionality.[5] A request that falls outside the scope of Article 57 GDPR should be deemed inadmissible for the purposes of Article 31 GDPR.

Article 31 GDPR can be read as a supporting provision to Article 58 GDPR. In practice, this means that when the Article is relied upon in conjunction with an order made under Article 58 GDPR, no additional legal obligations are imposed on the controller, as these obligations stem from orders made under Article 58 GDPR. However, Hartung notes that when a supervisory authority makes a request that relies solely on Article 31 GDPR which contains no corresponding order under Article 58 GDPR, the request has the capacity to give rise to a more extensive duty to cooperate, in the sense of imposing administrative procedural cooperative burdens.[6] This reading of Article 31 GDPR is supported by the language of Article 83(4)(a) GDPR which categorises Article 31 GDPR as an “obligation” of the controller and processor. In addition to imposing a general duty of cooperation, Article 31 GDPR also acts as a “gap filling” provision for Article 58 GDPR. In particular, where the supervisory authority requires a controller or processor to take an action, which is not included within its powers to make an order for under Article 58 GDPR, it may rely on Article 31 GDPR to do so. In practice, this reading suggests that a request made solely under Article 31 GDPR would be of the same binding nature as an order made by a supervisory authority in the exercise of its powers under Article 58 GDPR.

Shall cooperate

The controversy surrounding Article 31 arises when the question of to what extent may a controller or processor lawfully refuse to cooperate with a request made by the supervisory authority. The duty to cooperate finds its limits when confronted by the right against self-incrimination.[7] The right against self-incrimination stems from Article 6 of the Charter. This privilege does not protect against the making of an incriminating statement, but rather protects against the obtaining of evidence by coercion or threat of sanction. Infringements of the GDPR and the sanctions issued in response to any such infringements often have the capacity to be criminal in nature. Thus, in certain circumstances, GDPR infringements may give rise to the applicability of this right, as Member States are permitted to legislate criminal sanctions for infringements of the GDPR (Recital 149). Consequently, in certain jurisdictions infringements of the GDPR may give rise to criminal liability. Moreover, the imposition of a significant fine (or the threat of such a fine) may equally give rise to the right against self-incrimination.  In relation to the Charter, CJEU case law demonstrates that administrative fines may be considered criminal if they serve a punitive purpose and have a high degree of severity,[8] regardless of the fine’s classification as administrative under national legislation.[9] Therefore, if a request made under Article 31 gives rise to circumstances which invoke the right against self-incrimination, it is widely accepted by commentators that the right against self-incrimination takes precedence.[10]

Zierbath has suggested that the practical application of this reading would mean that Article 31 cannot be invoked by a supervisory authority to induce a controller or processor to make an admission which would give rise to criminal liability, instead a supervisory authority must use its own investigative powers to establish facts which are incumbent on itself to prove.[11]

While the CJEU has yet to rule on the interaction between Article 31 and the right against self-incrimination, similar lines of reasoning were taken by the Court in relation to the duty to cooperate in the context of competition law.[12] The leading case in this regard, Orkem, establishes that:

“[W]hile the Commission is entitled . . . to compel an undertaking to provide all necessary information concerning such facts as may be known to it and to disclose to it, if necessary, such documents relating thereto as are in its possession, even if the latter may be used to establish against it or an-other undertaking, the existence of anti-competitive conduct, it may not, by means of a decision calling for information, undermine the rights of defence of the undertaking concerned. Thus, the Commission may not compel an undertaking to provide it with answers which might involve an admission on its part of the existence of an infringement which it is incumbent on the Commission to prove.”[13]

It is debatable whether the Court will interpret the interaction between Article 31 and the right against self-incrimination along the same lines as in Orkem. Nonetheless, under European Union law, any reading of legislative acts of the European Union must respect the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, as they constitute general principles of Union law (Article 6(3) TEU). Therefore, the restriction of the duty to cooperate under Article 31 by the right against self-incrimination is not in question; however, what is in question is the precise degree to which the duty is restricted once the right against self-incrimination arises.

Decisions

→ You can find all related decisions in Category:Article 31 GDPR

References

  1. Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin numbers 1-4 (Beck 2020, 3rd edition).
  2. For instance, Article 58(1)(f) GDPR, which grants a supervisory authority the power to obtain access to the premises of the controller and/ or processor.
  3. Raum, in Ehmann, Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 4 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd Edition).
  4. Raum, in Ehmann, Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 5 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd Edition).
  5. Raum, in Ehmann, Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 31 GDPR, margin numbers 6-11 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd Edition); Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin numbers 7-11 (Beck 2020, 3rd edition).
  6. Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 5 (Beck 2020, 3rd edition).
  7. ECtHR Guide 2018: European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Criminal Limb)’ (31 August 2022), 42.
  8. Supervisory authorities possess wide remedial powers legislated for under Article 58(2), the most significant of which is the power to issue fines. Article 31 gains an independent significance as it is included the Regulation’s sanctions framework through Article 83(4). Article 83(4) provides that the infringement of Article 31 may be subject to administrative fines up to 10,000,000 EUR, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 2% of the total worldwide annual turnover. As noted above, Article 83(4)(a) categorises Article 31 as an obligation of the controller and processor. The language used by Article 83, in addition to the extensive remedial powers available to a supervisory authority to enforce against the non-compliance of Article 31, establishes that the duty to cooperate is relatively wide-reaching.
  9. Case C-27/22, Volkswagen Group Italia and Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, para 55; Case C-97/21, MV – 98.
  10. Hartung, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 14 (Beck 2020, 3rd edition); Kotschy, in Kuner, Bygrave, Docksey, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary, Article 31 GDPR, p. 628 (Oxford University Press 2020); Zierbarth in Sydow, Marsch, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 10 (Beck 2022, 3rd edition).
  11. Zierbarth in Sydow, Marsch, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 31 GDPR, margin number 10 (Beck 2022, 3rd edition).
  12. Kotschy, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 31 GDPR, p. 628 (Oxford University Press 2020).
  13. Case C-374/ 1987, Orkem, para. 34-35.