Datainspektionen - DI-2019-3840

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Datainspektionen - DI-2019-3840
LogoSE.png
Authority: Datainspektionen (Sweden)
Jurisdiction: Sweden
Relevant Law: Article 5(1)(f) GDPR
Article 5(2) GDPR
Article 24 GDPR
Article 32(1) GDPR
Article 32(2) GDPR
Article 58(2) GDPR
Article 83 GDPR
Chapter 4, 2 § of the Patient Data Act
Chapter 6, 7 § of the Patient Data Act
Chapter 4, 2 § of HSLF-FS 2016:40
Chapter 4, 9 § of HSLF-FS 2016:40
Type: Investigation
Outcome: Violation Found
Decided: 02.12.2020
Published: 03.12.2020
Fine: 3500000 SEK
Parties: Sahlgrenska University Hospital, Board of directors
National Case Number/Name: DI-2019-3840
European Case Law Identifier: n/a
Appeal: Unknown
Original Language(s): Swedish
Original Source: Datainspektionen (in SV)
Initial Contributor: Kave Noori

The Swedish DPA (Datainspektionen) fined a university hospital approximately €34 000 for giving its staff wider access to medical records than they needed to do their jobs.

English Summary[edit | edit source]

Facts[edit | edit source]

In April 2019, the DPA conducted an on-site inspection at Sahlgrenska University Hospital (Sahlgrenska universitetssjukhuset). The hospital is part of the Västra Götaland region. Four years earlier, the DPA had issued a supervisory decision concluding that the hospital had failed to carry out a necessity and risk analysis in accordance with the legal requirements.

The hospital maintains the medical records of about 900 000 patients. There are about 25 000 user accounts with access to the medical records system, although the hospital has only about 18000 employees. The hospital cooperates with other branches of the Västra Götaland region and assumes that the employees in the departments with which it cooperates have a legitimate need for direct access to the medical records. For the purposes of Chapter 4(1) of the Swedish Patient Data Act, the hospital considers this information to be lawfully shared within the same inner private zone (inre sekretess zon).

All health care workers, including medical secretaries, have general access to all medical records, including those outside their department. If the patient has restricted access to his or her record, only those who work in that department can see the record. Doctors and nurses have general and emergency access. This means that they can access restricted medical records outside their department in a situation where the patient is unable to give consent.

The hospital also maintains a log when a medical record is accessed. The log shall include the name of the health care professional, the portion of the record that was accessed, and the date and time of the last access.

Dispute[edit | edit source]

1. has the hospital taken appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect personal data in medical records?

a. Has the hospital conducted a proper necessity and risk analysis?

b. Has the hospital assigned authorizations correctly?

c. Is the hospital a data controller with respect to medical records maintained by other caregivers?

d. Does the hospital maintain adequate records of access?

2. sanction fee?


Holding[edit | edit source]

Has the hospital broken the law by not taking sufficient technical and organizational measures?[edit | edit source]

The DPA considered that the hospital had failed to implement adequate organizational and technical measures to protect medical records

Lack of risk and necessity analysis[edit | edit source]

In Sweden, sector-specific legislation consists of the Patient Data Act and the National Board of Health and Welfare's rules and general guidelines on the keeping of medical records and the processing of personal data in the health care system (Socialstyrelsens föreskrifter och allmänna råd om journalföring och behandling av personuppgifter i hälso- och sjukvården, HSLF-FS 2016:40).

Chapter 4(2) HSLF-FS 2016:40 requires that the hospital, as a care institution, carries out a so-called risk and necessity analysis before giving its staff access to different parts of the system for keeping medical records. In addition, Chapter 4(2) of the Patient Data Act stipulates that the hospital (caregiver) must limit employee access to the extent necessary for the performance of their duties. The Patient Data Act also permits the so-called coherent keeping of medical records, which means that a caregiver has direct access to the medical records of another caregiver. Before the caregiver grants his or her employees access to a coherent medical record, it must carry out a risk and necessity analysis.

The DPA considered that the hospital's current risk and necessity analysis was fit for the purpose of IT - security with a focus on the employee - which is a different form of risk analysis from that required by HSLF-FS 2016:40. The DPA was looking for a risk analysis that would assess the risks to patients as data subjects. For example, if patients who are famous, have a protected identity, or have a special diagnosis, are at risk of harm if access authorization is too relaxed. In addition, the DPA held that the hospital had not properly evaluated how permissions should be defined so that employees only have access to the information they need to do their jobs.

Access rights to medical records were too extensive[edit | edit source]

The DPA recalled that the risk and necessity analysis should determine how the caregiving institution assigns health care workers permission to access medical records. In this case, about 25 000 people had access to medical records, although the hospital only had about 18 000 employees. The hospital assigned permissions in such a way that health care workers, regardless of which department they worked in, could access the medical records of all departments within the hospital, except one. On this basis, the DPA concluded that the majority of the hospital's employees had access to more medical records than they needed to do their jobs. The DPA did not take a positive view of the fact that the hospital gave direct access to medical records to persons working in other governmental branches of the region of Västra Götaland.

Is the hospital a data controller regarding medical records it retrieves from other caregivers?[edit | edit source]

The Swedish Patient Data Act states that a caregiver is the data controller for the medical records that it creates. The hospital therefore did not consider itself a data controller of medical records that are retrieved from other caregivers through the coherent medical record system. However, the DPA considered that the hospital is a data controller for the specific data it retrieves in relation to an individual patient from a medical file kept by another caregiver.

Based on this finding, the DPA concluded that the hospital had once again failed to conduct a risk and necessity analysis and had not properly limited the permissions regarding access to the system for coherent medical records

Access logs[edit | edit source]

The DPA considered the current level of logging when an employee accesses a medical record to be insufficient. The DPA clarified that the purpose of the logging is not only to check for unauthorized access to the medical record. The log is also used to trace which actions were performed in connection with access to the medical record, such as printing, copying, or deleting personal data.

Sanction fee[edit | edit source]

The Swedish Data Protection Act (implementing the GDPR) provides that public bodies that violate the GDPR can be fined up to SEK 10 million. The DPA imposed a sanction fee of SEK 3.5 million on the hospital.

Firstly, the hospital processes a large amount of sensitive personal data of many affected patients (approximately 900 000).

Secondly, the hospital did not have a sufficiently granular access control system: health care staff could easily access documents from other departments. Also, the hospital had granted direct access to medical records to a large number of people working in other governmental branches of the region of Västra Götaland (outside the health care system).

Thirdly, the DPA considered that the hospital had not carried out a proper needs and risk analysis, as required by the DPA decision of 27 March 2015. According to the DPA, the hospital had been aware for several years that it was not complying with the law and deliberately decided not to take corrective measures.

Commands for making changes[edit | edit source]

Finally, the DPA instructed the hospital to take the following measures:

  1. Properly analyze the risk to the patients and analyze what access each employee needs.
  2. Assign each employee an individual access tailored to what he or she needs to do his or her job.
  3. To extend the logging of access to medical records to include information on what actions an employee has taken in relation to access to them.


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English Machine Translation of the Decision[edit | edit source]

The decision below is a machine translation of the Swedish original. Please refer to the Swedish original for more details.



Page 1
Decision
Diarienr
1 (34)
2020-12-02
DI-2019-3840
Postal address: Box 8114, 104 20 Stockholm
E-mail: datainspektionen@datainspektionen.se
Website: www.datainspektionen.se
Phone: 08-657 61 00
The board of Sahlgrenska
University Hospital
Blue stripe 5
413 45 Gothenburg
Supervision under the Data Protection Regulation and
Patient Data Act - needs and risk analysis and
questions about access in journal systems
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Content
The Data Inspectorate's decision ................................................ ..................................... 3
Report on the supervisory matter ............................................... .......................... 4
Previous review of needs and risk analysis ........................................... ..... 5
What has emerged in the case ............................................. ....................... 5
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has mainly stated the following ........... 5
Personal data controller ................................................. .................................... 5
Journal system ................................................. .................................................. 6
Internal privacy ................................................ .................................................. 6
Needs and risk analysis .............................................. ........................................... 6
Authorization of access to personal data about patients .. 8
Active selections ................................................ .................................................. ......... 9
Needs and risk analysis .............................................. ........................................... 9
Authorization of access to personal data about patients .. 9
Grounds for the decision ............................................... ......................................... 10
Requirements for doing needs and risk analysis .......................................... ............... 14
The Data Inspectorate's assessment ................................................ .................... 16
Sahlgrenska University Hospital's process for needs and risk analysis ...... 19
Documentation of access (logs) ............................................ .............. 27
Choice of intervention ............................................... ............................................ 29
Legal regulation ................................................ ........................................... 29
Order ................................................. .................................................. 30
Penalty fee ................................................. ........................................... 31
Appendices: Appendix 1 - How to pay a penalty fee ......................................... ... 33
How to appeal............................................... ........................................... 34
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The Data Inspectorate's decision
During an inspection on 23 April 2019, the Data Inspectorate has established that
The board of Sahlgrenska University Hospital (Sahlgrenska
University Hospital) processes personal data in violation of Article 5 (1) (f) and
5.2 and Article 32 (1) and (2) of the Data Protection Regulation 1 by
Sahlgrenska University Hospital in its capacity as
personal data controller does not meet the requirement that it should have
carried out a needs and risk analysis before allocating
permissions are made in the journal systems Melior and Nationell
patient overview in accordance with ch. 4 § 2 and ch. 6 § 7
the Patient Data Act (2008: 355) and ch. Section 2 of the National Board of Health and Welfare
regulations and general guidelines (HSLF-FS 2016: 40) on record keeping
and processing of personal data in health care. This
means that Sahlgrenska University Hospital has not taken
appropriate organizational measures to ensure and be able to
show that the processing of personal data has a security that is
appropriate in relation to the risks.
2. Sahlgrenska University Hospital does not restrict users
authorizations for access to the Melior and National journal systems
patient overview to what is only needed for the user to
be able to fulfill their duties in health care
according to ch. 4 § 2 and ch. 6 Section 7 of the Patient Data Act and Chapter 4 § 2 HSLF-
FS 2016: 40. This means that Sahlgrenska University Hospital does not
has taken steps to ensure and be able to show one
appropriate security for personal data.
3. Sahlgrenska University Hospital does not have documentation in Melior
of access (logs) where it is stated which measures have been taken
with information about a patient according to ch. 4 Section 3 of the Patient Data Act and 4
Cape. § 9 (item 1) HSLF-FS 2016: 40. This means that Sahlgrenska
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on protection
for natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free flow
of such information and repealing Directive 95/46 / EC (General
Data Protection Regulation).
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The University Hospital has not taken appropriate organizational measures
measures to be able to ensure and be able to show that the treatment of
the personal data has a security that is appropriate in relation to
the risks.
The Data Inspectorate decides on the basis of Articles 58 (2) and 83 of the
the Protection Ordinance and Chapter 6 § 2 of the law (2018: 218) with
additional provisions to the EU Data Protection Regulation that
Sahlgrenska University Hospital, for violation of Article 5 (1) (f) and
5.2 and Article 32 (1) and (2) of the Data Protection Regulation, shall pay a
administrative penalty fee of 3,500,000 (three million five hundred
thousand crowns.
The Data Inspectorate submits pursuant to Article 58 (2) (d)
data protection ordinance Sahlgrenska University Hospital that
1. ensure that the required needs and risk analysis is carried out and
documented for the journal systems Melior and Nationell
patient overview and that thereafter, with the support of needs and
risk analysis, each user is assigned individual authority for
access to personal data limited to what is
needed for the individual to be able to fulfill his or her duties
in healthcare, in accordance with Article 5 (1) (f) and Article
32.1 and 32.2 of the Data Protection Ordinance, Chapter 4 § 2 and ch. 6 § 7
the Patient Data Act and Chapter 4 2 § HSLF-FS 2016: 40.
2. document in the journal system Melior's logs so that it appears there
what measures have been taken with personal data about a patient, i
in accordance with Article 32 of the Data Protection Ordinance, Chapter 4 § 3
the Patient Data Act and Chapter 4 § 9 (item 1) HSLF-FS 2016: 40.
Report on the supervisory matter
The Data Inspectorate initiated supervision by letter on 22 March 2019 and has
on site on 23 April 2019 reviewed the Board of Directors of Sahlgrenska
University Hospital (hereinafter referred to as Sahlgrenska University Hospital)
decisions on the allocation of authorizations have been preceded by a need and
risk analysis. The review has also included how Sahlgrenska
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The University Hospital has been granted authorizations for access to
the main journal system Melior and NPÖ, and what access possibilities they have
granted the privileges provide within the framework of internal confidentiality
according to ch. 4 the Patient Data Act, as the coherent record keeping according to
Chapter 6 patient data law. In addition to this, the Data Inspectorate has examined which one
documentation of access (logs) contained in the journal systems.
The Data Inspectorate has only examined users' access to
the journal system, i.e. what care documentation the user can actually take
part of and read. The supervision has not included which functions were included in
the competence, ie. what the user can actually do in the journal system
(eg issuing prescriptions, writing referrals, etc.).
Previous review of needs and risk analysis
The Data Inspectorate has previously carried out an inspection regarding Sahlgrenska
The University Hospital had carried out a documented needs and
risk analysis according to ch. Section 6, second paragraph, second sentence of the National Board of Health and Welfare
regulations Information management and record keeping in health care
(SOSFS 2008: 14). Of the Data Inspectorate's decision with registration number 1607-2013,
announced on March 27, 2015, it appears that Sahlgrenska University Hospital
did not meet the requirement to carry out a needs and risk analysis according to
said regulations, and was therefore ordered to implement such a
the main journal system.
What has emerged in the case
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has mainly stated the following.
Personal data manager
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has stated that the Board of Sahlgrenska
The University Hospital is responsible for the processing of personal data
personal data that Sahlgrenska University Hospital performs in
the main journal system Melior. Sahlgrenska University Hospital also has
stated that the National Patient Overview (NPÖ) is only a reading view that
presents information from connected systems, and that no information
stored in NPÖ. Sahlgrenska University Hospital is not
personal data controller for information displayed in NPÖ.
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Journal system
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has stated that they have been using since 1998
of the main journal system Melior within the framework of internal confidentiality.
Everything is seen as internal secrecy within the framework of the Västra Götaland region.
Since May 6, 2014, Melior in the Västra Götaland region consists of one
single database (GEM), instead of the previous 27. It used to be possible
access other units' care documentation but it was significantly more
cumbersome, which meant that employees were reluctant to read
records of other units. The current division of units is
the same as before but now it is easier to access others
units records.
According to data provided by Sahlgrenska University Hospital
896,401 patients recorded in Melior at Sahlgrenska
University Hospital. The number of employees at Sahlgrenska
The University Hospital is 16,731, and the number of active accounts in Melior is
24 638 st. Sahlgrenska University Hospital has stated that the reason for
that the number of active accounts is greater than the number of employees is that Västra
The Götaland region is an internal privacy zone, and that Sahlgrenska
The University Hospital collaborates with other administrations within Västra
The Götaland region, where employees need access to
patient information at Sahlgrenska University Hospital.
Sahlgrenska University Hospital is not part of a cohesive system
record keeping through Melior, but is included in cohesive record keeping through
the NPÖ system.
Internal secrecy
Needs and risk analysis
At the time of the inspection, Sahlgrenska University Hospital stated in
essentially the following.
When a new employee is hired, a needs analysis is first made, consisting of one
assessment of which systems the employee needs access to.
The assessment is made in two steps: 1) which assignment the person has and 2) which
systems the person needs to have access to in order to perform their
work / assignment. Due to a limitation in the system no one is done
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assessment of which tasks in Melior the employee should be able to take part in
of.
Then a risk analysis is made which consists of an assessment at the individual level of
if the person to be assigned eligibility will follow the guidelines for
to take part in information in Melior. If this is not the case, the person should not normally
employed.
At the time of inspection, Sahlgrenska University Hospital cannot present
an analysis for people who are employed and it is unclear whether it is documented.
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has comments on
the inspection report that was received by the Swedish Data Inspectorate on 27 June 2019
stated that Sahlgrenska University Hospital in September 2011 carried out
a comprehensive risk analysis, Availability of the operation of the electronic
the patient record Melior, regarding patient safety, information security and
technical safety. The starting point for the risk analysis at that time was that
simplify access to patient data between the different devices within
the hospital when the National Board of Health and Welfare considered the division into different databases
which was present at the time entailed a patient safety risk. 27 databases
merged into a hospital-wide database and the general role
which is assigned to all staff in need of access to the patient record
was introduced.
Previous review of needs and risk analysis
Due to the Data Inspectorate's previous review, Sahlgrenska has
The University Hospital has submitted a number of documents, including a risk
and vulnerability analysis and a so-called simplified needs and risk analysis with
the title Needs and risk analysis when allocating individual eligibility to
journal systems , which are said to have been developed in the spring of 2019, to show how
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has acted after the inspection earlier
decision.
On 13 September 2019, Sahlgrenska University Hospital was also included
the document Needs and risk analysis when allocating authorization , of which it
states that “In healthcare, the patient's life and health are more important than integrity
which means that accessibility and accuracy outweigh
confidentiality from a patient safety perspective. IN
the patient record system (Melior), the employee must make an active choice for
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to be able to access patient information from other care units / processes. We
makes the assessment that that function is sufficient to satisfy
the requirement of confidentiality. We believe it is in accordance with HSLF-FS
2016: 40.
Sahlgrenska University Hospital accepts the risk of
confidentiality is not as high a priority as accuracy and availability
until Sahlgrenska University Hospital has a technical or
organizational opportunity to prioritize confidentiality ”.
Authorization of access to personal data about patients
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has mainly stated the following.
There are two different roles when it comes to assigning reading permissions to
Melior; a general role assigned to all health and medical staff
healthcare, and a so-called operational role.
When it comes to the general role, there are two different variants; a "general"
and a "general including emergency access". All employees within
health care has been assigned a general role - with or without
emergency access.
The difference between the different variants is that the variant “generally inclusive
emergency access ”is assigned to physicians and nurses, and involves the user
have the opportunity to open blocked journals outside their own
the activity, in the event that the patient is unable to give his consent.
The "general" variant is assigned to other care staff and secretaries, if desired
say the users who are not doctors or nurses but who should have
eligibility for Melior.
With the general role, the employee has access to all units
care documentation, with the exception of the clinical genetics unit which is not
included in the general authorizations. There are no more
restrictions on access in Melior, apart from healthcare documentation such as
the patient himself has blocked.
The business role provides access to blocked information regarding a certain
unit. An employee must have an assignment to be assigned
the business role and can only be assigned that role regarding that unit
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to which the employee belongs. Every business has such a business role
and in total the number of such operational roles amounts to about 60-70.
Active choices
During the inspection, Sahlgrenska University Hospital has shown how
the permissions appear in the system, and stated, among other things, the following.
When an employee logs in to Melior, he is directed to the unit that
the employee belongs to. When the employee is logged in, there are six tabs in it
the right edge that gives access to different parts of the journal that
the employee has chosen to take part in. As a starting point, only the journal is displayed at
the device that has been selected at login, but through active selections can
the employee has access to other units' records.
If an employee is logged in as a nurse, it is initially only visible
nurses' medical records. However, the employee can get
access to other professional categories' journal entries by checking
boxes for different occupational categories. There is also the opportunity to check
a single box covering all occupational categories, thereby gaining a share of
journal entries of all occupational categories.
Coherent record keeping
Sahlgrenska University Hospital participates in systems for cohesion
record keeping through NPÖ, and has mainly stated the following.
Needs and risk analysis
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has not done any needs and
risk analysis before granting authorization in NPÖ.
Authorization of access to personal data about patients
The patient must be enrolled at Sahlgrenska University Hospital in
Melior so that the employee can use NPÖ.
Access to NPÖ is given to healthcare professionals, especially doctors and nurses,
and an employee assignment is required to obtain such authorization. As
In principle, only doctors and nurses have access to
NPÖ, but other categories can be accessed upon their own application
competence. In such cases, the employee may apply for an employee assignment
coherent record keeping. The allocation of the authorizations is based on
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needs and fewer employees have access to NPÖ than to Melior. For example
assistant nurses need to be able to note in the journal in Melior but they
does not need to have access to NPÖ. Those who are eligible for NPÖ can see all
care documentation available there, but active choices are required.
Documentation of access (logs)
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has stated the following.
The documentation that is displayed when removing the access logs in Melior is
information about the patient, which user has opened the record, which
part of the journal that has been opened and the time and date of the most recent
the opening.
It is not clear at which care unit the measures were taken or which measures
which the user has specifically taken. Sahlgrenska University Hospital has
stated that information about which unit the user is employed on can
controlled by a search on where the user is employed. Different logs
must then be combined with each other.
Grounds for the decision
Applicable rules
The Data Protection Regulation is the primary source of law
The Data Protection Regulation, often abbreviated GDPR, was introduced on 25 May 2018 and
is the primary legal regulation in the processing of personal data. This
also applies to health care.
The basic principles for the processing of personal data are set out in
Article 5 of the Data Protection Regulation. A basic principle is the requirement
security pursuant to Article 5 (1) (f), which states that personal data shall be processed
in a way that ensures adequate security for personal data,
including protection against unauthorized or unauthorized treatment and against loss,
destruction or damage by accident, using appropriate
technical or organizational measures.
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Article 5 (2) states the so-called liability, ie. that it
personal data controllers must be responsible for and be able to show that the basic
the principles set out in paragraph 1 are complied with.
Article 24 deals with the responsibility of the controller. Of Article 24 (1)
it appears that the person responsible for personal data is responsible for implementing appropriate
technical and organizational measures to ensure and demonstrate that
the processing is performed in accordance with the Data Protection Regulation. The measures shall
carried out taking into account the nature, scope, context of the treatment
and purposes and the risks, of varying degrees of probability and severity, for
freedoms and rights of natural persons. The measures must be reviewed and updated
if necessary.
Article 32 regulates the security associated with the processing. According to paragraph 1
the personal data controller and the personal data assistant shall take into account
of the latest developments, implementation costs and treatment
nature, scope, context and purpose as well as the risks, of varying
probability and seriousness, for the rights and freedoms of natural persons
take appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure a
level of safety appropriate to the risk (…). According to paragraph 2,
when assessing the appropriate level of safety, special consideration is given to the risks
which the treatment entails, in particular from accidental or unlawful destruction,
loss or alteration or to unauthorized disclosure of or unauthorized access to
the personal data transferred, stored or otherwise processed.
Recital 75 states that in assessing the risk to natural persons
rights and freedoms, various factors must be taken into account. Among other things mentioned
personal data covered by professional secrecy, health data or
sexual life, if the processing of personal data concerning vulnerable physical persons takes place
persons, especially children, or if the treatment involves a large number
personal data and applies to a large number of registered persons.
Furthermore, it follows from recital 76 that the probable and serious risk of it
data subjects' rights and freedoms should be determined on the basis of processing
nature, scope, context and purpose. The risk should be evaluated on
on the basis of an objective assessment, which determines whether
the data processing involves a risk or a high risk.
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Recitals 39 and 83 also contain writings that provide guidance on it
the meaning of the Data Protection Regulation's requirements for security in
Processing of personal data.
The Data Protection Regulation and the relationship with complementary national
provisions
According to Article 5 (1) (a) of the Data Protection Regulation, personal data must:
treated in a lawful manner. In order for the treatment to be considered legal, it is required
legal basis by fulfilling at least one of the conditions of Article 6 (1).
The provision of health care is one such task of general
interest referred to in Article 6 (1) (e).
In health care, the legal bases can also be legal
obligation in Article 6 (1) (c) and the exercise of authority under Article 6 (1) (e)
updated.
When it comes to the legal bases legal obligation, in general
interest or exercise of authority by the Member States, in accordance with Article
6.2, maintain or introduce more specific provisions to adapt
the application of the provisions of the Regulation to national circumstances.
National law may specify specific requirements for the processing of data
and other measures to ensure legal and fair treatment. But
there is not only one possibility to introduce national rules but also one
duty; Article 6 (3) states that the basis for the treatment referred to in
paragraph 1 (c) and (e) shall be determined in accordance with Union law or
national law of the Member States. The legal basis may also include
specific provision to adapt the application of the provisions of
the Data Protection Regulation. Union law or the national law of the Member States
law must fulfill an objective of general interest and be proportionate to it
legitimate goals pursued.
Article 9 states that the treatment of specific categories of
personal data ( so-called sensitive personal data) is prohibited. Sensitive
personal data includes data on health. Article 9 (2) states
except when sensitive personal data may still be processed.
Article 9 (2) (h) states that the processing of sensitive personal data may be repeated
the treatment is necessary for reasons related to, among other things
the provision of health care on the basis of Union law or
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national law of the Member States or in accordance with agreements with professionals in
the field of health and provided that the conditions and protective measures
referred to in paragraph 3 are met. Article 9 (3) requires regulated secrecy.
This means that both the legal bases of general interest,
exercise of authority and legal obligation in the treatment of the vulnerable
personal data under the exemption in Article 9 (2) (h)
supplementary rules.
Supplementary national regulations
In the case of Sweden, both the basis for the treatment and those
special conditions for the processing of personal data in the field of health and
healthcare regulated in the Patient Data Act (2008: 355), and
the Patient Data Ordinance (2008: 360). I 1 kap. Section 4 of the Patient Data Act states that
the law complements the data protection regulation.
The purpose of the Patient Data Act is to provide information in health and
healthcare must be organized so as to meet patient safety and
good quality and promotes cost efficiency. Its purpose is also to
personal data shall be designed and otherwise processed so that patients and
the privacy of other data subjects is respected. In addition, must be documented
personal data is handled and stored so that unauthorized persons do not have access to it
them (Chapter 1, Section 2 of the Patient Data Act).
According to ch. Section 6 of the Patient Data Act is a care provider responsible for personal data
for the processing of personal data carried out by the care provider. In a region
and one municipality is each authority that conducts health and medical care
personal data controller for the processing of personal data that
the authority performs.
The supplementary provisions in the Patient Data Act aim to:
take care of both privacy protection and patient safety. The legislator has
thus through the regulation made a balance as to how
the information must be processed to meet both the requirements for patient safety
as the right to privacy in the processing of personal data.
The National Board of Health and Welfare has, with the support of the Patient Data Ordinance, issued regulations
and general advice on record keeping and processing of personal data in
health care (HSLF-FS 2016: 40). The regulations constitute such
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supplementary rules, to be applied in the care provider's treatment of
personal data in health care.
National provisions supplementing the requirements of the Data Protection Regulation
safety can be found in Chapters 4 and 6. the Patient Data Act and Chapters 3 and 4 HSLF-FS
2016: 40.
Requirement to do needs and risk analysis
According to ch. 4, the care provider must § 2 HSLF-FS 2016: 40 make a needs and
risk analysis, before the allocation of authorizations in the system takes place.
That the analysis requires both the needs and the risks is clear from the preparatory work
to the Patient Data Act, prop. 2007/08: 126 pp. 148-149, as follows.
Authorization for staff's electronic access to patient information shall be limited to
what the executive needs to be able to perform his duties in health and
healthcare. This includes that authorizations must be followed up and changed or restricted accordingly
hand as changes in the tasks of the individual executive give rise to it.
The provision corresponds in principle to section 8 of the Health Care Register Act. The purpose of the provision is to
imprint the obligation of the responsible caregiver to make active and individual
eligibility assignments based on analyzes of which details are different
staff categories and different types of activities need. But it's not just needed
needs analyzes. Risk analyzes must also be done where different types of risks are taken into account, such as
may be associated with an overly availability of certain types of information.
Protected personal data that is classified, information about publicly known persons,
data from certain clinics or medical specialties are examples of categories such as
may require special risk assessments.
In general, it can be said that the more comprehensive an information system is, the greater the amount
there must be different levels of authorization. Decisive for decisions on eligibility for e.g. various
categories of healthcare professionals for electronic access to data in
patient records should be that the authority should be limited to what the executive needs
for the purpose a good and safe patient care. A more extensive or coarse-meshed
competence allocation should - even if it has points from the point of view of efficiency -
is considered an unjustified dissemination of journal information within a business and should as such
not accepted.
Furthermore, data should be stored in different layers so that more sensitive data require active choices or
otherwise not as easily accessible to staff as less sensitive tasks. When it
applies to personnel who work with business follow-up, statistics production, central
financial administration and similar activities that are not individual-oriented, it should be
most executives suffice with access to information that can only be indirectly derived
to individual patients. Electronic access to code keys, social security numbers and others
data that directly point out individual patients should be able to be strong in this area
limited to individuals.
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Internal secrecy
The provisions in ch. 4 The Patient Data Act concerns internal confidentiality, ie.
regulates how privacy protection is to be handled within a care provider's business
and especially employees' opportunities to prepare for
personal data that is electronically available in a healthcare provider
organisation.
It appears from ch. Section 2 of the Patient Data Act stipulates that the care provider must decide
conditions for granting access to such data
patients who are fully or partially automated. Such authorization shall
limited to what is needed for the individual to be able to fulfill theirs
tasks in health care.
According to ch. 4 § 2 HSLF-FS 2016: 40, the care provider shall be responsible for each
users are assigned an individual privilege to access
personal data. The caregiver's decision on the allocation of eligibility shall
preceded by a needs and risk analysis.
Coherent record keeping
The provisions in ch. 6 the Patient Data Act concerns cohesive record keeping,
which means that a care provider - under the conditions specified in § 2 of the same
chapter - may have direct access to personal data processed by others
caregivers for purposes related to care documentation. The access to
information is provided by a healthcare provider making the information about a patient
which the care provider registers if the patient is available to other care providers
who participate in the coherent record keeping (see Bill 2007/08: 126 p. 247).
Of ch. 6 Section 7 of the Patient Data Act follows that the provisions in Chapter 4 § 2 also
applies to authorization allocation for unified record keeping. The requirement of
that the care provider must perform a needs and risk analysis before allocating
permissions in the system take place, also applies in systems for cohesion
record keeping.
Documentation of access (logs)
Of ch. 4 Section 3 of the Patient Data Act states that a care provider must ensure that
access to such data on patients kept in whole or in part
automatically documented and systematically checked.
According to ch. 4 Section 9 HSLF-FS 2016: 40, the care provider shall be responsible for that
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1. it appears from the documentation of the access (logs) which
measures taken with information on a patient,
2. it appears from the logs at which care unit or care process
measures have been taken,
3. the logs indicate the time at which the measures were taken;
4. the identity of the user and the patient is stated in the logs.
The Data Inspectorate's assessment
Personal data controller's responsibility for security
As described above, the National Board of Health and Welfare's regulations give the caregiver one
responsibility for information management in healthcare, such as that
carry out a needs and risk analysis before assigning authorizations in
the system happens. In public health care does not coincide
always the concept of caregiver with the personal data controller.
Of both the basic principles of Article 5 and Article 24 (1)
the Data Protection Ordinance, it appears that it is the person responsible for personal data
which shall implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to:
ensure and be able to demonstrate that the treatment is carried out in accordance with
the Data Protection Regulation.
The Data Inspectorate can state that the Data Protection Ordinance in its capacity as
EU regulation is directly applicable in Swedish law and that in the regulation
indicates when supplementary regulation is or may be introduced nationally. There is
for example, space to nationally regulate who is
data controller in accordance with Article 4 of the Data Protection Regulation. It is
however, it is not possible to give deviating regulation regarding it
the personal data controller's responsibility to take appropriate technical and
organizational measures to ensure an appropriate level of security in
relation to the risk. This means that the National Board of Health and Welfare's regulations state
that it is the caregiver who must take certain measures, does not change that
the responsibility to take appropriate security measures rests with it
personal data controller according to the Data Protection Regulation. The Data Inspectorate
can state that Sahlgrenska University Hospital, in its capacity as
responsible for personal data, is responsible for taking these measures.
As previously described, Article 24 (1) of the Data Protection Regulation provides a
general requirement for the personal data controller to take appropriate technical
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and organizational measures. The requirement is partly to ensure that
the processing of personal data is carried out in accordance with
the Data Protection Ordinance, and that the data controller must be able to
demonstrate that the processing of personal data is carried out in accordance with
the Data Protection Regulation.
The safety associated with the treatment is regulated more specifically in the articles
5.1 f and 32 of the Data Protection Regulation.
Article 32 (1) states that the appropriate measures shall be both technical and
organizational and they must ensure a level of security that is appropriate in
in relation to the risks to the rights and freedoms of natural persons which
the treatment entails. It is therefore necessary to identify the possible ones
the risks to the data subjects' rights and freedoms and assess
the probability of the risks occurring and the severity if they occur.
What is appropriate varies not only in relation to the risks but also
based on the nature, scope, context and purpose of the treatment. It has
thus the significance of what personal data is processed, how many
data, it is a question of how many people process the data, etc.
The health service has a great need for information in its operations. The
It is therefore natural that the possibilities of digitalisation are utilized as much as
possible in healthcare. Since the Patient Data Act was introduced, a lot
extensive digitization has taken place in healthcare. Both the data collections
size as the number of people sharing information with each other has increased
substantially. At the same time, this increase means that the demands on it increase
personal data controller, as the assessment of what is an appropriate
safety is affected by the extent of the treatment.
It is also a question of sensitive personal data. The information concerns
people who are in a situation of dependence when they are in need of care.
It is also often a question of a lot of personal information about each of these
people and the data may over time be processed by very
many people in healthcare. All in all, this places great demands on it
personal data controllers.
The data processed must be protected from outside actors as well
the business as against unauthorized access from within the business. It appears
of Article 32 (2) that the data controller, in assessing the appropriate
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level of safety, in particular shall take into account the risks of unintentional or illegal
destruction, loss or unauthorized disclosure or unauthorized access. In order to
be able to know what is an unauthorized access it must
personal data controllers must be clear about what is an authorized access.
Needs and risk analysis
I 4 kap. Section 2 of the National Board of Health and Welfare's regulations (HSLF-FS 2016: 40) which supplement
In the Patient Data Act, it is stated that the care provider must make a needs and
risk analysis before the allocation of authorizations in the system takes place. This means that
national law prescribes requirements for an appropriate organizational measure that shall:
taken before the allocation of authorizations to journal systems takes place.
A needs and risk analysis must include an analysis of the needs and a
analysis of the risks from an integrity perspective that may be associated
with an overly allotment of access to personal data
about patients. Both the needs and the risks must be assessed on the basis of them
tasks that need to be processed in the business, what processes it is
the question of whether and what risks to the privacy of the individual exist.
The assessments of the risks need to be made on the basis of organizational level, there
for example, a certain business part or task may be more
privacy sensitive than another, but also based on the individual level, if it is
the issue of special circumstances that need to be taken into account, such as
that it is a question of protected personal data, publicly known persons or
otherwise particularly vulnerable persons. The size of the system also affects
the risk assessment. The preparatory work for the Patient Data Act shows that the more
comprehensive an information system is, the greater the variety
eligibility levels must exist. (Prop. 2007/08: 126 p. 149). It is thus
the question of a strategic analysis at the strategic level, which should provide one
authorization structure that is adapted to the business and this must be maintained
updated.
In summary, the regulation requires that the risk analysis identifies
• different categories of data (eg health data),
Categories of data subjects (eg vulnerable natural persons and
children), or
• the scope (eg number of personal data and registered)
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• negative consequences for data subjects (eg injuries,
significant social or economic disadvantage, deprivation of rights
and freedoms),
and how they affect the risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons
Processing of personal data. This applies both within internal secrecy
as in coherent record keeping.
The risk analysis must also include special risk assessments, for example
based on whether there is protected personal data that is
classified, information on public figures, information from
certain clinics or medical specialties (Bill 2007/08: 126 p. 148-
149).
The risk analysis must also include an assessment of how probable and serious
the risk to the data subjects' rights and freedoms is and in any case determined
whether it is a risk or a high risk (recital 76).
It is thus through the needs and risk analysis that it
personal data controller finds out who needs access, which
information the accessibility shall include, at what times and at what
context access is needed, while analyzing the risks to it
the freedoms and rights of the individual that the treatment may lead to. The result should
then lead to the technical and organizational measures needed to
ensure that no access other than that of need and
the risk analysis shows that it should be justified.
When a needs and risk analysis is missing prior to the allocation of qualifications in
system, lacks the basis for the personal data controller on a legal
be able to assign their users a correct authorization. The
the data controller is responsible for, and shall have control over, the
personal data processing that takes place within the framework of the business. To
assign users one upon access to journal system, without this being founded
on a performed needs and risk analysis, means that the person responsible for personal data
does not have sufficient control over the personal data processing that takes place in
the journal system and also can not show that he has the control that
required.
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Sahlgrenska University Hospital's process for needs and risk analysis
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has within the framework of the supervisory matter
referred to three different processes or documents that are said to constitute one
needs and risk analysis. Regarding the process that Sahlgrenska
The university hospital referred to at the time of the inspection passed this
partly in an assessment of which assignments the person has and which systems
the person needs to have access to, partly in an assessment at the individual level of whether
the employee to be hired seemed inclined to take part in tasks
in the medical record system in violation of current guidelines.
The Data Inspectorate can state that Sahlgrenska University Hospital does not
has carried out an analysis concerning the business, various processes and
staff categories' need to process data. What is described is
instead, only an assessment of what systems an employee needs to have
access to.
The risk analysis described by Sahlgrenska University Hospital is about one
risk assessment other than that referred to in the National Board of Health and Welfare's regulations. IN
the needs and risk analysis, risks to the individual's integrity must be identified.
As is clear from the preparatory work for the Patient Data Act, certain information may be required
special risk assessment and protected personal data are given as examples
which are classified, information about publicly known persons, information
from certain clinics or medical specialties. So it is not
the assessment of the employee referred to in this context. On the contrary have
the legislator emphasizes precisely that even if health care should be able to have large
trust in their employees, it is not in itself sufficient protection,
The ethical principle of confidentiality in health care is deeply rooted
information that emerges in the contact between healthcare professionals and patients
is of course a strong counterforce to gossiping about patients or otherwise spreading information
in an unacceptable way among co-workers. The same is true of the propensity to
find out information about patients who are cared for in the workplace but who do not have one themselves
professional relationship with. Given the scope of health care and the big picture
the number of employed health and medical staff, about 300,000 people in the municipalities alone
and the county council's health and medical care, however, it cannot be assumed that this is not the case at all
occurs.
The trend towards common widely available electronic journal systems within the large ones
At the same time, the care providers' operations entail increased risks of invasion of privacy. If it increased
potential availability of medical records is not handled well so that patients
can feel confident that sensitive information is not read by unauthorized persons, there is a high risk of
that patients choose to stay out of electronic access systems.
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A mixture of preventive and reactive measures is needed to prevent patient data
shall be handled in an unacceptable manner (Bill 2007/08: 126 pp. 147-147).
The process that Sahlgrenska described at the time of the inspection is
thus not a needs and risk analysis according to ch. 2 § HSLF-FS 2016: 40.
The document Availability for operation of the electronic patient record
Melior
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has in supplementary information that
received by the Swedish Data Inspectorate on 27 June 2019 stated that the document
Accessibility to the operation of the electronic patient record Melior constitutes one
needs and risk analysis. The document is stated to have been prepared in 2011 and to have as
starting point to simplify access to patient data between the different
the units within the hospital. However, it can be stated that by
the document states that it aims to carry out a risk analysis regarding
operation of the Melior medical record system. In the section “Risk identification and
underlying causes "the identified risks are either attributed to" Part 1:
Patient safety and operational perspective ”or“ Part 2: Technical safety
with regard to availability for operation ”.
Regarding the needs analysis, the document does not contain an analysis of which ones
tasks employees need to be able to perform their
tasks. Regarding the risk analysis, examples of risks such as
identified in Part 1: Patient safety and operational perspective that “All IT
related anomalies that may affect patient safety are not reported ",
or "Wrong patient is dictated on the wrong dictation". Risks identified in Part 2:
Technical safety with regard to availability for operation, is for example “unauthorized
access to journal information ”, caused by“ transmission via
open networks ”. There are risks from an information security perspective, however
the document does not contain an analysis of the risks that may be associated
with one too wide availability regarding different types of personal data.
The document is thus an analysis from a business perspective and fulfills
not the requirements for a needs and risk analysis from an integrity perspective according to 4
Cape. 2 § HSLF-FS 2016: 40.
The document risk and vulnerability analysis
Sahlgrenska University Hospital also has due to
The Data Inspectorate's inquiry as to what measures have been taken after
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the authority's decision 1607-2013, in which Sahlgrenska University Hospital
was instructed to produce a documented needs and risk analysis, stated that
In the spring of 2019, a needs and risk analysis was carried out. Sahlgrenska
The University Hospital has submitted three different documents, a risk and
vulnerability analysis, a so-called simplified needs and risk analysis with the title
Needs and risk analysis when allocating individual eligibility to
journal system, and a document entitled Needs and risk analysis at
authorization allocation which can be said to constitute a brief account of how
the other two documents are used in the business. Initially, it can
It is stated that the documents were not produced until four years after the Data Inspectorate
order. In addition, none of the documents submitted constitutes a need
and risk analysis from an integrity perspective.
Regarding the risk and vulnerability analysis, it is an analysis that must be performed
according to the legislation on heightened preparedness and crisis preparedness 2 . Such a thing happens
for other purposes and is not the same as a needs and risk analysis
according to in ch. 4 2 § HSLF-FS 2016: 40.
It appears from the risk and vulnerability analysis that a measure to deal with one
too at the level of eligibility should be to implement a simplified needs and
risk analysis when allocating eligibility. The document thus states that a
needs and risk analysis must be done, but does not in itself constitute one.
The document does not contain an analysis of what tasks the employees have
need in the journal system to be able to perform their tasks. The
there are parts that concern the risk to the individual's integrity, but the so-called
identified consequences do not constitute an analysis of risks in the current case
the case but rather a statement of facts, such as that of a consequence
that the internal area of ​​confidentiality is extensive is that “VGR has many
employee which can lead to the permissions becoming too wide, which gives
employees more competence than they need ”. In some parts contains
the document identified risks which, however, do not aim at the protection of
the integrity of the individual; for example, it is found that a consequence of that
employees do not know what applies when accessing patient data
is that “patients when requesting a log extract can see that an unauthorized person has looked in
journal, bad will for SU ”.
2 Act (2006: 544) on municipalities 'and county councils' measures before and during extraordinary
events in peacetime and heightened preparedness , ordinance (2015: 1052) on crisis preparedness and
measures by the authorities responsible for surveillance in the event of heightened preparedness.
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In summary, the Data Inspectorate can state that the document does not
contains analyzes of the need for access to personal data or the risks
for the integrity of the individual arising from an excessively wide
authorization, and thus does not meet the requirements of a needs and
risk analysis from an integrity perspective according to ch. 2 § HSLF-FS 2016: 40.
The simplified needs and risk analysis
Regarding the simplified needs and risk analysis that Sahlgrenska in risk
and the vulnerability analysis determines to be done when authorization is granted
it is initially stated that it is not compatible with in ch. § 2 HSLF-
FS 2016: 40 to only perform a simplified needs and risk analysis. Further
the document consists of a list of 14 questions to be answered with yes or
no, such as “the employee knows that the computer must not be left unlocked,
without supervision? ”. The Data Inspectorate can state that this is rather a question of
a document to be used to create the conditions for a good
information security at the individual level. It is an organizational measure to
ensure an appropriate level of security, but it is not an analysis of the need for
access to personal data or the risks to the privacy of the individual
arises through an overly authoritative control. Thus does not meet
nor does this document require a needs and risk analysis from one
integrity perspective according to ch. 4 2 § HSLF-FS 2016: 40.
The document Needs and risk analysis when allocating eligibility
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has also submitted a document in which
the work with needs and risk analysis is briefly described. The document
briefly describes how the risk and vulnerability analysis and the simplified one
the needs and risk analysis is used in the business, and how Sahlgrenska
The University Hospital prioritises accuracy and accessibility over
confidentiality. The document does not contain any analyzes of the need for access
to personal data or the risks to the privacy of the individual that
arises through an overly allocation of competencies, and meets
thus not the requirements for a needs and risk analysis according to ch. § 2 HSLF-FS
2016: 40. Instead, the document shows that Sahlgrenska University Hospital
consciously prioritizes the requirement of confidentiality.
The Swedish Data Inspectorate's summary assessment
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As stated above, in a needs and risk analysis, both the needs and
the risks are assessed on the basis of the data that need to be processed in
the business, what processes are involved and what are the risks for it
individual integrity that exists on both organizational and individual
level. It is thus a question of a strategic analysis at a strategic level, which
shall provide an authorization structure that is adapted to the business. It should
result in authorization assignments but it is not
the instructions to the person who assigns the permissions that are the analysis.
At the Data Inspectorate's review, Sahlgrenska University Hospital
could not present any needs and risk analysis within the framework of
internal secrecy or within the framework of the cohesive
record keeping. Sahlgrenska University Hospital's document lacks it
basic inventory of users' access and analysis needs
of risks, nor has any balance been made between needs and those
actual privacy risks that the processing of personal data gives rise to.
In summary, the Data Inspectorate can state that the documents that
have not been reported individually or together meet the requirements
on a needs and risk analysis and that Sahlgrenska University Hospital does not
have been able to show that they have carried out a needs and risk analysis in that sense
referred to in ch. 4 § 2 HSLF-FS 2016: 40, neither within the framework of the internal
confidentiality or within the framework of the unified record keeping, according to 4
respectively 6 chap. patient data law. This means that Sahlgrenska
The University Hospital has not taken appropriate organizational measures in
in accordance with Article 5 (1) (f) and Article 31 (1) and (2) in order to ensure and,
in accordance with Article 5 (2), be able to demonstrate that the processing of personal data
have a security that is appropriate in relation to the risks.
Authorization of access to personal data about patients
As reported above, a caregiver may have a legitimate interest in having
a comprehensive processing of data on the health of individuals. Notwithstanding this shall
access to personal data about patients may be limited to
what is needed for the individual to be able to fulfill his or her duties.
With regard to the allocation of authorization for electronic access according to ch.
§ 2 and ch. 6 Section 7 of the Patient Data Act states that in the preparatory work, Bill.
2007/08: 126 pp. 148-149, i.a. that there should be different eligibility categories in
the journal system and that the permissions should be limited to what the user
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need to provide the patient with good and safe care. It also appears that “a
more extensive or coarse-grained eligibility should be considered as one
unjustified dissemination of medical records within a business and should as
such is not accepted. "
In health care, it is the person who needs the information in their work
who may be authorized to access them. This applies both within a
caregivers as between caregivers. It is, as already mentioned, through
the needs and risk analysis that the person responsible for personal data finds out who
who need access, what information the access should include, at which
times and in which contexts access is needed, and at the same time
analyzes the risks to the individual's freedoms and rights
the treatment can lead to. The result should then lead to the technical and
organizational measures needed to ensure no allocation
of eligibility provides further access opportunities than the one that needs and
the risk analysis shows is justified. An important organizational measure is to provide
instruction to those who have the authority to assign authorizations on how this
should go to and what should be considered so that it, with the needs and risk analysis
as a basis, becomes a correct authorization allocation in each individual case.
As emerged in the case, about 900,000 patients are registered in Melior at
Sahlgrenska University Hospital and the number of active accounts in Melior are
almost 25,000, which exceeds the number of employees at Sahlgrenska
The University Hospital, which at the time of the inspection was close to 18,000.
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has assigned the employees who work
with health care a general eligibility role - with or without
emergency access - which provides access to all units' care documentation,
with the exception of the clinical genetics unit which is not included in the
general competences. Thus, the majority of users have actually had
access to most of this information. This means that
Sahlgrenska University Hospital does not sufficiently have
restricted users' access to personal data about
patients in the Melior medical record system.
In addition, it can be stated that Sahlgrenska University Hospital has given
direct access to personal data about patients at Sahlgrenska
The University Hospital for employees at other administrations within Västra
Götaland region.
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Access to personal data in Melior presupposes that the user is active
choice. Sahlgrenska University Hospital has stated that they assess that
the active selection function is sufficient to meet the requirement of confidentiality
and that it is in accordance with HSLF-FS 2016: 40. The Data Inspectorate can
however, note that the Patient Data Act requires both limitation
of competencies and active choices. The active selection function is therefore not a measure
to compensate for a lack of access restriction. That Sahlgrenska
The University Hospital uses the above active choices is one
privacy enhancing measure, but does not constitute such a restriction of
competence referred to in ch. 4 Section 2 of the Patient Data Act. This provision
requires that the authority be limited to what is needed for it
individuals must be able to fulfill their duties in health care,
i.e. only those who need the information should have access to
them.
Of the preparatory work for the Patient Data Act, Bill. 2007/08: 126, p. 149, it appears that
the purpose of the provisions is to imprint the obligation on the person responsible
the care provider to make active and individual eligibility allocations from outside
analyzes of which details information different staff categories and different
kind of activities need. Because different users have different
tasks in different work areas, users need access to
the data in Melior are limited to reflect this. Of the preparatory work
it also appears that data should be stored in different layers so that more sensitive
tasks require active choices or are otherwise not as easily accessible
staff as less sensitive tasks.
That the allocation of authorizations has not been preceded by a need and
risk analysis means that Sahlgrenska University Hospital has not analyzed
users' need for access to the data, the risks of this access
can entail and thus also not identified which access is
justified to users on the basis of such an analysis. Sahlgrenska
The University Hospital has thus not used appropriate measures, in
in accordance with Article 32, to restrict users' access to
patients' data in the medical record system.
Regarding the processing of personal data by Sahlgrenska
The University Hospital performs within the framework of the cohesive
record keeping in the NPÖ system, it can initially be stated that
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Sahlgrenska University Hospital has stated that Sahlgrenska
The University Hospital is not responsible for that information
shown in NPÖ. The Data Inspectorate does not share this view. According to 2
Cape. Section 6 of the Patient Data Act is in one region each authority that conducts
and healthcare personal data controller for the processing of personal data
carried out by the authority. According to the second paragraph of the provision covers
personal data liability also such processing of personal data as
the care provider, or the authority in a region or municipality that is
personal data controller, performs when the care provider or authority through
direct access in an individual case prepares access to personal data about a
patient with another care provider or other authority in the same region or
municipality. Sahlgrenska University Hospital is thus
personal data controller for the processing of personal data that takes place when
the employees take part in tasks in NPÖ.
With regard to access to personal data within the framework of it
cohesive record keeping in the NPÖ system has about 7,000 users
Sahlgrenska University Hospital access. The Data Inspectorate can
note that a limit has been placed on the number of users in
compared to the approximately 25,000 who have eligibility in Melior, but do not
any restriction has been made as to what documentation these are
users can take part in the NPÖ system.
This in turn has meant that there has been a risk of unauthorized access and
unjustified dissemination of personal data partly within the framework of the internal
secrecy, partly within the framework of the coherent record keeping.
In the light of the above, the Data Inspectorate can state that
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has processed personal data in violation of
Article 5 (1) (f) and Article 32 (1) and (2) of the Data Protection Regulation by
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has not restricted users
permissions for accessing the Melior journal system to what only
is needed for the user to be able to fulfill his tasks within
health care according to ch. 4 § 2 and ch. 6 Section 7 of the Patient Data Act and 4
Cape. 2 § HSLF-FS 2016: 40. This means that Sahlgrenska
The University Hospital has not taken any measures to ensure and,
in accordance with Article 5 (2) of the Data Protection Regulation, be able to demonstrate an appropriate
security of personal data.
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Documentation of access (logs)
The Data Inspectorate can state that the logs showing access in Melior
contains information about the user's name and role, patients' identities,
which part of the journal has been opened (eg journal, referrals, certificate - someone
of the "six tabs") and the date and time the measures were taken.
It is not clear at which care unit the measure was taken or which
actions specifically taken by the user. Sahlgrenska has stated that
information about which care unit the user is employed at can be checked
through a search on where the user is employed. Sahlgrenska therefore means
that by combining different logs, you can find out at which care unit
as the measure has been taken. Each log entry in the logs constitutes the action “open
journal". In addition, it is not clear what actions the user has
taken with information about a patient.
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has in an opinion received
The Data Inspectorate on 17 March 2020 stated that the measures set out in
the logs are if an employee has opened the journal, about access to information
occurred through active selection and if the employee from the journal has made one
outlets to other care units. Sahlgrenska University Hospital states
further that the documentation in the logs creates conditions for
perform access controls in an appropriate manner, and that the logs
meets the requirement to log which measures have been taken with information
about a patient.
It appears from the National Board of Health and Welfare's Handbook when applying
The National Board of Health and Welfare's regulations and general guidelines (HSLF-FS 2016: 40) that
“The caregiver is responsible, among other things, for the documentation of
the access (logs) shows the measures that have been taken with information
about a patient. An active choice to access information about a patient is
an example of an action to be logged ”.
The Data Inspectorate states that the purpose of the requirement that action be taken
documented in the logs is not just to check if an employee
prepared access to the journal, but also what measures have been taken
information about a patient. The action documented in the logs “open
journal ”is an example of an action that should be logged, and in addition should also
other measures taken with information about a patient are documented in
the logs. Other such measures may include the creation of personal data,
copied, transferred, blocked, shredded or printed. the purpose with
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The security measure logs are to answer the question of who did what, it wants
say who took what action, with what personal information and when. This
constitutes an important part for the personal data controller to fulfill the requirement for
appropriate security measures to control personal data; and
how they are treated. The purpose of the access control security measure is to
ensure that users do not misuse their permissions through
to read, change or delete information that they should not process. To
Sahlgrenska University Hospital only introduced documentation of the measure
"Open journal", is thus not sufficient to meet the requirement in ch. § 9
(point 1) HSLF-FS 2016: 40 that the documentation of the access shall
state what measures have been taken with information about a patient.
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has thus treated and is treating
personal data in violation of ch. 4 Section 3 of the Patient Data Act and Chapter 4 § 9 (point
1) HSLF-FS 2016: 40. This means that Sahlgrenska University Hospital does not
has taken appropriate technical and organizational measures in
relation to the risk. Sahlgrenska University Hospital thus fulfills
not the requirement to ensure adequate security for the treatment of
personal data, in accordance with Article 32 of the Data Protection Regulation.
Choice of intervention
Legal regulation
If there has been a violation of the Data Protection Regulation
The Data Inspectorate a number of corrective powers available under the article
58.2 a – ji of the Data Protection Regulation. The supervisory authority can, among other things
instruct the data controller to ensure that the processing takes place in
in accordance with the Regulation and if required in a specific way and within a
specific period.
It follows from Article 58 (2) of the Data Protection Regulation that the Data Inspectorate in
in accordance with Article 83 shall impose penalty charges in addition to or in lieu of
other corrective measures referred to in Article 58 (2),
the circumstances of each individual case.
For the purposes of Article 83 (7) of the Data Protection Regulation, national authorities may:
rules state that administrative sanctions may be imposed on authorities.
According to ch. 6 Section 2 of the Data Protection Act allows for penalty fees to be decided
authorities, but to a maximum of SEK 5,000,000 or SEK 10,000,000
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depending on whether the infringement concerns articles covered by Article 83 (4)
or 83.5 of the Data Protection Regulation.
Article 83 (2) of the Data Protection Regulation sets out the factors to be taken into account for
to decide whether to impose an administrative penalty fee, but also
what is to affect the size of the penalty fee. Of central importance to
the assessment of the gravity of the infringement is its nature, severity and
duration. In the case of a minor infringement may
the regulatory authority, in accordance with recital 148 of the Data Protection Regulation, issue a
reprimand instead of imposing a penalty fee.
Order
As mentioned, the health service has a great need for information in its
business and in recent years has a very extensive digitization
occurred in healthcare. Both the data collections size and how many
sharing information with each other has increased significantly. This increases the demands on
the personal data controller, as the assessment of what is appropriate
safety is affected by the extent of the treatment.
In health care, this means that a great deal of responsibility rests on it
personal data controller to protect the data from unauthorized access,
among other things by having an authorization allocation that is even more
comminuted. It is therefore essential that there is a real analysis of the needs
based on different activities and different executives. Equally important is that
there is an actual analysis of the risks from an integrity perspective
may occur in the event of an override of access rights. From
this analysis must then be restricted to the individual executive.
This authority must then be followed up and changed or restricted accordingly
hand that changes in the tasks of the individual executive provide
reason for it.
The Data Inspectorate's inspection has shown that Sahlgrenska University Hospital
have not taken appropriate security measures to provide protection to
the personal data in the record system by Sahlgrenska
University hospital in its capacity as data controller did not comply with the requirements
which is set in the Patient Data Act and the National Board of Health and Welfare's regulations. Sahlgrenska
The University Hospital has thereby failed to comply with the requirements in Article 5 (1) (f)
and Article 32 (1) and (2) of the Data Protection Regulation. The omission includes
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both the internal secrecy according to ch. the Patient Data Act as it
coherent record keeping according to ch. 6 patient data law.
The Data Inspectorate therefore submits on the basis of Article 58 (2) (d)
data protection ordinance Sahlgrenska University Hospital to ensure that
required needs and risk analysis is performed and documented for
the medical systems Melior and National Patient Overview and that thereafter, with
support of the needs and risk analysis, each user is assigned individually
authorization for access to personal data limited to what only
necessary for the individual to be able to fulfill his duties within
health care, in accordance with Article 5 (1) (f) and Article 32 (1) and (2) (i)
the Data Protection Ordinance, Chapter 4 § 2 and ch. 6 Section 7 of the Patient Data Act and 4
Cape. 2 § HSLF-FS 2016: 40.
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has also failed to include in the logs in Melior
indicate what measures have been taken with information about a patient, a requirement
which appears from ch. 4 Section 3 of the Patient Data Act and Chapter 4 § 9 (item 1) HSLF-FS
2016: 40. The Data Inspectorate therefore submits Sahlgrenska
University Hospital to introduce documentation in the logs in Melior where it
shall state what measures have been taken with personal data about a
patient according to ch. 4 Section 3 of the Patient Data Act and Chapter 4 § 9 (item 1) HSLF-FS
2016: 40.
Penalty fee
The Data Inspectorate can state that the violations are basically related
Sahlgrenska University Hospital's obligation to take appropriate
security measures to provide protection of personal data according to
the Data Protection Regulation.
In this case, it is a matter of large data collections with sensitive
personal data and extensive powers. The caregiver needs to be involved
necessity to have a comprehensive processing of data on the health of individuals.
However, it must not be unrestricted but should be based on what individual
employees need to be able to perform their tasks. The Data Inspectorate
notes that this is information that includes direct identification
by the individual by name, contact information and social security number,
information about health, but that it may also be about other private
information about, for example, family relationships, sexual life and lifestyle. Patients
is dependent on receiving care and is thus in a vulnerable situation. The data
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character, scope and patients' dependence position give caregivers a
special responsibility to ensure patients' right to adequate protection for their
personal data.
Additional aggravating circumstances are the treatment of
personal data about patients in the main medical record system belongs to the core of a
the activities of caregivers, that the treatment covers many patients and that
the possibility of access not only refers to a large proportion of employees but to
Sahlgrenska University Hospital has also given access to a large number
employees at other administrations within the Västra Götaland region. In this
In this case, there are around 900,000 patients within the internal framework
confidentiality, close to 18,000 employees and 25,000 active accounts. There is
only one unit, the Clinical Genetics Unit, where the data is not accessible
for users outside these devices because the device is excluded from
the general competencies.
The Data Inspectorate can also state that Sahlgrenska
The University Hospital has not complied with the Data Inspectorate's decision of 27
March 2015. In the decision, Sahlgrenska University Hospital was instructed to
carry out a documented needs and risk analysis according to the then
requirement 2 chap. § 6 second paragraph second sentence SOSFS 2008: 14, which
corresponds to the current provision in ch. 4 2 § HSLF-FS 2016: 40. This is a
aggravating circumstance, according to Article 83 (2) (e) of the Data Protection Regulation.
The shortcomings that have now been established have thus been known to Sahlgrenska
the university hospital for several years, which means that the action took place
intentionally and thus is considered more serious.
The Data Inspectorate also states that Sahlgrenska University Hospital in
information received in the case has stated that the care provider accepts
the risk that confidentiality is not given as high a priority as accuracy and
availability. As the Data Inspectorate understands, Sahlgrenska has
The university hospital has actively taken a position on giving priority to taking
measures to protect the privacy of the individual, which makes the action
more serious.
Taken together, these factors mean that the infringements are not to be assessed
as minor violations without violations that should lead to a
administrative penalty fee.
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The Data Inspectorate considers that the violations are closely related to
each other. That assessment is based on the need and risk analysis
form the basis for the allocation of the authorizations. The Data Inspectorate
therefore considers that these infringements are so closely linked
that they constitute interconnected data processing within the meaning of Article 83 (3) (i)
the Data Protection Regulation. The Data Inspectorate therefore decides on a joint
penalty fee for the infringements.
Regarding the shortcomings in the logs, the Data Inspectorate can state that not
all the information that should be included in the logs does so, but that logging essentially
contains the information required by the National Board of Health and Welfare's regulations.
The Data Inspectorate therefore considers it sufficient that Sahlgrenska
The university hospital is ordered to rectify the shortcoming and therefore does not decide
any special penalty fee for this infringement.
The administrative penalty fee shall be effective, proportionate and
deterrent. This means that the amount must be determined so that it
the administrative penalty fee leads to correction, that it provides a preventive
effect and that it is also proportional in relation to both current
violations as to the ability of the supervised entity to pay.
The maximum amount for the penalty fee in this case is SEK 10 million
according to ch. 6 Section 2 of the Act (2018: 218) with supplementary provisions to the EU
data protection regulation.
In view of the seriousness of the infringements and that the administrative
the penalty fee must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive
the Data Inspectorate determines the administrative sanction fee for
Sahlgrenska University Hospital to 3,500,000 (three million five hundred
thousand crowns.
_______________________________________
This decision was made by Director General Lena Lindgren Schelin after
presentation by the IT security specialist Magnus Bergström. At the final
The case is handled by Hans-Olof Lindblom, General Counsel, and the Heads of Unit
Malin Blixt and Katarina Tullstedt participated.
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Lena Lindgren Schelin, 2020-12-02 (This is an electronic signature)
Appendices: Appendix 1 - How to pay a penalty fee
Copy for information to:
Data Protection Officer
How to appeal
If you want to appeal the decision, you must write to the Data Inspectorate. Enter i
the letter which decision you are appealing and the change you are requesting.
The appeal must have been received by the Data Inspectorate no later than three weeks from
on the day the decision was announced. If the appeal has been received in due time
the Data Inspectorate forwards it to the Administrative Court in Stockholm
examination.
You can e-mail the appeal to the Data Inspectorate if it does not contain
any privacy-sensitive personal data or data that may be covered by
secrecy. The authority's contact information can be found on the first page of the decision.