Article 69 GDPR: Difference between revisions
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== Legal Text == | == Legal Text == | ||
<br /><center>'''Article 69 - Independence'''</center | <br /><center>'''Article 69 - Independence'''</center> | ||
<span id="1">1. The Board shall act independently when performing its tasks or exercising its powers pursuant to Articles 70 and 71.</span> | <span id="1">1. The Board shall act independently when performing its tasks or exercising its powers pursuant to Articles 70 and 71.</span> | ||
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== Relevant Recitals== | == Relevant Recitals== | ||
{{Recital/139 GDPR}} | |||
==Commentary== | ==Commentary== | ||
Article 69 GDPR seeks to guarantee the Board's independence in its functioning as a Union Body. In practice, this provision establishes that other Union bodies may not interfere in the EDPB's functioning. This arrangement stands in stark contrast to that of the Board's predecessor, the Article 29 Working Party (“''WP29''”), in which the Commission held voting rights.<ref>''Dix'' in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 69 GDPR, margin numbers 1-3 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref> | |||
'' | ===(1) The Board shall act independently=== | ||
The establishment of the Board as a free-standing body goes beyond simply a normative assertion of independence. The wording of the Article provides that the Board shall ''"act independently,''" indicating that the EDPB must act autonomously in relation to the fulfilment of its functions.<ref>''Dix'' in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 69 GDPR, margin number 4 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref> Importantly, the Board's independence does not exclude its actions from the scrutiny of other Union bodies,<ref>''Docksey'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 68 GDPR, p. 1046 (Oxford University Press 2020); ''Dix'' in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 69 GDPR, margin number 4 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref> it still remains accountable to them.<ref>For further discussion on this point, see this Commentary on Article 68 GDPR.</ref> Nonetheless, the scrutiny of any such external bodies may only come following an action taken by the Board, they may not interfere in the performance of the Board's tasks and exercise of its powers. | |||
The right to supervision by an independent authority is laid down in Article 8(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ("''CFR''"), Article 16(2) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("''TFEU''"), and Article 39 Treaty on the European Union ("''TEU''"). The CJEU has also defined this right as an “''essential component''” of the fundamental right to data protection.<ref>CJEU, 9 March 2010, Commission and Federal Republic of Germany, C-518/07, margin number 23 (available [https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=8420BFF36DF4F104091DB5C7A1C2E74D?text=&docid=79752&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2589415 here]); ''Docksey'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 68 GDPR, p. 1056 (Oxford University Press 2020).</ref>However, the wording of Article 69 GDPR may suggest that it takes a less stringent position regarding the EDPB’s independence in comparison with that of national supervisory authorities. Under Article 52(2) GDPR national supervisory authorities must “''act with complete independence,''” while Article 69 simply provides that the Board shall ''"act independently''." The disparity in the wording of these two Articles indicates that the independence of the EDPB is not absolute. For instance, the Board relies on the European Data Protection Supervisor (''"EDPS"'') for facilities, staff, and budget, and pursuant to Article 68(6) GDPR, the EDPS holds limited voting rights in the Board on issues of dispute resolution. | |||
This reading is supported by the Court in ''Commission v Germany'', which interpreted the phrase “''complete'' ''independence''” in the context of Directive 95/46/EC. Here, the Court emphasised that the use of the “''adjective ‘complete’ [...] implies a decision-making power independent of any direct or indirect external influence on the supervisory authority.''”<ref>CJEU, 9 March 2010, Commission and Federal Republic of Germany, C-518/07, margin number 19 (available [https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=8420BFF36DF4F104091DB5C7A1C2E74D?text=&docid=79752&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2589415 here]); ''Docksey'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 68 GDPR, p. 1061 (Oxford University Press 2020).</ref> On the other hand, some commentators contend that this linguistic difference is immaterial.<ref>''Docksey'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 68 GDPR, p. 1059 (Oxford University Press 2020); ''Brink, Wilhelm'', in Wolff, Brink, DS-GVO, Article 69 GDPR, margin numbers 4-6 (C.H. C.H. Beck 2019, 35th edition) ''Dix'' in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 69 GDPR, margin number 4 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref> In particular, the word “''complete''” is omitted where primary law refers to independent supervisory authorities, yet in practice this omission does not affect their level of independence. | |||
===(2) The Board shall neither seek nor take instructions from any body === | |||
The second paragraph of Article 69 lays down the manner in which the Board exercises its independence, providing that the Board shall not seek nor take instructions from any body in the fulfilment of its duties. While the Board is not permitted to seek instructions from or depend on external bodies, this requirement does not exclude the Board from consulting external experts where needed. However, any such consultation must be made transparent within the framework of Article 76 GDPR regulating confidentiality.<ref>''Dix'' in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 69 GDPR, margin number 5 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref> | |||
Notably thought, Article 69(2) GDPR establishes that this requirement is without prejudice to instances where the Commission seeks advice from the Board on issues related to the protection of personal data in the Union, including advice regarding proposed amendments to the GDPR (pursuant to Article 70(1)(b) GDPR). | |||
Although not explicitly mentioned in Article 69(2) GDPR, the requirement that the Board shall not seek nor take instructions from any body also applies without prejudice to situations where the Commission requests an opinion from the EDPB on instances outlined by Article 64(2) GDPR. These instances concern matters “''of general application''” or which “''produc[e] effects in more than one member state, in particular where a competent supervisory authority does not comply with the obligations for mutual assistance in accordance with Article 61 or for joint operations in accordance with Article 62''” (Article 64(2) GDPR).<ref>''Dix'' in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 69 GDPR, margin number 6 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref> Commentators note that such requests for advice and opinions, which the EDPB cannot refuse, may impede the performance of its tasks where they fall outwith the scope delimitated by Article 64(2). Nevertheless, the Board is not obliged to address these requests within a particular time frame or hierarchical order.<ref>''Dix'' in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 69 GDPR, margin number 6 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref> | |||
Article 68(5) GDPR and Recital 139 provide that while the Commission does not enjoy voting rights, it may participate in EDPB activities and meetings. It has been argued that “''in view of the high standard of independence required under Article 8(3) of the Charter, care must be taken''” here, particularly regarding meetings concerning cases “''where the Commission has a specific interest in the executive of the European Union''.”<ref>''Docksey'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 68 GDPR, p. 1066 (Oxford University Press 2020).</ref> | |||
==Decisions== | ==Decisions== | ||
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[[Category:Article 69 GDPR]] | [[Category:Article 69 GDPR]] | ||
[[Category:GDPR]] | [[Category:GDPR Articles]] |
Latest revision as of 12:36, 14 December 2023
Legal Text
1. The Board shall act independently when performing its tasks or exercising its powers pursuant to Articles 70 and 71.
2. Without prejudice to requests by the Commission referred to in point (b) of Article 70(1) and in Article 70(2), the Board shall, in the performance of its tasks or the exercise of its powers, neither seek nor take instructions from anybody.
Relevant Recitals
Commentary
Article 69 GDPR seeks to guarantee the Board's independence in its functioning as a Union Body. In practice, this provision establishes that other Union bodies may not interfere in the EDPB's functioning. This arrangement stands in stark contrast to that of the Board's predecessor, the Article 29 Working Party (“WP29”), in which the Commission held voting rights.[1]
(1) The Board shall act independently
The establishment of the Board as a free-standing body goes beyond simply a normative assertion of independence. The wording of the Article provides that the Board shall "act independently," indicating that the EDPB must act autonomously in relation to the fulfilment of its functions.[2] Importantly, the Board's independence does not exclude its actions from the scrutiny of other Union bodies,[3] it still remains accountable to them.[4] Nonetheless, the scrutiny of any such external bodies may only come following an action taken by the Board, they may not interfere in the performance of the Board's tasks and exercise of its powers.
The right to supervision by an independent authority is laid down in Article 8(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ("CFR"), Article 16(2) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"), and Article 39 Treaty on the European Union ("TEU"). The CJEU has also defined this right as an “essential component” of the fundamental right to data protection.[5]However, the wording of Article 69 GDPR may suggest that it takes a less stringent position regarding the EDPB’s independence in comparison with that of national supervisory authorities. Under Article 52(2) GDPR national supervisory authorities must “act with complete independence,” while Article 69 simply provides that the Board shall "act independently." The disparity in the wording of these two Articles indicates that the independence of the EDPB is not absolute. For instance, the Board relies on the European Data Protection Supervisor ("EDPS") for facilities, staff, and budget, and pursuant to Article 68(6) GDPR, the EDPS holds limited voting rights in the Board on issues of dispute resolution.
This reading is supported by the Court in Commission v Germany, which interpreted the phrase “complete independence” in the context of Directive 95/46/EC. Here, the Court emphasised that the use of the “adjective ‘complete’ [...] implies a decision-making power independent of any direct or indirect external influence on the supervisory authority.”[6] On the other hand, some commentators contend that this linguistic difference is immaterial.[7] In particular, the word “complete” is omitted where primary law refers to independent supervisory authorities, yet in practice this omission does not affect their level of independence.
(2) The Board shall neither seek nor take instructions from any body
The second paragraph of Article 69 lays down the manner in which the Board exercises its independence, providing that the Board shall not seek nor take instructions from any body in the fulfilment of its duties. While the Board is not permitted to seek instructions from or depend on external bodies, this requirement does not exclude the Board from consulting external experts where needed. However, any such consultation must be made transparent within the framework of Article 76 GDPR regulating confidentiality.[8]
Notably thought, Article 69(2) GDPR establishes that this requirement is without prejudice to instances where the Commission seeks advice from the Board on issues related to the protection of personal data in the Union, including advice regarding proposed amendments to the GDPR (pursuant to Article 70(1)(b) GDPR).
Although not explicitly mentioned in Article 69(2) GDPR, the requirement that the Board shall not seek nor take instructions from any body also applies without prejudice to situations where the Commission requests an opinion from the EDPB on instances outlined by Article 64(2) GDPR. These instances concern matters “of general application” or which “produc[e] effects in more than one member state, in particular where a competent supervisory authority does not comply with the obligations for mutual assistance in accordance with Article 61 or for joint operations in accordance with Article 62” (Article 64(2) GDPR).[9] Commentators note that such requests for advice and opinions, which the EDPB cannot refuse, may impede the performance of its tasks where they fall outwith the scope delimitated by Article 64(2). Nevertheless, the Board is not obliged to address these requests within a particular time frame or hierarchical order.[10]
Article 68(5) GDPR and Recital 139 provide that while the Commission does not enjoy voting rights, it may participate in EDPB activities and meetings. It has been argued that “in view of the high standard of independence required under Article 8(3) of the Charter, care must be taken” here, particularly regarding meetings concerning cases “where the Commission has a specific interest in the executive of the European Union.”[11]
Decisions
→ You can find all related decisions in Category:Article 69 GDPR
References
- ↑ Dix in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 69 GDPR, margin numbers 1-3 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).
- ↑ Dix in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 69 GDPR, margin number 4 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).
- ↑ Docksey, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 68 GDPR, p. 1046 (Oxford University Press 2020); Dix in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 69 GDPR, margin number 4 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).
- ↑ For further discussion on this point, see this Commentary on Article 68 GDPR.
- ↑ CJEU, 9 March 2010, Commission and Federal Republic of Germany, C-518/07, margin number 23 (available here); Docksey, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 68 GDPR, p. 1056 (Oxford University Press 2020).
- ↑ CJEU, 9 March 2010, Commission and Federal Republic of Germany, C-518/07, margin number 19 (available here); Docksey, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 68 GDPR, p. 1061 (Oxford University Press 2020).
- ↑ Docksey, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 68 GDPR, p. 1059 (Oxford University Press 2020); Brink, Wilhelm, in Wolff, Brink, DS-GVO, Article 69 GDPR, margin numbers 4-6 (C.H. C.H. Beck 2019, 35th edition) Dix in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 69 GDPR, margin number 4 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).
- ↑ Dix in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 69 GDPR, margin number 5 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).
- ↑ Dix in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 69 GDPR, margin number 6 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).
- ↑ Dix in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 69 GDPR, margin number 6 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).
- ↑ Docksey, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 68 GDPR, p. 1066 (Oxford University Press 2020).