Article 86 GDPR: Difference between revisions
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== Legal Text == | == Legal Text == | ||
<br /><center>'''Article 86 - Processing and public access to official documents'''</center> | <br /><center>'''Article 86 - Processing and public access to official documents'''</center> | ||
Personal data in official documents held by a public authority or a public body or a private body for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest may be disclosed by the authority or body in accordance with Union or Member State law to which the public authority or body is subject in order to reconcile public access to official documents with the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation. | |||
== Relevant Recitals== | == Relevant Recitals== | ||
Line 191: | Line 193: | ||
== Commentary == | == Commentary == | ||
Transparency is essential to ensure the accountability of EU and national public institutions. Access to official documents is therefore | Transparency is essential to ensure the accountability of EU and national public institutions. Access to official documents is therefore recognised as a fundamental right under Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, as well as in the constitutions of many Member States. However, this right is not absolute. Under Article 86, it can be limited, ''inter alia'', to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of other individuals, including the right to privacy and data protection of individuals whose personal data would be contained in such documents. | ||
==== Personal data may be disclosed ==== | |||
Article 86 GDPR states that official documents "''may be disclosed''" for the sake of transparency even if the GDPR remains applicable, which is the case when those documents contain personal data. By doing so, Article 86 GDPR seems to indicate that EU data protection law should not systematically prevent their disclosure. | |||
The provision further points out that a potential conflict may arise between transparency and data protection, and stresses the need to reconcile those two conflicting rights, albeit without providing any indications as to how this should be accomplished. For example, it does not refer to the possibility of exempting controllers or processors from complying with certain obligations under the GDPR in order to facilitate access to documents as it happens, for example, in [[Article 85 GDPR|Article 85(1) GDPR]], which notably assigns Member States the task of reconciling freedom of expression and information with data protection rules, and specifically lists which parts of the GDPR can be derogated from in that context in Article 85(2). By contrast, Article 86 GDPR does not provide any specific instructions on how to ensure compliance with the GDPR while ensuring sufficient transparency. This confusion is also reflected in the case law. In ''C-28/08 Bavarian Lager,'' the General Court held that transparency overrode data protection. However, on appeal, the CJEU ruled the other way and stated that the original decision to withhold the documents was correct. There is some suggestion that if the personal data is particularly sensitive, privacy should trump transparency. In ''[[CJEU - C-439/19 - B v. Latvijas Republikas Saeima|C-439/19 B v Latvijas Republikas Saeima]]'' the CJEU held that ''‘in light [of]''… ''the sensitivity of data relating to penalty points imposed for road traffic offences and of the seriousness of the interference with fundamental rights … which is caused by the disclosure of such data, it must be held that those rights prevail’.''<ref>At para. 120</ref> | |||
The interest of reconciling data protection and transparency is acknowledged, “''but the provision does not allow for exemptions and derogations from the rules contained in the GDPR nor does it set any further conditions''”. Thus, some argue, that “[w]''hen examining Article 86 GDPR one can wonder what normative value it actually has''”.<ref>''Kranenborg'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 86 GDPR, p. 1216 (Oxford University Press 2020).</ref> | |||
==== '''Official documents''' ==== | |||
The term ''‘official documents’'' is not defined in the GDPR. Whichever interpretation the term is given will affect the scope of Article 86. Two possible interpretations include 1) documents generated by an authority in its official capacity and 2) all documents held by an authority. Recital 154 seems to lean towards the second as it states ''‘personal data in documents held by a public authority or a public body’.'' A decision about its scope will have to be determined by member states or eventually the CJEU. | |||
==== | ==== '''Disclosed by the authority or body''' ==== | ||
Article | Article 86 deals with disclosure by authorities and bodies covered by member state or union access laws. Since they are already covered by access regimes, a question arises as to why Article 86 as a provision exists. One idea is that it exists to prevent a situation where the GDPR is used by member states to create an obstacle against access laws.<ref>Spiecker et al., ''GDPR Article-by-Article Commentary (2023),'' p 1090.</ref> The acknowledgement of a need for ''‘reconciliation’'' and acknowledgement of the importance of access to information in Article 86, supports this interpretation and makes room for pro-transparency arguments at a national level.<ref>Spiecker et al., ''GDPR Article-by-Article Commentary (2023),'' p 1090.</ref> | ||
The | ==== The GDPR remains applicable ==== | ||
The task of balancing the right of access and right to privacy is left to each member state to decide in their national laws. This could result in fractured harmonisation as each member state has the competence to balance them differently. | |||
However, it can be concluded that the GDPR remains fully applicable in the context of the exercise of the right to access to official documents, with the need to respect, ''inter alia'', the principle of lawful and fair processing ([[Article 5 GDPR]]) or the obligation to have a valid legal basis (Article 6 GDPR),[On this point, some authors have argued that “''the Union or Member State law referred to in Article 86 on which disclosure can be based is no different from a Union or Member State law referred to in Article 6 GDPR''. Recital 154 also seems to go in this direction as it states that public access to official documents may be considered to be in “''the public interest''”. See, ''Kranenborg'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 86 GDPR, p. 1217 (Oxford University Press 2020).] and with the possibility for DPAs to scrutinise such processing. This interpretation was also confirmed by ''Bavarian Lager'', where the CJEU ruled that EU institutions have to apply EU data protection law in the context of access to official documents containing personal data.<ref>CJEU, Case C‑28/08, ''European Commission v The Bavarian Lager'', 29 June 2010, para. 59 (available [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62008CJ0028 here]).</ref> | |||
In many Member States, the right of the public to transparency in the administration has often been | In many Member States, the right of the public to transparency in the administration has often been conferred by provisions of national law requiring authorities to actively publish official documents, or to communicate a copy of them upon request. However, the GDPR remains applicable when those documents contain personal data, and the concerned authorities must therefore consider on which legal basis under [[Article 6 GDPR|Articles 6,]] [[Article 9 GDPR|9]] or [[Article 10 GDPR|10 GDPR]] such processing of personal data may take place. | ||
. In fact, national DPA’s (see UK, Germany, Estonia, Hungary etc.) are often tasked with balancing these two rights (such as freedom of information) and data privacy.<ref>Spiecker et al., ''GDPR Article-by-Article Commentary (2023),'' p 1087.</ref> On the EU level, these enforcement powers are separated. The EU Ombudsman takes care of access while EDPS acts as an independent supervisor of privacy of the EU Institutions. Having said this, the two signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation as early as 2006.<ref>2007/C 27/07</ref> | |||
''A fortiori'', when the documents do not contain any sensitive personal data, such disclosures could be lawful on the basis of [[Article 6 GDPR|Article 6(1)(c) GDPR]] (i.e. processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject) or [[Article 6 GDPR|Article 6(1)(e) GDPR]] (i.e. processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller). When the disclosure of official documents is based on the necessity to comply with a legal obligation, the conditions laid down in the underlying national law must be fully considered, including any exceptions or potential grounds for refusal. Often, one of these conditions is the respect of the right of privacy and data protection of individuals, which would require the concerned authority to balance the interest of the requesting party to access the documents with the legitimate interest and right to privacy of the data subjects whose personal data appear in such documents. This analysis must be made on a case-by-case basis, in light of all the relevant circumstances, including the nature of the document, its value for the public, and the consequences of its disclosure.<ref>This conclusion has been confirmed by the (scarce) case-law on the topic. Indeed, European courts have over the years developed different criteria to determine the lawfulness of disclosing official documents, or on the contrary to refuse such a disclosure, on grounds pertaining to the right to privacy or data protection.</ref> | |||
For instance, in | For instance, the ECtHR in ''Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary'' examined the refusal of the Hungarian authorities to provide an NGO with information relating to the names and work of ''ex officio'' defence counsel on the ground that such information constituted personal data.<ref>ECtHR, Case n. 18030/11, ''Magyar Helsinki Bizottsdg'', 8 November 2016, margin number 194 (available [https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-167828%22%5D} here]).</ref> The ECtHR considered this refusal contrary to the Convention, because (among others) the request for these names, "''although they constituted personal data, related predominantly to the conduct of professional activities in the context of public proceedings''", and that those activities "''cannot be considered to be a private matter''". | ||
A somewhat similar approach was adopted by the CJEU in a case where a Dutch journalist | A somewhat similar approach was adopted by the CJEU in a case where a Dutch journalist filed an access request concerning the functioning of an additional pension scheme for MEPs. The Parliament had first rejected the request in order to protect the privacy of parliamentarians. The CJEU, however, then annulled this decision because disclosure would not prejudice the legitimate interests of the MEPs. In particular, the CJEU held that “''in weighing up the interests engaged, the legitimate interests of the MEPs who are members of the additional pension scheme, which fall into the public sphere of those MEPs, must be subject to a lesser degree of protection than that which, following the logic of Regulation No 45/2001, would be enjoyed by the interests falling into their private sphere''”.<ref>CJEU, T-115/13, ''Dennekamp'', 15 July 2015, margin number 124 (available [https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=2FA0EC9AAD183756D99C4235B1E6A3C1?text=&docid=165829&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5449531 here]).</ref> | ||
In conclusion, as Kranenborg correctly states, the case law of the ECtHR as well as the case law of the CJEU show that there are at least two criteria to assess whether disclosure of data is justified: “''the distinction between private and professional matters and the 'public nature' of the data''”.<ref | In conclusion, as Kranenborg correctly states, the case law of the ECtHR as well as the case law of the CJEU show that there are at least two criteria to assess whether disclosure of data is justified: “''the distinction between private and professional matters and the 'public nature' of the data''”.<ref>''Kranenborg'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 86 GDPR, p. 1216 (Oxford University Press 2020).</ref> | ||
== Decisions == | == Decisions == |
Latest revision as of 10:01, 19 March 2024
Legal Text
Personal data in official documents held by a public authority or a public body or a private body for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest may be disclosed by the authority or body in accordance with Union or Member State law to which the public authority or body is subject in order to reconcile public access to official documents with the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation.
Relevant Recitals
Commentary
Transparency is essential to ensure the accountability of EU and national public institutions. Access to official documents is therefore recognised as a fundamental right under Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, as well as in the constitutions of many Member States. However, this right is not absolute. Under Article 86, it can be limited, inter alia, to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of other individuals, including the right to privacy and data protection of individuals whose personal data would be contained in such documents.
Personal data may be disclosed
Article 86 GDPR states that official documents "may be disclosed" for the sake of transparency even if the GDPR remains applicable, which is the case when those documents contain personal data. By doing so, Article 86 GDPR seems to indicate that EU data protection law should not systematically prevent their disclosure.
The provision further points out that a potential conflict may arise between transparency and data protection, and stresses the need to reconcile those two conflicting rights, albeit without providing any indications as to how this should be accomplished. For example, it does not refer to the possibility of exempting controllers or processors from complying with certain obligations under the GDPR in order to facilitate access to documents as it happens, for example, in Article 85(1) GDPR, which notably assigns Member States the task of reconciling freedom of expression and information with data protection rules, and specifically lists which parts of the GDPR can be derogated from in that context in Article 85(2). By contrast, Article 86 GDPR does not provide any specific instructions on how to ensure compliance with the GDPR while ensuring sufficient transparency. This confusion is also reflected in the case law. In C-28/08 Bavarian Lager, the General Court held that transparency overrode data protection. However, on appeal, the CJEU ruled the other way and stated that the original decision to withhold the documents was correct. There is some suggestion that if the personal data is particularly sensitive, privacy should trump transparency. In C-439/19 B v Latvijas Republikas Saeima the CJEU held that ‘in light [of]… the sensitivity of data relating to penalty points imposed for road traffic offences and of the seriousness of the interference with fundamental rights … which is caused by the disclosure of such data, it must be held that those rights prevail’.[1]
The interest of reconciling data protection and transparency is acknowledged, “but the provision does not allow for exemptions and derogations from the rules contained in the GDPR nor does it set any further conditions”. Thus, some argue, that “[w]hen examining Article 86 GDPR one can wonder what normative value it actually has”.[2]
Official documents
The term ‘official documents’ is not defined in the GDPR. Whichever interpretation the term is given will affect the scope of Article 86. Two possible interpretations include 1) documents generated by an authority in its official capacity and 2) all documents held by an authority. Recital 154 seems to lean towards the second as it states ‘personal data in documents held by a public authority or a public body’. A decision about its scope will have to be determined by member states or eventually the CJEU.
Disclosed by the authority or body
Article 86 deals with disclosure by authorities and bodies covered by member state or union access laws. Since they are already covered by access regimes, a question arises as to why Article 86 as a provision exists. One idea is that it exists to prevent a situation where the GDPR is used by member states to create an obstacle against access laws.[3] The acknowledgement of a need for ‘reconciliation’ and acknowledgement of the importance of access to information in Article 86, supports this interpretation and makes room for pro-transparency arguments at a national level.[4]
The GDPR remains applicable
The task of balancing the right of access and right to privacy is left to each member state to decide in their national laws. This could result in fractured harmonisation as each member state has the competence to balance them differently.
However, it can be concluded that the GDPR remains fully applicable in the context of the exercise of the right to access to official documents, with the need to respect, inter alia, the principle of lawful and fair processing (Article 5 GDPR) or the obligation to have a valid legal basis (Article 6 GDPR),[On this point, some authors have argued that “the Union or Member State law referred to in Article 86 on which disclosure can be based is no different from a Union or Member State law referred to in Article 6 GDPR. Recital 154 also seems to go in this direction as it states that public access to official documents may be considered to be in “the public interest”. See, Kranenborg, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 86 GDPR, p. 1217 (Oxford University Press 2020).] and with the possibility for DPAs to scrutinise such processing. This interpretation was also confirmed by Bavarian Lager, where the CJEU ruled that EU institutions have to apply EU data protection law in the context of access to official documents containing personal data.[5]
In many Member States, the right of the public to transparency in the administration has often been conferred by provisions of national law requiring authorities to actively publish official documents, or to communicate a copy of them upon request. However, the GDPR remains applicable when those documents contain personal data, and the concerned authorities must therefore consider on which legal basis under Articles 6, 9 or 10 GDPR such processing of personal data may take place.
. In fact, national DPA’s (see UK, Germany, Estonia, Hungary etc.) are often tasked with balancing these two rights (such as freedom of information) and data privacy.[6] On the EU level, these enforcement powers are separated. The EU Ombudsman takes care of access while EDPS acts as an independent supervisor of privacy of the EU Institutions. Having said this, the two signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation as early as 2006.[7]
A fortiori, when the documents do not contain any sensitive personal data, such disclosures could be lawful on the basis of Article 6(1)(c) GDPR (i.e. processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject) or Article 6(1)(e) GDPR (i.e. processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller). When the disclosure of official documents is based on the necessity to comply with a legal obligation, the conditions laid down in the underlying national law must be fully considered, including any exceptions or potential grounds for refusal. Often, one of these conditions is the respect of the right of privacy and data protection of individuals, which would require the concerned authority to balance the interest of the requesting party to access the documents with the legitimate interest and right to privacy of the data subjects whose personal data appear in such documents. This analysis must be made on a case-by-case basis, in light of all the relevant circumstances, including the nature of the document, its value for the public, and the consequences of its disclosure.[8]
For instance, the ECtHR in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary examined the refusal of the Hungarian authorities to provide an NGO with information relating to the names and work of ex officio defence counsel on the ground that such information constituted personal data.[9] The ECtHR considered this refusal contrary to the Convention, because (among others) the request for these names, "although they constituted personal data, related predominantly to the conduct of professional activities in the context of public proceedings", and that those activities "cannot be considered to be a private matter".
A somewhat similar approach was adopted by the CJEU in a case where a Dutch journalist filed an access request concerning the functioning of an additional pension scheme for MEPs. The Parliament had first rejected the request in order to protect the privacy of parliamentarians. The CJEU, however, then annulled this decision because disclosure would not prejudice the legitimate interests of the MEPs. In particular, the CJEU held that “in weighing up the interests engaged, the legitimate interests of the MEPs who are members of the additional pension scheme, which fall into the public sphere of those MEPs, must be subject to a lesser degree of protection than that which, following the logic of Regulation No 45/2001, would be enjoyed by the interests falling into their private sphere”.[10]
In conclusion, as Kranenborg correctly states, the case law of the ECtHR as well as the case law of the CJEU show that there are at least two criteria to assess whether disclosure of data is justified: “the distinction between private and professional matters and the 'public nature' of the data”.[11]
Decisions
→ You can find all related decisions in Category:Article 86 GDPR
References
- ↑ At para. 120
- ↑ Kranenborg, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 86 GDPR, p. 1216 (Oxford University Press 2020).
- ↑ Spiecker et al., GDPR Article-by-Article Commentary (2023), p 1090.
- ↑ Spiecker et al., GDPR Article-by-Article Commentary (2023), p 1090.
- ↑ CJEU, Case C‑28/08, European Commission v The Bavarian Lager, 29 June 2010, para. 59 (available here).
- ↑ Spiecker et al., GDPR Article-by-Article Commentary (2023), p 1087.
- ↑ 2007/C 27/07
- ↑ This conclusion has been confirmed by the (scarce) case-law on the topic. Indeed, European courts have over the years developed different criteria to determine the lawfulness of disclosing official documents, or on the contrary to refuse such a disclosure, on grounds pertaining to the right to privacy or data protection.
- ↑ ECtHR, Case n. 18030/11, Magyar Helsinki Bizottsdg, 8 November 2016, margin number 194 (available here).
- ↑ CJEU, T-115/13, Dennekamp, 15 July 2015, margin number 124 (available here).
- ↑ Kranenborg, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 86 GDPR, p. 1216 (Oxford University Press 2020).