Article 21 GDPR

← Article 21 - Right to object →
Chapter 1: General provisions Article 1: Subject-matter and objectives Article 2: Material scope Article 3: Territorial scope Article 4: Definitions Chapter 2: Principles Article 5: Principles relating to processing of personal data Article 6: Lawfulness of processing Article 7: Conditions for consent Article 8: Conditions applicable to child’s consent in relation to information society services Article 9: Processing of special categories of personal data Article 10: Processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences Article 11: Processing which does not require identification Chapter 3: Rights of the data subject Article 12: Transparent information, communication and modalities for the exercise of the rights of the data subject Article 13: Information to be provided where personal data are collected from the data subject Article 14: Information to be provided where personal data have not been obtained from the data subject Article 15: Right of access by the data subject Article 16: Right to rectification Article 17: Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) Article 18: Right to restriction of processing Article 19: Notification obligation regarding rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing Article 20: Right to data portability Article 21: Right to object Article 22: Automated individual decision-making, including profiling Article 23: Restrictions Chapter 4: Controller and processor Article 24: Responsibility of the controller Article 25: Data protection by design and by default Article 26: Joint controllers Article 27: Representatives of controllers or processors not established in the Union Article 28: Processor Article 29: Processing under the authority of the controller or processor Article 30: Records of processing activities Article 31: Cooperation with the supervisory authority Article 32: Security of processing Article 33: Notification of a personal data breach to the supervisory authority Article 34: Communication of a personal data breach to the data subject Article 35: Data protection impact assessment Article 36: Prior consultation Article 37: Designation of the data protection officer Article 38: Position of the data protection officer Article 39: Tasks of the data protection officer Article 40: Codes of conduct Article 41: Monitoring of approved codes of conduct Article 42: Certification Article 43: Certification bodies Chapter 5: Transfers of personal data Article 44: General principle for transfers Article 45: Transfers on the basis of an adequacy decision Article 46: Transfers subject to appropriate safeguards Article 47: Binding corporate rules Article 48: Transfers or disclosures not authorised by Union law Article 49: Derogations for specific situations Article 50: International cooperation for the protection of personal data Chapter 6: Supervisory authorities Article 51: Supervisory authority Article 52: Independence Article 53: General conditions for the members of the supervisory authority Article 54: Rules on the establishment of the supervisory authority Article 55: Competence Article 56: Competence of the lead supervisory authority Article 57: Tasks Article 58: Powers Article 59: Activity reports Chapter 7: Cooperation and consistency Article 60: Cooperation between the lead supervisory authority and the other supervisory authorities concerned Article 61: Mutual assistance Article 62: Joint operations of supervisory authorities Article 63: Consistency mechanism Article 64: Opinion of the Board Article 65: Dispute resolution by the Board Article 66: Urgency procedure Article 67: Exchange of information Article 68: European Data Protection Board Article 69: Independence Article 70: Tasks of the Board Article 71: Reports Article 72: Procedure Article 73: Chair Article 74: Tasks of the Chair Article 75: Secretariat Article 76: Confidentiality Chapter 8: Remedies, liability and penalties Article 77: Right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority Article 78: Right to an effective judicial remedy against a supervisory authority Article 79: Right to an effective judicial remedy against a controller or processor Article 80: Representation of data subjects Article 81: Suspension of proceedings Article 82: Right to compensation and liability Article 83: General conditions for imposing administrative fines Article 84: Penalties Chapter 9: Specific processing situations Article 85: Processing and freedom of expression and information Article 86: Processing and public access to official documents Article 87: Processing of the national identification number Article 88: Processing in the context of employment Article 89: Safeguards and derogations relating to processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes Article 90: Obligations of secrecy Article 91: Existing data protection rules of churches and religious associations Chapter 10: Delegated and implementing acts Article 92: Exercise of the delegation Article 93: Committee procedure Chapter 11: Final provisions Article 94: Repeal of Directive 95: /46: /EC Article 95: Relationship with Directive 20: 02: /58: /EC Article 96: Relationship with previously concluded Agreements Article 97: Commission reports Article 98: Review of other Union legal acts on data protection Article 99: Entry into force and application

Legal Text

Article 21 - Right to object

1. The data subject shall have the right to object, on grounds relating to his or her particular situation, at any time to processing of personal data concerning him or her which is based on point (e) or (f) of Article 6(1), including profiling based on those provisions. The controller shall no longer process the personal data unless the controller demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.

2. Where personal data are processed for direct marketing purposes, the data subject shall have the right to object at any time to processing of personal data concerning him or her for such marketing, which includes profiling to the extent that it is related to such direct marketing.

3. Where the data subject objects to processing for direct marketing purposes, the personal data shall no longer be processed for such purposes.

4. At the latest at the time of the first communication with the data subject, the right referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be explicitly brought to the attention of the data subject and shall be presented clearly and separately from any other information.

5. In the context of the use of information society services, and notwithstanding Directive 2002/58/EC, the data subject may exercise his or her right to object by automated means using technical specifications.

6. Where personal data are processed for scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes pursuant to Article 89(1), the data subject, on grounds relating to his or her particular situation, shall have the right to object to processing of personal data concerning him or her, unless the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out for reasons of public interest.

Relevant Recitals

Recital 69: Right to Object

Where personal data might lawfully be processed because processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller, or on grounds of the legitimate interests of a controller or a third party, a data subject should, nevertheless, be entitled to object to the processing of any personal data relating to his or her particular situation. It should be for the controller to demonstrate that its compelling legitimate interest overrides the interests or the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.

Recital 70: Right to Object to Direct Marketing

Where personal data are processed for the purposes of direct marketing, the data subject should have the right to object to such processing, including profiling to the extent that it is related to such direct marketing, whether with regard to initial or further processing, at any time and free of charge. That right should be explicitly brought to the attention of the data subject and presented clearly and separately from any other information.

Commentary

Article 21 ensures the data subject's right to object. In Paragraph 1, a general right to object is provided against the processing of personal data that may be lawful based on a permissible balancing of interests under Article 6(1)(f) or (e) GDPR. Paragraphs 2 and 3 establish a specific and unconditional right to object in the case of data processing for direct marketing purposes. Paragraph 4 reiterates the obligation on the data controller to inform about the existence of the right to object at the time of the first communication with the data subject. In the context of information society services, Paragraph 5 enables the exercise of the right to object through automated procedures using technical specifications. Lastly, Paragraph 6 grants an additional specific right to object to data processing for research or statistical purposes.

(1) Right to object

Article 21(1) GDPR grants data subjects the right to object, on grounds relating to their particular situation, to processing based on a legitimate interest (Article 6(1)(f) GDPR), or that is necessary for a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority (Article 6(1)(e) GDPR). Controllers may reject this objection where they demonstrate compelling legitimate grounds for the processing activity which overrides the data subject’s interests, rights, and freedoms, or for the establishment, exercise, or defence of claims.

Shall have the right to object

Once an objection has been submitted in accordance with Article 21(1) GDPR and is accompanied by appropriate justification, the data controller is obligated to cease processing the data. The GDPR does not grant data subjects a general right to object to the processing of their personal data. Rather, this right is limited to the circumstances outlined in Article 21(1) to (6) GDPR, as discussed further below.

The right to object requires a request from the data subject. There are no specific provisions, therefore the general rules of Article 12 GDPR apply, adapted to the specific cases, where appropriate. The controller must communicate in a clear, understandable, and easily accessible manner the actions taken in response to the request (Article 12(1) GDPR), and facilitate the entire process (Article 12(2) GDPR). The response must be provided promptly, within one month of the request, and no later than three months if the time extension under Article 12(3) GDPR applies.

The request does not require any specific form and can be submitted in written, oral, or electronic form. A general request, even not framed in legal terms, is sufficient. Scholars note that there is no need to assign a specific "title" to the request; it can be implied, for example, when the contractual relationship between the parties is terminated. However, the request must at least contain the reasons for the data subject's objection and the prevailing interest believed to be violated. This requirement should not be interpreted too restrictively for the data subject, considering the obligation to facilitate the request under Article 12(2) GDPR. In this regard, if the data subject's request is not clear, the controller may seek clarification and strive for a swift resolution of the dispute.

On grounds relating to his or her particular situation

Most commentators view this phrase as a clear threshold. Data subjects will not be able to exercise their right to object to processing under Article 21(1) GDPR, unless they assert specific reasons which pertain to their individual situation. These reasons can be of a legal, economic, ethical, social, societal, or family nature. It is not clear exactly how a data subject’s reasons will be assessed. Herbst argues, in line with the Hamburg Regional Court, that their objection must be justified by something “atypical”, which can be assumed to have previously been unknown to the controller, and which it could therefore not take into account in its overall assessment under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. For example, it would not be sufficient for a data subject to merely indicate that they do not want the processing to occur. Instead, they might have to assert a threat to their life, property, or the like. In contrast, others argue that the threshold should not be interpreted too strictly. This view might be supported by a judgement of the Frankfurt Regional Court, which deemed a plaintiff’s difficulties in looking for an apartment due to the disclosure of data about his debt to be sufficient. In our view, rather than acting as a prerequisite for the exercise of the right to object, the phrase “relating to his or her particular situation” simply indicates that the data subject should have the right to affirm their specific interests in their personal data not being processed, which the controller may consider (or reconsider, in the light of the the data subject's individual position) in its weighing of interests.

In any case, the EDPB states that a controller should not dismiss an objection by a data subject just because they did not elaborate much on their particular situation in their objection under Article 21(1) GDPR. Rather, the controller should ask the data subject to further specify their request.

To processing of personal data concerning him or her

The wording of Article 21(1) does not explicitly define the scope of an objection. However, the wording does not exclude the possibility that the data subject may object to specific forms of processing (e.g. transmission) or to the processing of certain data, rather than objecting to the entire processing. The mention of profiling in Article 21(1)(a) also supports this possibility, as profiling is a distinct form of processing that can coexist with other forms of processing. If the data subject objects solely to profiling, other forms of processing can still be carried out. Therefore, the data subject has the option to object to the entire processing or only to specific parts of it.

Based on Article 6(1)(e) or Article 6(1)(f)

The right to object is limited to cases where personal data processing is based on Article 6(1)(e) ("processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller") or Article 6(1)(f) GDPR ("processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject"). Consequently, the right to object applies to cases where the controller has initially considered the prevalence of their defended interest, specifically, the public interest in the case of Article 6(1)(e) and the controller's legitimate interest in the case of Article 6(1)(f). In other words, there is a balancing of interests carried out by the controller at the core of the processing.

Example: XXX

This also explains why the right to object does not apply to other legal bases. For example, consent can be revoked at any time. Revocation does not need to be "explained" and does not require an assessment by the controller. In the case of processing based on a contract, objecting would be inconsistent as it goes against the contractual interest of the data subject. For instance, if a data subject purchases a product and then objects to the use of their address for delivery, it would be a case of "venire contra factum proprium." Lastly, in the case of processing based on a legal obligation, it is assumed that the legislator has already conducted the balancing of interests and has mandated the legitimacy of the processing by law. In this case, the legislative decision takes precedence over the data subject's subjective right.

Including profiling based on Article 6(1)(f) or (e)

Article 21(1) GDPR specifies that data subjects can object to processing based on Article 6(1)(e) and (f) GDPR, “including profiling based on those provisions.” Profiling is defined in Article 4(4) GDPR as a form of automated processing consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person. Because all types of processing based on Article 6(1)(e) or (f) GDPR are clearly covered by Article 21(1) GDPR, mentioning profiling specifically is somewhat legally redundant. However, it can be seen to serve as more of a reminder, to the effect that the right of objection can apply especially with regard to profiling, which can be a problematic form of processing in the sense that sweeping and potentially incorrect conclusions are drawn about data subjects.

The controller shall no longer process personal data

Once an objection in accordance with Article 21(1) has been raised with proper justification, the data controller is obligated to cease the processing activities unless it can demonstrate valid grounds for continuing the activities. This does not occur automatically upon the objection, but rather after a prompt assessment by the data controller, determining that the factual requirements are met and there are no grounds for exemptions (see below). The assessment must be conducted without delay and its outcome promptly shared with the data subject. Any processing conducted prior to a valid objection remains unaffected (with an ex-nunc effect).

Unless the controller demonstrates

In the event of an objection from the data subject, the controller is required to cease processing (as mentioned above) and potentially delete the involved data. The GDPR includes two fundamental exceptions to this principle, allowing for the continuation of processing even when a valid objection is raised. The first exception applies when the controller demonstrates that the objected processing is, or continues to be, justified by "compelling legitimate grounds" that outweigh the interests of the data subject. The second exception applies when the processing is necessary for "the establishment, exercise, or defense of legal claims."

The burden of proof for this demonstration is on the controller and the presumption is in favor of the data subject objecting to a processing activity.

This provision presents controversial elements that have sparked debates and varying interpretations. The prevailing interpretation tends to argue that the burden of proving "compelling legitimate grounds" applies only to "processing which overrides the interests, rights, and freedoms of the data subject." Consequently, it is not necessary to demonstrate "compelling legitimate grounds" for "the establishment, exercise, or defense of legal claims." An intermediate interpretation suggests that in the second scenario (legal claims), the "compelling legitimate grounds" are presumed because the law itself considers the ability to bring legal action to be "compelling". In support of this interpretation, reference is made to the content of Recital 69, which only requires to demonstrate the controller's "legitimate interests", with no reference to the intention or necessity of legal action. However, in this case, it would still be necessary to demonstrate that the legal actions have a minimum level of credibility. Finally, a third interpretation is also possible. Upon closer examination, the phrase "compelling legitimate grounds" is followed by a first "for" (processing which overrides the interests, rights, and freedoms of the data subject) and a second "for" (the establishment, exercise, or defense of legal claims). According to a literal interpretation, the controller would therefore need to demonstrate "compelling legitimate grounds" in both the first and second cases.

Having said that, the following analysis presents the prevailing opinion on this matter.

Compelling legitimate grounds which override the data subject's interests

The GDPR does not elaborate on what constitutes a "compelling" legitimate ground. However, the WP29 suggested in its ‘Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making’ that processing may be based on a compelling legitimate ground where, instead of merely furthering the controller’s business interests, it is “beneficial for society at large (or the wider community)” (e.g. “profiling to predict the spread of a contagious disease)”. According to Zanfir-Fortuna, "compelling" means that the legitimate interest must be “overwhelming” and override the data subject’s interests “in a strong, significant way.” Additionally, Herbst notes that there can be no alternative ways to satisfy the controller’s interest.

The EDPB emphasized that the assessment of what constitutes a compelling legitimate ground is different from the assessment of what is a legitimate interest and the balancing exercise under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR.

"If a data subject has invoked their right to object against a processing based on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, it is not sufficient for the controller to just demonstrate that its earlier legitimate interest assessment regarding that processing was correct. The balancing test to be made under Article 21(1) GDPR is to be carried out in view of the particular situation of the data subject and requires the legitimate grounds invoked by the controller to be compelling, implying a higher threshold for overriding data subject objections. In other words, not all conceivable legitimate interests that may justify processing under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR are relevant in this context. Only interests that can be recognised as ‘compelling’ may be balanced against the rights, freedoms and interests of the data subject to assess whether there are grounds for processing that take precedence, despite the objection of the data subject. In essence, the grounds invoked should be essential to the controller (or to the third party in whose legitimate interest the data are being processed) to be considered compelling. This might be the case, for example, if a controller is compelled to process the personal data in order to protect its organisation or systems from serious immediate harm or from a severe penalty which would seriously affect its business. In contrast, showing that the processing would simply be beneficial or advantageous to the controller would not necessarily meet this threshold. The presence of compelling legitimate grounds needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis and be linked to a specific objection."

EDPB, 'Guidelines 1/2024 on processing of personal data based on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR', 8 October 2024 (Version 1), margin number 73. Footnotes omitted.

This interest will also be considered compelling if it is recognised as such by EU law (whether expressly or tacitly) or is within the remaining scope for regulation by national law. This includes the interests and purposes outlined in Article 23(1)(a) to (j) GDPR (e.g. national and public security) as well as Recital 73 GDPR (e.g. protection of human life). In any case, the threshold is certainly higher than the overriding legitimate interest that a controller must demonstrate under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, as any processing based on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR would otherwise be essentially immune to objection.

For example, the District Court of Amsterdam held that when refusing a data subject’s objection under Article 21(1) GDPR, it is insufficient for a bank to refer in general terms to its legal obligation to participate in a credit registration system.

Or processing concerns the establishment, excercise or defence of legal claims

A controller may also refuse a request to object where it has an interest in the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims. The provision applies when the establishment, exercise, or defense of legal claims is already underway or imminent. It is not limited to the judicial claims but also includes out-of-court proceedings. The mere possibility of future legal disputes is not sufficient to justify the further processing of data. In cases of uncertainty regarding potential legal disputes, a balanced prognosis is required, considering factors such as the likelihood of a legal dispute, the significance of the claims involved, and the interests of the data subject. It is necessary for the (probability of) pursuing legal claims to outweigh the interests of the data subject in order to justify the continuation of data processing.

(2) Direct marketing

Article 21(2) GDPR gives data subjects an absolute right to object to the processing of their personal data for direct marketing purposes. Unlike the scenario described in paragraph 1, the data subject is not required to provide details about their specific situation. The objection takes effect upon the receipt of the request alone and there is no need for a balancing of interests by the controller, who cannot refuse the objection based on its compelling legitimate grounds. Furthermore, and again unlike under Article 21(1) GDPR, it is not necessary for the processing to be based on a specific legal basis (in that case, Article 6(1)(f) or (e) of the GDPR). The direct marketing purpose can be based on any legal ground, including the contract. Regardless, the objection under Article 21(2) GDPR takes effect.

Example: following an objection, contract-based direct marketing should be stopped - social network case

Direct marketing purposes

Whilst "direct marketing" is not defined in the GDPR, its meaning can be derived from other EU and national laws. Pursuant to Article 2(a), Directive 2006/114/EC, "advertising" means "the making of a representation in any form in connection with a trade, business, craft or profession in order to promote the supply of goods or services, including immovable property, rights and obligations". It is irrelevant for whom the advertising is made. This includes not only direct advertising for the controller's own products or services, but also direct advertising for the benefit of third parties. Also irrelevant is whether or not the advertised content is communicated along other non-marketing materials. Direct advertising also occurs, for example, when commercial information is given in automatically generated confirmation e-mails. Communications for non-commercial purposes, such as political, social or religious purposes are also covered by the definition.

For "advertising" (or "marketing") to be "direct", it is necessary an underlying activity by which the user is singled out and addressed with promoting materials concerning the sale of goods or the provision of services. Article 13 of Directive 2002/58/EC (e-Privacy Directive, consolidated version) states that this scenario includes the use of automated calling machines, telefaxes, and e-mails, including SMS messages (Recital 40, e-Privacy Directive). The extent to which online (targeted) advertising may be classified as "direct marketing" is not entirely clear, as it is unclear whether online advertising always falls within the scope of Article 13 of the e-Privacy Directive. As a matter of fact, there is room for a broad interpretation of such a provision. Sophisticated online targeted advertising techniques do single-out and specifically target individual users across the internet to promote goods or services, and in this way appear to satisfy direct marketing’s key characteristics.

The CJEU case-law seems to support this latter interpretation, giving a broad and evolving meaning to the concept of the medium through which direct marketing is conveyed. In particular, the Court of Justice held that inbox advertising - the display of advertisements disguised as emails in an email inbox - is subjected to the e-Privacy directive, interpreted in line with the evolution of technological means.

CJEU: In StWL Städtische Werke Lauf, margin number 39, the CJEU supports a teleological, extensive and evolutive interpretation of the e-Privacy: “First, Directive 2009/136, which amended Directive 2002/58, refers, in recital 67 thereof, to kinds of communication other than those mentioned in Directive 2002/58 when it states that the safeguards provided for subscribers against intrusion into their privacy by unsolicited communications for direct marketing purposes by means of electronic mail ‘should also be applicable to SMS, MMS and other kinds of similar applications’. Second, as specified in recital 4 of Directive 2002/58, the objective of providing an equal level of protection of personal data and privacy for users of publicly available electronic communications services must be ensured ‘regardless of the technologies used’, which confirms that it is necessary to adopt an interpretation that is broad, and evolving from a technological perspective, of the types of communication covered by that directive.”

Including profiling related to direct marketing

See section above "Including profiling based on Article 6(1)(f) or (e)".

(3) Stopping direct marketing processing

Where a data subject objects to processing under Article 21(2) GDPR, all processing of their data for direct marketing purposes must stop. Processing of the personal data for other lawful purposes remains unaffected. That said, the relationship between Article 21(3) GDPR and Article 17 GDPR on the right to erasure must be considered. The tight relationship between Article 21(3) and Article 17(1)(c) GDPR seems to suggest that erasure should automatically follow an objection to processing for direct marketing. Zanfir-Fortuna highlights that a controller could conceivably argue that personal data only needs to be erased from a specific database kept for direct marketing purposes, and that it can continue to process it for other purposes elsewhere.

To avoid an automatic deletion could also be in the interest of the data subject, as a complete erasure makes it more likely that the controller, having obtained the same or related data in a second moment, accidentally uses them again for marketing purposes. The data subject could thus specify that their objection does not imply a complete deletion of all data. In such cases, including the data subject's contact information in an advertising blocking file is an appropriate measure to respect their preferences. By maintaining this file, it can ensure that the data subject will not receive any future advertising, even if external data is utilized. As part of the notification process in accordance with Article 12(3), data subjects should also be informed about the purpose of including their data in the blocking file. However, if the data subject requests the deletion of all data, they should be informed that they may receive advertising again in the future if third-party data is legally used.

(4) Information on the right to object

The obligation to inform data subjects of their right to object to processing stems from Articles 13(2)(b) and 14(2)(c) GDPR. However, Article 21(4) GDPR specifies that the right to object under Article 21(1) and 21(2) GDPR (i.e. the right to object against processing based on a legitimate interest, necessary for a task in the public interest, and for direct marketing, respectively) must be communicated to the data subject explicitly, clearly, separately from other information, and at the latest at the time of the first communication. For example, the French DPA has stated that information on the right to object should be provided in a distinct paragraph or pictogram. Any indirect or implied reference to the right of objection will not satisfy Article 21(4) GDPR. The notification under Article 21(4) GDPR must be made at the time of the first marketing communication, and not necessarily at the time that the data is first processed. However, if data is collected directly from the data subject, Article 13(2)(b) GDPR requires that the data subject will be informed of their right to object at the point that the data is collected from them.

(5) Objection when using information society services

In accordance with Article 21(5) of the GDPR, the right to object in relation to the use of information society services (ISS) can be exercised using automated procedures and technical specifications. Organisations can satisfy Article 21(5) GDPR by, inter alia, enabling a do-not-track function of the data subject’s browser, including an "opt-out" link in a direct marketing email, or by providing a Wi-Fi network that could detect a do-not-track signal from mobile phone users in a monitored area.

Article 21(5) GDPR applies "notwithstanding Directive 2002/58/EC". This means that this type of objection shall be implemented regardless of any e-Privacy conflicting regulations. This applies specifically to Article 14(1) e-Privacy under which no mandatory requirements for specific technical features are imposed on terminal or other electronic communication equipment which could impede the placing of equipment on the market and the free circulation of such equipment in and between Member States. For the purpose of enabling the automated exercise of the right to object, it is permissible to impose such mandatory requirements related to specific technical features.

(6) Processing for scientific or historical research purposes

Lastly, Article 21(6) GDPR gives users the right to object to processing for scientific or historical research purposes, or statistical purposes, on grounds relating to their particular situation, unless the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest. Controllers are therefore exempt from such an objection where processing is based on the first sentence of Article 6(1)(e) GDPR, but not the second sentence (i.e. where processing is necessary for the performance of a task in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller).

In contrast to the right to object under Article 21(1) GDPR, where controllers process data necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interests, they do not need to demonstrate "compelling legitimate grounds" in order to refuse an objection to processing. As such, the threshold for refusing an objection is lower.

The extent to which a controller would still need to carry out a balancing exercise of the importance of their task in the public interest and the objection in the interests of the data subject is not clear. Unlike Article 21(1) GDPR, Article 21(6) GDPR does not explicitly provide for this (note the lack of the word "override"). However, Munz argue that the need for a balancing of interests naturally stems from the principle of proportionality in Article 52(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, and that Article 21(6) GDPR should be interpreted in light of this. According to Martini, the word "unless" in Article 21(6) GDPR implies that the burden of proof for rejecting an objection lies with the controller, meaning that the data subject’s interest should take precedence in case of doubt.

Notably, unlike with Article 21(1) and (2) GDPR, the right to object under Article 21(6) GDPR does not need to explicitly be brought to the attention of the data subject under Article 21(4) GDPR. This may be attributable to the fact that data from a large number of data subjects are often processed during processing for research and statistical purposes, with the effect that satisfying Article 21(4) GDPR would likely be impractical or involve a "disproportionate effort” pursuant to Article 14(5) GDPR. Controllers are nonetheless still obligated to notify data subjects of their right to object under Article 12(2)(b) GDPR.

Decisions

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