Article 82 GDPR: Difference between revisions

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== Legal Text ==
== Legal Text ==
<br /><center>'''Article 82 - Right to compensation and liability'''</center><br />
<br /><center>'''Article 82 - Right to compensation and liability'''</center>


<span id="1">1.  Any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a result of an infringement of this Regulation shall have the right to receive compensation from the controller or processor for the damage suffered.</span>
<span id="1">1.  Any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a result of an infringement of this Regulation shall have the right to receive compensation from the controller or processor for the damage suffered.</span>
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== Relevant Recitals==
== Relevant Recitals==
Recital 146
{{Recital/75 GDPR}}{{Recital/85 GDPR}}{{Recital/146 GDPR}}{{Recital/147 GDPR}}
 
Recital 147
 
== Commentary ==
== Commentary ==
Article 82 GDPR introduces a right to compensation for damage caused as a result of an infringement of the GDPR.
Article 82 GDPR introduces a right to compensation for damage caused as a result of an infringement of the GDPR. Article 82(1)  contains the conditions for such a claim, which are to be interpreted in accordance with EU law. Such conditions include an infringement of the Regulation, the existence of a material or non-material negative consequence (the damage) and a causal link between these two elements.<ref>CJEU, Case C‑300/21, ''Österreichische Post'', 4 May 2023, margin number 32 (available [[CJEU - C-300/21 - Österreichische Post AG|here]]).</ref> The first paragraph also clarifies who can be active or passive subject of the claim.  


The provision conclusively contains all the conditions for such a claim, which are to be interpreted in accordance with EU law.
Article 82(2) differentiates between controller and processor’s liability, mirroring the division of functions established by the GDPR. Article 82(3) regulates the burden of proof, excluding a strict liability regime. Article 82(4) and (5) GDPR set out rules concerning the liability relationships in the case of several damaging parties. According to Article 82(4) GDPR, each damaging party is liable vis-à-vis the damaged party for the entire amount (joint liability). Article 82(5) GDPR regulates the internal compensation between the damaging parties. Finally, Article 82(6) establishes the competence of courts to adjudicate on claims for damages, in accordance with applicable national law.


Any person may be entitled to compensation, regardless of whether they are data subjects. Only a controller or a processor can be the debtor, with paragraph 2 containing additional requirements depending on the classification.
=== (1) Right to receive compensation===
Article 82(1) of the GDPR stipulates that any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a result of an GDPR infringement has the right to receive compensation from the controller or processor for the damage suffered. The right to compensation is therefore subject to three cumulative conditions:


A claim first requires an infringement of the GDPR, its delegated and implementing acts and relevant member state legislation. Secondly, damage must have occurred, which explicitly includes material and non-material damage. Thirdly, the infringement must be causal for the damage. Fourth, the damaging party must also be “responsible” for the event giving rise to the damage in the sense of paragraph 3. In a final step, the amount of damage must be assessed. Both here and in determining whether damage has occurred, a broad interpretation must be applied.
# an infringement of the provisions of the GDPR
# the existence of ‘damage’, whether material or non-material which has been suffered; and
# the causal link between that damage and that infringement.


As far as the burden of proof is concerned, Article 82 only contains one (special) provision in paragraph 3, otherwise it is silent on this matter. The burden of proof is to be determined according to general principles, taking into account [[Article 5 GDPR|Article 5(2) GDPR]].


Paragraphs 4 and 5 regulate the liability relationships in the case of several damaging parties. According to paragraph 4, they are each liable for the entire amount in their external relationship (i.e. vis-à-vis the damaged party) (joint liability). Paragraph 5 regulates the internal compensation between the damaging parties.
Article 82 GDPR – like almost all provisions of the GDPR – is directly applicable in all Member States without any act of implementation. Article 82 GDPR leaves the Member States no room for manoeuvre at all. Member State deviations that are not compatible with Article 82 GDPR must therefore – in accordance with the principle of the primacy of Union law – remain inapplicable.<ref>''Zanfir-Fortuna'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 82 GDPR, p. 1162, 1164, 1175. (Oxford University Press 2020); ''Quaas'', in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 3 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition).</ref> In this context, it should also be pointed out that this provision is only to be interpreted according to Union law and not according to the law of the Member States. Emphasising this self-evident fact is necessary, as this is not always followed in the case law and literature of some Member States.<ref>''Zanfir-Fortuna'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 82 GDPR, p. 1162, 1164, 1175. (Oxford University Press 2020); ''Quaas'', in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 3 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition).</ref>


=== (1) Compensation===
However, as the CJEU has pointed out, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, it is for the national legal order of each Member State to establish procedural rules for actions intended to safeguard the rights of individuals. These rules must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and they must not make it excessively difficult or impossible in practice to exercise the rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness).<ref>CJEU, Case C-507/23, ''PTAC'', 4 October 2024, margin number 31 (available [[CJEU - C‑507/23 - PTAC|here]]).</ref> Among others, this is relevant for rules on the assessment of damages under the GDPR, since the GDPR itself does not provide for such rules. 


==== Direct Application in the Member States ====
==== Any person (who has suffered damage) ====
First of all, it should be noted that Article 82 GDPR - like almost all provisions of the GDPR - is directly applicable in all member states without any act of implementation. Article 82 GDPR leaves the member states no room for manoeuvre at all. Member state deviations that are not compatible with Article 82 GDPR must therefore - in accordance with the principle of the primacy of Union law - remain inapplicable.<ref>''Zanfir-Fortuna'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 82 GDPR, p. 1162, 1164, 1175. (Oxford University Press 2020) (accessed 13 August 2021); ''Quaas'', in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 3 (Beck 2020, 36th ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref>  
Article 82(1) GDPR identifies the person who is entitled to bring a claim for damages under the GDPR in very broad terms. The claimant can be “''any person''. Therefore, according to the explicit wording, which is also congruent with Recital 146 sentence 1 of the GDPR, a person who is not a “''data subject''” can also be entitled to bring an action. We can imagine, for example, the case where a data breach affecting a data subject also entails monetary negative consequences for a third person whose data were not directly processed. It is disputed whether legal persons can also be damaged parties.<ref>''Bergt'', in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 15 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref>


In this context, it should also be pointed out that this provision is only to be interpreted according to Union law and not according to the law of the Member States. Emphasising this self-evident fact is necessary, as this is not always followed in the case law and literature of some Member States.<ref>Exemplary for the term "responsible" or for “immaterial damage” ''Gola/Piltz'' in Gola, DS-GVO, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 18 (Beck 2018, 2nd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref>
==== From the controller or processor ====
Paragraph (1) also defines the personal scope of a claim with regard to its passive subject (the damaging entity). Only controllers and processors within the meaning of Article 4(7) and (8) GDPR can be liable for compensation.


==== Person Entitled to Compensation ====
==== Infringement of the GDPR ====
Paragraph 1 first defines the claimant as "any person". According to the explicit wording, which is also congruent with Recital 146 sentence 1 of the GDPR, a person who is not a "data subject" can also be entitled to bring an action. In addition to the wording, this follows in particular from a systematic comparison with other provisions of the GDPR, which explicitly refer to the data subject.<ref>''Zanfir-Fortuna'', in Kuner et al, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 82 GDPR, p. 1175 (Oxford University Press 2020) (accessed 13 August 2021); ''Quaas'', in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 37 (Beck 2020, 36th ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021); ''Bergt'', in Kühling/Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 15 (Beck 2020, 3rd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021); different opinion ''Gola/Piltz'' in Gola, DS-GVO, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 10 (Beck 2018, 2nd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref> In this respect, the linguistic deviation ("data subject") in Article 82(4) GDPR and Recital 146 sentences 6 and 8 GDPR seems to be a drafting error.
A claim for damages first requires an infringement of the GDPR.  


It is disputed whether legal persons can also be damaged parties.<ref>Cf. ''Bergt'', in Kühling/Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 15 (Beck 2020, 3rd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref>
Article 82 GDPR does not contain a catalogue of infringements that justify compensation. In this respect, any infringement of the GDPR, be it a right, an obligation or a principle fulfils this requirement. In particular, the infringement is not limited to violations of Chapter III ('Right of the Data Subject'). As a matter of fact, according to Recital 146 sentence 5 GDPR, Article 82 GDPR also allows claims for damages for infringements of “''delegated and implementing acts adopted in accordance with this Regulation and Member State law specifying rules of this Regulation''”.<ref>Cf. also, for example, ''Zanfir-Fortuna'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 82 GDPR, p. 1175. (Oxford University Press 2020); ''Quaas'', in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 14 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition); ''Nemitz'', in Ehmann, Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 9 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition).</ref>


==== Person Liable for Compensation ====
==== Material or non-material damage suffered ====
Only controllers within the meaning of [[Article 4 GDPR|Article 4(7) GDPR]] and processors within the meaning of [[Article 4 GDPR|Article 4(8) GDPR]] can be liable for compensation. Depending on the respective qualification, there are different liability requirements according to paragraph 2.
The second requirement for the right to compensation under Article 82(1) is the existence of a 'damage'.


==== Infringement of the GDPR ====
According to the clear wording of Article 82 GDPR, damage must have occurred in order to justify a claim for damages. In its landmark [[CJEU - C-300/21 - Österreichische Post AG|judgement C-300/21]], the CJEU clarified that 'damage' shall be clearly distinguishable from the infringement itself, to be compensated. A simple violation of the GDPR does not automatically give rise to a claim under Article 82(1). Defining the concept of damage is therefore of crucial importance in determining the existence of a right to compensation. A key objective of the GDPR is effectiveness. This becomes particularly clear with regard to damages in the wording of Recital 146 sentence 6 GDPR, according to which not only “''full''” but also “''effective''” compensation has to be paid. Therefore, the concept of damage is necessarily broad under the GDPR.<ref>CJEU, Case C‑300/21, ''Österreichische Post'', 4 May 2023, margin number 32-42 and 50 (available [[CJEU - C-300/21 - Österreichische Post AG|here]]).</ref>
A claim for damages first requires an infringement of the GDPR.


Unlike [[Article 83 GDPR]], Article 82 GDPR does not contain a catalogue of infringements that justify compensation. In this respect, every infringement should initially fulfil this requirement. A limitation can, however, take place according to general principles within the framework of causality.<ref>''Quaas,'' in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 14 (Beck 2020, 36th ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref>
{{Quote-CJEU|"[The CJEU] has repeatedly interpreted Article 82(1) to the effect that mere infringement of that regulation is not sufficient to confer a right to compensation on that basis, since the existence of ‘damage’, whether material or non-material, or of ‘damage’ which has been ‘suffered’ constitutes one of the conditions for the right to compensation laid down in that provision, as does the existence of an infringement of the provisions of that regulation and of a causal link between that damage and that infringement, those three conditions being cumulative. Accordingly, the person seeking compensation for non-material damage on the basis of that provision is required to establish not only infringement of that regulation, but also that that infringement has actually caused him or her such damage".|CJEU - C‑507/23 - PTAC|24.}}


The wording "infringement of this Regulation" does not appear precise, as it seems to be also the case under [[Article 83 GDPR]] (see the respective [[Article 83 GDPR|Commentary]]). According to the Recital 146 sentence 5 GDPR, Article 82 GDPR also allows claims for damages for infringements of "''delegated and implementing acts adopted in accordance with this Regulation and Member State law specifying rules of this Regulation''".<ref>Cf. also, for example, ''Zanfir-Fortuna'', in Kuner et al, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 82 GDPR, p. 1175. (Oxford University Press 2020) (accessed 13 August 2021); ''Quaas'', in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 14 (Beck 2020, 36th ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021); ''Nemitz'', in Ehmann/Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 9 (Beck 2018, 2nd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref>
It should also be noted that the GDPR does not contain any provision defining the rules on the assessment of damages suffered under Article 82 GDPR. Therefore, it is up to the national legal order of each Member State to establish the respective procedural rules, i.e. rules for assessing the amount of compensation due must be described in the legal system of each member state. National courts must apply those domestic rules regarding the amount of any financial compensation, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness of EU law are observed, meaning that the national law must provide for a full and effective compensation of the damages suffered.<ref name=":0">CJEU, Case C-507/23, ''PTAC'', 4 October 2024, margin number 31-34 (available [[CJEU - C‑507/23 - PTAC|here]]).</ref>  


==== Material or Immaterial Damage Suffered ====
{{Quote-CJEU|"[...] it should be noted that the GDPR does not contain any provision intended to define the rules on the assessment of the damages to which a data subject, within the meaning of Article 4(1) [GDPR], may be entitled under Article 82 thereof, where an infringement of that regulation has caused him or her harm. Therefore, in the absence of rules of EU law governing the matter, it is for the legal system of each Member State to prescribe the detailed rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Article 82 and, in particular, the criteria for determining the extent of the compensation payable in that context, subject to compliance with those principles of equivalence and effectiveness [...]".|CJEU - C-300/21 - Österreichische Post AG|54.}}
According to the clear wording of Article 82 GDPR, damage must have occurred in order to justify a claim for damages. This reading is in line with Recital 146 sentence 1 GDPR: "''compensate any damage which a person may suffer as a result of processing [...]''."


This requirement is nevertheless not uncontroversial. For example, ''Zanfir-Fortuna'' predicted that under the civil law systems of some member states – especially in the case of non-material damages – there could be a question of whether a breach of the regulation without proof of quantifiable damage is sufficient for a damage claim.<ref>''Zanfir-Fortuna'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 82 GDPR, p. 1175 et seq. (Oxford University Press 2020) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref> This question is currently before the ECJ for preliminary decision ([[OGH - 6Ob35/21x (request for preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU)|OGH - 6Ob35/21x]]).  
That being said, Article 82(1) makes reference to two different kinds of damages: material and non-material.


The question of whether there must be an infringement at all cannot be clearly distinguished from the substantive requirements for damage:
Material damages are any ''out of pocket'' loss caused by a violation of the GDPR. They are usually forms of ''secondary harm'' (such as the loss of a job, the damage from having a contract denied or the damage from price discrimination), that are indirectly caused by a violation of the data subject's rights under GDPR. Out of pocket losses can be objectively quantified in economic terms and this makes the damage ‘material’.


Recital 146 sentence 3 GDPR proves that the concept of harm should be interpreted broadly: "''The concept of damage should be broadly interpreted in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice in a manner which fully reflects the objectives of this Regulation.''" An elementary objective of the GDPR is effectiveness. This becomes particularly clear in view of the wording in Recital 146 sentence 6 GDPR, according to which not only "''full''" but also "''effective''" compensation has to be paid.
Non-material damages are the emotional damage caused by the illegal processing of personal data itself. There is no objective value of emotional damages and it will be up to the civil courts to quantify these damages. '''(FN)''' This problem is not specific to the GDPR, as also other emotional damages (e.g. ‘pain and suffering’) exist and are mainly determined by case law. Traditionally, different Member States have very different approaches when it comes to the calculation of emotional damages. This makes it very hard not only to predict exact amounts but also to harmonise the matter at the European level. ('''FN''') The specific requirements for the occurrence of non-material damages are therefore unclear. For example, it has been argued that making personal data accessible to third parties without their consent may constitute non-material damage due to the inherent public exposure.<ref>''Nemitz'', in Ehmann, Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 13 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition).</ref> A frequent issue is whether the mere loss of control over personal data, such as e.g. in a data breach, could entail non-material damage. Given these interpretative difficulties, several cases concerning the notion of non-material damage are currently pending before the CJEU. ('''FN''')
===== No minimum threshold =====
As stated above, the calculation of the extend of damages and its (financial) compensation is subject to Member State's domestic legal system applied by national courts, provided such compensation is full and effective and in line with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.<ref name=":0" />


The specific requirements for the occurrence of damage are unclear. For example, it is argued with regard to non-material damage that making personal data accessible to third parties without their consent may constitute non-material damage due to the inherent public exposure.<ref>Cf. ''Nemitz'', in Ehmann/Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 13 (Beck 2018, 2nd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref>
In connection with the principle of effectiveness, Recital 146 GDPR should be kept in mind which reads: "The concept of damage should be broadly interpreted in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice in a manner which fully reflects the objectives of this Regulation." and "Data subjects should receive full and effective compensation for the damage they have suffered". For the compensation to be full and effective, a financial compensation must be compensated ''in its entirety''. This precludes any national law provisions (and practices) that make the compensation for (non-material) damages subject to the condition that the damage suffered has reached a certain degree of seriousness.<ref>CJEU, Case C‑300/21, ''Österreichische Post'', 4 May 2023, margin number 51 and 58 (available [[CJEU - C-300/21 - Österreichische Post AG|here]]).</ref>


The term “damage” must be interpreted in accordance with Union law, which also follows indirectly from Recital 146 sentence 4 GDPR ("''without prejudice to any claims for damage deriving from the violation of other rules in Union or Member State law''").<ref>See only ''Bergt'', in Kühling/Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 15 (Beck 2020, 3rd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref> Other readings, which we tend to disagree with, seem to put more emphasis on the national law. For example, some seem to apply the case law of the German Federal Court of Justice, according to which non-material damages in the case of violations of personality rights can only be considered in the case of a serious violation of personality rights, is methodologically erroneous (see under ''Germany: "minimal damages''").<ref>But so, for example, ''Gola/Piltz'' in Gola, DS-GVO, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 10 (Beck 2018, 2nd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref>
The Germany practice favoured by many scholars and some courts regarding “''minimal violations''” (''Bagatellverstoß'') that do not give rise to damages under GDPR is therefore not compatible with EU law. Article 82 GDPR does not foresee such an exception for “''minimal violations''” and there is no opening clause that would allow national law or case law to create such an exception.  


===== Material damages=====
{{Quote-CJEU|"Making compensation for non-material damage subject to a certain threshold of seriousness would risk undermining the coherence of the rules established by the GDPR, since the graduation of such a threshold, on which the possibility or otherwise of obtaining that compensation would depend, would be liable to fluctuate according to the assessment of the courts seised.
Material damages are any "out of pocket" loss that are causes by a violation of the GDPR. They are usually forms of ''secondary harm'' (such as the loss of a job, the damage from having a contract denied or the damage from price discrimination), that are indirectly caused by a violation of the data subject's rights under GDPR. Out of pocket losses can be objectively quantified.


===== Non-Material damages=====
[...]
Non-material damages are the emotional damage of the illegal processing of personal data itself. There is no objective value of emotional damages and it will be up to the case law of civil courts to quantify these damages. This is not specific to GDPR, as also other emotional damages (e.g. pain and suffering) are mainly following case law. Traditionally different Member States have very different case law when it comes to calculating emotional damages. This makes it very hard to predict exact amounts.


===== Germany: "minimal" damages? =====
The fact remains that the interpretation thus adopted cannot be understood as meaning that a person concerned by an infringement of the GDPR which had negative consequences for him or her would be relieved of the need to demonstrate that those consequences constitute non-material damage within the meaning of Article 82 of that regulation."|CJEU - C-300/21 - Österreichische Post AG|49 et seq.}}{{Quote-CJEU|"[...] Article 82(1) of the GDPR does not require that, following a proven infringement of provisions of that regulation, the damage alleged by the data subject must reach a ‘de minimis threshold’ in order to give rise to a right to compensation [...]"|CJEU - Joined Cases C‑182/22 and C‑189/22 - Scalable Capital|44.}}
In Germany, many scholars and some courts take the view that "minimal violations" (''Bagatellverstoß'') do not give rise to damages under GDPR. In effect this would man that Article 82 does not apply, unless a certain threshold is met. There is no clear indication how this alleged threshold is defined.


This legal view seems to be solely based on a German legal tradition to limit non-material damages. Under the German BDSG (implementing Directive 95/46/EC) there was no non-material damages in the private sector at all. There is also a limit under German civil law protection of the right to privacy (''Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht''). The German debate is often connected with the option under German law that lawyers may be able charge for cease and desist letters (''Abmahnungen'').
This means that if even if a damage is rather small and not particularly serious, national courts have to award compensations that compensate the damage suffered in full - even if this leads to a minimal (financial) compensation.<ref>CJEU, Case C-507/23, ''PTAC'', 4 October 2024, margin number 35 (available [https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?title=CJEU_-_C%E2%80%91507/23_-_PTAC here]); CJEU Joint Cases C-182/22 and C-189/22, ''Scalable Capital'', 20 June 2024, margin number 46 (available [[CJEU - Joined Cases C‑182/22 and C‑189/22 - Scalable Capital|here]]). </ref>


Article 82 GDPR does not foresee an exception for "minimal violations" and there is no opening clause that would allow national law or case law to create such an exception. To the contrary, Recital 146 GDPR clarifies:
{{Quote-CJEU|"[...] where the damage suffered by the data subject is not serious, a national court may compensate for it by awarding minimal compensation to that person, provided that the small amount of damages thus granted is such as to offset in full that damage [...]".|CJEU - C‑507/23 - PTAC|35.}}


::"''The concept of damage should be broadly interpreted in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice in a manner which fully reflects the objectives of this Regulation.''" and "''Data subjects should receive full and effective compensation for the damage they have suffered.''"
In one case, the CJEU held that - where so provided by national law - an apology could constitute a compensation for non-material damages, provided that such an apology complies with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, in particular, it must compensate the suffered damage in full: 


The German interpretation therefore seems to be a clear violation of GDPR - as EU law may never be interpreted under national law, but solely based on European law. Hopefully, the debate will find a conclusive solution in the near future by the ECJ in the context of a pending preliminary ruling procedure ([[OGH - 6Ob35/21x (request for preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU)|OGH - 6Ob35/21x]]).
{{Quote-CJEU|" [...] Article 82(1) of the GDPR does not preclude the making of an apology from being able to constitute standalone or supplementary compensation for non-material damage, as laid down in the present case in Article 14 of the Law of 2005, provided that such a form of compensation complies with those principles of equivalence and effectiveness, in particular in that it must serve to compensate in full the non-material damage that has actually been suffered as a result of the infringement of that regulation, which it is for the national court before which the case has been brought to ascertain, taking account of the circumstances of each individual case."|CJEU - C‑507/23 - PTAC|36.}}


==== Damage Amount ====
===== No punitive function =====
With recourse to Recital 146 sentence 3 GDPR (see above), a dissuasive effect of the claim for damages is stipulated for the assessment of the amount of the damage.  
The purpose of this provision lies in the compensation of any damage suffered. This does not include the payment of any punitive damages.<ref>CJEU, Case C-507/23, ''PTAC'', 4 October 2024, margin number 34 with further references (available [[CJEU - C‑507/23 - PTAC|here]]).</ref>


According to this, on the one hand, a broad interpretation is required in compliance with the case law of the ECJ, and on the other hand, the objective of taking into account the objectives of the GDPR as fully as possible must be observed.<ref>''Nemitz,'' in Ehmann/Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 18 (Beck 2018, 2nd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref>
{{Quote-CJEU|"Having regard to the exclusively compensatory, rather than punitive, function fulfilled by that right to compensation, the gravity of such an infringement cannot influence the amount of damages granted under Article 82(1) and that amount cannot be set at a level that exceeds full compensation for that damage [...] Only the damage actually suffered by the data subject must be taken into consideration in order to determine the amount of such monetary compensation [...].


In this context, a certain sensitivity is required in particular for non-material damages, which is justified not least by the general function of damages for pain and suffering, namely a function of satisfaction and dissuasion.<ref>''Quaas,'' in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 31 (Beck 2020, 36th ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021); ''Nemitz'', in Ehmann/Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 18 (Beck 2018, 2nd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref>


==== Burden of Proof ====
[...]
The burden of proof is determined by general rules of Union law.  


The burden of proof is on the party who presents the facts favourable to them. The legislator has provided for an explicit reversal of the burden of proof for the "responsibility" according to paragraph 3.


However, it is discussed whether a general reversal of the burden of proof for all requirements of a claim for damages could be derived from the accountability obligation from [[Article 5 GDPR|Article 5(2) GDPR]].<ref>''Geissler/Ströbel'', Datenschutzrechtliche Schadensersatzansprüche im Musterfeststellungsverfahre, NJW 2019, 3414, 3415; so probably also ''Wybitul/Haß/Albrecht'', Abwehr von Schadensersatzansprüchen nach der Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, NJW 2018, 113, 116.</ref> This cannot be followed in this sweeping manner. However, it would probably also be too short-sighted to speak only of "facilitations" by [[Article 5 GDPR|Article 5(2) GDPR]].<ref>''Quaas,'' in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 16 (Beck 2020, 36th ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref> In light of [[Article 5 GDPR|Article 5(2) GDPR]], a reversal of burden of proof for the infringement may well be considered. However, it may be doubted whether this also extends to the other requirements, in particular to the damage. Otherwise, the reversal of the burden of proof expressly provided for in paragraph 3 would be superfluous. Therefore, it can be assumed that the legislator did not assume a general reversal of the burden of proof. However, it should not be ignored that [[Article 5 GDPR|Article 5(2) GDPR]] aims to do justice to the often lacking knowledge of the damaged party of internal processes of the damaging party. It is already in line with general principles that such a lack of knowledge is to be compensated under the law of evidence.<ref>See ''Nemitz,'' in Ehmann/Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 21 (Beck 2018, 2nd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref>
Likewise, there would be a lack of observance of the exclusively compensatory function of Article 82(1) if the controller’s attitude and motivation were taken into account in order to determine the form of compensation granted on the basis of that provision or in order to award redress that is ‘smaller’ than full compensation for the damage suffered by the data subject [...]".|CJEU - C‑507/23 - PTAC|43 et seq.}}   


==== Competition with Other Claims ====
==== Right to compensation and burden of proof ====
Recital 146 sentence 4 GDPR deals with competition with other claims. A claim under Article 82 GDPR stands alongside potential other claims under Union or Member State law and is not affected by them. Conversely, this also means that data protection violations can in principle lead to claims for damages under Member State (general) civil law rules.<ref>Cf. ''Quaas,'' in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 8 et seqq. (Beck 2020, 36th ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021); ''Nemitz'', in Ehmann/Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 7 (Beck 2018, 2nd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref>
Like any other element of material law, the right to compensation is subject to the rules on burden of proof. As a general rule, it falls upon the party who presents the facts favourable to them. Each element of the right to compensation - infringement, damage and causal link - should thus be proved by the person damaged.


=== (2) Involvement, Causality and Specific Liability Requirements for Processors ===
It has been discussed whether a general reversal of the burden of proof for all requirements of a claim for damages could be derived from the accountability obligation enshrined in Article 5(2) GDPR.<ref>Geissler, Ströbel, Datenschutzrechtliche Schadensersatzansprüche im Musterfeststellungsverfahre, in NJW, 72 (2019) p.3415; Similar opinion by Wybitul/Haß/Albrecht, Abwehr von Schadensersatzansprüchen nach der Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, NJW, 71 (2018) p. 116.</ref> This theory is not totally convincing. In light of Article 5(2) GDPR, a reversal of burden of proof for the infringement may be reasonable. However, is doubtful whether this also extends to the other requirements. Therefore, it can be assumed that the legislator did not provide for a general reversal of the burden of proof.
Paragraph 2 contains another basic requirement for liability, namely causality. Moreover, a processor is only liable if one of the additional requirements set out in the second sentence are met.
By contrast, the legislator established an explicit reversal of the burden of proof for the responsibility requirement (subjective requirement of the damage) mentioned by Article 82(3), to which we refer.
=== (2) Liability requirements for controllers and processors ===


Both sentences first establish a prerequisite that applies regardless of the classification as controller or processor, the causality between breach and damage. This is also clear from Recital 146 sentence 1 GDPR: “''compensate any damage which a person may suffer as a result of processing […]''”. As for the entire Article 82 GDPR, care must be taken to ensure effective application of European law (principle of equivalence and effectiveness). Recourse to ECJ case law on antitrust damages is likely to be appropriate.<ref>''Quaas'', in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 26 (Beck 2020, 36th ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref>
==== Controllers and processors ====
The first sentence of Article 82(2) states that a controller involved in processing shall be liable for the damage caused by any conduct which infringes the GDPR. This means that each controller involved in a processing is in principle fully liable for the resulting damage. In this respect, it is sufficient that the controller can be regarded as the controller for the processing in question within the meaning of Article 4(7) GDPR.


The first sentence states that a controller involved in processing shall be liable for the damage caused by processing which infringes this Regulation. This means that each controller involved in a processing is in principle fully liable for the resulting damage.
According to the second sentence, a processor is liable for damage only in two cases: (1) it did not comply with obligations of the GDPR specifically directed to processors; (2) it acted outside or contrary to lawful instructions of the controller. The obligations of the GDPR specifically directed to processors include all provisions in which a processor is named as the norm addressee. It is irrelevant whether it is named alone or together with or as an alternative to the controller.<ref>See only ''Bergt,'' in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 27 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref> The obligation to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures according to Article 32(1) GDPR would be an example of such an obligation.<ref>On the lawfulness of instructions, see in particular ''Bergt'', in Kühling/Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin numbers 30, 36, 37 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref>


In this respect, it is sufficient that the controller can be regarded as the controller for the processing in question within the meaning of [[Article 4 GDPR|Article 4(7) GDPR]]. This is already made clear by the wording "any controller" in sentence 1 in contrast to "a processor" in sentence 2. In this respect, the controller is already “involved” when they engage a processor to process the data in question, irrespective of whether the processor complies with the instructions given by the controller.<ref>Different opinion ''Zanfir-Fortuna'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 82 GDPR, p. 1176. (Oxford University Press 2020) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref> Any other view would lead to an unacceptable shift of the insolvency risk, which is in particular not compatible with the dogmatic of paragraphs 4 and 5. It is correct that the controller should not be ultimately liable in the case described above. However, this result can also be achieved by a consistent application of paragraphs 4 and 5. If the injured party makes a claim against the controller, for example, the controller can fully indemnify the processor according to paragraph 5. In contrast to the opinion of ''Zanfir-Fortuna,'' the injured party is not burdened with the insolvency risk of the processor in this way, for which there would be no objective reason. After all, the controller initiated the processing.
It is also important to stress that, without prejudice to the processor's liability under Article 82(2), according to Article 28(10) GDPR a processor that infringes the Regulation by determining the purposes and means of processing becomes controller with regard to that processing and is consequently subject to liability rules applicable to controllers - including thus further liability.


According to the second sentence, a processor is only liable for damage in two cases: (1) it had not complied with obligations of the GDPR specifically directed to processors; (2) it had acted outside or contrary to lawful instructions of the controller.
==== Processing ====
 
On the basis of Article 82(2), some courts have argued that infringements giving rise to damages are only those involving a "processing". Recital 146 sentence 1 GDPR is usually cited in this regard, too, as it states that “''the controller or processor should compensate any damage which a person may suffer as a result of processing that infringes this Regulation''”. However, this seems to be a weak argument. Article 82 GDPR aims at providing damaged persons with full and effective protection through a compensatory remedy. Limiting such a remedy to infringements that are based on a processing would exclude situations that entail serious negative consequences on the legal position of data subjects, such as unanswered access requests where the lack of a reply hinders the rights and interests of the person requesting the information. The problem here is similar to the one already addressed in the context of Article 77(1) GDPR. Therefore, we refer to that part of this commentary.
The obligations of the GDPR specifically directed to processors include all provisions in which a processor is named as the norm addressee. It is irrelevant whether it is named alone or together with or as an alternative to the controller.<ref>See only ''Bergt,'' in Kühling/Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 27 (Beck 2020, 3rd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref> The obligation to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures according to Article 32(1) GDPR may be mentioned here as an example.  
 
On the lawfulness of instructions, see in particular ''Bergt'', in Kühling/Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin numbers 30, 36, 37 (Beck 2020, 3rd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).


=== (3) Presumed Responsibility===
=== (3) Presumed Responsibility===
Paragraph 3 introduces a further prerequisite (“responsible”) for the claim for damages, which should mean something like intent and negligence.
Article 82(3) GDPR introduces a further prerequisite (“''responsible''”) for the claim for damages, which should mean something like intent and negligence. Article 82(3) GDPR also contains a reversal of the burden of proof with regard to “''responsibility''”. Responsibility is presumedition The purely dogmatic dispute as to whether the provision should rather be qualified as strict liability with the possibility of exculpation is practically irrelevant and can be left aside.<ref>''Bergt'', in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 51 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref> Only if the controller or processor proves (i.e. bears the full burden of proof) that they are not responsible “''in any way''" for the damage that has occurred, there is exceptionally no liability. This is confirmed by Recital 146 sentence 2 GDPR.
 
Paragraph 3 also contains a reversal of the burden of proof with regard to "responsibility". Responsibility is presumed. The purely dogmatic dispute as to whether the provision should rather be qualified as strict liability with the possibility of exculpation is practically irrelevant and can be left aside.<ref>''Bergt'', in Kühling/Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 51 (Beck 2020, 3rd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref> Only if the controller or processor proves (i.e. bears the full burden of proof) that they are not responsible “in any way" for the damage that has occurred, there is exceptionally no liability. This is confirmed by Recital 146 sentence 2 GDPR.


The examples listed by ''Zanfir-Fortuna'' in which responsibility should be omitted seem incorrect.<ref>''Zanfir-Fortuna'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 82 GDPR, p. 1176. (Oxford University Press 2020) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref> The first example given is: "''Controllers prove that they are not controllers of the unlawful processing''". If this proof succeeds, the proving party would already not be considered as a controller. The second example (which is a mirror image of the third example) is also unconvincing: "''Damage was caused by a processor acting outside of or contrary to the mandate received by the controller''". Here, too, the liability requirement of paragraph 2 would already cease to apply (especially if the controller could not foresee or control the processor’s wrongdoing)., so that without paragraph 3 a claim for damages would not come into consideration. Moreover, this view is not convincing from the point of view of creditor protection (see in detail under ''(2) Involvement, causality and special liability requirements for processors)''. These examples suggest that ''Zanfir-Fortuna'' understands paragraph 3 as a general reversal of the burden of proof to paragraphs 1 and 2, which is not the case (see above ''Burden of Proof'').
The examples listed by Zanfir-Fortuna in which responsibility should be omitted seem incorrect.<ref>''Zanfir-Fortuna'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 82 GDPR, p. 1176. (Oxford University Press 2020).</ref> The first example given is: ''Controllers prove that they are not controllers of the unlawful processing''. If this proof succeeds, the proving party would already not be considered as a controller. The second example (which is a mirror image of the third example) is also unconvincing: ''Damage was caused by a processor acting outside of or contrary to the mandate received by the controller''. Here, too, the liability requirement of Article 82(2) GDPR would already cease to apply (especially if the controller could not foresee or control the processor’s wrongdoing) so that without Article 82(3) GDPR, a claim for damages would not come into consideration. Moreover, this view is not convincing from the point of view of creditor protection (see in detail under ''(2) Involvement, causality and special liability requirements for processors)''. These examples suggest that Zanfir-Fortuna understands Article 82(3) GDPR as a general reversal of the burden of proof to paragraphs 1 and 2, which is not the case (see above ''Burden of Proof'').


''Nemitz'' points out that the exemption from liability only applies if the respective controller or processor can prove a fault rate of 0 percent. In practice, this means that either there must not be a causal connection between the violation of the GDPR and the damage or that the violation is only based on an unavoidable event.<ref>''Nemitz'', in Ehmann/Selmayr, Data Protection Regulation, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 7 (Beck 2018, 2nd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref> The liability system of paragraphs 4 and 5 must be applied to everything else because of the otherwise unfairly distributed insolvency risk (see previous paragraph).  
''Nemitz'' points out that the exemption from liability only applies if the respective controller or processor can prove a fault rate of 0 percent. In practice, this means that either there must not be a causal connection between the violation of the GDPR and the damage or that the violation is only based on an unavoidable event.<ref>''Nemitz'', in Ehmann, Selmayr, Data Protection Regulation, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 7 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition).</ref> The liability system of Article 82(4) and (5) GDPR must be applied to everything else because of the otherwise unfairly distributed insolvency risk (see previous paragraph).


=== (4) Liability in the Case of Multiple Damaging Parties (Joint Liability)===
=== (4) Liability in the Case of Multiple Damaging Parties (Joint Liability)===
Paragraph 4 contains a special rule for the case where there are several damaging parties (cf. also Recital 146 sentence 7 GDPR).
Article 82(4) GDPR contains a special rule for the case where there are several damaging parties (cf. also Recital 146 sentence 7 GDPR). The provision contains the addition at the end “''in order to ensure effective compensation of the data subject''”. Therefore, the provision itself contains a justification that has become substantive law. In this respect, it must be considered even more sharply in interpreting the provision than, for example, the intention of the legislature, which can only be inferred from recitals or other regulatory material. The provision must therefore be interpreted in a particularly damaged-party friendly and thus broad manner.
 
The provision contains the addition at the end "in order to ensure effective compensation of the data subject". The provision itself therefore contains a justification that has become substantive law. In this respect, it must be taken into account even more sharperly in interpreting the provision than, for example, the intention of the legislature, which can only be inferred from recitals or other regulatory material. The provision must therefore be interpreted in a particularly damaged party-friendly and thus broad manner.


According to paragraph 4, each damaging party is liable for the entire damage suffered by the damaged party. This means that in the external relationship there are no restrictions based on the level of “involvement” in the respective processing. All damaging parties are liable without limitation as joint debtors. This also corresponds to the aforementioned regulatory background of the provision. The damaged party's chances of compensation are increased by the increase in the number of persons liable (lower risk of insolvency). The compensation in the internal relationship is regulated in paragraph 5.
According to Article 82(4) GDPR, each damaging party is liable for the entire damage suffered by the damaged party. This means that in the external relationship there are no restrictions based on the level of “''involvement''” in the respective processing. All damaging parties are liable without limitation as joint debtors. This also corresponds to the aforementioned regulatory background of the provision. The damaged party's chances of compensation are increased by the increase in the number of persons liable (lower risk of insolvency). The compensation in the internal relationship is regulated in Article 82(5) GDPR.


It is the sole decision of the damaged party whether to claim one damaging parties or all of them.<ref>''Bergt'', in Kühling/Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 57 (Beck 2020, 3rd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref>
It is the sole decision of the damaged party whether to claim one damaging parties or all of them.<ref>''Bergt'', in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 57 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref> The provision clarifies that it is irrelevant whether several controllers and processors, or a mixture of both are involved in the processing leading to damage. This makes it clear that the processor is not liable in a subsidiary manner to the controller. The “''involvement''” corresponds to that of Article 82(2) GDPR. However, for a majority of the damaging parties to exist at all, the aforementioned requirements of Article 82(2) and (3) GDPR must be fulfilled in addition to the “''involvement''”.


The provision clarifies that it is irrelevant whether several controllers, several processors or a mixture of both are involved in the processing leading to damage. This makes it clear that the processor is not liable in a subsidiary manner to the controller.
The meaning of Recital 146 sentence 8 GDPR is uncertain. Proportionate judicial recourse to the damaging parties seems to contradict Article 82(4) GDPR, according to which all damaging parties are liable for the full amount. Moreover, the application of the provision presupposes that a ''pro rata'' claim against joint damaging parties is possible at all. In this respect, Bergt correctly points out that a ''pro rata'' conviction is only justifiable if the joint conviction takes effect immediately if a party convicted ''pro rata'' does not pay voluntarily within a short period of time. This is because the expense of enforcement measures against several damaging parties, possibly even abroad, stands in the way of effective and complete compensation.<ref>''Bergt,'' in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 58 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).</ref>
 
The “involvement” corresponds to that of paragraph 2. However, in order for a majority of the damaging parties to exist at all, the aforementioned requirements of paragraphs 2 and 3 must be fulfilled in addition to the "involvement".
 
The meaning of Recital 146 sentence 8 GDPR is questionable. Proportionate judicial recourse to the damaging parties seems to contradict paragraph 4, according to which all damaging parties are liable for the full amount. Moreover, the application of the provision presupposes that a pro rata claim against joint damaging parties is possible at all. In this respect, ''Bergt'' correctly points out that a pro rata conviction is only justifiable if the joint conviction takes effect immediately in the event that a party convicted pro rata does not pay voluntarily within a short period of time. This is because the expense of enforcement measures against several damaging parties, possibly even abroad, stands in the way of effective and complete compensation.<ref>''Bergt,'' in Kühling/Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 58 (Beck 2020, 3rd ed.) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref>


=== (5) Internal Compensation in Cases of Joint Liability===
=== (5) Internal Compensation in Cases of Joint Liability===
Paragraph 5 regulates the compensation of damages paid in the case of multiple damaging parties (internal relationship). As seen, all damaging parties can be held liable for the entire damage in the external relationship (paragraph 4). In the internal relationship, however, the damaging parties should only be liable proportionally, as otherwise there would be material injustice. This idea is also reflected in Recital 146 sentence 9 GDPR.
Article 82(5) GDPR also regulates the compensation of damages paid in the case of multiple damaging parties. However, this paragraph addresses the problem from the angle of the internal relationship between damaging parties. As seen, all damaging parties can be held liable for the entire damage in the external relationship (Article 82(4) GDPR). In the internal relationship, however, the damaging parties should only be liable proportionally proportionally to their involvement in the unlawful activity, as otherwise there would be material injustice. This is why the person who has been held liable can demand compensation from the other damaging parties. This idea is also reflected in Recital 146 sentence 9 GDPR, which mentions ‘''recourse proceedings''’ against other controllers or processors involved in the same processing. In this context, it is once again established that – not differently from Article 82(4) GDPR processors and controllers are on the same level in terms of liability, even within their internal relationship. The only differentiation stems from their different obligations under the material part of the GDPR and the controller-processor agreement pursuant to Article 28 GDPR.
 
The person who has been held liable can demand compensation from the other damaging parties. In this context, it is once again established - in a mirror image of Article 82(4) GDPR - that processors and controllers are on the same level in terms of liability, even in the internal relationship.  
 
The liability ratio shall be determined according to the causation contributions to be determined in accordance with paragraph 2. Liability may also be 100 to 0 (see above).  


=== (6) Court Proceedings and Competent Court===
=== (6) Court Proceedings and Competent Court===
Paragraph 6 first states that claims for damages must be brought before the courts (and are not determined by the supervisory authorities).
Article 82(6) GDPR states that claims for damages must be brought before courts and therefore they are not determined by the supervisory authorities. For the respective jurisdiction of the courts, reference is made to Article 79(2) GDPR (see also the respective commentary).
 
For the respective jurisdiction of the courts, reference is made to [[Article 79 GDPR|Article 79(2) GDPR]] (see also the respective [[Article 79 GDPR|commentary]]).
 
Recital 147 GDPR makes clear the ''lex specialis'' relationship with other provisions that also regulate jurisdiction, in particular with regard to damages proceedings. However, it has also been argued that the rules of the Brussels I Regulation should continue to apply to the extent that they are applicable with the GDPR.<ref>''Zanfir-Fortuna'', in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 82 GDPR, p. 1177. (Oxford University Press 2020) (accessed 13 August 2021).</ref>
 
=== Other forms of monetary relief ===
In addition to damages under Article 82 GDPR, there may be other civil law or contractual claims that a data subject may rely on.
 
For example, many jurisdictions foresee that unlawful profits must be given back ("unjust enrichment").
 
GDPR does not regulate such other civil law claims, that may apply in parallel to Article 82.


== Decisions ==
== Decisions ==

Latest revision as of 10:37, 18 October 2024

Article 82 - Right to compensation and liability
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Chapter 10: Delegated and implementing acts

Legal Text


Article 82 - Right to compensation and liability

1. Any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a result of an infringement of this Regulation shall have the right to receive compensation from the controller or processor for the damage suffered.

2. Any controller involved in processing shall be liable for the damage caused by processing which infringes this Regulation. A processor shall be liable for the damage caused by processing only where it has not complied with obligations of this Regulation specifically directed to processors or where it has acted outside or contrary to lawful instructions of the controller.

3. A controller or processor shall be exempt from liability under paragraph 2 if it proves that it is not in any way responsible for the event giving rise to the damage.

4. Where more than one controller or processor, or both a controller and a processor, are involved in the same processing and where they are, under paragraphs 2 and 3, responsible for any damage caused by processing, each controller or processor shall be held liable for the entire damage in order to ensure effective compensation of the data subject.

5. Where a controller or processor has, in accordance with paragraph 4, paid full compensation for the damage suffered, that controller or processor shall be entitled to claim back from the other controllers or processors involved in the same processing that part of the compensation corresponding to their part of responsibility for the damage, in accordance with the conditions set out in paragraph 2.

6. Court proceedings for exercising the right to receive compensation shall be brought before the courts competent under the law of the Member State referred to in Article 79(2).

Relevant Recitals

Recital 75: Risks to the Rights and Freedoms of Natural Persons
The risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, of varying likelihood and severity, may result from personal data processing which could lead to physical, material or non-material damage, in particular: where the processing may give rise to discrimination, identity theft or fraud, financial loss, damage to the reputation, loss of confidentiality of personal data protected by professional secrecy, unauthorised reversal of pseudonymisation, or any other significant economic or social disadvantage; where data subjects might be deprived of their rights and freedoms or prevented from exercising control over their personal data; where personal data are processed which reveal racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religion or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, data concerning health or data concerning sex life or criminal convictions and offences or related security measures; where personal aspects are evaluated, in particular analysing or predicting aspects concerning performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences or interests, reliability or behaviour, location or movements, in order to create or use personal profiles; where personal data of vulnerable natural persons, in particular of children, are processed; or where processing involves a large amount of personal data and affects a large number of data subjects.

Recital 85: Notification Reasons and Timeframe
A personal data breach may, if not addressed in an appropriate and timely manner, result in physical, material or non-material damage to natural persons such as loss of control over their personal data or limitation of their rights, discrimination, identity theft or fraud, financial loss, unauthorised reversal of pseudonymisation, damage to reputation, loss of confidentiality of personal data protected by professional secrecy or any other significant economic or social disadvantage to the natural person concerned. Therefore, as soon as the controller becomes aware that a personal data breach has occurred, the controller should notify the personal data breach to the supervisory authority without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of it, unless the controller is able to demonstrate, in accordance with the accountability principle, that the personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. Where such notification cannot be achieved within 72 hours, the reasons for the delay should accompany the notification and information may be provided in phases without undue further delay.

Recital 146: Claim for Damages
The controller or processor should compensate any damage which a person may suffer as a result of processing that infringes this Regulation. The controller or processor should be exempt from liability if it proves that it is not in any way responsible for the damage. The concept of damage should be broadly interpreted in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice in a manner which fully reflects the objectives of this Regulation. This is without prejudice to any claims for damage deriving from the violation of other rules in Union or Member State law. Processing that infringes this Regulation also includes processing that infringes delegated and implementing acts adopted in accordance with this Regulation and Member State law specifying rules of this Regulation. Data subjects should receive full and effective compensation for the damage they have suffered. Where controllers or processors are involved in the same processing, each controller or processor should be held liable for the entire damage. However, where they are joined to the same judicial proceedings, in accordance with Member State law, compensation may be apportioned according to the responsibility of each controller or processor for the damage caused by the processing, provided that full and effective compensation of the data subject who suffered the damage is ensured. Any controller or processor which has paid full compensation may subsequently institute recourse proceedings against other controllers or processors involved in the same processing.

Recital 147: Specific Rules on Jurisdiction
Where specific rules on jurisdiction are contained in this Regulation, in particular as regards proceedings seeking a judicial remedy including compensation, against a controller or processor, general jurisdiction rules such as those of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council should not prejudice the application of such specific rules.

Commentary

Article 82 GDPR introduces a right to compensation for damage caused as a result of an infringement of the GDPR. Article 82(1) contains the conditions for such a claim, which are to be interpreted in accordance with EU law. Such conditions include an infringement of the Regulation, the existence of a material or non-material negative consequence (the damage) and a causal link between these two elements.[1] The first paragraph also clarifies who can be active or passive subject of the claim.

Article 82(2) differentiates between controller and processor’s liability, mirroring the division of functions established by the GDPR. Article 82(3) regulates the burden of proof, excluding a strict liability regime. Article 82(4) and (5) GDPR set out rules concerning the liability relationships in the case of several damaging parties. According to Article 82(4) GDPR, each damaging party is liable vis-à-vis the damaged party for the entire amount (joint liability). Article 82(5) GDPR regulates the internal compensation between the damaging parties. Finally, Article 82(6) establishes the competence of courts to adjudicate on claims for damages, in accordance with applicable national law.

(1) Right to receive compensation

Article 82(1) of the GDPR stipulates that any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a result of an GDPR infringement has the right to receive compensation from the controller or processor for the damage suffered. The right to compensation is therefore subject to three cumulative conditions:

  1. an infringement of the provisions of the GDPR;
  2. the existence of ‘damage’, whether material or non-material which has been suffered; and
  3. the causal link between that damage and that infringement.


Article 82 GDPR – like almost all provisions of the GDPR – is directly applicable in all Member States without any act of implementation. Article 82 GDPR leaves the Member States no room for manoeuvre at all. Member State deviations that are not compatible with Article 82 GDPR must therefore – in accordance with the principle of the primacy of Union law – remain inapplicable.[2] In this context, it should also be pointed out that this provision is only to be interpreted according to Union law and not according to the law of the Member States. Emphasising this self-evident fact is necessary, as this is not always followed in the case law and literature of some Member States.[3]

However, as the CJEU has pointed out, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, it is for the national legal order of each Member State to establish procedural rules for actions intended to safeguard the rights of individuals. These rules must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and they must not make it excessively difficult or impossible in practice to exercise the rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness).[4] Among others, this is relevant for rules on the assessment of damages under the GDPR, since the GDPR itself does not provide for such rules.

Any person (who has suffered damage)

Article 82(1) GDPR identifies the person who is entitled to bring a claim for damages under the GDPR in very broad terms. The claimant can be “any person”. Therefore, according to the explicit wording, which is also congruent with Recital 146 sentence 1 of the GDPR, a person who is not a “data subject” can also be entitled to bring an action. We can imagine, for example, the case where a data breach affecting a data subject also entails monetary negative consequences for a third person whose data were not directly processed. It is disputed whether legal persons can also be damaged parties.[5]

From the controller or processor

Paragraph (1) also defines the personal scope of a claim with regard to its passive subject (the damaging entity). Only controllers and processors within the meaning of Article 4(7) and (8) GDPR can be liable for compensation.

Infringement of the GDPR

A claim for damages first requires an infringement of the GDPR.

Article 82 GDPR does not contain a catalogue of infringements that justify compensation. In this respect, any infringement of the GDPR, be it a right, an obligation or a principle fulfils this requirement. In particular, the infringement is not limited to violations of Chapter III ('Right of the Data Subject'). As a matter of fact, according to Recital 146 sentence 5 GDPR, Article 82 GDPR also allows claims for damages for infringements of “delegated and implementing acts adopted in accordance with this Regulation and Member State law specifying rules of this Regulation”.[6]

Material or non-material damage suffered

The second requirement for the right to compensation under Article 82(1) is the existence of a 'damage'.

According to the clear wording of Article 82 GDPR, damage must have occurred in order to justify a claim for damages. In its landmark judgement C-300/21, the CJEU clarified that 'damage' shall be clearly distinguishable from the infringement itself, to be compensated. A simple violation of the GDPR does not automatically give rise to a claim under Article 82(1). Defining the concept of damage is therefore of crucial importance in determining the existence of a right to compensation. A key objective of the GDPR is effectiveness. This becomes particularly clear with regard to damages in the wording of Recital 146 sentence 6 GDPR, according to which not only “full” but also “effective” compensation has to be paid. Therefore, the concept of damage is necessarily broad under the GDPR.[7]

CJEU-icon.png

"[The CJEU] has repeatedly interpreted Article 82(1) to the effect that mere infringement of that regulation is not sufficient to confer a right to compensation on that basis, since the existence of ‘damage’, whether material or non-material, or of ‘damage’ which has been ‘suffered’ constitutes one of the conditions for the right to compensation laid down in that provision, as does the existence of an infringement of the provisions of that regulation and of a causal link between that damage and that infringement, those three conditions being cumulative. Accordingly, the person seeking compensation for non-material damage on the basis of that provision is required to establish not only infringement of that regulation, but also that that infringement has actually caused him or her such damage".

CJEU - C‑507/23 - PTAC, margin number 24..


It should also be noted that the GDPR does not contain any provision defining the rules on the assessment of damages suffered under Article 82 GDPR. Therefore, it is up to the national legal order of each Member State to establish the respective procedural rules, i.e. rules for assessing the amount of compensation due must be described in the legal system of each member state. National courts must apply those domestic rules regarding the amount of any financial compensation, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness of EU law are observed, meaning that the national law must provide for a full and effective compensation of the damages suffered.[8]

CJEU-icon.png

"[...] it should be noted that the GDPR does not contain any provision intended to define the rules on the assessment of the damages to which a data subject, within the meaning of Article 4(1) [GDPR], may be entitled under Article 82 thereof, where an infringement of that regulation has caused him or her harm. Therefore, in the absence of rules of EU law governing the matter, it is for the legal system of each Member State to prescribe the detailed rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Article 82 and, in particular, the criteria for determining the extent of the compensation payable in that context, subject to compliance with those principles of equivalence and effectiveness [...]".

CJEU - C-300/21 - Österreichische Post AG, margin number 54..


That being said, Article 82(1) makes reference to two different kinds of damages: material and non-material.

Material damages are any out of pocket loss caused by a violation of the GDPR. They are usually forms of secondary harm (such as the loss of a job, the damage from having a contract denied or the damage from price discrimination), that are indirectly caused by a violation of the data subject's rights under GDPR. Out of pocket losses can be objectively quantified in economic terms and this makes the damage ‘material’.

Non-material damages are the emotional damage caused by the illegal processing of personal data itself. There is no objective value of emotional damages and it will be up to the civil courts to quantify these damages. (FN) This problem is not specific to the GDPR, as also other emotional damages (e.g. ‘pain and suffering’) exist and are mainly determined by case law. Traditionally, different Member States have very different approaches when it comes to the calculation of emotional damages. This makes it very hard not only to predict exact amounts but also to harmonise the matter at the European level. (FN) The specific requirements for the occurrence of non-material damages are therefore unclear. For example, it has been argued that making personal data accessible to third parties without their consent may constitute non-material damage due to the inherent public exposure.[9] A frequent issue is whether the mere loss of control over personal data, such as e.g. in a data breach, could entail non-material damage. Given these interpretative difficulties, several cases concerning the notion of non-material damage are currently pending before the CJEU. (FN)

No minimum threshold

As stated above, the calculation of the extend of damages and its (financial) compensation is subject to Member State's domestic legal system applied by national courts, provided such compensation is full and effective and in line with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.[8]

In connection with the principle of effectiveness, Recital 146 GDPR should be kept in mind which reads: "The concept of damage should be broadly interpreted in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice in a manner which fully reflects the objectives of this Regulation." and "Data subjects should receive full and effective compensation for the damage they have suffered". For the compensation to be full and effective, a financial compensation must be compensated in its entirety. This precludes any national law provisions (and practices) that make the compensation for (non-material) damages subject to the condition that the damage suffered has reached a certain degree of seriousness.[10]

The Germany practice favoured by many scholars and some courts regarding “minimal violations” (Bagatellverstoß) that do not give rise to damages under GDPR is therefore not compatible with EU law. Article 82 GDPR does not foresee such an exception for “minimal violations” and there is no opening clause that would allow national law or case law to create such an exception.

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"Making compensation for non-material damage subject to a certain threshold of seriousness would risk undermining the coherence of the rules established by the GDPR, since the graduation of such a threshold, on which the possibility or otherwise of obtaining that compensation would depend, would be liable to fluctuate according to the assessment of the courts seised.

[...]

The fact remains that the interpretation thus adopted cannot be understood as meaning that a person concerned by an infringement of the GDPR which had negative consequences for him or her would be relieved of the need to demonstrate that those consequences constitute non-material damage within the meaning of Article 82 of that regulation."

CJEU - C-300/21 - Österreichische Post AG, margin number 49 et seq..

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"[...] Article 82(1) of the GDPR does not require that, following a proven infringement of provisions of that regulation, the damage alleged by the data subject must reach a ‘de minimis threshold’ in order to give rise to a right to compensation [...]"

CJEU - Joined Cases C‑182/22 and C‑189/22 - Scalable Capital, margin number 44..


This means that if even if a damage is rather small and not particularly serious, national courts have to award compensations that compensate the damage suffered in full - even if this leads to a minimal (financial) compensation.[11]

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"[...] where the damage suffered by the data subject is not serious, a national court may compensate for it by awarding minimal compensation to that person, provided that the small amount of damages thus granted is such as to offset in full that damage [...]".

CJEU - C‑507/23 - PTAC, margin number 35..


In one case, the CJEU held that - where so provided by national law - an apology could constitute a compensation for non-material damages, provided that such an apology complies with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, in particular, it must compensate the suffered damage in full:

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" [...] Article 82(1) of the GDPR does not preclude the making of an apology from being able to constitute standalone or supplementary compensation for non-material damage, as laid down in the present case in Article 14 of the Law of 2005, provided that such a form of compensation complies with those principles of equivalence and effectiveness, in particular in that it must serve to compensate in full the non-material damage that has actually been suffered as a result of the infringement of that regulation, which it is for the national court before which the case has been brought to ascertain, taking account of the circumstances of each individual case."

CJEU - C‑507/23 - PTAC, margin number 36..


No punitive function

The purpose of this provision lies in the compensation of any damage suffered. This does not include the payment of any punitive damages.[12]

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"Having regard to the exclusively compensatory, rather than punitive, function fulfilled by that right to compensation, the gravity of such an infringement cannot influence the amount of damages granted under Article 82(1) and that amount cannot be set at a level that exceeds full compensation for that damage [...] Only the damage actually suffered by the data subject must be taken into consideration in order to determine the amount of such monetary compensation [...].


[...]


Likewise, there would be a lack of observance of the exclusively compensatory function of Article 82(1) if the controller’s attitude and motivation were taken into account in order to determine the form of compensation granted on the basis of that provision or in order to award redress that is ‘smaller’ than full compensation for the damage suffered by the data subject [...]".

CJEU - C‑507/23 - PTAC, margin number 43 et seq..


Right to compensation and burden of proof

Like any other element of material law, the right to compensation is subject to the rules on burden of proof. As a general rule, it falls upon the party who presents the facts favourable to them. Each element of the right to compensation - infringement, damage and causal link - should thus be proved by the person damaged.

It has been discussed whether a general reversal of the burden of proof for all requirements of a claim for damages could be derived from the accountability obligation enshrined in Article 5(2) GDPR.[13] This theory is not totally convincing. In light of Article 5(2) GDPR, a reversal of burden of proof for the infringement may be reasonable. However, is doubtful whether this also extends to the other requirements. Therefore, it can be assumed that the legislator did not provide for a general reversal of the burden of proof. By contrast, the legislator established an explicit reversal of the burden of proof for the responsibility requirement (subjective requirement of the damage) mentioned by Article 82(3), to which we refer.

(2) Liability requirements for controllers and processors

Controllers and processors

The first sentence of Article 82(2) states that a controller involved in processing shall be liable for the damage caused by any conduct which infringes the GDPR. This means that each controller involved in a processing is in principle fully liable for the resulting damage. In this respect, it is sufficient that the controller can be regarded as the controller for the processing in question within the meaning of Article 4(7) GDPR.

According to the second sentence, a processor is liable for damage only in two cases: (1) it did not comply with obligations of the GDPR specifically directed to processors; (2) it acted outside or contrary to lawful instructions of the controller. The obligations of the GDPR specifically directed to processors include all provisions in which a processor is named as the norm addressee. It is irrelevant whether it is named alone or together with or as an alternative to the controller.[14] The obligation to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures according to Article 32(1) GDPR would be an example of such an obligation.[15]

It is also important to stress that, without prejudice to the processor's liability under Article 82(2), according to Article 28(10) GDPR a processor that infringes the Regulation by determining the purposes and means of processing becomes controller with regard to that processing and is consequently subject to liability rules applicable to controllers - including thus further liability.

Processing

On the basis of Article 82(2), some courts have argued that infringements giving rise to damages are only those involving a "processing". Recital 146 sentence 1 GDPR is usually cited in this regard, too, as it states that “the controller or processor should compensate any damage which a person may suffer as a result of processing that infringes this Regulation”. However, this seems to be a weak argument. Article 82 GDPR aims at providing damaged persons with full and effective protection through a compensatory remedy. Limiting such a remedy to infringements that are based on a processing would exclude situations that entail serious negative consequences on the legal position of data subjects, such as unanswered access requests where the lack of a reply hinders the rights and interests of the person requesting the information. The problem here is similar to the one already addressed in the context of Article 77(1) GDPR. Therefore, we refer to that part of this commentary.

(3) Presumed Responsibility

Article 82(3) GDPR introduces a further prerequisite (“responsible”) for the claim for damages, which should mean something like intent and negligence. Article 82(3) GDPR also contains a reversal of the burden of proof with regard to “responsibility”. Responsibility is presumedition The purely dogmatic dispute as to whether the provision should rather be qualified as strict liability with the possibility of exculpation is practically irrelevant and can be left aside.[16] Only if the controller or processor proves (i.e. bears the full burden of proof) that they are not responsible “in any way" for the damage that has occurred, there is exceptionally no liability. This is confirmed by Recital 146 sentence 2 GDPR.

The examples listed by Zanfir-Fortuna in which responsibility should be omitted seem incorrect.[17] The first example given is: “Controllers prove that they are not controllers of the unlawful processing”. If this proof succeeds, the proving party would already not be considered as a controller. The second example (which is a mirror image of the third example) is also unconvincing: “Damage was caused by a processor acting outside of or contrary to the mandate received by the controller”. Here, too, the liability requirement of Article 82(2) GDPR would already cease to apply (especially if the controller could not foresee or control the processor’s wrongdoing) so that without Article 82(3) GDPR, a claim for damages would not come into consideration. Moreover, this view is not convincing from the point of view of creditor protection (see in detail under (2) Involvement, causality and special liability requirements for processors). These examples suggest that Zanfir-Fortuna understands Article 82(3) GDPR as a general reversal of the burden of proof to paragraphs 1 and 2, which is not the case (see above Burden of Proof).

Nemitz points out that the exemption from liability only applies if the respective controller or processor can prove a fault rate of 0 percent. In practice, this means that either there must not be a causal connection between the violation of the GDPR and the damage or that the violation is only based on an unavoidable event.[18] The liability system of Article 82(4) and (5) GDPR must be applied to everything else because of the otherwise unfairly distributed insolvency risk (see previous paragraph).

(4) Liability in the Case of Multiple Damaging Parties (Joint Liability)

Article 82(4) GDPR contains a special rule for the case where there are several damaging parties (cf. also Recital 146 sentence 7 GDPR). The provision contains the addition at the end “in order to ensure effective compensation of the data subject”. Therefore, the provision itself contains a justification that has become substantive law. In this respect, it must be considered even more sharply in interpreting the provision than, for example, the intention of the legislature, which can only be inferred from recitals or other regulatory material. The provision must therefore be interpreted in a particularly damaged-party friendly and thus broad manner.

According to Article 82(4) GDPR, each damaging party is liable for the entire damage suffered by the damaged party. This means that in the external relationship there are no restrictions based on the level of “involvement” in the respective processing. All damaging parties are liable without limitation as joint debtors. This also corresponds to the aforementioned regulatory background of the provision. The damaged party's chances of compensation are increased by the increase in the number of persons liable (lower risk of insolvency). The compensation in the internal relationship is regulated in Article 82(5) GDPR.

It is the sole decision of the damaged party whether to claim one damaging parties or all of them.[19] The provision clarifies that it is irrelevant whether several controllers and processors, or a mixture of both are involved in the processing leading to damage. This makes it clear that the processor is not liable in a subsidiary manner to the controller. The “involvement” corresponds to that of Article 82(2) GDPR. However, for a majority of the damaging parties to exist at all, the aforementioned requirements of Article 82(2) and (3) GDPR must be fulfilled in addition to the “involvement”.

The meaning of Recital 146 sentence 8 GDPR is uncertain. Proportionate judicial recourse to the damaging parties seems to contradict Article 82(4) GDPR, according to which all damaging parties are liable for the full amount. Moreover, the application of the provision presupposes that a pro rata claim against joint damaging parties is possible at all. In this respect, Bergt correctly points out that a pro rata conviction is only justifiable if the joint conviction takes effect immediately if a party convicted pro rata does not pay voluntarily within a short period of time. This is because the expense of enforcement measures against several damaging parties, possibly even abroad, stands in the way of effective and complete compensation.[20]

(5) Internal Compensation in Cases of Joint Liability

Article 82(5) GDPR also regulates the compensation of damages paid in the case of multiple damaging parties. However, this paragraph addresses the problem from the angle of the internal relationship between damaging parties. As seen, all damaging parties can be held liable for the entire damage in the external relationship (Article 82(4) GDPR). In the internal relationship, however, the damaging parties should only be liable proportionally proportionally to their involvement in the unlawful activity, as otherwise there would be material injustice. This is why the person who has been held liable can demand compensation from the other damaging parties. This idea is also reflected in Recital 146 sentence 9 GDPR, which mentions ‘recourse proceedings’ against other controllers or processors involved in the same processing. In this context, it is once again established that – not differently from Article 82(4) GDPR – processors and controllers are on the same level in terms of liability, even within their internal relationship. The only differentiation stems from their different obligations under the material part of the GDPR and the controller-processor agreement pursuant to Article 28 GDPR.

(6) Court Proceedings and Competent Court

Article 82(6) GDPR states that claims for damages must be brought before courts and therefore they are not determined by the supervisory authorities. For the respective jurisdiction of the courts, reference is made to Article 79(2) GDPR (see also the respective commentary).

Decisions

→ You can find all related decisions in Category:Article 82 GDPR

References

  1. CJEU, Case C‑300/21, Österreichische Post, 4 May 2023, margin number 32 (available here).
  2. Zanfir-Fortuna, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 82 GDPR, p. 1162, 1164, 1175. (Oxford University Press 2020); Quaas, in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 3 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition).
  3. Zanfir-Fortuna, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 82 GDPR, p. 1162, 1164, 1175. (Oxford University Press 2020); Quaas, in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 3 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition).
  4. CJEU, Case C-507/23, PTAC, 4 October 2024, margin number 31 (available here).
  5. Bergt, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 15 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).
  6. Cf. also, for example, Zanfir-Fortuna, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 82 GDPR, p. 1175. (Oxford University Press 2020); Quaas, in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 14 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition); Nemitz, in Ehmann, Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 9 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition).
  7. CJEU, Case C‑300/21, Österreichische Post, 4 May 2023, margin number 32-42 and 50 (available here).
  8. 8.0 8.1 CJEU, Case C-507/23, PTAC, 4 October 2024, margin number 31-34 (available here).
  9. Nemitz, in Ehmann, Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 13 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition).
  10. CJEU, Case C‑300/21, Österreichische Post, 4 May 2023, margin number 51 and 58 (available here).
  11. CJEU, Case C-507/23, PTAC, 4 October 2024, margin number 35 (available here); CJEU Joint Cases C-182/22 and C-189/22, Scalable Capital, 20 June 2024, margin number 46 (available here).
  12. CJEU, Case C-507/23, PTAC, 4 October 2024, margin number 34 with further references (available here).
  13. Geissler, Ströbel, Datenschutzrechtliche Schadensersatzansprüche im Musterfeststellungsverfahre, in NJW, 72 (2019) p.3415; Similar opinion by Wybitul/Haß/Albrecht, Abwehr von Schadensersatzansprüchen nach der Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, NJW, 71 (2018) p. 116.
  14. See only Bergt, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 27 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).
  15. On the lawfulness of instructions, see in particular Bergt, in Kühling/Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin numbers 30, 36, 37 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).
  16. Bergt, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 51 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).
  17. Zanfir-Fortuna, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 82 GDPR, p. 1176. (Oxford University Press 2020).
  18. Nemitz, in Ehmann, Selmayr, Data Protection Regulation, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 7 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition).
  19. Bergt, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 57 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).
  20. Bergt, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 82 GDPR, margin number 58 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).