Article 6 GDPR: Difference between revisions
Line 252: | Line 252: | ||
The uncertainty mentioned above seems, however, to be further limited, at least in certain areas, by the existence of common European principles. In this perspective, for example, the principles of contractual fairness towards the consumer, as set out in the Unfair Terms Directive 93/13/EEC and other related directives. Example: A Spanish controller and a French consumer concluded a contract that is illegal under the applicable French law. The lack of any valid contract means there is no legal basis. | The uncertainty mentioned above seems, however, to be further limited, at least in certain areas, by the existence of common European principles. In this perspective, for example, the principles of contractual fairness towards the consumer, as set out in the Unfair Terms Directive 93/13/EEC and other related directives. Example: A Spanish controller and a French consumer concluded a contract that is illegal under the applicable French law. The lack of any valid contract means there is no legal basis. | ||
In conclusion, in order to understand whether or not a contract is valid, it seems appropriate first to identify the law applicable to the case and secondly to verify whether in the light of that law the contract is valid. | In conclusion, in order to understand whether or not a contract is valid, it seems appropriate first to identify the law applicable to the case and secondly to verify whether in the light of that law the contract is valid.<ref>The EDBP seems to accept this reading in some recent guidelines where it is made clear that "''contracts and contractual terms must comply with the requirements of contract laws and, as the case may be for consumer contracts, consumer protection laws in order for processing based on those terms to be considered fair and lawful''". See, EDPB, Guidelines 2/2019 on the processing of personal data under Article 6(1)(b) GDPR in the context of the provision of online services to data subjects, 8 October 2019, p. 4 (available [https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp217_en.pdf here]).</ref> | ||
=====Necessity===== | =====Necessity===== |
Revision as of 15:31, 5 October 2021
Legal Text
1. Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies:
- (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes;
- (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;
- (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject;
- (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person;
- (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;
- (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.
Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks.
2. Member States may maintain or introduce more specific provisions to adapt the application of the rules of this Regulation with regard to processing for compliance with points (c) and (e) of paragraph 1 by determining more precisely specific requirements for the processing and other measures to ensure lawful and fair processing including for other specific processing situations as provided for in Chapter IX.
3. The basis for the processing referred to in point (c) and (e) of paragraph 1 shall be laid down by:
- (a) Union law; or
- (b) Member State law to which the controller is subject.
The purpose of the processing shall be determined in that legal basis or, as regards the processing referred to in point (e) of paragraph 1, shall be necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller. That legal basis may contain specific provisions to adapt the application of rules of this Regulation, inter alia: the general conditions governing the lawfulness of processing by the controller; the types of data which are subject to the processing; the data subjects concerned; the entities to, and the purposes for which, the personal data may be disclosed; the purpose limitation; storage periods; and processing operations and processing procedures, including measures to ensure lawful and fair processing such as those for other specific processing situations as provided for in Chapter IX. The Union or the Member State law shall meet an objective of public interest and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
4. Where the processing for a purpose other than that for which the personal data have been collected is not based on the data subject's consent or on a Union or Member State law which constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard the objectives referred to in Article 23(1), the controller shall, in order to ascertain whether processing for another purpose is compatible with the purpose for which the personal data are initially collected, take into account, inter alia:
- (a) any link between the purposes for which the personal data have been collected and the purposes of the intended further processing;
- (b) the context in which the personal data have been collected, in particular regarding the relationship between data subjects and the controller;
- (c) the nature of the personal data, in particular whether special categories of personal data are processed, pursuant to Article 9, or whether personal data related to criminal convictions and offences are processed, pursuant to Article 10;
- (d) the possible consequences of the intended further processing for data subjects;
- (e) the existence of appropriate safeguards, which may include encryption or pseudonymisation.
Relevant Recitals
Commentary
(1) Legal Basis
The GDPR prohibits all processing of personal data unless it is based on one or more of the six alternative legal bases under Article 6(1) GDPR. This means that by default processing of other persons' personal data is prohibited - unless one of the exceptions in Article 6(1) GDPR are met. There is no hierarchy between these legal bases. A controller may use any of them or use different ones for different processing operations. The legal basis has to be disclosed to the data subject under Article 13(1)(c) GDPR or Article 14(1)(c) GDPR.
(a) Consent
Data subjects can be asked to "consent" to the processing for a specific purpose (see Article 5(1)(b) GDPR). The GDPR wanted to end the various forms of hidden consent in terms and conditions, forced consent (take it or leave it), and the need for click-marathons through per-ticked consent boxes ("opt-out"). To achieve this aim, consent must meet a very high standard to be legally binding. Under the definition of consent in Article 4(11) GDPR, consent must be freely given, specific,[1] informed, and unambiguous. Further conditions are also contained in Article 7 GDPR and Article 8 GDPR on children's consent. Consequently, the conditions for consent are split between Articles 4(11), 6(1)(a), 7 and 8 GDPR.
(b) Contract
If a data processing is necessary for the fulfillment of a contract, the controller has a legal basis to carry out such operations in pursuance of its freedom to conduct a business.[2] For instance, if a data subject orders a product in an online store with a credit card and has it shipped home, some of these processing operations (payment and shipment) are obviously necessary for the performance of the contract. The data subject's data will then be transferred to financial institutions or the postal service to process the payment and deliver the product.
Article 6(1)(b) GDPR makes these types of processing operations lawful without any further action required from the data subject (for example, a consent to share the data with financial institutions). [3] According to relevant legal literature, the contract is, together with consent under Article 6(1)(a) GDPR the only legal basis in which processing is based (indirectly in the case of a contract, directly in the case of consent) on the data subject's will.[4]
Existence of a Valid Contract
It seems clear that the contract mentioned in Article 6(1)(b) must be valid. The GDPR, however, does not express any indication as to the validity of the contract.
The doctrine, on this point, seems to agree in clarifying that contracts vitiated by nullity are not included in the definition of Article 6(1)(b) GDPR. Heberlein, for example, and barring our mistakes in translation, seems to suggest that “the contract must be effective and in any case must not suffer from legal defects that lead to its nullity”.[5] Buchner and Petri seem to go in the same direction, confirming that in the case of void contracts recourse to Article 6(1)(b) GDPR seems out of the question.[6]
Defining the concept of contractual "nullity", however, does not seem easy, especially in terms of European uniform law. The regulation of contractual defects is in fact mostly left to the choices of the national legislator, with the consequence that a certain contractual defect may be a cause of nullity in some legal systems and not in others. Certainly there appear to be defects of nullity common to European legal traditions: for example lack of will, deception and threat. Beyond such exemplary cases, however, there are circumstances in which the breach does not necessarily lead to nullity but to declarations of annulment (of an originally valid, albeit flawed, contract).
The uncertainty mentioned above seems, however, to be further limited, at least in certain areas, by the existence of common European principles. In this perspective, for example, the principles of contractual fairness towards the consumer, as set out in the Unfair Terms Directive 93/13/EEC and other related directives. Example: A Spanish controller and a French consumer concluded a contract that is illegal under the applicable French law. The lack of any valid contract means there is no legal basis.
In conclusion, in order to understand whether or not a contract is valid, it seems appropriate first to identify the law applicable to the case and secondly to verify whether in the light of that law the contract is valid.[7]
Necessity
The scope of a contract has to be assessed. Elements that are not within the scope of the contract cannot serve as a legal basis for processing personal data.
- Example: An order of a product cannot serve as a basis to sell customer data to a data broker.
The processing of personal data must be necessary for the performance of a contract. A mere relationship with the contract is not sufficient. This does not mean that the controller may only use personal data if there is absolutely no other way to provide to the contract, but processing that is not necessary cannot be justified by Article 6(1)(b) GDPR.
- Example: It is not necessary to track a user to generate personal suggestions simply because the data subject bought a mobile application.
Party to the Contract
The controller and the data subject must be parties to the contract. Contracts cannot lead to the processing of personal data of third party data subjects.
- Example: A contract between company A and B on personalized advertisement does not form a legal basis to process the personal data of data subject C.
Precontractual Steps
Under Article 6(1)(b) GDPR, processing may also be lawful in precontractual situations at the request of the data subject, for example where data is processed to prepare an offer for a package tour. As noted by Kotschy, although such data processing could be based on explicit consent or legitimate interest, “mentioning it under Article 6(1)(b) GDPR makes a difference as to the consequences, as in case of Article 6(1)(b) GDPR the data subject cannot terminate lawful processing either by withdrawing consent or by objecting” (see Articles 7(3) and 21(1) GDPR). [8]
(c) Legal Obligation
GDPR recognizes any legal obligation that the controller may be subject to. In countless European and national laws, controllers are subject to obligations to collect, process, and store personal information.
Processing that goes beyond these legal obligations is not legal under this provision. Equally, national permissions (and not obligations) to process data do not fall under this provision. Any obligation to process data under another law must itself be proportionate (Article 7 and 8 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) and in compliance with Article 6(2) and (3) GDPR.
- Example: Tax law requires the keeping of certain records for 7 years, which GDPR recognizes.
(d) Vital Interest
Recital 46 clarifies that a vital interest is one which is "essential for the life" of the data subject, and includes processing necessary for humanitarian purposes, as well as to "monitor epidemics and their spreads" and "situations of natural and man-made disasters". Further, Article 6(1)(d) GDPR should only be used when no other legal basis applies.
Unlike in Article 9 GDPR, the capability of the data subject to provide consent to processing is not mentioned. However, Kotschy argues that the principle of fair processing “might require that the data subject should be consulted if possible.”[9]
The vital interest of a natural person other than the data subject may also be used as a legal basis under Article 6(1)(d) GDPR. Processing of a data subject’s personal data in order to protect the life of another could also constitutes a "legitimate interest" under Article 6(1)(e) GDPR, however Article 6(1)(e) GDPR notably excludes public sector controllers.
(e) Public Interest
Under Article 6(1)(e) GDPR, data controllers can legally process personal data for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller. This acts as the general basis for personal data processing in the public sector. [10]
Recital 46 provides examples of the types of processing that qualify under Article 6(1)(e) GDPR.
Kotschy highlights how in the English version of the GDPR it is unclear whether it is the "task", or the "official authority" that must be "vested in the controller", whilst a reading of the German version suggests that it is the task. This "vesting" of a task requires a legal provision, excluding situations where tasks are assigned by contract, even in the public interest. This is particularly significant for private entities.[11]
The extent to which private entities must also be vested with official authority in order to qualify under Article 6(1)(e) GDPR is disputed.
Processing under Article 6(1)(e) GDPR must be "necessary" for the performance of relevant tasks. This should be interpreted strictly in light of proportionality, and "if there are several alternatives," the "least intrusive" is appropriate.
Finally, in its Joint Response on the US Cloud Act, the EDPB made clear that Article 6(1)(e) GDPR is not satisfied "solely on the basis of a compelling request" from a foreign authority.[12]
(f) Legitimate Interest
The most debated exception on the prohibition of the processing of others' personal data is the so-called legitimate interest. While there are cases at the core of the balancing test where there is a clear overriding interest in processing personal data (e.g. when enforcing a legal claim against a criminal), there are other areas where the existence of a legitimate interest that overrides the interest of the data subject is more controversial or a minority view.
Because it is in many cases inherently unclear if a legitimate interest exists, controllers may want to avoid this legal basis whenever any of the other six legal basis is available to them.
Legitimate nterest of the Controller or Third party
A legitimate interest may be a legal, factual or economic interest. It must be "legitimate", so more than just legal or possible. It must be "pursued by the controller or by a third party", which means it must actively be followed. It must be an interest by the controller or third party, but may not be a public interest (see Article 6(1)(e) GDPR).
Controller or Third Party
The legitimate interest may be the interest of a controller or anyone else ("third party").
- Example: A video surveillance system at a bank may not only process data in the interest of the bank (usually the controller) but also to protect customers in a bank if a robbery were to occur.
Public Authorities
Article 6(1)(f) GDPR may not be relied upon by public authorities insofar as they perform public tasks.
Necessity
The processing of personal data must be "necessary" to achieve the legitimate interests of the controller or the third party.
Balancing
Once a legitimate interest and the necessity to process personal data is established, the interests of the controller and the data subject must be balanced.[13][14]
Interests, Rights and Freedoms of the Data Subject
On the side of the data subject, not only the rights to privacy and data protection (Articles 7 and 8 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) must be considered, but also other rights, freedoms, and interests. This can include anything from minor personal or economic interests all the way to the freedom of speech.
The legitimate interests of the controller on the one hand and the rights of the data subject on the other have to be balanced. Recital 47 highlights the importance of the data subject's reasonable expectations, based on the relationship between the data subject and the controller, within the balancing test.
Reasonable Expectations
The controller must objectively and fairly assess what a data subject would reasonably expect in a given situation.
- Example: While the average person may expect CCTV in a bank, they may oppose any such surveillance inside a private space like a hotel room.
Relationship Between Controllers and Data Subjects
Relationships between controllers and data subjects may lead to a certain level of trust but also to certain expectations by both parties. There is no clear rule that a more intense relationship should lead to more intense data protection. In many cases the opposite may be true.
While it may be reasonable to distrust a new customer, it may not be reasonable for a loyal long-term customer. Similarly, it may be unreasonable to expect that a controller will conduct surveillance on third-party property. However, the fact that a data subjects enters the property of the controller may make certain surveillance reasonable.
Children
Article 6(1)(f) GDPR explicitly mentions situations "in particular where the data subject is a child". This seems to indicate that a balancing test needs to take the specific interests and expectations of a child into account.
(2) Option to Further Determine Article 6(1)(c) and (e) GDPR
Member states can maintain or introduce provisions to specify and adapt the requirements for legal processing under Article 6(1)(c) GDPR (processing based on a "legal obligation") and Article 6(1)(e) GDPR ("public interest"), as well as to ensure lawful and fair processing regarding the specific processing situations outlined in GDPR Chapter IX.
Member states can consequently keep sector-specific data protection law in the public sector so long as it complies with the GDPR, as such law would be based on Article 6(1)(e) GDPR.[15]
In terms of private sector laws, Article 6(2) GDPR notably does not refer to Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. However, national laws regarding private sector entities may qualify where these deal with the situations prescribed in GDPR Chapter IX. [16]
Details on Member States’ varying implementations of the GDPR can be found in the GDPRhub Country Overview.
(3) Formal Requirements Under Article 6(1)(c) and (e) GDPR
Article 6(3) GDPR specifies that in order for processing to be based on Article 6(1)(c) and (e) GDPR, the controller’s legal obligation, or the task vested in the controller, must be laid down by Union Law or Member State Law to which the controller is subject. In other words, "tasks based exclusively on foreign law cannot provide a legal basis for processing."
Under Recital 45 GDPR, the GDPR "does not require a specific law for each individual processing". "A law as a basis for several processing operations [...] may be sufficient."
Article 6(3) and Recital 45 GDPR also provide examples of content for Member State Laws which, in accordance with Article 6(2) GDPR, specify and adapt the GDPR's rules regarding processing under Article 6(1)(c) or (e) GDPR.
(4) Change of Purpose
Article 6(4) GDPR prescribes factors to be taken into account where a controller wishes to further process personal data for a purpose other than that for which it was collected, where no other legal basis applies. This is only possible where the original and further purposes are "compatible." The factors set out in Article 6(4)(a)-(c) GDPR are not exhaustive.
Kotschy notes two key issues emerging from the factors in Article 6(4)(a)-(c) GDPR.[17] The first regards the relationship between the initial and further purpose. Notably, the new purpose does not need to be a "sub purpose" of the initial purpose. Rather, compatibility can exist where the initial and further purpose are “pursued ‘together’ in close vicinity” or where the further purpose is “a logical consequence of the initial purpose.” [18]
Recital 50 GDPR adds that "the reasonable expectations of data subjects based on their relationship with the controller" should be considered. As Kotschy argues, "compatibility" thus largely rests on “what is usual and what is to be expected in certain circumstances.” For example, where a customer receives further marketing information from an organisation they recently purchased from, this would classify as compatible further use, as customer relationship management “is a usual activity resulting from the customer relationship."[19]
The second issue regards the assessment of risk that may stem from processing, prescribed in Article 6(4)(c)-(e) GDPR. Importantly, further processing “must not result in a substantially higher risk than the initial lawful processing.” The presence of sensitive personal data is specifically mentioned as a risk factor. Risks may be mitigated by various safeguards, such as encryption or pseudonymisation. To rely on further processing compatibility, controllers must be able to demonstrate that an assessment of all relevant risks was done.[20]
The potential to legally process information for a purpose that does not directly correlate with the original, but where there is a very high level of safeguards in place, is not yet clear from the law or relevant jurisprudence.[21]
Decisions
→ You can find all related decisions in Category:Article 6 GDPR
References
- ↑ The principle of specificity of consent (Article 4(11) GDPR) is confirmed by Article 6(1)(a) which requires consent to be given for “for one or more specific purposes”. This seems in line with the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU, according to which consent must refer to specific processing activities, clearly identified, also in order to allow the user to effectively understand the operations being carried out. See this Commentary under Article 4(11) GDPR.
- ↑ This supports the freedom to "conduct a business, which is guaranteed by Article 16 of the Charter, and reflects the fact that sometimes the contractual obligations towards the data subject cannot be performed without the data subject providing certain personal data. If the specific processing is part and parcel of delivery of the requested service, it is in the interests of both parties to process that data, as otherwise the service could not be provided and the contract could not be performed". In this sense, EDPB, Guidelines 2/2019 on the processing of personal data under Article 6(1)(b) GDPR in the context of the provision of online services to data subjects, 8 October 2019, p. 4 (available here)
- ↑ Some authors have that the contractual legal basis laid down explicitly in Article 6(1)(b) GDPR can also be derived more generally "from the fact that the controller, as a contractual partner, has a legal obligation to fulfill their contractual obligations according to general legal principles". Furthermore, legitimacy for fulfilling a contractual obligation may also be interpreted as a "special case of 'legal obligations' and even 'legitimate interests of the controller". See, Kotschy, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 6 GDPR, p. 330 (Oxford University Press 2020).
- ↑ Resta, in Riccio, Scorza, Belisario, GDPR e normativa privacy - Commentario, Article 6 GDPR (Wolters Kluwer 2018), p. 69 which, in turn, refers to Pelino, Bistolfi, Bolognini, Il regolamento privacy europeo (Milano 2018).
- ↑ Heberlein, in Ehmann, Selmayr, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Article 6 GDPR, margin number 13 (Beck, 2nd edition 2018) (accessed 5 October 2021)
- ↑ Bucher, Petri, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 6 GDPR, margin number 31 (C.H. Beck 2020) (accessed 5 October 2021).
- ↑ The EDBP seems to accept this reading in some recent guidelines where it is made clear that "contracts and contractual terms must comply with the requirements of contract laws and, as the case may be for consumer contracts, consumer protection laws in order for processing based on those terms to be considered fair and lawful". See, EDPB, Guidelines 2/2019 on the processing of personal data under Article 6(1)(b) GDPR in the context of the provision of online services to data subjects, 8 October 2019, p. 4 (available here).
- ↑ Kotschy, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 6 GDPR, p. 332 (Oxford University Press 2020) citing Dammann and Simitis 1997, p. 149.
- ↑ Kotschy, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 6 GDPR, p. 334 (Oxford University Press 2020).
- ↑ Kotschy, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 6 GDPR, p. 336 (Oxford University Press 2020).
- ↑ Kotschy, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 6 GDPR, p. 340 (Oxford University Press 2020).
- ↑ Kotschy, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 6 GDPR, p. 339 (Oxford University Press 2020) with reference to EDPB-EDPS Joint Response to the LIBE Committee on the impact of the US Cloud Act on the European legal framework for personal data protection, 12 July 2019, p. 4.
- ↑ In CJEU, 24 November 2011, ASNEFF and FECEMD, C-468/10 and C-469/10, margin number 38 (available here https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=115205&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=135346, the CJEU named two elements for a test under Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46/EC: Firstly, the processing of the personal data must be necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed; and, Secondly, such interests must not be overridden by the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject. The wording of Article 6(1)(f) GDPR and Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46 are sufficiently overlapping to be able to apply this test after the introduction of GDPR.
- ↑ The following situations are generally assumed to form a legitimate interest: Defense of legal claims It is generally accepted that the defence of legal claims is a legitimate interest. This includes civil law claims (whether contractual or not), administrative or criminal cases. Any such use of personal data must still comply with other provisions like the general principles in Article 5 GDPR. Fraud prevention Recital 47 explicitly names the prevention of fraud as a legitimate interest. In practice, an assessment and balancing of the likeliness of any fraudulent activity and the interference with the rights of the data subject needs to be made. Previous fraudulent activity may be an indicator. Any such use of personal data must still comply with other provisions like the general principles in Article 5 GDPR. Network security Recital 49 explicitly deals with data processing for network security. Processing of personal data for these purposes can also be derived as a legal duty under Article 32 GDPR. Any such use of personal data must still comply with other provisions like the general principles in Article 5 GDPR. Search engines Insofar as search engines process personal data, the right to freedom of information by the user as well as the rights of the search engine operators generally leads to an overriding legitimate interest. This may, however, be overridden by the interests of specific data subjects. Video surveillance: In many national laws under Directive 95/46/EC, video surveillance ("CCTV") was accepted under the legitimate interest. Many limitations on the specific situations when a controller has an overriding interest in surveillance over the interest of others were defined in national laws. When there is a genuine security challenge or threat, the use of structural surveillance may override the interests of data subjects. This includes the security of third parties, like the safety of passengers on a train. Such examples may include a high risk institution (e.g. banks) or previous criminal activity (e.g. thefts, violent crime or vandalism). Any video surveillance system must still comply with other provisions like the general principles in Article 5 GDPR. This means that the records must be destroyed as soon as the purpose is fulfilled (usually the time that realization of a crime takes, which may be 72 hours over a weekend). Data minimization also requires that only the strictly necessary area is filmed. Other obliogations like information to the public through signs under Article 13 GDPR also need to be observed. Direct marketing: During the negotiations on the GDPR there were multiple attempts to include "direct marketing" into the list of legitimate interests. In the end, the negotiating parties agreed to not reach a clear agreement: "Direct marketing" was moved to the last sentence of the non-binding recitals and the word "may" was added. Recital 47 now says that direct marketing "may be regarded" as carried out for a legitimate interest. At the same time, Article 21(2) GDPR includes an absolute right to object to direct marketing. Generally, the GDPR therefore seems to accept that direct marketing can be a legitimate interest ("may") while recognizing that it will not always be a legitimate interest across all situations. After all, a controller must engage in a balancing test in each individual case. The only legal description of "direct marketing" can be found in Article 13(3) of the ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC, which requires (1) obtaining the personal data in the context of the sale of a product or service (existing relationship), (2) the use by the same controller, for (3) its own similar products or services and (4) a clear and distinctive opportunity to object when the data is collected and with any further communication. It can be assumed that these situations also form a legitimate interest within the meaning of the GDPR.
- ↑ Kotschy, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 6 GDPR, p. 340 (Oxford University Press 2020).
- ↑ Kotschy, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 6 GDPR, p. 340 (Oxford University Press 2020).
- ↑ Kotschy, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 6 GDPR, p. 341 (Oxford University Press 2020).
- ↑ Kotschy, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 6 GDPR, p. 341 (Oxford University Press 2020).
- ↑ Kotschy, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 6 GDPR, p. 341 (Oxford University Press 2020).
- ↑ Kotschy, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 6 GDPR, p. 341 (Oxford University Press 2020).
- ↑ Kotschy, in Kuner et al., The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 6 GDPR, p. 341 (Oxford University Press 2020).