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== Commentary ==
== Commentary ==
According to this Article 73 ''GDPR'', the EDPB has a Chair and two deputy chairs. The provision also specifies the election modalities. In particular, it stipulates that the majority of EDPB members decides. Finally, the term of office is five years and can be renewed once.
Article 73 GDPR establishes the hierarchical framework of the Board. The purpose of this provision is primarily to regulate the election procedure and term of office of the Chair and its two deputy chairs, establishing that the election procedure is through simple majority and that the term of office is five years. For the role of the Chair, refer to Articles 68 and 74 GDPR.


=== (1) Chair, Deputy Chairs and their Election ===
=== (1) Chair, Deputy Chairs and their Election ===
For the role of the Chair, please refer to Articles 68(2) and 74 GDPR and the respective commentaries. The Chair is the representative of the EDPB and is sometimes referred to as the “''mouthpiece of the data protection supervisory authorities in Europe''”.<ref>''Nguyen'', in Gola, DS-GVO, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 1 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition); ''Brink, Wilhelm'', in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 2 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition).</ref> As was already the case with the Article 29 Working Party (“''WP29''”), two deputy chairs are envisaged for the Board. This has the advantage that three member supervisory authorities (“''SA''”) (or two and the EDPS) can participate in a decisive position of the EDPB. In addition, this makes it possible to share the not inconsiderable workload. After all, at least two members of the Chair always still head their respective Member State SA.<ref>''Brink, Wilhelm'', in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 4 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition).</ref>
The Chair is the representative of the EDPB and is sometimes referred to as the “''mouthpiece of the data protection supervisory authorities in Europe''”.<ref>''Nguyen'', in Gola, DS-GVO, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 1 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition); ''Brink, Wilhelm'', in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 2 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition).</ref> As was the case with the Article 29 Working Party (“''WP29''”), the Chair is assisted by two deputy chairs. The advantage of this arrangement is that it allows for three Member State supervisory authorities to participate in a decisive position on the Board.<ref>''Brink, Wilhelm'', in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 4 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition).</ref> All members of the Board are entitled to stand for election. Pursuant to Article 68(3) GDPR, Board members are the heads of Member State supervisory authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor (''"EDPS"'').<ref>Not included in the Board's membership are the three acceded EFTA countries.</ref> The Commission has the right to participate in the activities and meetings of the EDPB (Article 68(5)(1) GDPR), but is not a member.


All members of the EDPB are entitled to stand for election. According to Article 68(3) GDPR, these are the heads of the SAs of the Member States (but not the three acceded EFTA countries) and the EDPS. The Commission only has a right to participate in the activities and meetings of the EDPB (Article 68(5)(1) GDPR), but is not a member. The legally possible election of the EDPS as Chair is variously assessed as impracticable. First, this is justified by the limited voting rights under Article 68(6) GPDR. Secondly, the organisational separation between the secretariat and the EDPS according to Article 75(2) and (3) GDPR is pointed out: the independence of the EDPB vis-à-vis the EDPS can be ensured more easily if the EDPS, who ultimately provides the secretariat according to Article 75(1) GDPR, does not also chair the EDPB. Otherwise, the EDPS, as Chair of the EDPB, would have to conclude an agreement under Article 75(4) GDPR as an “''in-itself transaction''”.<ref>''Dix'', in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 5 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition); agreeing ''Brink, Wilhelm'', in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 9 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition).</ref> The active right to vote corresponds to the passive suffrage, i.e. that all members of the EDPB (but not the three acceded EFTA states) can vote.
Legally, it is possible for the EDPS to stand as an electoral candidate for Chair; however, in actuality this would be impracticable for two reasons. Firstly, the EDPS holds limited voting rights under Article 68(6) GPDR. Secondly, there is an organisational separation between the secretariat and the EDPS for the purposes of to Articles 75(2) and 75(3) GDPR. The independence of the EDPB vis-à-vis the EDPS can be ensured more easily if the EDPS, who provides the secretariat to the Board, does not also chair the EDPB.<ref>Article 75(1) GDPR.</ref> Otherwise, if the EDPS were to stand Chair of the Board, would have to conclude an agreement under Article 75(4) GDPR as an “''in-itself transaction''”.<ref>''Dix'', in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 5 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition); agreeing ''Brink, Wilhelm'', in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 9 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition).</ref> The active right to vote corresponds to a right of passive suffrage; meaning that all members of the EDPB, but not the three acceded EFTA states, can vote.


The requirements for the “''simple majority''” are congruent with those from Article 72(1) GDPR.<ref>''Brink, Wilhelm'', in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 12 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition); ''Körffer'', in Paal/Pauly, DS-GVO, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 2 (C.H. Beck 2021, 3rd edition); ''Schiedermair'', in Simitis/Hornung/Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Datenschutzrecht, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 3 (C.H. Beck 2019, 1st edition).</ref> Another view, according to which only the majority of the votes cast should be decisive here as an exception,<ref>''Nguyen'', in Gola, DS-GVO, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 2 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition); ''Dix'', in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 5 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition); ''Regenhardt'', in Sydow, Europäische Datenschutzgrundverordnung, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 6 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition).</ref> must be rejectedition In support of this view, it is argued that the deviating majority requirement is intended to prevent the potential inability of the body to act if several members do not attend the election.<ref>''Nguyen'', in Gola, DS-GVO, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 2 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition).</ref>
The simple majority requirement aligns with those under Article 72(1) GDPR.<ref>''Brink, Wilhelm'', in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 12 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition); ''Körffer'', in Paal/Pauly, DS-GVO, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 2 (C.H. Beck 2021, 3rd edition); ''Schiedermair'', in Simitis/Hornung/Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Datenschutzrecht, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 3 (C.H. Beck 2019, 1st edition).</ref> Another view, according to which only the majority of the votes cast should be decisive here as an exception,<ref>''Nguyen'', in Gola, DS-GVO, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 2 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition); ''Dix'', in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 5 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition); ''Regenhardt'', in Sydow, Europäische Datenschutzgrundverordnung, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 6 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition).</ref> must be rejectedition In support of this view, it is argued that the deviating majority requirement is intended to prevent the potential inability of the body to act if several members do not attend the election.<ref>''Nguyen'', in Gola, DS-GVO, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 2 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition).</ref>


However, this problem does not specifically arise for the election of the Chair, but also for other decisions under the GDPR. In particular, the EDPB would be practically incapable of acting without rules of procedure. For their adoption, a two-thirds majority is required Moreover, it is not apparent why the principle laid down in Article 72(1) GDPR should be deviated from. The omission of the addition of “''its members''” after “''simple majority''” seems to be a drafting error. This can be explained by the fact that “''from amongst its members''” already precedes “''by simple majority''”, so that the addition of “''of its members''” may have seemed redundant at first glance. The fact that Article 73(1) GDPR regulates majority requirements at all is not an indication of an intended derogation from Article 72(1) GDPR. Admittedly, the majority principle of Article 72(1) GDPR would have applied anyway without the majority provision in Article 73(1) GDPR. However, the GDPR also explicitly requires a “''simple majority''” (in the sense of Article 72(1) GDPR) elsewhere, namely in the case of the opinion in the consistency mechanism under Article 64(3)(2) GDPR (cf. commentary on Article 72 GDPR).
However, this problem does not specifically arise for the election of the Chair, but also for other decisions under the GDPR. In particular, the EDPB would be practically incapable of acting without rules of procedure. For their adoption, a two-thirds majority is required Moreover, it is not apparent why the principle laid down in Article 72(1) GDPR should be deviated from. The omission of the addition of “''its members''” after “''simple majority''” seems to be a drafting error. This can be explained by the fact that “''from amongst its members''” already precedes “''by simple majority''”, so that the addition of “''of its members''” may have seemed redundant at first glance. The fact that Article 73(1) GDPR regulates majority requirements at all is not an indication of an intended derogation from Article 72(1) GDPR. Admittedly, the majority principle of Article 72(1) GDPR would have applied anyway without the majority provision in Article 73(1) GDPR. However, the GDPR also explicitly requires a “''simple majority''” (in the sense of Article 72(1) GDPR) elsewhere, namely in the case of the opinion in the consistency mechanism under Article 64(3)(2) GDPR (cf. commentary on Article 72 GDPR).

Revision as of 13:08, 12 October 2023

Article 73 - Chair
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Chapter 10: Delegated and implementing acts

Legal Text


Article 73 - Chair

1. The Board shall elect a chair and two deputy chairs from amongst its members by simple majority.

2. The term of office of the Chair and of the deputy chairs shall be five years and be renewable once.

Relevant Recitals

Recital 139: EDPB
In order to promote the consistent application of this Regulation, the Board should be set up as an independent body of the Union. To fulfil its objectives, the Board should have legal personality. The Board should be represented by its Chair. It should replace the Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data established by Directive 95/46/EC. It should consist of the head of a supervisory authority of each Member State and the European Data Protection Supervisor or their respective representatives. The Commission should participate in the Board's activities without voting rights and the European Data Protection Supervisor should have specific voting rights. The Board should contribute to the consistent application of this Regulation throughout the Union, including by advising the Commission, in particular on the level of protection in third countries or international organisations, and promoting cooperation of the supervisory authorities throughout the Union. The Board should act independently when performing its tasks.

Commentary

Article 73 GDPR establishes the hierarchical framework of the Board. The purpose of this provision is primarily to regulate the election procedure and term of office of the Chair and its two deputy chairs, establishing that the election procedure is through simple majority and that the term of office is five years. For the role of the Chair, refer to Articles 68 and 74 GDPR.

(1) Chair, Deputy Chairs and their Election

The Chair is the representative of the EDPB and is sometimes referred to as the “mouthpiece of the data protection supervisory authorities in Europe”.[1] As was the case with the Article 29 Working Party (“WP29”), the Chair is assisted by two deputy chairs. The advantage of this arrangement is that it allows for three Member State supervisory authorities to participate in a decisive position on the Board.[2] All members of the Board are entitled to stand for election. Pursuant to Article 68(3) GDPR, Board members are the heads of Member State supervisory authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor ("EDPS").[3] The Commission has the right to participate in the activities and meetings of the EDPB (Article 68(5)(1) GDPR), but is not a member.

Legally, it is possible for the EDPS to stand as an electoral candidate for Chair; however, in actuality this would be impracticable for two reasons. Firstly, the EDPS holds limited voting rights under Article 68(6) GPDR. Secondly, there is an organisational separation between the secretariat and the EDPS for the purposes of to Articles 75(2) and 75(3) GDPR. The independence of the EDPB vis-à-vis the EDPS can be ensured more easily if the EDPS, who provides the secretariat to the Board, does not also chair the EDPB.[4] Otherwise, if the EDPS were to stand Chair of the Board, would have to conclude an agreement under Article 75(4) GDPR as an “in-itself transaction”.[5] The active right to vote corresponds to a right of passive suffrage; meaning that all members of the EDPB, but not the three acceded EFTA states, can vote.

The simple majority requirement aligns with those under Article 72(1) GDPR.[6] Another view, according to which only the majority of the votes cast should be decisive here as an exception,[7] must be rejectedition In support of this view, it is argued that the deviating majority requirement is intended to prevent the potential inability of the body to act if several members do not attend the election.[8]

However, this problem does not specifically arise for the election of the Chair, but also for other decisions under the GDPR. In particular, the EDPB would be practically incapable of acting without rules of procedure. For their adoption, a two-thirds majority is required Moreover, it is not apparent why the principle laid down in Article 72(1) GDPR should be deviated from. The omission of the addition of “its members” after “simple majority” seems to be a drafting error. This can be explained by the fact that “from amongst its members” already precedes “by simple majority”, so that the addition of “of its members” may have seemed redundant at first glance. The fact that Article 73(1) GDPR regulates majority requirements at all is not an indication of an intended derogation from Article 72(1) GDPR. Admittedly, the majority principle of Article 72(1) GDPR would have applied anyway without the majority provision in Article 73(1) GDPR. However, the GDPR also explicitly requires a “simple majority” (in the sense of Article 72(1) GDPR) elsewhere, namely in the case of the opinion in the consistency mechanism under Article 64(3)(2) GDPR (cf. commentary on Article 72 GDPR).

Furthermore, the view of the authors cited above is based on the understanding of the term “simple majority” under German constitutional law, which interprets the term as “majority of the members present”. In contrast, there is no uniform Union law understanding of this term, and only this understanding is relevant here. In addition, a historical argument applies: The Chair and deputy chairs of the WP29 were also elected with a simple majority in the sense of Article 72(1) GDPR. It is unclear why this should now be deviated from without comment. This is all the more true in view of the fact that the Chair of the EDPB is vested with broader powers than the Chair of the predecessor institution. In particular, the EDPB Chair is authorised to make a casting vote in accordance with Article 65(3) GDPR.[9] In this respect, their election would require a higher level of democratic legitimacy rather than a lower one. Furthermore, the GDPR does not contain any provisions on a quorum of the EDPB. In fact, according to the view to be rejected, an election of the Chair by only one member would thus be possible, which cannot be intendedition Finally, the EDPB has also endorsed the view expressed here with the introduction of (declaratory) Article 5(1) Rules of Procedure (“RoP”). The election of the Chair and the deputy chairs shall be by secret ballot. This is stipulated in Article 5(1) RoP in exercise of the explicit authorisation in Article 76(1) GDPR.

(2) Term of Office

Article 73(2) GDPR stipulates that a term of office is five years, with the possibility of renewal once. In total, elected persons can thus hold office for a maximum period of ten years. The limited term of office not only ensures that the Chair itself rotates, but also that the representation of the Member States holding important offices change regularly.[10] The entire GDPR contains only one (indirect) provision on the termination of the Chair/deputy chairs, namely by expiry of the term of office in Article 73(2) GDPR. The EDPB has made use of its rules of procedure autonomy and has also laid down three further termination variants in Article 6(1) RoP: (1) the end of the term of office at the SA; (2) resignation; (3) dismissal pursuant to Article 6(2) RoP. In this context, the term “SA” refers to both the national SAs and the EDPS, whose mandate under Article 42 of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 may end in particular at the end of a (renewable) five-year term.[11] According to Article 6(2) of the RoP, the dismissal of the Chair or a deputy chair can be made by a resolution passed by a simple majority of the EDPB members.

Decisions

→ You can find all related decisions in Category:Article 73 GDPR

References

  1. Nguyen, in Gola, DS-GVO, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 1 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition); Brink, Wilhelm, in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 2 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition).
  2. Brink, Wilhelm, in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 4 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition).
  3. Not included in the Board's membership are the three acceded EFTA countries.
  4. Article 75(1) GDPR.
  5. Dix, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 5 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition); agreeing Brink, Wilhelm, in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 9 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition).
  6. Brink, Wilhelm, in BeckOK DatenschutzR, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 12 (C.H. Beck 2020, 36th edition); Körffer, in Paal/Pauly, DS-GVO, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 2 (C.H. Beck 2021, 3rd edition); Schiedermair, in Simitis/Hornung/Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Datenschutzrecht, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 3 (C.H. Beck 2019, 1st edition).
  7. Nguyen, in Gola, DS-GVO, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 2 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition); Dix, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 5 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition); Regenhardt, in Sydow, Europäische Datenschutzgrundverordnung, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 6 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition).
  8. Nguyen, in Gola, DS-GVO, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 2 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition).
  9. Regenhardt, in Sydow, Europäische Datenschutzgrundverordnung, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 6 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition).
  10. Regenhardt, in Sydow, Europäische Datenschutzgrundverordnung, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 8 (C.H. Beck 2018, 2nd edition).
  11. Dix, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 73 GDPR, margin number 6 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd edition).