Article 55 GDPR

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Article 55 - Competence
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Chapter 10: Delegated and implementing acts

Legal Text


Article 55 - Competence

1. Each supervisory authority shall be competent for the performance of the tasks assigned to and the exercise of the powers conferred on it in accordance with this Regulation on the territory of its own Member State.

2. Where processing is carried out by public authorities or private bodies acting on the basis of point (c) or (e) of Article 6(1), the supervisory authority of the Member State concerned shall be competent. In such cases Article 56 does not apply.

3. Supervisory authorities shall not be competent to supervise processing operations of courts acting in their judicial capacity.

Relevant Recitals

Recital 20: Respect to the Independence of the Judiciary
While this Regulation applies, inter alia, to the activities of courts and other judicial authorities, Union or Member State law could specify the processing operations and processing procedures in relation to the processing of personal data by courts and other judicial authorities. The competence of the supervisory authorities should not cover the processing of personal data when courts are acting in their judicial capacity, in order to safeguard the independence of the judiciary in the performance of its judicial tasks, including decision-making. It should be possible to entrust supervision of such data processing operations to specific bodies within the judicial system of the Member State, which should, in particular ensure compliance with the rules of this Regulation, enhance awareness among members of the judiciary of their obligations under this Regulation and handle complaints in relation to such data processing operations.

Recital 122: Competence of Supervisory Authorities
Each supervisory authority should be competent on the territory of its own Member State to exercise the powers and to perform the tasks conferred on it in accordance with this Regulation. This should cover in particular the processing in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller or processor on the territory of its own Member State, the processing of personal data carried out by public authorities or private bodies acting in the public interest, processing affecting data subjects on its territory or processing carried out by a controller or processor not established in the Union when targeting data subjects residing on its territory. This should include handling complaints lodged by a data subject, conducting investigations on the application of this Regulation and promoting public awareness of the risks, rules, safeguards and rights in relation to the processing of personal data.

Recital 128: No Lead Supervisory Authority for Processing Carried Out by Public Authorities or Private Bodies in the Public Interest
The rules on the lead supervisory authority and the one-stop-shop mechanism should not apply where the processing is carried out by public authorities or private bodies in the public interest. In such cases the only supervisory authority competent to exercise the powers conferred to it in accordance with this Regulation should be the supervisory authority of the Member State where the public authority or private body is established.

Commentary

Article 55 is a provision on jurisdiction.[1] According to the general rule set out in paragraph 1 a supervisory authority (SA) has jurisdiction on the territory of its Member State. Paragraphs 2 and 3 provide for two exemptions from the territorial principle, for processing to comply with a legal obligation or in public interest (point c and e of Article 6(1) GDPR) and for processing by judiciary).

Additionally, rules on competences of SAs are also entailed in Article 56 GDPR. Article 56 GDPR governs competences in cases of cross-border processing. Thus Article 56 GDPR should be consulted in cases where data is processed by several establishments of a processor or controller in the EU/EEA or when processing substantially affects data subjects in more than one Member State.

(1) Territorial competence of supervisory authorities (SAs)

As a general rule the jurisdiction of a SA is limited to the territory of its Member State. SAs are entitled to act and exercise their powers on the territory of its own state. This reflects the basic principle of public international law, the principle of sovereignty: a state has the power to enforce the law within its national borders through its national authorities. [2] Another aspect of the principle of sovereignty, each state is prohibited to exercise power or authority on the territory of another state.[3] Therefore, the competence of a SA ends at the border of it's Member State.

Example: French DPA can conduct an investigation on the premises of a controller, if the premises is located in France. At the same time the French DPA cannot on its own conduct an investigation on the premises of a processor, if the premises is located in Spain.

It also means that a decision issued by a SA cannot be enforced in another state.

Example: If the Austrian SA would issue a decision by which it would ban further processing of data and impose a 150.000 EUR fine against a controller from France that has no establishment in Austria the Austrian authority would not have the power or any means to force the controller to comply with the decision and pay the fine since it is not on the territory of Austria.

The limitation of jurisdiction to the territory of the state “confirms the role of SA as enforcement authorities, having competence on national territory equal to other public bodies and judicial authorities.”[4]

Is competent

A SA is competent to act based on it's territorial competence when there is a link between the territory of its Member State and either the data controller or processor or the data processing or data subjects.[5]

Controller or processor as points of reference

According to Recital 122 a SA should be in particularly competent when processing takes place in the context of the activities of an establishment on the territory of its Member State.

Example: Spanish SA has jurisdiction over processing activities of Spanish company ES that collects and stores data of its customers.

The concepts of "in the context of its activities" and "establishment" are further discussed in Article 4 GDPR of this commentary.

Data subjects as points of reference

Second, a SA should be competent to act with regard to processing that affects data subjects on the territory of its state. In general, when the processing in question concerns only residents of one Member State, a SA of that state will be competent to investigate and take a decision in this case. In particularly, if there is no transnational element and also the controller is located on the territory of this Member State. In situations where a complaint was lodged with a SA by one of its residents who was affected and the controller has no establishment in this state, the SA will have to ask the SA of the establishment of the controller for cooperation in accordance with Article 61 and Article 62. A final decision establishing a violation and imposing corrective measures and a fine should be issued by the national SA where the controller is established.[6]

On the other hand, processing of data can affect data subjects in several Member States, in particularly cross-border processing. In such cases SAs have to act and handle cases in accordance with the rules on allocation of competences between the lead supervisory authority (LSA) and other supervisory authorities concerned. For more information see in particularly commentary to Article 56 GDPR and Article 60 GDPR.[7]

Third, a SA is competent when processing carried out by a controller or processor not established in the EU/EEA is targeting data subjects residing on its territory. The targeting can be done in relation to offering goods or services or through monitoring their behaviour. This refers to situations when GDPR is applicable according to Article 3(2) GDPR. In this situations, several SAs can be competent to act in parallel, each concerning the data processing of their residents.

In this situations the main question is how to enforce a decision when a violation of the GDPR is established. In particularly, how corrective measures and fines can be enforced, since the controller or processor are located outside the territory and thus outside the reach of any Member State, especially in situations when a controller has not designated a representative on  the territory of the European Union (in breach of Article 27(1) GDPR). In such situations s SA may ask the competent authorities of the country of the processor for cooperation under an international agreement between the countries.[8] It may also order that the data has to remain within the Union and cannot be transferred to a third country.[9]

Tasks assigned and powers conferred

The competence of a SA extends to all of the tasks assigned to it and powers conferred to it by the GDPR. As long as the tasks are performed and the powers exercised on the territory of its Member State. This is confirmed by the wording of Articles 57 and 58 GDPR the main articles on tasks and powers of SAs, respectively. For instance, SA's first task and also its main task is monitoring and enforcement of the GDPR. Based on Article 58 GDPR SAs may impose a ban on processing and an administrative fine. Both Articles explicitly limit SA's performance of entailed tasks and the exercising of conferred powers to the territory of its Member State.

CJEU ruled on the territorial limitation of performance of tasks and exercising of powers in Weltimmo judgement (C-230/14).

Case law: In case C-230/14, Weltimmo, CJEU stated that a SA cannot impose penalties outside the territory of its own Member State but it can examine a complaint and exercise investigative powers against a company established in another Member State which was directing its activities to residents of its state. For finding an infringement and imposing penalties the SA must request cooperation of SA of the establishment in accordance with the rules on cooperation.[10]

The ruling concerned the Article 28(6) of the former Directive 95/46. As GDPR introduced a new procedure and special rules on allocation of competences in cross-border cases, respective the judgement cannot be applied for these cases. However, before the one-stop shop mechanism introducing special rules on allocation of competences for cross-border cases was enacted with the GDPR. Nevertheless the judgement can still provide guidance when and where , in particularly but is still relevant xxxx.

At the same time according to the CJEU case law “the law should make it possible for individuals to enforce their right to protection[11] Therefore the GDPR has provided a cooperation and consistency mechanism between SAs under Article 56 GDPR and Articles 60 to 67 GDPR, which should result in final decisions being issued by the national SA of the establishment of the controller.[12]

On the territory of its own Member State

The jurisdiction of a SA and its coercive power is limited to the territory of its own state due to the principle of sovereignty. This means that a SA of one Member State cannot use its powers outside the borders of it's state, on the territory of another state.[13]

Example: French DPA can conduct an investigation on the premises of a controller, if the premises is located in France. At the same time the French DPA cannot on its own conduct an investigation on the premises of a processor, if the premises is located in Spain.

Another consequence of the principle of sovereignty is that a decision issued by a SA cannot be enforced in another state.

Example: If the Austrian SA would issue a decision by which it would ban further processing of data and impose a 150.000 EUR fine against a controller from France that has no establishment in Austria the Austrian authority would not have the power or any means to force the controller to comply with the decision and pay the fine since it is not on the territory of Austria.

The provision should not be understood as an obligation that each SA must be competent for the whole territory where several SAs co-exist in one Member State. It is a question of national law to determine the jurisdiction of SAs when a state takes advantage of the option provided under Article 51(3) GDPR to establish several SAs.[14]

No rule on applicable law

The GDPR in several provisions mandates Member States to adopt more specific national rules on data protection, such as on special categories of data (Article 9 GDPR) or human resources data (Article 88 GDPR). It is not evident which national law is applicable in such instances as GDPR does not contain any rules on applicable law for data processed within the Union. The SA of one state may have to apply the national rules of another state in such cases concerning such situations.[15]

(2) Exclusive competence regarding processing for compliance with a legal obligation or in the public interest

Article 55(2) GDPR regulates the SA’s competence in case of processing carried out by public authorities or private bodies complying with a legal obligation or performing a task in the public interest. The provision confirms the competence of the SA in whose Member State the public authority or private body is located. In such cases, Article 56 GDPR will not apply and the only competent SA to exercise its powers should be the one where the public authority or private body is established. This rule thus establishes the exclusive jurisdiction of the national SA.[16]

The rule should prevent SAs of another state from monitoring public authorities and other bodies carrying out tasks in public interest. Also, the monitoring of processing of data to comply with a legal obligation imposed by the public law of a Member State, such as collection of telecommunication data, should be subject to control by the national SA of that state.[17]

Processing carried out by public authorities

This provision applies to public authorities when they perform their public duties by virtue of Article 6(1)(c)(e) GDPR. According to Recital 128 GDPR the rules on the LSA and the one-stop-shop mechanism should not apply where the processing is carried out by public authorities. In such cases the only supervisory authority competent should be the supervisory authority of the state where the public authority is established.[18]

Any other activities by a public body, such as publicly owned undertaking, that would not be performance of public tasks, such as commercial activities, are not subject to the exception under Article 55(2) GDPR. There may be a LSA.[19]

Processing carried out by private entities performing tasks under a legal obligation or under the public interest

Also, private entities performing tasks under a legal obligation or in the public interest will not be subject to the cooperation mechanism. That would imply that the obligation of air carriers to retain data or data retention obligation of electronic communication providers would not be subject to the one-stop shop procedure. However, when the private entity is processing data under any other legal basis than Article 6(1)(c)(e), for example based on consent or contract (Article 6(1)(b)), the same entity is subject to Article 56. This means that in case of cross-border processing the LSA will be responsible for monitoring the entities' compliance with the GDPR. This can lead to situations where the same entity can be subject to monitoring by different SAs in relation to different processing of same data.

For example: Passenger data that are collected by airlines for commercial purposes are subject to control by the LSA (SA of main establishment of the airline). When data on passengers is transferred to the public authority where the plane will land or take off under Article 8 Directive 2016/681, the transfer is subject to the control of the SA of the Member State on the territory of which the plane will land or take off.[20]

(3) Limited competence for supervision of courts

In order to protect the independence of the judiciary, Article 55(3) GDPR exempts SAs from supervising the activities of courts and other judicial authorities when they are acting in their judicial capacity. That does not mean that their activities are not subject to the GDPR, since this would be contrary to Article 8(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) but rather that the monitoring of personal data by the judiciary should be entrusted to specific bodies within the judicial system of the Member State.[21]

Courts

Even if Article 55(3) GDPR only mention courts, it seems obvious that other judicial bodies – such as the prosecutor office – should be subject to independent supervision separate from the SA.[22] This is confirmed by Article 80 of the Law Enforcement Directive (Directive (EU) 2016/680) that states that courts and other independent judicial authorities should always be subject to independent supervision.

Supervisory authority (SA) is (not) competent

Courts are not totally exempt from control by SAs. They are exempt only when they are acting in their judicial capacity, but not regarding activities that are outside their judicial capacity.

Case law: CJ EU considered in case C-245/20 - Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens that processing of personal data carried out in the context of a court's communication policy on cases falls outside the competence of a SA.[23]

On the other hand, activities of judicial administration, such as practices, procedures and offices that deal with the management of the system of the courts are subject to the control by a SA. Thus, processing of the data of the staff hired by a court remains subject to the supervision of the SA.

Acting in judicial capacity

Case law: In case C-245/20 - Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens CJ EU clarified that processing operations carried out by courts ‘acting in their judicial capacity’ must be understood, as not being limited to the processing of data in specific cases, but as referring, more broadly, to all processing operations carried out by courts in the course of their judicial activity whose supervision by a SA would be likely, whether directly or indirectly, to have an influence on the independence of their members or to weigh on their decisions. [24]

Decisions

→ You can find all related decisions in Category:Article 55 GDPR

References

  1. Hijmans, in Kuner, Bygrave, Docksey, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary, Article 55 GDPR, p. 906 (Oxford University Press 2020).
  2. Ziebarth, in Sydow, Marsch, DS-GVO/BDSG, Article 55 GDPR, margin number 3 (Nomos 2022).
  3. Ziebarth, in Sydow, Marsch, DS-GVO/BDSG, Article 55 GDPR, margin number 3 (Nomos 2022).
  4. Hijmans, in Kuner, Bygrave, Docksey, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary, Article 55 GDPR, p. 904 (Oxford University Press 2020).
  5. xxx
  6. Polenz, in Simitis, Hornung, Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Datenschutzrecht, Article 55 GDPR, margin number 9 (Nomos 2019).
  7. CJEU C-230/14 - Weltimmo, paragraph 57. See also CJEU C-645/19 - Facebook Ireland and others, paragraph 53.
  8. See Polenz, in Simitis, Hornung, Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Datenschutzrecht, Article 55 GDPR, margin numbers 16 and 17 (Nomos 2019). See also Hijmans, in Kuner, Bygrave, Docksey, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary, Article 55 GDPR, page 907 (Oxford University Press 2020).
  9. See Hijmans, in Kuner, Bygrave, Docksey, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary, Article 55 GDPR, page 907 (Oxford University Press 2020). Regarding the option that the data must remain within the territory of the Union to secure the protection of individuals and their rights under the GDPR see also CJEU C-293/12 - Digital Rights Ireland, paragraph 68, available here.
  10. CJEU C-230/14 - Weltimmo, paragraphs 53 to 57.
  11. See CJEU C-230/14 - Weltimmo, paragraph 53. See also Hijmans, in Kuner, Bygrave, Docksey, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary, Article 55 GDPR, page 907 (Oxford University Press 2020).
  12. Hijmans, in Kuner, Bygrave, Docksey, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary, Article 55 GDPR, page 907 (Oxford University Press 2020).
  13. Hijmans, in Kuner, Bygrave, Docksey, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary, Article 55 GDPR, page 907 (Oxford University Press 2020).
  14. Boehm, in Kühling, Buchner, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 55 GDPR, margin number 16 (C.H. Beck 2020, 3rd Edition).
  15. Hijmans, in Kuner, Bygrave, Docksey, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary, Article 55 GDPR, page 908 (Oxford University Press 2020).
  16. Körffer, in Paal, Pauly, DS-GVO BDSG, Article 55 GDPR, margin number 4 (C.H. Beck 2021).
  17. Ziebarth, in Sydow, Marsch, DS-GVO/BDSG, Article 55 GDPR, margin numbers 7 and 10 to 13 (Nomos 2022).
  18. See Recital 128 GDPR and Polenz, in Simitis, Hornung, Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Datenschutzrecht, Article 55 GDPR, margin number 18 (Nomos 2019). See also Ziebarth, in Sydow, Marsch, DS-GVO/BDSG, Article 55 GDPR, margin number 5 (Nomos 2022).
  19. Hijmans, in Kuner, Bygrave, Docksey, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary, Article 55 GDPR, page 909 (Oxford University Press 2020).
  20. Hijmans, in Kuner, Bygrave, Docksey, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary, Article 55 GDPR, page 909 (Oxford University Press 2020).
  21. See Recital 20 GDPR and CJEU, in C-245/20 - Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, paragraph 24.
  22. See Directorate-General for Research and Documentation, Research Note on the Supervision of courts’ compliance with personal data protection rules when acting in their judicial capacity (available here).
  23. See C-245/20 - Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, paragraph 37.
  24. See CJEU C-245/20 - Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, paragraphs 34 to 39.